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Abstract
The issue of felon disenfranchisement has grown considerably over the past
two decades. The following thesis places (criminal) disenfranchisement in
the US, and those affected, firmly in the sphere of political economic studies.
That is, this work takes the issue of felon disenfranchisement in the United
States as a case in point regarding the relationship of political (de)mobilization
and the welfare state. Utilizing a multi-method approach, this study contex-
tualizes the place of political participation within welfare policy, integrates
correctional systems into a welfare state framework, and reports on the de-
tailed political and economic preferences of those removed from the electorate
on account of felon disenfranchisement policy. This study is to the knowledge
of the author the first to approach this issue from the political-economic lens
of welfare state studies.
In what follows, I illustrate the significance of political agency for the
welfare state, as well as the role which welfare policy plays in fostering that
same political agency. In addition, I provide a new framework for conceptual-
izing the welfare state, enveloping those services previously omitted from the
accounting of welfare state effort into one coherent structure. Finally, this
work provides detailed quantitative and qualitative data on the preferences
of the politically disenfranchised not previously recorded. In particular, the
evidence strongly suggests that the political demobilizaiton of low-income
workers through the institutionalization of criminal disenfranchisement is
of special interest to political scientists and scholars of the welfare state in
general. In addition, it is argued that such policies may in fact benefit partic-
ular interests in the Democratic party and negatively impact the Republican
party. Far from removing these voices from public discourse, the state may
indeed benefit from their particular preferences - themselves products of their
experiences with the state. In as much, the politically demobilized clients of
the social corrections tier should be viewed not as destructive to democracy,
but instructive to welfare policy oversight and development.
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Introduction
I begin this work with a central note which is key for the reader to keep in
mind from the outset. This work is concerned with the relevance of demo-
cratic participation for the welfare state, and its converse. It is also a work
dedicated to producing information from primary sources to enable answers
to previous assertions. While it targets those removed from the political
environment by criminal disenfranchisement statutes in the United States
(and explicitly in the state of North Carolina), it is not a work explicitly of
felon rights nor the restoration of those rights. On the contrary, this work
endeavors to disentangle the concept of offender from the topic of felon dis-
enfranchisement, re-positioning these citizens in the context of welfare state
clients. While it uses custodial and community supervisory institutions as
sites of investigation, it is not a work on prisons or other supervisory fa-
cilities. In fact, this work is much less about the citizen as offender, and
moreso explicitly (and concertedly) dedicated to the phenomenon of the po-
litical disenfranchisement of clients of the welfare state. The offender as the
subject of political demobilization is, to a degree, ancillary to the study of
felon disenfranchisement herein.
The distinction is crucial to clarify before delving further into this work.
It defines the aims and the intended scope of research for the remainder of
the analyses presented. That is, while this thesis does explore the situation
of felon disenfranchisement extensively, it does so from an angle of political
economic concern. In as much, it also looks to introduce alternative perspec-
tives about the origins, impacts, and recommendations regarding its practice.
While much of the literature and data concerned herein pertains to citizens
under the supervision of prison authorities (as opposed to those supervised
within the community), it is not a study of prisons or their genesis, though
some discussion is unavoidable for the aims of this research. To put this into
plainer terms, while felons form the delimiting status for the analysis, such
status is readily reproducible in the status in other contexts (e.g., Roma/Sinti
populations across Europe; aboriginal populations in Australia or elsewhere;
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or female citizens in states which continue to disallow their full incorporation
into democratic society).
Research Problem and Questions
Overview: A felony is defined by the US federal government as any
criminal offense which is subject to one year or more of imprisonment. 1 Of-
fenders who are subject to such a conviction are considered as felons, though
they may or may not serve their time in custodial supervision - fully two-
thirds of such offenders do not (Uggen and Manza 2012). Offenders who fall
outside this category are considered misdemeanors. The loss of one’s right
to participate in elections is governed at the state level in the US, creating
levels of severity across the nation - discussed in more detail within this work.
According to the latest reliable figures, at the time of this writing, nearly
2.5 percent of adult citizens (5.85 million persons) in the US remained ineli-
gible to participate in the elections of federal, state, and local officials due to
felony disenfranchisement (Uggen, Shannon and Manza 2012). In 11 south-
ern states, that figure moves up towards roughly 7 percent of the voting age
population, and still higher when aggregated to the level of the minority pro-
portion of the electorate.2
As with many aspects of social phenomenon, these numbers must be
taken in perspective of their “true” impact. While the issue of felon dis-
enfranchisement is first and foremost an issue of political citizenship, this
citizenship is often not situated in terms of its practical importance. Po-
litical rights are often touted as the cornerstone of modern welfare states,
and most nation-states in general. In as much, political rights and capabil-
ities are not merely symbolic gestures of community membership, they are
functional components of the regulation of systems of social protection. The
abrogation of those rights must, then, be taken seriously, especially when
removal is non-random. These issues have important consequences which
are, for the most part, extremely localized. The spatial and socio-economic
exceptionalism of crime and poverty predict the spatial and socio-economic
1US Code:Title 18 ; PART II; Chapter 227; Sub-chapter A; Sec. 3559
2To put that figure into context: such is the equivalent of the entire US active military
service, worldwide, fourfold (Defense Manpower Data Center 2014 ); or roughly the popu-
lation of Denmark (CIA 2014) ; or (and more comparably) two-thirds of disabled medicaid
recipients in the US (KFF 2010).
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exclusiveness of disenfranchisement. This spatial exclusiveness further exac-
erbates the loss of political power among felony offenders. The evidence of
this is readily apparent. Across the US, approximately 50 percent of criminals
return to only five states. Within counties, offenders originate predominantly
from inner-city, urban environments. Inside these cities, the disenfranchised
originate from only a few specific communities. For example, the Brooklyn
Borough of New York City accounts for approximately 20 percent of the
city’s population yet contains 50 percent of parolees (Burch 2007). In Cal-
ifornia, with 28 percent of the state’s population, Los Angeles supplies 34
percent of the state’s prisoners (Wagner 2004). In Illinois, of the 97 per-
cent of released offenders whom returned to the state, 75 percent returned
to only six counties. 62 percent of those released returned to Cook County -
home to the state’s largest city, Chicago, the 3rd largest city in the country
according to 2014 US Census reports. In the case of Chicago, felons were
found to originate particularly from only 6 of the 77 communities in the city
(Horn 2007). Such phenomenon are not limited to the case of the United
States. As Behan (2012) notes, ”one percent of electoral districts accounted
for nearly 24 percent of prisoners; but less than 5 percent of the population”
(Behan 2012: 22). These communities tend to be the worst off communities
in the city economically and in a range of other areas. Furthermore, their
composition is not constrained by any one particular racial or ethnic identity.
The loss of political rights by such focused populations is not inconse-
quential. Political and civil rights are not separate from social rights. They
are circular, reciprocal and self-reinforcing - and in some cases self-defeating.
This conception alters our understanding of redistributive systems by fo-
cusing on more inter-connected dynamics than simple demographic and/or
financial matters. If we evaluate welfare systems as reflexive phenomena,
we come to a discussion where political citizenship re-enters the discourse.
That is, political capability/agency enables the creation of institutions to
manifest themselves into self replicating cultural phenomenon (Olson 2006).
Institutions are not only created by those who have decisive power (e.g.,
over agenda setting, social protection legislation and other means of control-
ling the overall definitions of benefits and required contributions), they also
contribute to the creation of the political agency of contributors and benefi-
ciaries. The decisions made by governments pertaining to who may or may
not participate in democratic governance continues to play an instrumental
role where the redistribution of resources - and thus life chances - are con-
cerned. As societies across the world become more culturally diverse and
spatially clustered, the impact of this reciprocity is increased. That is, no
system of social protection exists in a vacuum. Rather, they participate in a
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symbiotic relationship with the political agency and deliberative capabilities
of the population which it benefits and relies on for its provision. The welfare
state is created by political and social institutions and relations, just as it
creates and reinforces those very same institutions and accepted norms of
citizenship. While the welfare state can empower citizens in one instance, its
design also makes it possible to undermine and disenfranchise in another.
Questions: Considering this, we ought to inquire about which interests,
if any, the systematic denial of political rights affects. Such an endeavor is,
however, beset with intricacies. As will be elaborated on in depth over the
following chapters, a multitude of work has stopped short of exploring the
political economic dimensions of this breed of political demobilization to the
favor of more popularized cleavages among the electorate - race in particular.
This research goes further, examining the political-economic identities of the
disenfranchised, while re-positioning these citizens within the overall welfare
state framework.
I set out to explore the ramifications of the large scale political demobi-
lization of clients of the welfare state in the United States, using the state of
North Carolina as the site for investigation. I argue that because those
affected by these policies are exclusive to particular (spatially clustered)
socio-economic groups, their interests are likely not inconsequential for policy
making. Felon disenfranchisement matters precisely because mass demobi-
lization of any group, and particularly the lower income classes, impacts
predominantly social welfare policy which in turn forms a cornerstone of the
maintenance of political agency at the individual and group level. Due to the
nature of the subject matter, and the novelty of the approaches necessitated
to obtain sufficient data on the population under investigation, multiple hy-
potheses are tested herein. I lay these out in the order they are tested in this
work.
I first test the hypothesis that political participation, in the form of elec-
toral turnout, is integral to the development and maintenance of the welfare
state. This hypothesis is tested in a three-stage approach wherein a reflexive
relationship (Olson 2006) is tested. These hypotheses are:
• H1: Political turnout and spending towards public welfare policy are
positively related.
– H1a: This policy effect, in accordance with existing literature, will
be most noticeable at the level of welfare policy.
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– H1b: Increased spending on welfare services responsive to public
demand will lead to a decrease in aggregate levels of incomed
inequality.
– H1c: States with lower levels of inequality after transfers will ex-
hibit higher rates of electoral turnout, owing to positive feedbacks
for the political agency of beneficiaries.
These three stages are tested using a unique dataset for all 50 US states,
covering over a decade of data on state accounts. The results build on the the-
oretical underpinnings presented in Chapter 1. With these items accounted
for, two further hypotheses are then tested in the primary research areas of
this work (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). These hypotheses pertain to the policy
preferences and political identity of the disenfranchised voter. That is:
• H2: The blanket de-mobilization of felony offenders represents a demo-
bilization of non-random preferences.
• H3: The political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders is spatially
aggregated as to affect those communities which would stand to benefit
materially through increased participation.
These final hypotheses necessitate, to no small degree, a determined gath-
ering of primary data by which to test these assumptions.
Organization of Study
Due to the nature of this study, each chapter includes in it a summary of
the relevant background literature, gaps in research, and other relevant in-
formation which pertains to its core purpose. These chapters are structured
from larger macro-issues pertaining to welfare state theory and participation,
towards more detailed study of the disenfranchised themselves. The reader
is advised to keep such a structure in mind as it greatly assists in compre-
hending the intention of each of the following chapters and sections. A brief
summary of each chapter follows below. An overall schematic of the struc-
ture of this work can be seen in Figure 1. This work is delivered in two parts.
Part one delivers more macro-level considerations for the study at hand, and
outside the specific research area of felon disenfranchisement. Part two fo-
cuses on issues directly related to felon disenfranchisement and shapes the
argument towards the re-conceptualization of this policy from racial animus
(in particular) towards political-economic importance.
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Figure 1: Thesis Progression
Part One: Chapter one focuses on a selection of core debates and dis-
courses involved within the field of welfare state research. It develops the core
competencies which help the reader situate the relevance of political agency
(at the group and individual level) in respect to that of issues concerning the
political economic theoretic of welfare states. This chapter expands on the-
ories of justification and legitimization of state intervention in the economic
affairs of society by elaborating on political agency based arguments. More
so, this chapter promotes the examination of research which focuses on the
citizen’s role not only in creation of policy movements, but also on the citizen
as product of her environment. These considerations inform the work in the
following chapter.
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Chapter 2 empirically tests the assumptions of the theoretical arguments
lain out in the preceding chapter. Following from the overview of political
reflexivity outlined in the preceding chapter, this chapter delivers more spec-
ified literature supporting this view - establishing the research base by which
to empirically test these arguments. The focus is on analyzing if and how
political participation is relevant for contemporary welfare state programs.
I pursue this effort by using an original time-series cross-sectional (TSCS)
dataset consisting of economic, political, and comparative (incomed) inequal-
ity data. This chapter bolsters the arguments in favor of conceptualizing the
welfare state as a reflexive system of policy and agency, one which relies on
and is contributory to the electorate’s well-being. The results confirm much
of the existing arguments towards a more political agency based model of
welfare states, while admitting of those concerns in opposition.
Chapter 3 follows with an exercise in incorporating correctional systems
with the larger framework of the welfare state. The rationale for this chapter
lays in the dearth of theoretical and empirical literature regarding the proper
place of correctional systems (and thus those under its authority) within the
welfare state. This chapter informs the debate on the following chapters by
re-positioning the client of custodial and community supervision authorities
into a functional conception of welfare systems. In as much, this chapter
condenses a large amount of literature from those fields which focus on crim-
inology and prison studies into a political-economic understanding. It covers
a large amount of theoretical and empirical ground in short course; however,
without such a concept included, the remaining arguments for understanding
the impact of the political demobilization of felons on public policy would be
incomplete. As such, this chapter covers the recent growth in punitiveness
in the United States, leading arguments in its explanation, and the evolving
political economic discourse in analyzing its connection with social protec-
tion systems. It leaves off with a reconditioned framework of welfare systems
which incorporates correctional services (and therefore clients) into one, uni-
fied framework. This chapter ends part one.
Part Two: Chapter 4 begins the more dedicated analysis of political dis-
enfranchisement of felons in the United States. This chapter lays out the
development of policies of political demobilization in general, and felon dis-
enfranchisement in particular. Notably, this chapter approaches the popular
debates on these policies from the logic of class agitation. After address-
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ing the existing literature on felon disenfranchisement, this chapter embarks
on an exploration of the legitimacy of this policy from a political-economic
perspective. The leading position herein is that challenges to felon disen-
franchisement have found little support from courts due to their focus on
racial and ethnic arguments. Instead, I argue that opponents of felon disen-
franchisement might be better served be accepting the underlying class di-
mension of political demobilization as a basis for challenging the removal of
voting rights. This is considered after a more in-depth treatment of criminal
disenfranchisement from a labor relations perspective, dating to the period
before the Civil War in the US and onwards. This chapter forms a combina-
tion of historical and theoretical literature which establishes an alternative
view for the disenfranchisement of citizens based on criminal conviction.
Chapter 5 moves from the historical-theoretical arguments of the previous
chapter to begin the primary analysis of the political and economic identities
of the affected citizens. This chapter lays out the rationale for exploration
more in depth and provides the methodological and process issues related to
the primary research conducted as part of this work. It defines the methods
used to approach the gaps in the research to date. The process and choices of
using survey, qualitative interviewing, and Geographic Information Systems
is given in turn. Sampling techniques and project design are all reported
here, while some room in the remaining chapters is given for issues better
addressed closer to their respective reporting.
Chapter 6 reports on the quantitative findings from the survey portion
of this research. It is divided into five major sections. Section 1 presents de-
scriptive results from the survey research. Section 2 reports the results of re-
sponses to items covered by the American National Election Survey. Section
3 follows with responses to items taken from the International Social Sur-
vey Programme’s Social Inequality module. Section 4 reports on participant
attitudes on items taken from the International Social Survey Programme’s
Role of Government module. As the largest item donor of this stage of the
research, this section forms a more comprehensive area of findings. Section
5 reports on more specific policy areas concerning benefit levels and expen-
ditures, taken from the International Survey of Economic Attitudes. This
is followed by section 6, which reports results on unmatched and matched
control groups. This section also reports the predicted political party mem-
bership using items supplied to both control and participant groups.
Chapter 7 reports on qualitative results from interviews carried out with
participants over the course of research. These interviews are combined with
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primary data obtained from Manza and Uggen’s (2006) study to both tri-
angulate the results from the survey stage of this research, as well as sup-
plement those of Manza and Uggen (2006) using a Qualitative Secondary
Analysis (QSA) technique. The results report on respondent preferences and
own perceptions of conditions of political and economic issues.
Chapter 8 rounds off this work with the results of a detailed study of the
geographic exclusivity of felon disenfranchisement. After a closer analysis of
the literature on spatial processes and democratic participation, this chapter
uses detailed census tract level data to illustrate the clustering of political
demobilization at near electoral district levels. As such, this chapter builds
on the research base regarding the neighborhood level effects of criminal
disenfranchisement statutes. Furthermore, this chapter informs the reader
on the importance of political agency and spatial aggregations of power for
welfare systems. In particular, I find that not only are the politically disen-
franchised clustered into particular areas of the urban environment, they are
particularly so in areas of depressed turnout and extreme partisanship. The
ramifications for this are discussed in turn.
Chapter 9 wraps up this work with a discussion of the main findings pre-
sented across this work. It discusses the implications of these findings and
the relevance for welfare states and the scholars thereof. Particularly, the
findings from this work show considerable need for concern from academics
and practitioners alike for policies which affect clients of the lower tiers of the
welfare state at a rate far outpacing those of racial or ethnic considerations.
Given the empirical research on political participation and welfare state de-
sign, these findings imply that the disenfranchisement of large swathes of
welfare system clientele at the lower ends of the income distribution is an
important area of concern. In addition, it discusses why the attention of wel-
fare state researchers and political scientists must turn towards considering
more than just those institutions which are facially connected to welfare sys-
tems. Researchers may find valuable insights while adjusting their attention
towards that of periphery areas which are necessarily instrumental to the
maintenance of welfare systems across time and space.
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Part I
Welfare, Political Participation,
and Correctional Systems in
Perspective
11

Chapter 1
Political Participation and
Welfare Systems
1.1 Introduction
Welfare states are at their most basic level “political artifacts”. They occupy
a theoretical and normative purgatory, leaving them in a precarious space
of arguments based on conflicting viewpoints and justifications, “theoretical
orphans” (Powell and Barrientos 2008:8) traveling uneasily across political
economic landscapes, temporally and spatially. Since the mid 20th century,
arguably with the work of Wilensky and LeBeaux (1958), the welfare state
has increasingly become the subject of intense academic and social debate.
Over the course of the recent past, scholars have debated the origins, the
intent, and viability of systems of social protection in the advanced capitalist
democracies. The insights gained from the myriad of studies is not able to
be reproduced in its entirety here, however the work presented herein does
go some distance to familiarize the reader with major contributions to the
field.
This chapter looks at selected debates which have preoccupied much of
the academic debate on the welfare state until the present. In as much as
it endeavors to provide a broad range of debates to facilitate the main ar-
gument in relation to this thesis, only a fraction of the entirety of scholarly
literature is presented. A full description of the myriad of issues which oc-
cupy this field is better left to the numerous and voluminous works on the
issue. Here I address, first, what it is that we term the “welfare state”, at its
more basic level, and further into the more complex system of social transfers
and services which more adequately describe the overall system. Following
13
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this, an exploration of the core literature is provided as a primer for what
follows in the descriptions of the various theoretical approaches to explaining
the growth and analysis of welfare states. An overview of welfare typologies
is delivered covering a selection of the most prominent research in the field.
This chapter continues with a more thorough look at the underlying ratio-
nales of state intervention. While the major strands of theories are discussed
briefly, a more in depth view is taken of two leading strands of research
(i.e., Power Resource Approach and Varieties of Capitalism) as these two
approaches have considerable meaning for our understanding of welfare state
dynamics. Following this, this chapter leaves off with an exploration of the
underlying areas of justifications for state intervention. The first of these
delves heavily into a discussion of two opposing views of the role of the state
and the individual, especially as this pertains to actionable policy. This
initial sub-section relies considerably on an analytic which places historical
developments in line with ethical and moral arguments for and against con-
certed state effort at the alleviation of market forces on the individual. In
as much, it provides a useful backdrop for later discussion of the particular
focus of this thesis - i.e., political disenfranchisement of particularly at-risk
citizens. More succinct discussion is provided of two other leading areas,
that of the economic and political justifications of state intervention. A brief
summary of the implications are then given before moving to Chapter 2 -
empirically testing the importance of citizen engagement and state policies.
1.2 Defining Welfare States
Analysis of why welfare states vary across space and time entails deep inves-
tigation into the underlying purposes of organization (e.g., equity vs. effi-
ciency), normative justifications for such organization, operationalization of
the process by which to accomplish these purposes, and assessment of perfor-
mance against appropriate measures. Approaches abound for the assessment
of each of these components, and undoubtedly this description is a simplistic
one at best.
Common metrics of analysis are useful for comparative analysis, however
no approach is perfect; take for instance the measure of welfare state effort as
measured by approximating welfare delivery using direct spending as a vari-
able set. The United States differs markedly from its European counterparts,
and less so with its Liberal Democratic associates (Esping-Andersen 1990),
however the yardstick by which we measure this difference is continuously
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under question. It has been argued that a pure accounting measure of the
US welfare state is biased in favor of a generally European developmental
standpoint. That is, judged from the institutional organization of many Eu-
ropean and Scandinavian welfare systems, the US and other Liberal Market
Economies differ considerably in the effort they exert towards social welfare
provision. The search for comparative metrics has led to numerous modes
of measurement, both empirically (e.g., financial shares of expenditures) and
substantively (e.g., benefit policies and regulations). Perhaps the most com-
mon metric for state intervention is that of welfare state effort measured as
the share of total Gross Domestic Product devoted to social welfare services
- take for instance the comparative data illustrated in figure 1.1. This figure
represents the share of GDP spent on total public expenditures directed at
public welfare compared with percent of households in poverty after taxes
and transfers have been processed.
Figure 1.1: Comparative Social Spending
Source: OECD - Statistical Database - accessed 3/2/2014
From this standpoint, it is clear that the US typically lags when com-
pared to its international counterparts. Why this is so has sparked an im-
mense amount of research across academic disciplines. The US, more than
any other similarly situated nation, spends considerably less on the social
protection of citizens. Analysis of services and benefits outside mainstay
measurements of welfare state effort, however, has revealed that the US ex-
pends considerably more effort than is generally acknowledged (Howard 1999;
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Castles 2008). The massive amounts which the US devotes to military ex-
penditure, for instance, obscure the many social benefits and services which
are embedded within these costs. Approximately USD 42 billion of defense
outlays were directed at military health, and are expected to reach USD 92
billion by 2030 (CBO 2011).
This does not include the costs for housing and other services provided
to active and retired personnel including their dependents. In addition, as
Howard (1999) has succinctly explored, the US relies heavily on a system
of tax financed benefits and services which accrues mainly to middle and
upper middle class households. Additionally, and importantly for the pop-
ulation covered in this research, welfare effort is further discounted when
incorporation of correctional services are taken into account. This area of
public spending has received only surface attention previously, at least as
regards welfare state scholarship, and is treated in depth in chapter 3. Thus,
while parsimonious definitions provide useful comparative standards to mea-
sure states against one another, one must remember that they are first and
foremost guides to understanding welfare state dynamics. Our commonly
held metrics of welfare state “effort” does not provide a definitive picture of
modern systems, but rather useful aides in deciphering the extent of social
protection. Indeed, what to include in welfare systems remains a contentious
issue.
Given the many nuances of accounting for welfare states, a definition of
the topic is useful if not pragmatic as a basis to pursue further investiga-
tions. Three conceptual definitions of the welfare state are applied herein,
two of which provide commonly accepted interpretation of welfare states.
Provision of welfare services can take the form of one or a combination of
options: regulation, price subsidy, public production, and/or income transfer
(Barr, 1991). These functions, according to Barr, must wrestle with delivery
of benefits and services while avoiding distortion of the market (efficiency),
ensuring distributive justice (equity), and ensuring administrative feasibility.
The issue of equity, that of social justice, is a particularly salient issue and is
almost exclusively an issue addressed in Barr’s opinion by income transfers.
Once the objectives of the system are defined, the state intervenes when,
almost invariably, a market failure materializes. The state may intervene for
one of many reason, including imperfect competition, information asymme-
try, independent probabilities in risks, moral hazard, and other issues which
the market will fail to reconcile adequately.
Intervention reasons aside, it is possible to ascribe a practical, general
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definition of welfare states which helps to form a starting point for analysis.
A welfare state is “a set of institutions, policies and programmes aimed at
reducing potential losses in population welfare” (Cichon, Office. et al. 2004).
It is differentiated from other states in that (a) it exists within the context of
a market economy and (b) forms a set of compulsory, collective, and largely
non-discriminatory means of welfare provision (Goodin 1988). Such institu-
tions are neither private, voluntary, nor charitable enterprises. Their benefit
is available to all who meet the legislated criteria. To this end, states pur-
sue variable purposes with their welfare institutional structures. The most
inclusive definition of the welfare state, according to Wilensky and LeBeaux
(1958), is then considered “those formally organized and socially sponsored
institutions, agencies and programs, exclusive of the family and private enter-
prise, which function to maintain or improve the economic conditions, health
or interpersonal competence of some parts or all of a population”(Wilensky
and LeBeaux 1958:17; emphasis added).
In this vein, scholars have largely settled on, after Esping-Andersen (1990),
three main categories of welfare states/regimes to focus their attention on
- the Liberal/Residual, Conservative/Christian Democratic, and Scandina-
vian/Social Democratic states/regimes. Residual varieties have at their core
an ethos of minimum intervention, leaving only the most distressed situa-
tions to be alleviated by collective arrangements of the state. Neo-liberals
follow residualists but with an emphasis on intervention in those circum-
stances where the market has overtly failed - such is marked by use of social
insurance schemes such as unemployment, old-aged pensions, and so forth.
A third category, that of a socialist variety, emphasizes the ideal of equal-
ity and/or solidarity as the guiding rationale for institutional design. These
states provide universal benefits and services with minimal means testing.
1.3 Theories of Welfare Systems
Within the field of welfare state studies, many scholars have worked within
or around the comparative framework provided by the seminal work of Gosta
Esping-Andersen (1990). Steeped in the tenants of the Power Resource Ap-
proach (PRA), The Three World’s of Welfare Capitalism propelled compar-
ative research in the political economic realm of welfare state studies.
PRA, as with Esping-Andersen’s typological framework, has not been
without its detractors. Like the typological framework, however, PRA re-
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mains an influential force in scholarly research. Whether we believe that
state typologies are useful or not (Kasza 2002), they have become a standard
facet of research agendas in the study of the welfare state. The following
section lays out the main theoretical movements in the field in a chronologi-
cal manner as typically treated in the literature, providing a background on
which to contextualize current debates on which this thesis incorporates. A
comprehensive list of all movements and intricacies regarding the issue is left
to the dedicated and numerous works on the subject. Readers are advised
consult Leibfried and Mau (2008); Pierson, Castles and Naumann (2013);
and Castles et. al. (2010) for detailed treatment of theoretical develop-
ments. Powell and Barrientos (2008), Arts and Gelissen (2002), and Bambra
(2007) are recommended for a detailed treatment of typological accounts.
1.3.1 Logic of Industrialization (LOI)
Proponents of LOI, also termed modernization theory, view the welfare state
as a function of industrialization and an increasingly “needy” society. As
states became increasingly affluent, they are able to afford the bureaucratic
and institutional capabilities which facilitate expanding services to those in
the midst of the market economy. This occurred as states moved from an
agrarian society to an industrialized one (Wilensky 1965, 1974), increasing
their capacity to intervene with “tooled-up” administrative capacities (Aidt
2009). LOI proposes a rather deterministic, if not optimistic, explanation of
the functions of welfare state institutions, in that it proposes that such insti-
tutions are natural prerequisites for advanced market capitalism (Brooks and
Manza 2007). Such viewpoints share similar deterministic interpretations of
the work of TH Marshall’s view of citizenship, while Marshall had a decidedly
normative justification for welfare state development, LOI gives little room
for the necessity of rights. Development is a result of replacement by the
state for dismantled non-state welfare provision (Flora and Alber 1981). It
is those advancements in economic circumstances and demographic changes
that account for the bulk of welfare state evolution (Wilensky 1975). This
matter-of-fact nature, devoid of political culture, also informs LOI’s counter-
part, the logic of capitalism.
1.3.2 The Logic of Capitalism (LOC)
The logic of capitalism approach, inclusive Marxist and Neo-Marxist view-
points, also holds that the welfare state has evolved as a result of industri-
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alization and growing affluence, however it has done so to serve the needs of
the owners of capital (Brooks and Manza 2007). As a set of institutions, the
welfare state represents a network of remedial benefits and services which
diffuse tensions inherent between capital and labor. The resulting system
adjusts to workers’ needs, but it does so at the bequest of the dominant
capital class. Variants of this approach view the development and variation
of programs and benefits as results of conflict and negotiation between the
classes. The welfare state is shaped by these conflicting demands and owes
its existence and maintenance to the ability of the laboring classes to demand
concessions from capital. The welfare state is a functional tool of capitalism
which quells social unrest, maintains the legitimacy of the system, and pro-
vides an environment conducive to markets. Class is reproduced as much as
it is necessary. Here the necessity of political party or agent interaction is
minimized, if not considered circumstantial.
A national values supplement (Brooks and Manza 2007) maintains that
the varieties of norms particular to each state and their cultural values shape
what citizens consider appropriate. These values form the support, or at least
aversion to rebellion, which society has for particular modes of action by the
state (discussed further). Public preference research, linking preferences to
developments in welfare policy, owes much to this national values view and
a large body of scholarly work has found public opinion highly correlated to
variances in welfare state typologies (Svallfors 1995, 1997, 2004). In as much,
preferences are indicators of class distinctions and potential demands.
1.3.3 Power Resource Approach (PRA)
LOI and radical/LOC approaches gave forth to the Power Resource Approach
to welfare state development. PRA focuses on class differences and the re-
sources available to particular classes of citizens, aggregated to groups, to
advance their interests (Korpi 1984). For PRA, modernization, industrial-
ization, and even some facets of Marxist theory all find their place within
its explanatory framework. Political power on the left has acted in chorus
(where strong universalistic states exist) to constrain the ability of capital
to subsume labor to the market. Policies are enacted which decommodify
one’s exposure to the market and achieve marked equalization of incomes
(Esping-Andersen 1990).
With the aforementioned Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990),
PRA took center-stage as the dominant framework in comparative welfare
state studies, launching what some have termed as a new “business” of wel-
19
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
fare modelling (Abrahamson 1999). Variations of the Worlds of Capitalism
(WoC) typological classification are numerous, major contributions are listed
in tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Typologies of Welfare Systems
Source: (Schro¨der 2009:29)
Supplementary approaches have been merged with PRA to provide fur-
ther explanatory power to the approach. Of the criticisms of PRA is its fail-
ure to take into account the extent which political/institutional structures
affect welfare state development. The polity centered compliment stresses the
importance of political structuring for welfare state development and mainte-
nance. This variant is concerned with how the political environment in which
welfare states arose and exist interact with policy decisions. “New policies
create new politics” (Schattschneider 1935), and as Myles and Quadango
(2002) summarizes, “when filtered through very different political systems,
similar economic forces produce very different outcomes in the same way that
an electrical charge produces a different effect in a refrigerator and a stove”
(Myles and Quadango 2002:52; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993). The
mannner in which political systems are structured affect the way in which
needs are not only articulated, but also how those needs are transformed (if at
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Table 1.1: Welfare State Typological Studies 1/2
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Table 1.2: Welfare State Typological Studies 2/2
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all) into policy. Proportional representation, federalist structuring of govern-
ment, and diffusion of decision points to more and lower levels of authority,
for instance, create substantial veto points which impede both evolution and
retrenchment of welfare policy (Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Lijphart 1999; Im-
mergut 1992; Tsebelis 1995).
New Politics and Vested Interests Such structural phenomenon incul-
cate norms of reciprocity and engender “new politics” on account of vested
interests (e.g., the growth of political action groups for seniors safeguarding
old-age pensions in the US - AARP,Inc.)(Pierson 1993; Mau 2004; Hacker
2004). Such developments create a “perpetual motion” phenomenon which
enable a ratcheting up of social spending policies (Rothstein 1998; Huber
and Stephens 2001). Vested interests are often embedded in politically and
socially defined segmentations in society, such that a defined group is seen as
the primary beneficiary of a policy or program which they themselves must
be mobilized to perpetuate. Such segmentations and establishment of vested
interests can and do lead to periodic backlashes of public sentiment where
programs are seen as exclusive to one group to the detriment of (real or imag-
ined) others. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), and others, show (for
instance) that the degree of racial heterogeneity and prejudiced electorates
can negatively impact welfare spending when minorities are viewed as pri-
mary beneficiaries of welfare policies (Fox 2004; Gilens 1999). While this
is clearly evident in the race-based political climate of the United States,
similar research has shown evidence of immigration and welfare expenditure
- focusing on the antipathy of native populations - in the Nordic regions
(Eger 2009). In addition, a gender compliment illustrates how women’s par-
ticipation and labor force involvement has created strong demand for social
protective institutions across regimes (Miles and Pierson 2001; Huber and
Stephens 2001). Together, these areas of focus look at the position of groups
based on a variety of cleaving factors (e.g., old-age/pension or bias in labor
market advantage) which segment recipient citizens.
Trust Matters More recently, Rothstein (2010) has offered a further ad-
dition to PRA which incorporates quality of government into the approach.
from this perspective, citizens must believe that institutions are fair, respon-
sive to them as equals, and whether system is adequately guarded against
abuse. In order for individuals to turn to the state, they must trust the state
to work. In order to trust the state to work, they must be aware of the
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competency of the state apparatus to facilitate such demands. The image
portrayed of ‘the state’, then, is a crucial component of increasing or de-
creasing support for the use of the state (Rothstein 2010). In particular, this
compliment illustrates that incorporating this facet of investigation tends to
deflate the explanatory power of left parties and increases the effect of Chris-
tian democratic governments on welfare state formation.
Feedback Effects Finally, recent trends in research have begun to develop
the scholarship on feedback effects and their impact on policies (e.g., Camp-
bell, 2003; Soss 2000). This area looks at how welfare states impact upon
themselves, reflexively. This literature focuses on the welfare state as an
explanatory variable in constituent activity and support for welfare policy.
The work in this area is supported by several recent findings concerning the
deleterious effects of poverty and inequality (i.e., scarcity) on mental and
emotional ability to inform their choices. Scarcity, and by extension inequal-
ity, consumes “mental bandwidth” which constrains the ability of those to
perform optimally in economic and social decision making activities. As so-
cial policy design inherently consists of varying degrees of stress points on
the individual or household, construction of cumbersome or demoralizing
policies further taxes the ability of the poor to perform at optimal levels
in decision making (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). “The very condition of
[scarcity of resources]”, according to Kelly (2013), “can actually be a cause
of poverty”. Thus, the multitude of rules and regulations which accompany
many poverty relief policies may perversely increase the handicaps of many.
The creeping normality of stringent regulatory actions on beneficiaries con-
strains their ability to appropriate their needs from government.1
These compliments to PRA make for a comprehensive set of theoretical
and empirical avenues of exploration. PRA, however, has faced a significant
challenge from within the field of comparative welfare state research. The
most pronounced challenger to PRA comes from scholarship which has splin-
tered from PRA and WoC approaches, towards the firm centered varieties
of capitalism (VoC) approach of Hall and Soskice (2001). VoC differs from
PRA in both focus and assumptions. The following sub-sections address
these issues.
1These recent developments entice further questions. If the poor cannot make quality
decisions about the common types of situations that directly concern their immediate lives,
how does it effect the types of choices that effect the political agenda.
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1.3.4 Varieties of Capitalism (VoC)
As opposed to focusing on political power constellations across welfare regimes
or families, VoC advocates a bifurcated model based on how firms, embed-
ded in markets, have organized themselves and led to the development of
welfare types with the assistance of cross-class coalitions (Hall and Soskice
2001; Korpi 2003, Mares 2003). The primary types of groupings are liberal
market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). VoC
posits that the employer-employee nexus forms a causal stream for welfare
state development – where companies are “the crucial actors in the capitalist
economy” (Korpi 2006:169).
Workers do not demand protection from the market in LMEs because
they invest in general skills demanded by employers and can thus insure
themselves with access to employment. Workers in CMEs, on the other
hand, have specific skills and thus demand security for their risks of not be-
ing readily able to transfer their skill portfolio to other employers. Employers
act on the basis that individuals will not invest in (hard to transfer) skills if
they are rational, as companies will not insure them against unemployment.
Hence, the welfare state intervenes to provide security to invest in human
capital. As opposed to PRA, VoC views parties and other political agents
as concentrated on particular industry/sector interests, not class divisions.
While they both cite risk aversion as a driver, they differ on which side
(employer/employee, capital/labor) is the author of policy. While VoC pro-
ponents, notably Iversen and Soskice (2009), have vehemently defended the
VoC approach as distinctively seperate and superior to the PRA approach,
while others have argued convincingly for incorporation of the two.
1.4 PRA v VoC - Contrast or Compromise
Earlier debates between PRA and VoC have most notably taken place be-
tween Korpi(2003, 2006), Iversen and Soskice (2009), and Iversen, Cusack
and Soskice (2010). The discussion has been dictated by the fundamental
difference of opinion regarding where welfare state development originated.
Following Lash and Urry (1987), investigating changes to welfare states with
relation to the initial organization of capital and labor relationships, VoC in-
terprets social protection as a set of complimentary institutions which firms
agree to voluntarily in order to satisfy their own interests. As opposed to
PRA, which views development as an essentially competitively organized
framework - where left party mobilization imposed demands on reluctant
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employers, VoC proposes that firms (not class-based mobilization), were the
driving force behind welfare state development. More so, the two theoretical
approaches are reluctant to come to terms with the correlation of propor-
tional representation systems and welfare state variation.
As opposed to the PRA, VoC views parties and other political agents as
concentrated on particular industry/sector interests. “Scholars within this
perspective reject the hypothesis that welfare state development reflects any
particular balance of power between and labor and capital” (Korpi 2006:170).
PRA views employers as consenting in CMEs, but certainly not protagonists,
and more often than not antagonists, for social rights. “VoC scholars ...have
mistaken employer’s consent to expansion as evidence of their first-order pref-
erences” (171). In PRA, employers have access to the bulk of economic power
and laborers sell their labor/human capital to them. By creating a reserve
wage, welfare states bring employers to the negotiating table to the advan-
tage of labor. Importantly, PRA starts out by accepting that “socioeconomic
class generates differences in risks to which citizens are exposed during the
life course”(173). What is at issue is a “politics of markets” and not “politics
against markets”.
1.4.1 PRA’s Defense:
Regarding early welfare state developments and the emergence of Christian
(confessional) parties, Korpi argues that the Catholic Church supported ef-
forts to defuse growing affinity among the likely constituents with socialist
and communist parties with a logic of “corporatist thinking”. Confessional
parties sprang up in response to an overt policy of “counteracting the social-
ist threat by creating societal institutions that would generate cooperation
between employers and employees and split the base for working-class col-
lective mobilization by segmenting the dependent labor force into separate
occupational communities.” (175).
This instigated, in essence, a European “separate but equal” institution-
alization which manipulated religion as a cleaving factor in attracting the
allegiance of the working class to the detriment of socialist factions. While
many critics of PRA see it as a zero-sum game, Korpi (2006) argues this is
not the case and as much is indicated by a closer reading of the supporting
literature. Furthermore, the risk pools for VoC are narrow and based on
occupational standings, whereas those of PRA are broad and class based.
Instead of detracting from PRA, Korpi argues that the work of Mares (2003)
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and Swenson (1991, 2002), which has been held up as proof against PRA,
actually proves PRA’s claim that it was not employers who moved welfare,
but rather merely that employers consented to development. VoC, argues
Korpi, should not be seen as a contender to PRA, but as a complement.
1.4.2 VoC Response
The VoC response by Cusack, Iversen and Soskice (2007) and Iversen and
Soskice (2009) forms a dual pronged attack on the argument laid out by
Korpi. First, the authors lay out an extended interpretation of how propor-
tional representation is critical to understanding firm involvement. Second,
VoC, argues Iversen and Soskice, should not be confused in any sense with
PRA as (1) PRA assumes that firms are captive by left party demand and
(2) PRA cannot account for the frequent violations of the Meltzer-Richard
median voter theorem, a common assumption on PRA research - “data for
advanced democracies consistently show equality in market income to be as-
sociated with high redistribution” (Iversen and Soskice 2009:440).
The Meltzer and Richard model, they argue, does not address why redis-
tribution is negatively related to market income inequality.2 The historical
narrative of Iversen and Soskice puts economic coordination ahead of politi-
cal developments – including the franchise and the choice of electoral system.
“Coordinated capitalism and proportional representation deter-
mine distribution and redistribution. . . [Employers and the right]chose
[proportional representation] because of the opportunities this
representative system created for collaborative arrangements with
labor”(Iversen and Soskice 2009:443).3
In this view, where the right did not fear the left (in the presence of unions
and trades/craft industries interested in regulation), the right welcomed the
2However, following Marshall (1950), such violations may be accounted for by proximity
to accomplishment. That is, “diminution of inequality [strengthens] the demand for its
abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social welfare” (Marshall 1950, found in
Manza and Sauder 2009:153). In essence, success encourages confidence in the ability of
the state, while failure discourages faith in the policy.
3A further interpretation of the rationale for the choice of PR and franchise extension
is given by Rodden (2010), elaborated in Chapter 8; one which relies more n strategic
linkages of party based interests.
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opportunity to collaborate with the left. Decisions to pursue majoritarian
representative systems followed where the right feared the left because of
threats from unions and their supporters, in turn they chose systems to hold
onto power and protect their interests. Subsequent developments in politi-
cal representation is itself a reflection of power struggles between conflicting
sides. Injecting presidencies into PR systems helps to claw back losses in-
curred from proportional representation. Federalism with high labor mobility
increases tax competition among states and with immobility it allows for dif-
ferences but “ limits and compensates for competition” to ensure investments
won’t be lost ( Cusack, Iversen, and Soskice 2007).
“Economic interests are the ultimate drivers” of the institutionalization
of PR, coordinated economic systems, and coalitional patterns. As the (self-
proclaimed) first “real” challenge to social cleavage theory of Rokkan (1970)
and the framework offered by Esping-Andersen (1990), the respondents to
Korpi’s defense claim to offer a “bridge between party politics and the eco-
nomic interests that are embedded in production systems” (457). The ex-
istence of exclusionary minimum winning coalitions determines distributive
outcomes, while the consensus aspect of PR relates to the regulatory poli-
tics if other interest incorporation is deemed appropriate or desirable. All
states that are now PR/CMEs were previously locally coordinated and were
Standestaaten.
In analyzing the American liberal developments, they cite the role that
weak unions and lack of pressure on the political system (in the 19th cen-
tury) to form PR.4 In contrast to PRA, Iversen and Soskice (2009) find no
evidence of intense battles of contestation between the left and right. “Po-
litical parties representing [both the right and left] for the most part agreed
on the move to PR.”(465).
In addition, the Christian Democratic parties which emerged as part of
the Kulturkampf against the Catholic church was necessary, but not suffi-
cient, for its continued existence. Thus, they assume that economic linkages
cemented the supporters of confessional parties in line with Korpi’s analysis,
but devoid of the strategy of short circuiting class-power. In essence, VoC
views political parties as servants, but not drivers, in the initial construction
of welfare state institutions. Firms agree to institutions and high replace-
4This, however, begs the question of how the out-migration of workers from continental
Europe, and the in-migration to the Americas, fits into their account, given the absence
of political participation of early labor in the American states.
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ment rates as insurance for high-end skill development.
Ironically, Iversen and Stephens (2008) argue that there is no reason why
PRA and VoC (Welfare Production Regimes (WPR)) cannot be combined.
Using educational investment to analyse the merit of the two theories, the
authors find that the two competing theories are complimentary. Thus, the
VoC CMEs are divided into two sub-groups, while LMEs still form the ideal
type. Proportional representation continues to play the most vital role as it
allows for the type of coordination in human capital formation which firms
take advantage of, and enables the environment where left and center left
coalitions (minimum winning coalitions) can come to power and pursue re-
distributive policy agendas.
By shifting the focus from the traditional view of working class mobi-
lization and left party power, VoC scholars have challenged the field to view
alternative perspectives as viable subject matters. This path has not gone un-
used, many inside and outside the field of welfare state research have begun
to investigate evidence from this evolving perspective. PRA, however, re-
mains a powerful perspective and one which this thesis finds ample evidence
to support its focus on the political powers and capacities of constituent
members of society to form and alter welfare state institutions - directly
or (more often) indirectly. These two approaches (rather recent, in relative
terms) are useful in two aspects. First, the starting points they represent in
terms of why both systems of redistribution and political inputs have come
about affect how we approach the study of political processes and welfare
systems. VoC, with its emphasis on firm influence and negotiation to favor
skill formation and protection, implies that political participation takes on a
more minor role in the development of social protective institutions. PRA,
on the other hand, focuses on the abilities of actors and labor groups to use
their resources to facilitate welfare state formation and development - not
least of which is their political power. Thus, the two views are particularly
useful in deciding which mechanisms the researcher should best focus on.
Having briefly surveyed these issues, I turn to a substantively more in-
volved concern regarding welfare system formation - the underlying norma-
tive basis for (and against) state intervention - i.e., legitimacy. Whereas the
preceding discussion has focused on the development of approaches to under-
standing the establishment of welfare systems in a comparative perspective,
the following section involves a discussion on the normative considerations for
why the state ought or ought not involve itself in the financing and/or pro-
vision of services. This section thus provides a large degree of interpretation
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and historical reference.
1.5 Legitimacy of the Welfare State
Justifying state intervention has proven to be a burning bush and an achilles
heel to the development of welfare systems. On the one hand, calls for
social justice and equality resonate with citizens at all levels of society. How-
ever, establishing fairness (whether normative, procedural, or economically),
deservingness (income thresholds, physical distress, behavioral standards),
scope (targeted or universal benefits), and content (duration of benefit re-
ceipt and generosity) are issues which can, and often do, unhinge gains made
by proponents of engaged state action. Justifications for the creation of par-
ticular variants of welfare systems which have taken on moral, economic, and
(more recently) political themes are discussed in turn.
1.5.1 Moral Debates and Norms of Reciprocity
Issues of redistribution invariably involve matters of moral prerogatives re-
garding the “just” (re)distribution of resources. Social justice is an intensely
contentious area of debate, and as such this subsection delves deeper into this
issue than others. Development and reforms of the welfare state and its cor-
responding institutional structure, then, imply unavoidable debates around
how moral justifications are developed and transmitted to constituents. Mau
(2003, 2004) demonstrates how debates around such moral considerations
have taken on, primarily, one of two genres of viewpoint. One approaches
the legitimacy of the welfare state from a rationalist perspective where indi-
viduals act in accordance with their own (known) preferences and for their
personal benefit. Here, individuals are agents of their own material bene-
fit maximization and expect others to act accordingly. A second approach
perceives of individuals as inherently concerned with moral objectives and
normative understanding of individual and community identity. Individuals
in this view have as their first order preferences the mutual association of
betterment, a ‘quasi-Titmuss paradigm’ (Mau 2004:56; Deacon, 2002:22).
This thesis posits that these two “camps” of legitimization of welfare are
two sides of the same coin, and arguably pre-date that of the modern welfare
state as discussed here. That is, welfare institutions, and the welfare state
itself, are manifestations of the morals and normative goals which are right
and just to each society (Katznelson 1988). The contrasting modes of justi-
fication shape and enforce the very institutional structures which members
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must interact with. It is important then to view the welfare state as not
simply a practice of political and economic accounting, but as a process by
which ideals of morality and reciprocity are congealed into operative systems.
The worlds of homo economicus and homo reciprocus stand at polar ends of
a continuum on which most members of the polity find themselves. The in-
tractable dilemma involves an endless struggle between those who see welfare
institutions as legitimate on the grounds of solidarity and the betterment of
the community, and those who contest the same institutions as represen-
tations of individual utility calculations with legitimacy based on value for
money (Marshall 1964; Titmuss 1974; Mau 2003, 2004; Rothstein, 1998).
These two competing approaches have shaped modern welfare states at
least since the early 20th century if not well before. At their core, these theses
embody two opposing views of the nature of the individual’s place and role
in society, and what society itself “naturally” embodies. For the rationalist
camp, individuals are seekers of their own profit. Their view follows from a
Malthusian Social Darwinism of survival of the fittest. Society’s role is to
protect morality and reform deviants punitively and to the fullest extent of
the law. On the other hand, those who espouse a solidaristic moral viewpoint
operate from a Kropotikin Social Darwinistic approach, which sees individ-
uals as cooperative by nature and seekers of mutual agreements. Society’s
role is to promote morality through its institutional structure and reintegrate
deviants as full members of community. As such, measuring welfare states
need not rely solely on how much or how often a state allocates resources for
assistance or insurance. Rather, a normative approach is useful in tackling
the more contentious nature of establishing why the state ought to intervene
at all. Thus, as others have detailed the various clustering of states based
on selected outcome variables, so too can one just as readily use ethical con-
siderations to also build segmentations. A pragmatic framework, diverting
from typical quantitative typological accounts, is provided by Mau (2003) -
Figure 1.3.
As such, it is not necessary to follow a singular metric of welfare regime
measurement, and indeed we gain by constructing and fusing different ap-
proaches. While institutional effort and programmatic reach and efficiency
are certainly valuable for our ability to grasp the reality of welfare states
(especially in a comparative studies framework), it is also possible to view
different systems for what and how they view the individual’s and state’s role
in benefit structures. The immediate subsections focus on two main strands
of justification from a moral viewpoint - one based on atomized agency, and
the other on collective organization.
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Figure 1.3: Welfare Regimes and Norms of Social Exchange
Source: (Mau 2004)
Malthus and the Perversity of Poverty
Hard as it may appear in individual cases, dependent poverty
ought to be held disgraceful - Thomas Malthus
The rationalist strand of discourse is often (though not exclusively or al-
ways so vehemently) dominated by a market fundamentalist tone of debate.
Emphasis is given to the direct effect of institutional arrangements on eco-
nomic resources and moral behaviour. The latter issue is often subsumed to
the former. Benefit take-up is couched in terms of individual idleness or in-
tentional abuse. Historically, market fundementalism, be it in the guise of the
Austrian borne neo-liberal variant or its Victorian predecessor, is transfixed
by the morality of social citizenship as much as its egalitarian counterpart.
The critical difference between these two poles of perception is the view of
the state as destructive (residualist) or instructive (universalistic) to morally
desirably behaviour.
Victorians and Neo-Victorians: The evidence of this extends into the
recent past, at least back to the advent of industrialization and the rise of
market capitalism; it is instructive to appreciate how far debates have not
come. Of the many antagonists of welfare provision (i.e., poor relief), there
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may be no more articulate of opponents as Thomas Malthus - of whom many
fervently followed in spirit and teachings. Malthus arraigned the poor laws
themselves for poverty and followed others to promote the subjugation of so-
cial policy to the market. Like Hayek and the Austrian School of economists
who ousted pragmatic American liberals, early market fundamentalists saw
the practicality, if not necessity, of letting “nature” take its course.
Wars and famines, unemployment and recessions, were nature’s way of
thinning the herd and any attempts to interfere with that were doomed to
failure. With strong support in the Royal Commission, and a larger enfran-
chised population of upper class voters, the Malthusian 1834 New Poor Law
(NPL) reforms “broke the institutionalist social compact and replaced it with
a market-based one” (Somers and Block 2005:276). It did so by “joining the
moral categories of desert, merit, and self-sufficiency to the material status
of poverty and the volatility of the labor market” (ibid.).
Queerly, the political and economic changes in the US (which culmi-
nated in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Recon-
ciliation Act (PRWORA)), like the NPL, were based on analogous events in
the US. Beginning with the Mount Perelin Society (founded by the Austrian
economist Hayek) classical liberals began to construct an alternate narrative
purporting deficiencies in social and economic situations. Joined by Fried-
man, who saw a “middle way” between the evils of collectivism and the
failure of Victorian liberalism, the neo-liberal narrative began to take tan-
gible form. As opposed to Adam Smith, who saw a role for governments
to pro-actively pursue public projects and establish the institutional struc-
tures necessary to defend against market failures. Friedman believed that
such endeavors belonged to the private market. This coupled with Hayek’s
view that the longstanding tradition of Keynesianism, which reigned into
the Great Society, was inherently flawed - precisely the way in which market
fundamentalists in the 1800s saw the mercantilist policies before them (Jones
2012).
Poverty, for Neo-Victorians (neo-liberals) as with their classical liberal
predecessors (Morone 2003), is not so much an economic condition as it is a
moral condition. The poor are, and remain so, as a result of their inability
to say “no” to vices and “yes” to long-term hardships and hard work. The
neo-liberal intellectual base (having developed narratives in think tanks, dis-
seminated to journalists, and then promoted by political operatives) working
in tandem with conservatives (who had found a common banner to unite
under via anti-communism and shocks to the established order - e.g., Brown
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vs Board of Education), was propelled to the center of the political arena
where not previously possible.
The social and economic turmoil of the 60s and 70s were reframed as
products of failed policy guided by erroneous judgments of how the system
actually worked. Just as the “Lockean-inspired social naturalism” of Joseph
Townsend propagated the failure of the Poor Laws in 1786 (i.e., once the
poor were subjected to the harsh realities of their moral and behavioral in-
feriorities, they would be impelled to lift themselves out of their situations),
so too works such as Charles Murray’s Losing Ground instigated renewed
acceptance of stigmatizing the poor for their situation in light of, and often
in the face of, any evidence to the contrary. The “culture of poverty” thesis,
propagated by Murray and others, contends that the poor and their value
structures are to blame for their circumstances.
Free Market Morality: The culture of poverty position disguises, argue
Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (2009), a more insidious phenomenon operating
in the background of social and political discourse. They offer a “culture
of inequality” thesis which posits that a permissiveness towards inequality
(both social and economic) depresses demand for government intervention to
reduce the effects of such inequality. It “reaches its highest form among those
modern-day social Darwinists who believe that the problems of the poor, the
unemployed, and the uneducated are due to their own failures” (Crutchfield
and Pettinicchio, 2009:135).
The conversion narrative of conservative arguments framed the aspiration
against market capitalism in the 1970s as ignorance and incompetence on the
part of the intellectuals who derided the system (Somers and Block 2005:266).
Quoting Friedman at the Southern Industrial Relations Conference in Blue
Mountain, NC, Powell notes:
“It (is) crystal clear that the foundations of our free society are
under wide-ranging and powerful attack — not by Communist or
any other conspiracy but by misguided individuals parroting one
another and unwittingly serving ends they would never intention-
ally promote.” (Powell, 1970; p.18)
Such opinions alone are (for all intents and purposes) only personally held
views and not actionable in the policy sense. Ideas require a catalyst moment
to become actionable political issues. They must, according to Fraser (1989),
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break out of the private (non-political) arena and find a place in public (po-
litical) discourse. The crises of the 1970s provided the opportunity for the
launch of these ideas into mainstream politics. The depth and breadth of
the turmoil of the decade swept across the globe, and took a notable toll on
US domestic (and international) policy agendas. While welfare retrenchment
was encountered by all industrialized nations in the 1970s and 1980s, this re-
trenchment was virulently ideological in the US and UK (Huber and Stephens
2001). In the US, Ronald Reagan’s indictment against “welfare queens” in
his 1976 presidential campaign found resonance among middle class voters
and deficient reaction in the subsiding efficacy of political power at the lower
end of the income distribution (Quadango 1984, 1996; Hays 2003; Alesina,
Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001).5
Reagan had long advocated the need for the poor to be given self-respect
and spiritual dignity through work, however low-paid that may be. He pro-
posed, as early as 1972, that “all able-bodied welfare recipients should be re-
quired to work on highway construction and other public service jobs without
additional pay” (UPI 1972). Such rhetoric coalesced with growing sentiments
that the problem with welfare was the “reward” given to those (predomi-
nantly mothers) on social welfare for having more children. This view was
shared among conservative and liberal opinions, that the AFDC recipient
did not live in the “real world”, but instead in one that created dependency
through laziness and lack of foresight.
Reagan saw an opportune moment to dismantle the Nixon administra-
tion’s agenda on welfare reform, which sought to establish a guaranteed in-
come. Across the Atlantic, Thatcher and the New Right equally set upon
a welfare system believed to be inept in an effort to “remoralize” not just
welfare, but society as a whole - notably by privatizing public assets (Abra-
hamson 2003). While Reagan failed in his election bid, the real victory of
his campaign was the breakout of market fundamentalist policies backed by
social and religious conservatives. The epistemic privilege (Somers and Block
5For this market-based turn in policy, neo-liberals brought the ideal of personal respon-
sibility firmly about face from the progressive era. Reagan castigated welfare beneficiaries
during his bid for the presidency in which he claimed that “She has 80 names, 30 ad-
dresses, 12 Social Security cards and is collecting veteran’s benefits on four nonexisting
deceased husbands. And she is collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid,
getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names.Her tax-free
income alone is over USD 150,000” (AP 1977). Lynda Taylor, who surfaced around 1974
in Chicago, Illinois (St. Petersburg Times 1974), was arraigned on 31 counts including
grand theft, perjury, and bigamy (ibid.).
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2005:265) bequeathed to neo-liberal doctrine has (despite its critics) all but
overrun all other competing narratives in the United States. The attack on
the institutions of the American welfare state has everything to do with an
absence of a solidaristic understanding of the moral purpose of the welfare
state and a constant derision of government intervention. One might say
that a focus on Reagan and Thatcher surely fall short of the entirety of par-
ticipants, however their contributions were significant.
A Never-ending Story: Thus, when Michael Tanner (2003) and others
present their propositions of limited government, they continue to pander
to audiences with matter-of-fact arguments which, ironically, utilize self-
fulfilling prophecies engineered by their co-opponents of state intervention
in conjunction with the logic of proponents of the universal welfare state
(i.e., that poverty is undesirable and solutions must be effective) (Orbach,
2006). It is unsurprising that Tanner closes his Poverty of Welfare (2003)
with reference to the archetypal welfare state antagonist, Charles Murray: “A
return to limited government should not be confused with ending communal
efforts to solve social problems. In a free society, a genuine need produces
a response. If government is not seen as a legitimate source of intervention,
individuals and associations will respond” (Tanner, 2003:158). “Charities”,
according to Tanner, “operate far more efficiently than do their government
counterparts” (Tanner, 2003: 103).
The views of Tanner, and others, reflect the dogmatic manner in which
conservative/neo-liberal, residual government proponents frame and dissemi-
nate their arguments for a renaissance of an elusive, if not imaginary, market
economic moral core - for an “American dream”. The overt failings of many
of the market friendly policies to alleviate distress were, according to Som-
ner and Block (2005), simply ignored by their supporters. “Data are not
essential to certain arguments about social policy and indeed can get in the
way.” (Murray 1984; found in Somners and Block 2005:p.278). The utopia of
a neo-liberal, market-driven policy universe thus accepted positive feedback
while blatantly ignoring, or categorically refuting, any evidence to the con-
trary. The result is a system where beneficiaries are increasingly subjected
to ever more stigmatized and demeaning bureaucratic processes on the basis
of restoring work-ethic. Claimants are “screened, diagnosed and treated for
their dependence on welfare.” (Schram 2006:6).
At its core, these issues are based on a certain preoccupation with the
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efficiency of the market and reciprocity divorced of egalitarian objectives.
In this view, the welfare state is detrimental to morality. The location of
solidarity is isolated to the informal institutions of society (churches, volun-
teer organisations, and so forth) (Notten, Geranda, and de Neubourg 2007).
The “new regime” of governing marginality is explicitly paternalistic at the
lower (e.g., social welfare) income levels and laissez faire at the highger (i.e.,
occupational and fiscal welfare) levels of the welfare state (Titmuss 1965,
Wacquant 2001b, Schram 2006).
This has contributed to leaving the American institutional system rela-
tively weak and distrusted by large swathes of the population, a fact that
is as much a function of actual institutional incapacity as it is ideological
rhetoric (Table 1.4). Diminished trust in institutions and targeted benefits
and services perpetuate this situation, but importantly have not led to its
demise (Rothstein 2010). While Americans tend to favor less government in-
tervention into welfare than their European and Scandinavian counterparts,
they have not abandoned it, despite concerted efforts from the political right.
This brings to light a considerable question: Why have Americans not
turned their back on the state when the chorus of market fundamentalist sup-
porters have rallied so diligently to dismantle even the most basic trust in
government? Two considerations are particularly relevant here. First, Amer-
icans, according to Feldman and Steenbergen (2001), are humanitarian but
not necessarily egalitarian. Thus, Americans support welfare policies insti-
tuted with the goal of moralized assistance to the needy, but not large struc-
turing of social policy to interfere with market mechanisms. There is good
reason for this. Humanitarianism is compatible with capitalism, whereas
egalitarianism evokes images of (incompetent) state interference and control.
However, are these preferences particular to Americans, and if so, why? One
possibility, according to Mau (2004) and Rothstein (1998), lies in the fun-
damental nature of individuals to organize a “ moral economy” of welfare
institutions.
Individuals have personal experiences with welfare policies and these ex-
periences inform their attitudes regarding the normative justifications of poli-
cies. More so, these experiences inform the potential beneficiary voter about
her status in the social order, impacting her attitude towards politics and her
propensity to participate in communicative political activities (Mau 2004,
Kumlin 2004, Soss 2002). The beneficiary’s perception that his claim is
backed by moral justification, that he has a defined entitlement to receive
benefits, is itself a function of the prevailing norms of social justice. Where
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Figure 1.4: Trust in National Institutions Among OECD Countries 2010
Source: OECD Social Indicators
the client is perceived as the “other” in society, he will likely feel the inher-
ent stigma attached to claim making (Rothstein and Stolle 2003).6 While
arguments against perverse effects of state intervention on the economy and
the moral well-being of society clearly help to understand how and why op-
position to the welfare state has developed and persisted, it fails to account
for why the welfare states persist.
Communality and Collective Protection
“The mutual-aid tendency in man has so remote an origin, and
is so deeply interwoven with all the past evolution of the human
race, that it has been maintained by mankind up to the present
6These issues are further elaborated in 2.1.2
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time, notwithstanding all vicissitudes of history” (Kropotkin, 1902)
Developments in the US, following the decline of the Great Society and
New Deal coalition, illustrate the effects of declining trust and moral legit-
imacy on the welfare state. The concerted effort of a dedicated core group
of neo-liberal scholars and policy makers shifted welfare debate considerably
away from universal provision and the reciprocal norms attached with it.
Juxtaposed to the view of welfare institutions as antagonistic towards social
morality lies the view of welfare institutions as virtuous arrangements, sup-
portive of societal solidarity and cohesion. This view is espoused, notably,
by TH Marshall and Richard Titmuss, among many. From this perspective,
the state is guarantor of an institutional setting which facilitates full citizen-
ship. Welfare institutions are legitimate on the basis of social justice, and
this social justice is underwritten by the morality of collective assistance.
That is, the responsibility to care for those in need lies at the institutional
level. Ensuring just institutions is at the heart of ensuring just outcomes.
As such, procedural justice is paramount for maintaining the legitimacy of
institutions (Rawls 1999; Rothstein 2010, 2013).
In democratic market economy states, this entails that the responsibility
lies at the feet of government and focuses on areas which the market can-
not or will not provide at a socially satisfactory level. That is, “the main
purpose of welfare state institutions is to achieve a balance in the quality of
life between members and groups in a given society by means of organized
and institutionalized reciprocity” (Mau 2004:59). In contrast to the punitive
and stigmatizing nature of minimalist welfare systems, universalistic systems
operate from a basis of shared entitlement and wellbeing.
Marshall’s oft cited work focuses on the development of social rights, in
an English context, from civil and political rights. This account is largely
interpreted to entail that social rights are the result of a progressive evolution
of society to incorporate individuals into the full status of citizens. An alter-
native understanding to the three component argument views this framework
not as a static evolutionary relationship, but as a dynamic process in per-
petual flux. According to Marshall, the constituent elements of citizenship
were established sequentially: civil (with the Reform Act of 1832), political
(universal suffrage: 1918;1928), and social(Beveridge report 1942 and subse-
quent legislation). Marshall was attuned to the functional purpose of social
citizenship, acknowledging the explicit remedial effect of welfare provision in
capitalist economies. Citizenship, for Marshall, stood outside and against
the development of market economies. “In the twentieth century,” Marshall
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argues, “citizenship and the capitalist class system have been at war” (Mar-
shall 1950:92). This conflict is more perceptible in recent history due to
the antagonistic nature of the welfare state and capitalist economies. Social
rights, according to Marshall, subordinate market price to social justice. The
market is constrained from commodifying individual risk over one’s life by
the establishment of collective arrangements.
The establishment of these collective arrangements is a product of the
three components of citizenship acting in unison. Individually, these com-
ponents are not necessarily potent enough to disturb the market. The first
element of citizenship, civil rights, did not pose a threat to capitalism be-
cause they did not interfere with the system. Civil rights buttressed capitalist
claims that the basis for society lay in contractual agreements and that indi-
viduals were solely responsible for their own well-being based on their value.
“Differential status...was replaced by a single uniform status of citizenship
...which the structure of inequality could be built” (Marshall 1950, found in
Manza and Sauder 2009:151). The rights of the 19th century did not impede
inequality as no recourse to the failure to achieve one’s right existed.7 How-
ever, political rights gave action to the guarantees made possible by of civil
rights.
The traditional view. . . was that a man had a right to earn a
living, and if unable to do so, a right to be kept alive by his
community. The view of the middle-class liberal economists was
that men must take such jobs as the market offered (Hobsbawm
1999:67).
The collective nature of individuals (i.e., the resilience of cooperative sur-
vival) was and is part and parcel to the advancement of the components of
rights, and particularly the advancement of political and social rights. The
old Poor Laws were a barrier to industrialist interests; industrialists who
were seeing not only the expansion of their own political power, but also the
movement towards that of the laboring classes. Thus, the extension of the
franchise in the mid 1800s meant not only would parliament represent more
numerous and poorer interests, it also entailed that elites would need increas-
ingly indirect means of “incentivizing” the changing work force. The Poor
7That is, a property right is a right to acquire property and defend it. A right to speech
is a right to voice one’s opinions without fear of reprisal. However, this does not entail
others have a duty to provide another with property or attend to another’s opinion.
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Law Reforms provided a vehicle to these ends at the bequest of the enfran-
chised industrialist class. “ The [new] poor law was an aid...to capitalism,
because it relieved industry of all social responsibility outside the contract of
employment, while sharpening the edge of competition in the labor market”
(Marshall 1950, found in Manza and Sauder 2009:151).
Growing inequalities had very little impact on the capitalist system be-
cause “the mass of the working people did not wield effective political power”
(ibid.). As labor developed political power, a program to replace the latter
Poor Law progressed (Korpi and Palme 1998). This proved to be a sig-
nificant problem for capital. Political rights, unlike civil rights, contained
inherently precarious issues for the growing capitalist system. Those extend-
ing the franchise were, most likely, woefully unaware of the full weight of
their “generosity”. Political power enabled, among other things, collective
bargaining which strengthened the established, and cherished, civil rights
regime of citizenship. Organized labor interests, acting as mobilized political
forces, represented a powerful force underwritten by the contractual ideol-
ogy of the market. Collective political rights reinforced collective bargaining
ability, harnessing the communal preferences of the laboring classes in new
and unsettling ways.
The Poor Law created “others” who were outside the realm of respectable
citizens. Beneficiaries were of a separate status, effectively that of non-citizen
(Preuss 2003). With the advent of political rights, however, such a status was
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to sell to the electorate - especially
an electorate now comprised of the previously morally reprehensible. Citi-
zens, needy or otherwise, were legally and politically equals - at least as far
as political representatives were concerned. Democratic participation is in-
strumental because, notes Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova (2006), it “channels
the ‘demand’ for public spending by granting citizens voice” (274). A politi-
cian faced with an enlarged electoral pool operates from a different calculus
than one in a narrow field of interests. As such, argue Lizzeri and Persico
(2004), political actors aim their pledges at the widest possible audience.
The morally defensible duty of the state to protect citizens from distress is
by far one of the most broad campaigns one may think of. Put simply, a
larger pool of electors incentivizes the prospective candidate and/or party to
make electoral promises which are inclusive of that electorate. As clientellism
diminished, actors adjusted their platforms correspondingly. Much more has
been written, and will be addressed, on the place of franchise extension and
welfare policy. What is key to grasp here is the centrality of such political
developments for earlier developments in very real ways.
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The “moral economy” of the welfare state is enabled by the extension
of the civic and political rights of citizenship. By constructing institutions
based on the lowest common denominator such as citizenship, states pro-
mote reciprocity based on a common shared status. Electors are not only
self-calculating agents of their own personal utility, they are also members
of a moral community. The identification of themselves in the community as
equals is cemented by shared expectations of morally acceptable behavior.
With the advent of social rights, supported by the configuration of moral
sentiments which shoulder institutional frameworks, states construct insti-
tutions of welfare on top of society’s norms. As Dobelstein (1999) argues,
“welfare cannot go beyond what [citizens] believe to be right and wrong
ways to live. . . welfare does not define the [system], the [system] defines
welfare”(Dobelstein 1999:xiv, 6). Norms of reciprocity are informative to
creating appropriate policy. Additionally, these norms not only communi-
cate the “proper” etiquette of social citizenship, they are also sensitive to
the experience of social citizenship (Soss 2000, Rothstein 1988, 1999). While
the system defines what welfare is and ought to be, the beneficiaries of the
system integrate institutionalized norms of reciprocity into their actions and
reactions. Thus, increased equality of citizens, supported by their rights,
enables the possibility of realizing communal protection. As the role of the
state is no longer seen as one of agitator to moral soundness, institutional
development is given room to evolve and build (ideally) trust as it develops
competency.
Summary
It is clear that attitudes towards morally appropriate behavior and norms
of reciprocity lie at the heart of welfare institutions. Citizens work from a
menu, so to speak, of morally justifiable and normatively acceptable pol-
icy solutions which satisfy to one degree or another the expectations of how
members ought to be treated by each other (Jaeger 2006, Mau 2004). The
advent of modern social rights, according to Marshall, are expressions of the
community’s moral duty to each other. They are, which I will discuss further,
more so expressions of those who are “politically relevant”. While residualist
interests see the natural state of society as an atomized world of individual ef-
fort and reward, collectivist/universalist interests perpetuate state organized
mutual aid on the basis of the benefits which mutual achievement brings.
As with Hythloday explaining the lessons of Utopia, the two logics seem at
constant odds. The atomizing mode of thought produces systems designed
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to reduce the interplay of state interaction against the “natural” processes of
the market; in contrast to the collective mode of survivalist thought which
sees organized activity as the normal and necessary course for maintaining
progress. That said, and having lain out the expose of the moral nuances
for and against state interference, it is necessary to details economic justifi-
cations for the legitimacy of the welfare state which have been forwarded for
degrees of state action - counterpoints will not be discussed.
1.5.2 Insurance
“The bureaucracy is expanding to meet the needs of the expand-
ing bureaucracy.” - Oscar Wilde
Another strand of research bases the justification and legitimacy of the
welfare state on its functional aspect. That is, while the previous view posits
that welfare institutions are essentially moral and normative manifestations,
this economic or insurance view sees the welfare state as a functional ne-
cessity. This posits that society demands and creates welfare institutions
to mitigate the failures of the market. As such, this view espouses more
questions of efficiency and trade-offs related to state intervention (Sandmo
1999). For VoC, for instance, social insurance and assistance schemes are
necessary compliments to the nature of the business world and not expressly
the rewards of class struggle against capital interests (Iversen 2006, Mares
2003). Citizens continue to support redistribution on the basis of reciprocity,
however their motivation to do so is essentially one arrived at by calculation
of the costs and benefits of participation (Miller 1995).
The changing nature of employment patterns and household structures
necessitates welfare institutions which enable individuals to participate fully
in economic life. Greater female participation in the labor market entails
less production of welfare services in the home, thereby necessitating and
releasing more labor into the social protection sector to compensate for this
loss (Huber and Stephens 2001). As women make up a large portion of the
bureaucracy devoted to the supply of welfare services, the welfare state oper-
ates as the largest employer of women - in effect instigating a vested interest
cycle noted in the politics centered compliment of PRA (Huber and Stephens
2001). Polices which enable women to enter the labor market, independent of
male income, is not entirely an explicit result of feminist movements (Sains-
bury 1996). Rather, policies driving services, such as childcare, are strategic
measures to ensure maximal use of labor (Morgan 2006; Orloff 2002). The
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changing nature of the economy and family structures justifies institutional
welfare provision to enable workers not only to increase their human capital,
but also (for instance) to stave off declining fertility rates - both integral com-
ponents of economic success (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010). Recent research
has also indicated that changing economic opportunities, notably in Sweden,
is leading to a “masculinization” of poverty among the younger segments of
the population (Brostro¨m 2012).
Thus, services are provided by the state, according to Barr (2001), be-
cause of the imperfections of the market. The state has legitimate reasons
to intervene as information asymmetry implies that there are risks that the
private market cannot or will not insure, or that consumers cannot afford.
Adverse selection of clients by private market insurance firms or other enter-
prises create a need, for instance, for governments to impose mandatory un-
employment insurance (Akerlof 1970). Whereas debates regarding the moral
legitimacy of welfare institutions revolve largely around normative meanings
of behavior, debates from an economic viewpoint revolve largely around be-
haviors which violate theories of economic principles. A justification that
unemployment insurance is necessary because of market failure is weighed
against moral hazard. Here the design of policy becomes based on the ex-
pected likelihoods that an individual will select out of employment to free
ride on the system - the oft proclaimed benefit cheat. As with attempts to
target policies at morally undesirable behaviours, issues arise when systems
attempt to target inefficient behaviours.
The push to activate as many unemployed as possible essentially filters
the hardest to employ into the existing social protection system. In which
case, the system can either choose to accept that they are unable to be
employed and continue to support those individuals, or it can cease to support
the individual and remove them from the system – itself an administrative
hassle. These hard-to-employ individuals invariably find themselves in an
“assisted equilibrium” where they find state help when they can, and other
means of living to “get by” in the meantime. In many cases, this leads
to “abuse” and fraud. In addition, this can lead to extremely criminogenic
environments which themselves can prove economically detrimental to society
(Downes 2006, Lacey 2008). I will address these criminogenic effects further
in chapter three.
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Summary
Inman (1987) noted that “the institution of market trading cannot enforce
cooperative behavior on self-seeking, utility-maximizing agents, and coop-
eration between agents is often required for beneficial trading”. From the
perspective of legitimization, the welfare state is a system of insurance which
provides protection to workers against the unknowable risks of both market
forces and life course events. It is a set of ex ante risk pooling arrange-
ments since the risks are unknown for current, let alone future, members. As
such, the welfare state may be said to enjoy legitimacy on the grounds of
complementarity for economic prosperity.
1.5.3 Political
“It is not enough to provide people with abstract political rights
if ...inequalities undermine their ability to use their rights”(Olson
2003:6)
“Democracy gave birth to demogagism, anarchy, and commu-
nistic attitudes towards property” - US Army training manual ca.
1920 (found in Keyssar 2009:181)
A lesser debated justification for welfare state legitimacy concerns that of
political agency. While political power is central to theories of welfare state
creation (elaborated on in more detail in Ch. 2), recent studies transfer it,
and particularly in the form of participation, from an explanatory variable to
a dependent variable. That is, welfare states are drivers of political agency
in very real and important ways. The reflexive democracy theory, posited
by Olson (2006), implies that welfare states can be seen as legitimated and
justified under the grounds of their intrinsic reflexive nature. The theory
incorporates a variety of areas of scholarship from Amartya Sen’s capabil-
ity approach, Habermas’s conception of political agency, Fraser’s paradox of
participation, and Marshall’s tri-fecta of citizenship. It represents a unique
position regarding how one may conceptualize the welfare state as an out-
come of political processes, and/or even as an input to political processes.
Such a position provides a justification of welfare states on the basis of their
interaction with the political community. Similar to the defense of residual
systems for the promotion of individual responsibility, or of the comprehen-
sive insurance model as guarantor against risk and uncertainty of market
solutions, proponents of maximized democratic participation may utilize the
welfare state’s impact on individual and group political agency as a pretext
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for system design.
More detailed discussion regarding the effects of political participation
on the welfare state and the alternate effect of the welfare state on political
participation is given in Chapter 2. Here I present the theoretical framework
as proposed by Olson, combined later with a system analytic model proposed
by Easton (1965). In addition, I combine this theoretical and analytic frame-
work to include a functional model of welfare state operation as proposed by
the International Labor Organisation’s Department of Social Protection.
Components of Citizenship and Reflexive Democracy
Olson’s conception of reflexive democracy parallels (intentionally or not)
Marhsall’s previously mentioned model of citizenship. It is worth review-
ing how notions of citizenship have shaped discourses on social rights and
therefore welfare states as underwriters of those rights. Marshall’s argument
has received criticism from those who interpret the three elements of citizen-
ship from a static and deterministic evolutionary perspective. Additionally,
some criticism has been leveled that the model which Marshall delivered re-
lied too heavily on the case of England. Marshall’s conception of citizenship
is considered to be too weak, conceptually, and overly focused on entitlements
as opposed to duties and actual political activity (Powell 2002; Janoski 1998;
Oldfield 1990; Breiner 2006). However, a more dynamic conception of Mar-
shallian citizenship leads to an incredibly flexible and useful starting point
to understand political agency and how this is intertwined with welfare state
institutions.
The political sphere, according to Marshall, is the primary location of
conflict between proponents of egalitarian policies and those of market de-
termined outcomes. Each side attempts to advance their own interests, and
each adapts new strategies to impede the other. Campaign contributions
come to mind. Political citizenship impedes attempts to metastasize social
and economic advantage into “differences of protection, power, or wealth,
the exact reverse of what classical liberals were trying to accomplish through
restrictive suffrage” (Breiner 2006:17). Political equality is undermined once
real income (life chances) are limited. In a market based economy, this most
readily occurs through (monied) income inequality.
The benefit of universal welfare rests in its capacity to (potentially) sub-
sume income inequality to the realm of symbolic significance. As politi-
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cal power is realized by those with differential risk profiles and preference
sets, more favorable to universalistic policy, elites increasingly employ what
Hirschman calls the “jeopardy argument”. To stoke resistance to social
rights, elites begin to play on fears that the extension of social citizenship
will damage other areas of benefit. More extensive social rights mean less
individual rights because of an ever increasingly intrusive government. This
jeopardy argument works in tandem with the perversity thesis to produce
skepticism, whether validated or not, about the scope and depth of social
rights. “In the 19th century, the struggle over social citizenship was in fact
collapsed into a struggle over political citizenship” (Breiner 2006:23).
Dynamic Social Rights: The negotiation over the extension of social
rights and political rights was not sequential, and many of the day (espe-
cially those of higher economic means) were pitted firmly against extension
of both social and political rights - the one contingent on the other. John
Stewart Mill, to cite one example, argued for disenfranchisement as a per-
son who had failed in the market should not be allowed to participate in
power sharing. According to Mill, those who did not pay taxes or accepted
public assistance had neither the moral qualifications nor risk of sharing the
cost of their requests. The wealthy Mill was a staunch opponent of univer-
sal franchise. Herbert Spencer went one further, openly advocating for direct
taxation for services. These user fees, essentially, were designed such that the
poor would never have enough resources to pay for services they demanded.
“The incidence of taxation”, Spencer argued, “must be made more direct in
proportion as the franchise is extended” (Breiner 2006:26).
If the elites were, in their view, forced to share political power with the
common man, than the common man ought to share the burden of financial
responsibility. Decentralizing taxes performs a simple task of putting the
burden of assistance on those who need assistance. This results in making
the state so weak that it cannot afford services even in the face of massive
support and makes the realization of political power ineffectual at best and
useless at worst. Opponents of full citizenship proposed and used a range
of strategies to “short circuit” the development of full citizenship and its
inherent threat to the class order. “Equality of opportunity” was (and still
is) promoted as a central aspiration, with concomitant differences between
market success and failure, thereby diverting claims away from “equality of
condition” (Moynihan 1965).
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These feelings were revisited in the midst of the turbulent 1960s, espe-
cially so in the United States. So much was noted by the Moynihan Report
of 1965. The political upheaval of the long decade demanded not just politi-
cal rights, but institutional change to ensure equality of outcome for groups.
Liberty (civil rights), for conservatives, had been the watchword of American
political and economic life. It ensured that the state would not obstruct the
individual from success, while also enabling the justification of protection of
states’ rights against the intervention of the Federal government - the US’s
18th century framework was designed to ensure exactly this weakness of cen-
tralized state power.
Equality, however, is a different animal altogether. As liberty does not
ensure equality (and in fact may lead contrary to it), equality does not nec-
essarily depend on liberty. “Much of the political history of the American
nation can be seen as a competition between these two ideals, as for exam-
ple, the unending troubles between capital and labor” (Moynihan 1965:2).
While Marshall may not have foreseen the new types of social inequalities
that social citizenship would create, it is clear that many opponents of full
Marshallian citizenship were not as na¨ıve about the slippery slope of entitle-
ments(Runciman, Bulmer and Rees 1996).
Reflexive Political Agency: For Olson, the dynamic between political
and social rights is a “reflexive” arrangement which must take into account
competing conceptions of citizenship. In a liberal democratic view, citizen-
ship is a legal status “that confers particular rights , obligations and bene-
fits...often seen as the result of political processes ...but no attention is paid
to the ways people are shaped to fit particular models of what a citizen is”
(Olson 2006:16). The governmental view, on the other hand, proposes that
citizens are constructed and from very different starting points across the
continuum of society. However, for Olson, the governmental view “focuses
so intently on the construction of citizens that it verges on liquidating the
citizen and her agency completely into the process of construction” (Olson
2006:4).
A further libertarian approach conceives of citizenship as a natural right,
and thus as something society attempts to codify and that governmentalists
suppose is dependent on external factors. A reflexive theory of citizenship,
according to Olson, in the spirit of Rousseau, unites the competing theories
of citizenship and posits a unified approach where individuals are simultane-
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ously both subjects and authors of their own governance.
Olson’s theoretical approach addresses Fraser’s concept of “participatory
parity” - wherein an adequate theory of justice must take into consideration
the inequity in economic and cultural participation among groups in society,
particularly as it relates to class bias in the electorate. “Class” according
to Fraser, “is an order of objective subordination derived from economic ar-
rangements that deny some actors the means and resources they need for
participatory parity” (Fraser and Honneth, 2003:48). The existence of such
structures in society debilitates members from full enjoyment of the rights
of citizenship. The concept of reflexive citizenship, then, is to bypass what
Olson sees as the paradox of enablement. That is, participation cannot be
the solution to enabling participation - participation requires an external
mechanism to provide the basis for the enabling of democratic participatory
behavior/agency.
The existent cycle which distributes capabilities in society must be con-
structed such that it creates a virtuous rather than vicious cycle. As much
can be likened to Rawls’ concept of the veil of ignorance, given uncertainty of
one’s position in the final distribution of power and resources, as well as the
principle of equal participation (Rawls 1999). Of the many modes of demand
articulation, political participation is the most direct and appropriate area
of participation to focus on, as it is most overtly connected to the process of
registering the demands of individuals in order to achieve resolution/outputs.
As Olson argues, “it is not enough to provide people with abstract political
rights if ...inequalities undermine their ability to use their rights. .. equal
opportunity can only be guaranteed when people are sufficiently equal in the
abilities and resources that enable participation” (Olson 2003:6).
It is participation, and specifically political participation, that takes cen-
ter stage in justifying the welfare state. The participatory ideal, then, re-
quires a welfare state which maximizes and safeguards participation. How
this welfare state is to be constructed, however, poses a dilemma for Ol-
son and he resorts to a pseudo-promotion of (at least initially) an expert
(i.e., social scientist) designed system based around the goal of participation
maximization. Though stepping short of a call for action, Olson does illus-
trate successes in the past (the Johnson era’s espousal of maximum feasible
participation and the subsequent formation of the National Welfare Rights
Organisation (NWRO)) and advocates at least the concept of such an under-
taking, while admitting the potential pitfalls and possible repeats of historical
failures. Despite these limitations, the proposition marks a unique approach
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to legitimization of the welfare state from a primarily political standpoint.
Furthermore, such an approach combines well with TH Marshall’s (dynamic)
view of citizenship, and one which places the welfare state firmly in the field
of political discourse. Or to use Olson’s own words: “the primary task of
the welfare state...is to enact the necessary rights and guarantee the corre-
sponding dimensions of participatory agency” (13). What this entails is that
claims for state intervention to decommodify daily lives need not be limited
to calls for individual autonomy, community cohesion, morally defensible
support structure, or matters of market efficiency. Rather, such claims are
able to be forwarded on the basis that welfare systems are themselves agency
promoting processes and it is this end which justifies the means.
Systems Theory and Reflexive Democracy
Having combined the formative theory of Marshall with the philosophical
justification of Olson, what remains is a practical mode of application of the
two towards the study of welfare states from a primarily political viewpoint.
Knowing what the subjects of study are, how they have evolved together,
and how their functions matter for eachother, I now employ a final branch of
theory to complete the process of my approach. With the background of the
Marshall-Olson theory, I incorporate a model for the study of both political
participation and institutional design. For this, I use David Easton’s systems
analysis of political systems.
This general theory of political systems has proved an enduring contribu-
tion to the field of political science and the study of the political economic
framework of the welfare state. It informs the empirical investigations in
Chapter 2. Figure 1.5 shows a graphical representation of Easton’s model.
Easton’s System Adapted: The following descriptive of Easton’s work
is brief at best, and readers are advised to consult the primary works for
further information and clarification of terms and concepts. Here I take into
account those parts which directly influence the analysis of political processes
and welfare system policy. In a rather simplistic account, Easton’s model
consists of demands and supports, which are primary inputs into the produc-
tion of outputs in the form of policy decisions. Outputs do not terminate
after production, but inform the following sequence in an additive manner.
“Unless a system is approaching a state of entropy...it must have continuing
inputs to keep it going” (Easton 1957:385). Authorities, “by virtue of their
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Figure 1.5: Adapted Systems Model
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status in all systems,. . . have special responsibilities for converting demands
into outputs”. (Easton 1957:31). Demands, however, are not necessarily
solved politically. Many demands never make it to the political arena and
are either solved or dissolved in the private sphere or parallel institutions, in-
deed some are never fully politicized successfully (See Fraser 1989). More so,
authorities are responsible for demands when the weight of society is brought
to one side, then the demand becomes political (Easton 1957:40).
Non-Demands: While supports are inputs, they stand apart from
demands. They are not active in the way a demand is an active element in
the political system. Of those issues which are not considered rightfully, or
necessarily, demands on the system are expectations, motivations, ideology,
interests, preferences, and public opinion. This aspect of Easton’s distinc-
tion clarifies the various approaches in comparative studies regarding welfare
state development and functioning. It is not uncommon for studies of po-
litical participation and welfare effort to be framed in terms of “political
support” for welfare institutions.
Indicators of political turnout may be considered as demands made on
the system, or perhaps even support given voice, however they ought not be
confused with political support in this sense. Likewise, investigations into
public preference or attitudes, typically via national or international survey
instruments, represent a measurement of support, but these cannot be con-
sidered demands. An unmet expectation may form a stimulus, but it cannot
be considered a demand. Likewise, motivations are not reasonable demands,
as a political actor may find the thought of redistribution (for instance) ap-
palling; however, if such a policy stance increases her chances at re-election,
her motivation for pro-redistributive policies is apart from the motivations
of the poor electorate supporting the same action.8
Ideology, as well, is not a demand per se, but a set of beliefs about the
“proper” demands. Preferences may be seen as innate feelings of what one
would like to see, but again, they are not demands at this level. Like prefer-
ences, public opinion is also not considered at the level of demand, but rather
that of supportive input. This remains important for research into pub-
lic preferences and the relationship with welfare policy formation, as public
8Thus, as Korpi (2006) has argued, acquiescence (consent) by capital to the demands of
labor, or even the underlying support for such policies, cannot be said to have demanded
expansion of the welfare state.
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opinion is not recorded representatively across the population, let alone the
electorate (Berinsky 2002). Conservative voices are more likely to participate
in public opinion surveys than more liberal opinions, mirroring discrepancies
in other input dynamics. Supports may be (and often are) transformed or
converted into demands by active participation. These converted supports
may take a number of forms such as writing letters to officials, organizing
interest groups to lobby legislators, or simply by voting (Easton 1957; Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995). The latter activity forms the subject of the
following chapter, as the most basic element in the demand area of inputs.
Demands: “To become a demand, there needs to be voiced a proposal
that authoritative action be taken with regard to it.” (Easton 1957:47). In
this view, both opponents and proponents of increased state intervention
have two avenues of pursuing their goals. The perversity thesis as advocated
by market fundamentalists in the previous section, for example, can be seen
as a strategy to alter support in the face of electoral threat - i.e., it would
be imprudent to attempt to alter the preferences of politically irrelevant in-
dividuals or groups. Strategies of voter (de)mobilization are, however, more
appropriately deployed for those groups which remain unchanged in their
real or expected preferences (support) towards policies. Demand and sup-
port strategies often work in tandem, however they need not be invariably
deployed together nor simultaneously.
Finally, political activity originates from external systems such as the en-
vironment, economy, culture or otherwise. These external demands, then,
emanate from experiences with systems outside the political system and in-
form their demands upon it and its authorities. People may have strong
cultural affiliations with certain norms of behavior, and these cultural prefer-
ences or opinion when in conflict with other preferences and opinions become
demands when they are voiced to political processes for resolution. Taken
together, these elements produce a framework by which to approach the un-
derstanding of how various aspects of political agency can and do affect policy
formation. Integrating Easton’s understanding of inputs (both at the level
of demand and support) helps to disentangle the myriad of issues inherent
in studying the relationship between political activity and redistributive sys-
tems. More so, it helps us to isolate what it is we mean when we discuss the
act of electoral participation via voting, as compared to the multitudinous
activities which may also be considered as inputs, but which are not to be
confused with demands (e.g., public opinion or elite/laymen preferences). It
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enables this work to focus on a single dimension for the remainder of this
study.
Summary
The preceding section has lain out viewpoints for the development of welfare
states in comparative perspective, as well as various approaches to legitimiza-
tion of institutions. A central tenet common to all theories is that of political
power. The concept of political power, however, carries varieties meanings
depending on the context it is used. Thus, we say the poor lack political
power, the young are a potential source of political power, or that the rich
hold the reigns of political power.
These statements carry a variety of messages about the types of access
and ability to manipulate the policy agenda. While elites lack the numeric
strength of the middle or lower classes, they garner significant amounts of
political power in respect to their influence on political processes. Their po-
litical power is located in their position in the social and economic hierarchy
and the amount of resources they can or do contribute to particular policy
formulation either directly from consultation, translated through special in-
terest groups, or through clientellism and campaign contributions. Similarly,
the elderly may lack positional prestige; however, their numeric strength and
electoral threat carry significant weight with political actors. As such, their
power is measured not on their resources, but rather on their propensity to
turn-out on election day. A wealth of literature documents the axiom that
participation is contingent on one’s command of resources (Verba, Schlozman
and Brady 1995), and these resources are not distributed evenly across the
electorate.
This section has given an overview of the leading theories of welfare state
formation, as well as delving into two particularly insightful approaches -
e.g., PRA and VoC. Further to this, key areas of welfare state intervention
have been detailed which illustrate the various strategies which voices in
society can and do legitimize various applications (or abstentions) of state
policy towards individual and group well-being. While justifications based
in the ideal of securing efficient markets in the face of present or potential
failures is readily apparent, other concerns regarding the moral and political
justifications of state interference provide alternative manners to address the
impetus behind (non)action. Moral justifications for and against state ac-
tion remain contentious issues, and certainly this area interacts with many
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other areas of social policy outside the parameters of welfare systems. Of
these justifications, the political agency approach forms a far less explored
avenue of research. Indeed, these latter issues (i.e., moral and political le-
gitimization) appeal for exploration of how current systems are structured
and perpetuated (and even deconstructed). If maximal democratic partici-
pation is encouraged (for instance) by particular policy regimes, it is prudent
to explore how such policies are developed and (indeed) how policies which
decrease such activities are perpetuated. More to the point, we ought to be
interested in how the inclusion and/or exclusion of preferences impacts and is
impacted by welfare state policy. The following chapter explores these issues
more explicitly, taking the issue of political agency as a centering issue.
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Chapter 2
Political Participation and
Welfare Systems - Testing
Theory
Of the arguments presented earlier for welfare system formation and justifica-
tion, political agency remains central to comparative and case study research.
It surpasses the aim of this work to investigate all forms of political agency,
and in as much I leave the subject for future consideration. I focus here on
the key argument put forward in the matter of systematic political demobi-
lization, the situation of the political demobilization of convicted felons. The
following analysis focuses on political participation as the main variable of
interest, leaving aside other forms of political agency. Following the reflexiv-
ity outlined in Olson’s work, and using a systems analysis approach provided
by the adaptation of Easton’s framework, a three stage process is empirically
tested to explicate how political participation functions as both an input of
welfare policy and an output of the feedback process. In particular, I pro-
pose that political participation can be viewed as a proxy for the effects of
welfare policy on beneficiary populations.It is, in essence, in and of itself an
indication of policy performance.
Political participation is often considered a merit good because it entails
that all are able to contribute to the laws which they must abide by. “The
right to [vote]”, wrote Chief Justice Earl Warren, “in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights” (Reynolds
v. Sims - 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). To respect it solely as a symbolic token of
citizenship, however, is to lose sight of its substantive purpose, and hence its
true value (Dobelstein 1999). While voting is no doubt a particularly blunt
instrument for policy formation, it remains the basic form of input available
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to promote representative policy formation and/or extract concessions from
elites. In as much, it is a value in and of itself if it can shape policy in favor
of the less fortunate who lack alternative means to influence policy making
(Bennet and Resnick 1990). To what degree and in what ways the franchise
is important is, however, another matter. Surely we may value voting as
a fundamental precondition for democratic governance, but as with fiscal
and demographic inputs, it is important to know in which ways electoral
participation (if at all as Gilens and Page 2014 argue) moves social policy.
Preference for policy may be a necessary component of policy creation, but
it is not sufficient. In a democratic state, it must be backed by electoral
pressure - i.e., demand. While the crowd may certainly not be efficient or
even necessarily completely aware of the proper policy course of action (es-
pecially in the case of contentious social policy decisions),“we cannot go the
next step and conclude that collectively-decided allocations...are inferior to
individually-decided market allocations” (Inman 1987). Political participa-
tion remains an essential component of representative policy formation.
2.1 Review of the Literature
The United States supplies a particularly useful, if not cruelly ironic, case
in point. On the one hand, its foundations are built on the assumption
of political rights; on the other, the realization of these rights constantly
engender threats to the status quo. In the early years of the republic, indus-
trialists pained over the prospect of Jefferson’s political experiment, leaving
the English historian Thomas Macauley to allege that the time would come
when the US would run out of land to expel the raucous, disaffected, labor-
ing classes. The US, in Macauley’s view, would suffer not least because of
the congestion of inequality and labor shortages, but because the “unwashed
multitude possessed the ballot and therefore the political power”, which in
the end determined the ability to submit the poor to state (and particularly
police) control (Huston 1983:38). The connection between labor, class, and
the vote (which will be discussed further in chapter 4), has remained central
to the American experience.
Political equality has many facets: equal rights, equal capacity, equal
voice, equal chance. Voting in general is the lowest common denominator in
the game of political inputs; it is “the political act least dependent on skills
and for which the opportunity to act is most clearly presented to the citizen
at election time”(Verba 2003:665). Allowing access to the vote is one matter,
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ensuring citizens participate is another. It is widely accepted that voluntary
participation is positively correlated with socio-economic status. Wealth-
ier and higher educated individuals vote at consistently high rates (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995; Wolfinger 1980; Verba 2003), while economic
adversity decreases ones probability to turnout on election day (Rosenstone
1982). Education, in particular, plays a pivotal role in participation. How-
ever, because differentials in education are themselves related to the quality
of educational institutions created from previous policies, it is endogenous to
participation. Indeed, previous work has shown that cross-national variation
in educational spending is a function of the median voter (Garfinkel, Rain-
water, and Smeeding 2010).
Despite these disparities, electoral participation remains essential. It is
a basic capability in that it facilitates the ability to acquire other desired
goods and outcomes which themselves can then be translated into further
capability promoting policies (Verba 2006, Sen 1985, 2000). Of all the inputs
delivered into the black-box of policy making, it remains the least reliant on
socio-economic status. It is also the most difficult input to target covertly.
Indeed, hidden disenfranchisement is extremely difficult to hide, given the
personal nature of the exercise of the franchise. Opponents of full turnout
must tread carefully, and strategically.
The basic nature of the vote, then, makes it a significant indicator of how
polities are performing, and how much of the policies enacted are represen-
tative of the will of the masses or of the control of the few. The reserve
army of the electorate is overwhelmingly and universally located at the lower
ends of the socio-economic spectrum. Where the poor are more important
to political actors (i.e., when their votes form a real and meaningful force),
programs aimed at basic needs are more likely to show up on the policy
agenda (Verba 2003). All this leads to a playing field which is far from level,
meaning that the median voter is not the median citizen. She is more likely
to have greater wealth at her disposal, longer years of education, and greater
social status. What’s more, political participation among the needy crosses
racial and ethnic divisions - an ever present issue in American politics and
an increasingly apparent development in Europe.
For the United States, this is an essential point, not least on account of
the traditionally race-based politics permeating American life. While some
racial groups may be observed to participate at lower levels than others, this
is due less to their racial designation than their market position. Accord-
ing to Verba (2003), the relationship of race on participation is moderate to
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weak among the “needy”. Higher turnout rates are almost entirely reliant
on lower class turnout, as the higher strata of society are rarely disassociated
from elections and therefore are at or near their natural limits . A reflex-
ivity of social and political rights emerges in electoral competition. That
is, “socio-economic inequality produces inequality in political voice; this in
turn fosters policies that favour the already advantaged; and these policies
reinforce socioeconomic inequality” (Verba 2003:675). However this is not a
truism, per se. The less advantaged sometimes turn out in droves, the case of
pro-life/anti-abortion movements which mobilize many lower income citizens
is one such example of mass mobilization of this type. Well articulated issues
have the ability to foster participation in the face of the known predictors of
non-participation. Thus, turnout (or lack thereof) is not a foregone conclu-
sion, but it is a function of a vast array of elements which are institutional in
nature. Varying the (institutional) rules of the game affects who will turnout
on election day and in turn what groups will carry the weight of decision
making for policy (Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995).
Non-participation is also driven by pragmatic reasons, and among those
is lack of agreeable candidates. Where candidates do not represent decisive
issues to the voter, turnout may decrease as voters abstain from participat-
ing instead of voting for the least-worst choice. This is particularly troubling
for social policy, as a key campaign issue area amongst the less advantaged
generally and among the worst off in particular. Political actors, pandering
to the electorate, compromise their ideologies to win pivotal votes (Dixit and
Londregan 1998). If the pivotal vote (i.e., the median voter) is left to politi-
cal actors to manipulate at will, a potentially vicious cycle of voter corralling
becomes a dangerous possibility. To put this in simpler terms: where the
avenue exists to depress the participation of a group possible voters, political
actors may reduce their risks by rolling back the electorate which they must
satisfy. This is an issue which some research concerning welfare policy has
(and should) come to consider. Social protection systems must at some point
conform to the will of the people, and the people ought to have a vested in-
terest in the design and implementation of beneficial welfare programs.
2.1.1 Political Participation and Welfare Spending
This leads to the question of how political inputs impact upon social polilcy,
especially in the realm of welfare state programs. In highly competitive races,
the pivotal vote is likely to belong to the less well-off members of society - un-
less of course it is possible to create a floor of the electorate which is income
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determined. Higher income voters already turnout nearer to their natural
limits than the poor. The pool of poorer participants, or non-participants,
is substantially more numerous. Hobolt and Klemmensen (2006) show that
when an executive is under threat of being replaced (i.e., losing re-election),
she is more receptive and beholden to the public’s preferences. Higher lev-
els of contestation, therefore, lead to increased responsiveness by executives.
Conversely, where the executive is under little to no threat, she will not be
motivated to act in the interest of the public at large.
An ideal strategy would be to simply remove the possibility of threat alto-
gether (i.e., the disenfranchisement of Blacks in pre-Civil Rights era Southern
states, residency requirements for traveller groups, or the disenfranchisement
of women in (even contemporary) male dominated societies).1 Therein lies
the use of political disenfranchisement in political communities - the culling
of potentially disruptive or disagreeable preferences. Politicians are not ne-
scient machines. They are strategic actors keenly aware of their surroundings.
They take notice of which citizens are active in the polity and in what ways
these activities affect their own concerns. The support side of inputs plays a
vital informational role in this respect (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Piven
and Cloward 1988). Regardless, real or imagined electoral threat forms a real
(not imagined) force for social policy. The question that should be addressed
is whether or not the extent of inclusive democracy impacts social policy. We
must explore whether the parameters of the electorate make a difference.
The Borders of the Electorate and the Welfare State: This issue
benefits from a large degree of historical work conducted concerning the im-
pact which electoral reform has had on state processes. Franchise extension,
notes Kim (2008), has shaped not just what type of policy welfare states have
adopted, but also the form of that policy. An enlarged electorate in Europe
during the formative years of welfare states (1880 - 1945) increased the prob-
ability of adopting some form of unemployment insurance program; however,
it significantly decreased the use of voluntary programs in favor of compul-
sory unemployment schemes after roughly half of the adult population had
been enfranchised. Under increased enfranchisement, governments adopted
more compulsory insurance schemes which cover all of society, including those
with very little risk of unemployment. As the electorate is enlarged, the risk
1Regarding the success of the maternity bill in the US, Dobelstein (1998: 99) suggests
“what seemed to push the balance of power in favor of the maternity bill was women
winning the right to vote in national elections”.
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portfolio of voters changes and becomes more heterogeneous, making a vol-
untary scheme untenable and compulsory schemes develop (Kim 2008).
Such historical work is complimented further by studies focused on the de-
velopment of US policies and democratic participation. Research by Husted
and Kenny (1997) found that the amount which US states spent on welfare for
the period 1950-1988 was significantly and positively related to the extension
of the vote down the income distribution. In their own words, “eliminating
poll taxes raised welfare spending by 11-20 percent and eliminating literacy
tests...brought about a 13 percent increase in welfare spending” (Husted and
Kenny 1997:76). Special consideration should be give to the non-effect on
non-welfare spending, indicating a potent connection between welfare poli-
cies and democracy. Similarly, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found that (at
the sub-state level) voter turnout has a distinguishable impact on policy. Im-
portantly, this effect is not felt at the level of developmental (e.g., tourism
enhancement projects) or maintenance (e.g, roadworks or utility upkeep) ar-
eas, but is focused on redistributional spending (Hajnal and Troustine 2005,
2010). Thus, while there is evidence that elite voice is given undue weight
compared to those of “modest means” (if they listen to the poor at all (Bartels
2005, Gilens and Page 2014)), the case for a significant effect for participation
on social policy spending remains strong. Significant historical work has also
shown that during the birth of the American welfare state (i.e., the New Deal
era), the presence of (or lack thereof) electoral threat greatly contributed to
the amount which local citizens could expect to benefit from expanded social
citizenship (Fleck 1999; 2000; 2001).
The lack of political power (i.e., the vote), according to Fleck, had a
distinguishable impact on early US welfare spending and policy formation.
Fleck, examining distribution of Federal Emergency Relief Assistance (FERA)
spending during the New Deal era, notes that by limiting the political ca-
pacity of the least well off (i.e, disenfranchising African Americans) “the
. . . political system weakened politicians’ incentives to respond to the prefer-
ences of blacks” (Fleck 1999; 2001; 2002). Furthermore, according to Fleck,
though need had a strong influence on spending, “increasing the level of
turnout by one standard deviation (.072) in a county. . . [represented] an in-
crease of about 16 percent [in relief spending] for the typical county”. Put
simply, areas with more political power, here measured by the franchise,
could expect more relief spending to be distributed to their areas.
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Contentions Among Authors: The findings of those who pursue the
importance of political participation are not without their dissenters, and the
results for the effects on welfare spending are not entirely unanimous. Scruggs
(2007), using unemployment insurance as a measure of state generosity con-
cluded that several of the mainstays which one might consider natural drivers
of social spending did not stand the test. That is, analyzing unemployment
generosity across states (testing union density, democratic control of gov-
ernment, per capita income, unemployment rate, and racial heterogeneity),
Scruggs found that racial heterogeneity was the chief determinant of gen-
erosity. Other authors have removed, or at least obscured, the electorate
from consideration, advancing the centrality of party control of states as a
primary variable in spending allocation. According to Primo and Snyder
(2010), party strength is significantly and negatively related to federal aid
to states and state spending. Specifically, states which are party strongholds
(Democratic or Republican) are less attractive recipients of dollars for aid
or spending. Tighter electoral races produce increased incentives for policy
makers to target distributional goods to important voters.2 In comparison,
others have posited, and in line with the Power Resource Theory approach,
that it is the bias at the polls which produce discernible results. That the
poor turn out less is more relevant for social policy outcomes than whether
or not the rich show up on election day. Hill and Leighly (1992), incorpo-
rating a turnout component and a bias in the turnout component, conclude
that turnout accounts for 16 percent of the variation on four measures of
state generosity for public social spending (AFDC). Similarly, Fellowes and
Rowe (2004) show that income bias in the electorate, among other predic-
tors, has serious consequences for cash expenditures (TANF). Ideologically
liberal states and those with less high-income bias are less likely to set strin-
gent standards on the receipt of benefits (flexibility) and are more generous
with expenditures - reaffirming the pre-PRWORA reform findings of Hill and
Leighly (1992).
Electoral turnout affects the redistribution of income and reduction of
poverty. Representatives obtain and target monies to their constituents in
deliberate ways, and they are under no compulsion or even desire to see an
increased electorate to increase the difficulty of such a task (Martin 2003).
Thus, it is not necessarily in the best interest of political actors to increase
either the borders or the participation of the electorate where such devel-
opments might lead to weakened ability to mobilize the entirety of their
2A contention with Primo and Snyder (2010) is the lack of inclusion of a variable for
political turnout in their analysis.
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supporters. The skew effect of turnout constitutes a central aspect of how
electoral turnout impacts redistribution. According to Mahler (2008), a “1
percent increase in turnout is, on average, associated with a 2-gini-point
increase in redistribution”, explaining 35 percent of the variation (Mahler
2008: 174). “If the lower class makes a relatively strong showing in elec-
tions, it can demonstrate its electoral clout to lawmakers and help neutralize
the natural tendency for states with large lower class populations to restrict
access to welfare programs” (Avery and Peffley 2003:10). That is, “by not
voting, citizens make the jobs of political actors easier by providing politi-
cians a relatively clear way to minimize their workload”(Martin 2003:123).
The tendency of the poorer classes to shy away from the polls due to lack
of agreeable candidates or favorable policies is therefore counterproductive
to their interests. Thus, while some authors have contended that turnout
has no effect on (cross-national) redistributive spending (Iversen 2001; Hu-
ber and Stephens 2001; Gilens and Page 2014), Kittel and Obinger (2003)
find inconclusive evidence to rule out any certain assertions.
Those investigating public participation and policy need bot be dissuaded
from exploring these aspects. Turnout has not only been shown to matter,
but to matter differentially. The evidence from comparative welfare stud-
ies has shown a clear impact of the type of parties which are elected into
office, however those parties act within electoral environments. Political par-
ties must be put in context of the larger environment they act in. That
is, party matters when there is a competitive environment, but not without
(Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002). For decisions to spend or not to
spend, ideology comes first, and governmental strength comes second (Moon
and Dixon 1985). While the bulk of studies have focused attention at the
national level, there is a more dynamic structure to states, and especially
the US, in terms of redistributive policy making. As former Speaker of the
House, Tip O’Neill, once proclaimed:“all politics is local”. It is sensible then
to attend more to the types of policies which are more apt to influence policy
at the local level, especially when those policies increase the distance between
income groups at the voting booth. Unsurprisingly, competitive races and
more devolved powers of spending coincide with this realization. Using data
from the International City/County Manager Association’s 1986 survey, Ha-
jnal (2010) found that voter turnout matters where races are thought to be
tight. The tighter the race, the more important is the otherwise absent voter.
This electoral threat impacts government spending in the area of redistribu-
tive spending particularly more than in other areas of allocation. Thus, we
see that not only does political participation matter across time and space,
it matters discriminantly for policy areas. This particular force of political
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agency is nourished by one’s situation.
2.1.2 Welfare States and Political Participation
“We get confused because we assume that the fight for democracy
was won a long time ago. . . the battle for democracy is still going
on but has now assumed a new form” Schattschneider (1960:100).
The effect of political participation on the welfare state is only one side of
the coin. Given the theorized nature of political activity and the state’s abil-
ity to manipulate personal (and therefore group) agency, it is vital to model
the reciprocal effect of macro-economic forces on turnout. Such endeavors
are clearly manifested in the expansive literature on economic voting. Voters
are thought to be (a) punitive and rewarding (the disadvantaged electorate
punishes elected representatives in bad times by ousting them from office,
or rewards them for good policies by returning them to office), (b) “gun-
shy” (voters retract from participation because of increased financial burden
and the costs of participation on mental and physical resources), or (c) neu-
tral (the electorate is not discernibly reactive to macro-economic forces and
changes in voter turnout are primarily the result of personal level factors
as the population does not attribute the state to the resolution of personal
economic dilemmas) (Rosenstone 1982). The notion of neutrality of the pub-
lic seems contentious, given that we know that the electorate is not neutral
when it comes to participation (i.e., non-participation is not randomly dis-
tributed), the “punishing at the polls” and the “disengaged voter” positions
remain viable propositions.
While scholars have debated whether or not political participation has
an effect on government spending priorities, the same cannot be said for the
issue of economic adversity and political participation. The consensus among
political scientists is that economic hardship depresses political participation
across the board, with recipients of welfare services particularly less likely
to have their day at the polls (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady 1995). This is, or ought to be, particularly troubling for scholars of the
welfare state, and for instrumental reasons. The design of services impacts
not just on the empirical measurements of the incidence of poverty and/or
labor force participation, they also carry signals to the labor force about their
position in the political-economic super-structure of the state (Schneider and
Ingram 1993, 2007). The psychological stress and demoralization of being
65
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
“down and out” leaves many distressed voters reluctant to participate.
The Ramifications of Non-Universality and Self Reliance: Policy,
and especially social protection policy, carries with it a message in its cre-
ation, design, and administration. Particularly for the US, this is part and
parcel to the perpetuation of the “go it alone” philosophy of the American
ethos. The good citizen is the productive citizen, and that citizen has made
the most of her opportunities. Those who do not contribute should not have
a say in society, in the vein of the atomistic moral view of legitimization
of the welfare state. A message is transmitted to those who are suffering
economic hardship, and especially those who have been made redundant or
lack satisfactory access to the labor market – they are off the team. As much
has been shown in dedicated work on recipient behaviors and attitudes. Sec-
combe, James, and Walters (1998) show how TANF recipients are caught in
a vicious cycle wherein they acknowledge that they are aware of how society
sees them (i.e., as lazy, unmotivated, and devoid of human capital); however,
study participants excluded themselves from this association by a belief in the
uniqueness of their situations. That is, interviewees were unable to perceive
of others in similar situations as similar cases, nor were they accepted by
the non-claimant population. They adapted to the “ideological hegemony”
even when faced with experiences which ought to dislodge this ascription
(O’Connor 2001: 18; Gramsci 1971). Means testing, in this view, is a form
of parasitic stigma for participants which divorces any notion of entitlement
to benefit provision. This is particular troubling for political citizenship.
The belief in entitlement to protection from the market or other risks, notes
Gordon (1994), “is the attitude of citizenship, the essence of independence;
without it we would have subjects, not citizens” (Gordon 1994:288).
The Ramifications of Mutual Security: As a formative institution of
voice and demand, welfare policies - unintentionally or not - impact the de-
liberative capabilities of participants to interact with institutional dynamics.
According to Mettler and Soss (2004), “some policies actively encourage or
discourage demand making”(Mettler and Soss 2004:63). Thus, the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC - a decidedly pro-market program) is designed to
minimize state intervention and thereby distance administration from client
interaction, this has a knock-on effect of diminishing the political agency of
recipients(Hotz and Scholz 2001). The ramifications for this are not inconse-
quential in a representative democracy. Stratifying the interaction with the
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state between income classes produces not only dissimilar experiences, but
also dissimilar messages.
There is a perverse side-effect to distancing the citizen from government
administration in some cases. By and large, social assistance take-up is a par-
ticularly labor intensive activity. Administrators, counselors, and myriads of
inspectors must be employed to certify compliance with social policy. For
the sake of efficiency and the promotion of self-reliance among clients (or at
least deferment of social assistance), governments may reduce resources and
encourage distance between client and administrators. That is, clients are
reconceptualized into abuse risk groups within the system itself, as opposed
to universal standards of treatment. Those who have the most experience
with such situations are not just those least likely to voice these experiences
in the political arena, they are (intentionally or not) conditioned to refrain
from activity by the messages inculcated by such programmatic design (Met-
tler and Stonecash 2008, Soss 1999; Soss and Schram 2007).
The distance created between client and provider, through intentional
restrictions and policy mandates, socializes recipients to perceive of their sit-
uations as deplorable, and (even worse) themselves as inferior citizens. At
the same time, the exclusion of the non-least worst off (i.e., those who do
not meet the subsistence level income requirements to participate in social
assistance programs) from interaction with welfare administration increases
the distance between the general population and the policies which they are
called to support or oppose in the political arena (Soss and Schram 2007).
Means-tested programs must by their very nature impose a stratification of
the electorate. Thus, while it may seem logical that if government wishes to
attack poverty, it should pursue targeting strategies (Goodin and LeGrand
1987), the paradox of redistribution entails that real reductions in inequality
succeed only when the non-poor are brought into the equation as well (Korpi
and Palme 1998). Poverty, and inequality, are symptoms of larger processes
which enable their existence. That is, social policy itself cleaves away citizens
from mutually sympathetic associations.
The Message of Deservingness: The framing of the terms of deserv-
ingness, explicated previously in Chapter 1, forms an added facet of social
policy with implications for political processes. The universality of social se-
curity in the United States, for instance, enables senior citizens to maintain
their cognitive and participatory capacity, as opposed to more demoralizing
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means-tested benefits in the social assistance tiers (Campbell 2003). The
effect of this agency maintaining phenomenon entails constraints for polit-
ical actors. As Campbell (2003) notes, those with vested interests in the
continuation of universalistic schemes (e.g., senior citizens) are not limited
by the stigma of receipt; this may be a more poignant issue for conservative
(Republican) representatives with large numbers of interested voters (i.e., el-
derly) within their districts. The features of universalistic policy as a force of
decommodification are also seen at play in such areas. Consider that decid-
ing to participate is a luxury good that the affluent have time and resources
to take advantage of, and additionally are solicited by the major parties in
the US. It is here that universalistic policy structures come into play in the
political arena.
Because universalistic schemes create a floor both financially and socially,
their effect is a stabilization of political agency not replicated in the means-
test programs. Political parties set out to mobilize those who have not just
the ability, but the will to use their vote.3
The universalistic nature of social security bucks the trend in the resource
perspective of voting behavior by illustrating the stabilization and partici-
pation effects decommodification has on political agency (Campbell 2003a,
2003b). Strategically, legislators have increasingly ignored popular approval
for increased taxation to fund social programs which they may benefit from
in the future and instead listened to more affluent interests disfavoring social
policies. By cutting back financing options, conservatives have possibly been
able to lock the spicket of funding for social welfare programs which might
otherwise create a ratcheting up effect (Campbell and Morgan 2005; Huber
and Stephens 2001).
Trickle Down Participation: Voters, who do vote (Kumlin 2004 ), are
motivated to a large degree by their sociotropic concerns(i.e., concerns about
the larger economic environment). These sociotropic perceptions, especially
in lieu of objectively informative inputs, are informed by default by one’s
3Not surprisingly, many conservatives fervently attempt to block movements to simplify
and expand access to the polls - voter ID legislation, curtailing early voting policies, and
de-funding voter outreach programs are but a few strategies. This is most particular in
America where both parties cater to the median voter; whereas in Europe, left wing parties
play a substantial role in mobilizing the poor (Kohler 2010). Where the poor are mobilized
in the US, it is often by faith-based organizations which reinforce (primarily protestant)
moralistic preferences.
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personal experiences. These personal experiences are in turn informed and
reinforced by one’s position in the social hierarchy. Thus, the dominant view
of the worthy voter is one which is very much based on one’s value in the
market, value which trickles down to the lower ends of the income distribu-
tion through various modes of communicative channels. This facet of policy
design has at its core an underlying moral message from the top of the in-
come distribution. The strings attached to receipt of means-tested benefits
are as moral as they are economic, in turn creating the political aspect of
such policies. Individual responsibility and rationality are assumed charac-
terstics of all persons, including (and detrimentally so) those most affected by
commodificaiton. The tenants of homo oeconomis demand that citizens be
in control of their own choices and their own fate, and as such atomizes the
relationship between market failure and remedial efforts (Garland 1981 ).4
Citizens also vote retrospectively based on their sociotropic concerns (e.g.,
national and regional economic situations), their ideological position in re-
lation to available candidates or parties (i.e., voters choose candidates close
to their own policy preference set), and their resources - or what Lewis-Beck
terms “patrimony” (voters with more assets vote differentially than those
without) (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 2011; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011).
That is, voters may take on the same value of the national well-being,
however they diverge on how to achieve that national well-being. Positional
voting leads to different voting with votes going to those parties which most
closely represent their policy position. Patrimony, an alternative measure of
class defined as ones available assets, plays an important part in selecting
voters into a more right-wing vote (i.e., the Republican camp). All of these
facets are interconnected with where one falls on the spectrum of income
distribution in society and how the state reacts to mediating (or not) com-
modification. The welfare state offsets positional starting points.
This message is brought firmly to the fore in a powerful analysis by
Schwartz, Blackstone, Uggen, McLaughlin (2009). Using the Youth De-
velopment Survey (YDS), the authors investigate variant types of welfare
provision on political participation. The authors are able to measure actual
participation rates (not reported rates) and control for past participation.
In the midst of one of America’s most progressive states, stigmatized/means
tested welfare programs were significantly related to depressed political ac-
tivity across time. Importantly, this effect is seen only in voter turnout
rates, not volunteerism; whereas those who received non-means tested bene-
4This holds for welfare as much as it holds for criminal policy, as will be discussed later.
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fits showed no significant differences from non-welfare recipients in terms of
participatory activities. The “welfare effect” may not be all encompassing.
Rather, it may have a discerning characteristic which is particularly virulent
for electoral participation. It should be noted, and will be shown further,
that political participation is not a panacea for all policy choices; it does
not effect to a noticable degree decisions regarding shopping mall zoning or
whether to increase imports of oil from particular foreign states, for instance.
The impact of political participation is felt at the level of welfare policy, and
welfare policy itself impacts upon political participation - not discernibly on
areas such as volunteerism. With the evidence that public welfare policies
are indeed consequential for political participation, we are left with a prob-
lem of pin-pointing just how such an effect imposes itself on citizens. That
is, in what ways ought we measure policy in order to disentangle detrimental
from beneficial effects.
Understanding the Mechanisms: We presuppose that politics are re-
sponsive to electorates or their preferences. This is a particular issue in
utilizing expenditure as an outcome variable for welfare effort. As noted
previously, increasing expenditures across dissimilar social protection sys-
tems will produce dissimilar results. It is thus the design of the system,
and therein its constituent programs, that remains important. According to
Mettler and Soss (2004), to understand the feedback effect of policies, we
need to know the exact character of these policies. We need to know what
elements are conducive to political participation and which are deleterious.
When we understand the mechanism, we can understand how processes may
be manipulated to serve particular ends.
The myriad of regulations and bureaucracy attached to means tested poli-
cies in the name of “value for money”, for instance, correlate with a series of
rituals of power (Staples 1997) which further demoralize and create a situa-
tion where programmatic choices stimulate unwanted benefits. That is, such
designs can promote a situation where eligible citizens bypass benefit claim-
ing and depress take-up rates, further legitimizing “tough love” conservative
policies as successful (Orbach 2006). However, in order to change such poli-
cies, citizens must be mobilized to hold those in power accountable. Indeed,
the system itself must be receptive to such preference articulation for such a
result to be possible. Since, as Olson (2006) shows, we cannot rely on partic-
ipation to cure the lack of participation among the least well off, scholarship
must focus on creating institutions which create beneficial feedback effects.
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However, the connection between welfare policy and political participation
need not be necessarily direct. It may be that the experiences which social
policies enable play a decisive role in mediating not only preferences, but also
their articulation. Such a circumstance is argued to be inherently measured
with metrics designed to capture the degree of inequality in a population.
Inequality as a variable: It is clear that scholars of the welfare state,
and especially political actors, must pay greater attention to the external-
ities which policies create for areas other than the market or endogenous
measures of policy success. It is useful to forward a further matter in the
discussion of political inputs and outputs - that is, the measurement of the
problem itself. Measures of inequality, and specifically incomed inequality,
provide one such measure. Inequality as a dependent variable is, arguably,
a straightforward affair. The differences between incomes can be measured,
as can the differences in a multitude of other areas. As a dependent vari-
able, inequality is not a particularly difficult concept to grasp. However, the
operationalization of inequality as an independent variable is quite another
task. The debate on inequality and political agency takes on two areas of
research. Scholars tend to focus either on the relationship between public
opinion and inequality, or on political participation and demand - the two
are related but separate areas of inquiry. Whereas scholars of public opinion
find mixed results between the relationship between increases in inequality
and support for more welfare spending (Kelly and Enns 2010; Taylor-Gooby
1982, 1983, 1985; Svallfors 1995, 1997,2004, 2011), scholars of participation
frequently cite the vast disparities in participation rates and income levels.
While universal welfare states have discernible differences in attitudes in
support of welfare policies, liberal welfare regimes (with high levels of in-
equality) show little class specific attitudes. According to Svallfors (2004),
this is possible as the liberal market economy of the US (for instance) has
not politicized the class differences in policy, as compared to other states,
which is corroborative of the perceptions of means-tested beneficiaries to-
wards other recipients noted earlier. The relationship of class differences in
voting, however, is somewhat more uniform. Lower income classes vote at
lower rates than the higher income in the developed industrial economies,
though most noticable in the US. It is the degree to which these rates differ
that forms the primary question for many researchers.
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2.1.3 Inequality and Participation:
Inequality has become a standard measure of welfare state effort and polit-
ical mobilization. While inequality and voter turnout at the state level in
the United States has been explicitly investigated at least since 1972, schol-
ars have recently begun to investigate the intricacies of these two aspects of
American life in more detail. For the US, several studies have found that
state level inequality is significantly related to democratic share of the vote
after controlling for both state- and period-fixed effects (Galbraith and Hale
2006). In addition, how much states incorporate their citizens, or do not
exclude, affects political activity as well. Using supplementary welfare pro-
vision in the United States (i.e., food stamps), Plutzer (2010) found that
states with higher inclusivity had much lower political inequality (i.e., bias
in electoral turnout) (Plutzer 2010). Moreover, inequality has been shown to
diminish the capacity to actively participate in civic activities. Solt (2008)
shows that not only does (monied) inequality lead to inequality in turnout,
it also depresses both interest and discussion of political issues. “Inequality
saps the will to conceive of ambitious solutions to large collective problems”
(Packer 2011).
States might adjust their priorities to optimally reduce inequality, espe-
cially if doing so might improve the representativeness of the democratic pro-
cess. However, attempts at state intervention to reduce or relieve inequality
will likely encounter opposition from interests which benefit from the exis-
tence of such inequality.5 As Tilley (2006) suggests, a concerted “political
program to attack, subvert, bypass, or buy off [opposing] interests” may be
required to pursue inequality reduction policies (Tilley 2006:22). Addition-
ally, party platforms are themselves contingent on an interaction effect of
inequality and likelihood of lower-class mobilization. Left parties move to
the left (relative to the center of political gravity) when participation by the
lower income groups can be expected. In the absence of this, left parties have
a tendency to move to the right with their right party counterparts (Pon-
tusson and Rueda 2010) - a matter explored further in chapter 8. As such,
the ability of left parties, and the policies they espouse, to maintain their
position are compromised by demobilization of lower class citizens and they
drift away from policies amenable to their situations. It would be erroneous
however, as Solt (2008) argues, to assume that the issue of redistribution
is on the agenda in the first place. It is plausible that in the absence of
5As Dobelstein (1998) notes, “it was not until 1965 that there was sufficient [political
support] from older citizens to overcome the opposition of the organized medical commu-
nity” to medicare.
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decommodification and presence of punitive means-tested policies (thereby
increasing the cognitive stress on the poor), inequality further limits the in-
centive of political participation by removing options from the agenda.
Taken together, these inter-connectivities entail that welfare policy, polit-
ical participation, and inequality form a palpable force. To investigate these
concerns, an in depth analysis of the United States at the sub-national (i.e.,
state) level is carried out for the years 1992-2008. This analysis explores
a tri-partite relationship wherein policy change in the previous year (T-1)
affects the experience of voters who then either participate or abstain from
participation at year (T). This participation or lack thereof then informs the
subsequent (T+2) formation and implementation of policy which informs the
next round of experiences of the electorate.
2.2 Data and Methods
The analyses in this section follow from the documentation that (a) politi-
cal participation impacts welfare state development, while (b) welfare state
(institutional) design impacts political agency (e.g., political participation).
The approach here is based on three separate regression stages which utilize
data from various sources compiled into a unique data set for the 50 states
of the US, spanning the time period 1992 to 2008. Variable descriptions are
also located in appendix 9.3.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the path diagram tested in the following sections.
Financial data is taken from the US Census Bureau’s (USCB) State and
Local Finances database. The data has been combined to form a time-series
cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset covering 16 years and all 50 states. This data
gives the reported revenue and expenditure for each state across the entire
universe of revenue and expenditure categories. The main variables of inter-
ests are expenditure categories. Within this category, I focus on those labeled
as welfare functions and those whose function relates to welfare provision.
That is, though unemployment, for instance, is not included under the re-
porting category of welfare expenditure, it is used with this function in mind.
Furthermore, aggregate state and local finances are used instead of state
or local only. The decision to proceed with the combined data was taken
after consideration for other variables used which are not available at the lo-
cal level. The advantage of using disaggregated local or state fiscal data lies
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Figure 2.1: Path Diagram of Welfare System and Political Activity
in the fact that states devolve some responsibilities to local authorities and
maintain some taxing and spending powers for the centralized state level.
High spending for cash benefits in one state may not necessarily be compa-
rable with similar spending in another due to the fact that one may devolve
the majority of spending responsibilities to the local authorities, thus leaving
discretionary powers at the level of the local instead of state levels.
While it would certainly be advantageous to exploit this aspect of the
data, a current lack of corresponding political data prohibits making good
use of such expenditure. As such, I have reverted to use of the aggregate
estimates. To compensate for this shortcoming, an expenditure “burden” of
each state on each spending variable of interest has been calculated. States
are given values ranging from 0 to 1 depending on the share of the overall
contribution to the total amount of resources used between local and state
authorities to provide the given function. Also, as the USCB reports current
prices in their accounts, I have taken the shares of of revenue and expenditure
derived by (a) dividing the amount financed and spent by function from the
total general revenue of each state at time (T), as well as (b) the share
of expenditure by function of total direct expenditures. This alleviates the
necessity of accounting for inflation over time and changes in prices across
regions - that is, as shares, the data reports the percentage of total effort
that a state devotes to each function and not the dollar amounts it spends.
Data has also been taken from the USCB on demographic variables. Political
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variables, such as share of numbers of Democrats versus Republicans in office,
are taken from the USCB statistical abstracts for each year. These are used
as a check against data from the University of Kentucky’s Center for Poverty
Research (UKCPR). Data from the UKCPR is integrated which provides
information on state level AFDC/TANF rates, unemployment rates, benefit
expenditure limits, benefit caseloads, and minimum wages for both state
and federal levels. Importantly, this data provides the means to assess the
generosity of states across space and time. The analyses are divided into
political participation and spending (2.2.1), state spending and inequality
(2.2.2), and inequality and political participation (2.3.3).
2.2.1 Political Participation Effect on Spending
This research follows similar studies that have explored the impact of political
participation on welfare spending. As Mule (2001) noted, “the budget is the
skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies” (Mule 2001:6).
Personal preferences aside, in situations where the poor turnout to vote at
higher rates, political actors (through the logic of universalizing/broadening
campaign promises) may amend their strategies and take on more pro-welfare
spending stances. That is, those who wish to win election and stay in office
will face the threat of electoral pressure to adapt policy in favor of those with
greater possibility to be or become welfare clients. Therefore, I hypothesize
that:
• H1: If welfare systems are sensitive to electoral turnout variation, I
expect a positive relationship with the amount a government spends
on welfare spending as a proportion of their overall expenditure budget
and voter turnout at T-2.6
Directional Influence: Determining causal flow is laden with complica-
tions, and this analysis is no exception. Directional flow between turnout and
redistribution relies on the assumption that institutions are (a) responsive
to turnout, and (b) that this relationship is not bi-directional. That is, re-
distribution, according to the literature on the effects of the welfare state on
turnout, intrinsically implies that turnout (and of course public opinion) is
6Budget and policy are large ships and do not move so quickly. It is also conceivable
that these processes take even longer since many budgets are made in 2-year intervals.
Therefore I use a lagged turnout variable of 2 years to estimate the effect of increased
turnout on budgetary outlays. I also test for the effect which turnout might imply for
benefit generosity.
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an endogenous variable impacted by welfare institutions. This proves prob-
lematic, to say the least. Fortunately, however, a portion of this dilemma
has been resolved by Mahler (2008: 174-175). Applying an instrumental ap-
proach, Mahler confirms that, cross-nationally, the causal direction of voter
turnout for welfare spending (redistribution) is from turnout to redistribu-
tion. Given the voluminous literature on the theoretical direction of turnout,
I proceed with the assumption of causality in the theorized direction.7
For the turnout and spending analysis, eight categories of spending are
taken as dependent variables: three Formal welfare programs: Cash bene-
fits, Vendor payments, Other payments ; and five non-formal welfare pro-
grams: Health, Hospital, Assistance and Subsidies, Corrections, and Un-
employment.8 To control for other possible explanations, I include a De-
mographic variable to account for the racial heterogeneity of each state
- percent black ; a Collective Bargaining variable - union density - to
account for the degree of organized labor interests; one variable for Urban-
ization -population per square mile - to control for densely populated states;
two Demand variables - unemployment rate to account for increases in de-
mand for expenditure related to the labor market and AFDC/TANF rate to
account for pressures on state resources; two variables to account for the Ide-
ological make-up of states, citizen ideology and institutional ideology(Berry
et.al. 1998 ); two variables which measure Partisan Control, the share of
Democratic control of the House and Senate in each state; and a final control
variable for Federal, the percentage federal monies of a state’s general rev-
enue. These variables most closely recreate other studies investigating similar
issues of electoral competition and public spending (Browning 1983; Moon
and Dixon 1984; Hill and Leighley 1992; Fording 1997; Jacoby and Schnei-
der 2001; Barrileaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Martin 2003; Fellowes and
Rowe 2004; Bartels 2005; Avery and Peffley 2005; Ross 2006; Scruggs 2007;
Mahler 2008). Additionally, some analyses makes use of a lagged dependent
variable to account for the possibility that state spending is a function of
previous levels of state spending (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001).
7The analysis here is taken with a degree of caution. Even with causation primarily in
one direction, causality in the opposite direction can bias estimated coefficients.
8Definitions for these variables are available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/local/definitions.html
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2.2.2 Welfare Effects on Inequality
Data and analysis for the effects of public spending on inequality are rather
more straightforward than the preceding operationalization for the effect of
political participation on welfare spending. Data used for these analyses
come from the same TSCS dataset, however the analysis here also includes
the measure of income inequality in a state at year T. Such an effort is com-
plicated by two primary reasons. First, data on the actual distribution of
income inequality over states is, surprisingly, still in its infancy. This stems
from the nature of data collection in the US and across states. Second, be-
cause data for inequality measurement comes primarily from the Current
Population Survey (CPS), a degree of caution is necessary when deliberating
the coding of income levels. “Top coding”, as it is referred to, may bias in-
come inequality estimates down. Also, there is no sure method of taking into
account the myriad of taxation schemes and transfer methods used across the
US simultaneously - though the work of Saez (2013) has gone some distance
to unravel these complexities.
The USCB reports decennial gini coefficients for states, however a more
reliable source of data was sought out for this analysis. While it might also be
useful to utilize the Theil index of inequality, which is more sensitive to top
incomes and decomposable by region into between and within region inequal-
ity, the gini measure has been adopted as the preferred reporting variable.
This measure is less comparable or intuitive for the purposes at hand. I use
two measures of income inequality for the analysis, one of which is used as an
aside for the main analysis. This aside gini data comes from the University
of Texas Inequality Project for the years 1992 - 2004. Years following 2004
are then supplemented with reports directly from the USCB. These measures
are for pre-tax and transfer incomes, and as such measure the initial earnings
inequality of states. The second (and primary) gini data comes from John
Voorheis at the University of Oregon. Voorheis utilizes a “best behaved”
series that incorporates information from three sources: the March CPS, the
Decennial Census (connected via cubic spline interpolation) and the Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS), where each component with data for a given
year is given equal weight. All three sources are top-coded in the public use
microdata, with an extension applied of the Jenkins et al (2009) generalized
beta multiple imputation method, adapted to state-level data. The CPS,
ACS and Census microdata includes transfer payments, but earned income
is reported as gross (pre-tax) income. The inequality measures are for the
household level, where household income has been deflated by an equivalence
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scale equal to the square root of the household size.9
The analysis here tests whether transfers, sensitive to electoral turnout,
significantly impact the reduction of income inequality captured in the Voorheis
estimates. If so, it goes one step further to understanding the path of de-
pressed electoral participation and public spending outcomes. That is, I
hypothesize that:
• H2: Those areas of spending which are positively affected by elec-
toral participation will negatively effect associate with inequality, post-
transfer, controlling for other factors.
In addition to the spending variables under consideration, I control for the
density of the state’s population (assuming that larger populations will in-
crease the likelihood of income inequality by increasing the diversity of di-
vision of labor), the prison rate per 100,000 (assuming that the removal
of bread-winners from the community will contribute to decreased earnings
and aggrevated inequality), per capita income, whether a state is in the
south/southeastern region of the US (given historically high levels of incomed
inequality and rural populations based around agricultural economies), per-
cent black (controlling for racial heterogeneity which may or may not lead to
discrimination in the labor market), and union density (collective bargaining
agreements which may affect income outcomes).
I include those variable which are most directly targeted to welfare of
registered recipients. Correctional spending is included as only supervised
populations are the beneficiaries of the budgetary outlays for correctional
spending.10 Unemployment is targeted specifically to the insured popula-
tion or workers, and as such increased spending on this area should predict
less post-transfer income inequality. Cash transfers are expected to produce
negative effects on inequality, while vendor spending is likely to produce
increased inequality since it is an indirect benefit which is not designed to
mitigate inequality but rather the results of inequality. The same can be
said of correctional spending - what I term as reactive institutions. Other
spending is not hypothesized to have any effect, however is included to com-
plete the formal welfare category variable listing. The results are presented
9As reported by J. Voorheis
10That said, the dynamics of correctional spending are highly contentious. For one,
prisoners - who account for 1/3 of the supervised population across the US - are not
accounted for in labor or census surveys. As such, it is controversial whether to include
this variable as a predictor of income inequality as the beneficiaries are not receiving a
benefit as such. None the less, I include this variable to investigate any potential impact
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in Table 2.3.3.
2.2.3 Inequality Effects on Political Participation
The literature on inequality and voting is an evolving one. For one, there
is a strong consensus that economic hardship differentially impacts voters at
different parts of the income distribution; however, how and why this is so
remains a bit of a mystery to be reconciled. This thesis takes as its point of
view that the manner in which policy makers attempt to resolve inequality
shapes the participatory and ideological nature of the electorate. Thus, the
measure of income inequality in a society post-tax and transfer constitutes
a crude but effective measure of how governments attend to the needs of
their constituents. A more adequate measure would investigate the degree
to which various programs stack up against each other after accounting for
program delivery, benefit levels and types, and eligibility requirements - e.g.,
the Social Policy Indicator Database (SPIN). Under this assumption, changes
to welfare eligibility and generosity shift the burden of proof for assistance
away from firms and towards the individual. As income inequality is mea-
sured at the household level, increased burdens on households are expected
to be captured by this coefficient. For this analysis, I hypothesize that:
• H3: Higher levels of post-tax income inequality at T-1 will associate
with lower levels of political turnout at T.
To investigate the impact of inequality on voting behavior, and hence
the realization of inequality reduction through welfare related spending, I
use the Voorheis gini coefficient as my main explanatory variable with other
variables as controls. The independent variable is the turnout of the voting el-
igible population at time T. The main explanatory variable is the post-transfer
income distribution per state. Additionally, I control for factors which have
been shown to increase one’s probability of participating. As individuals who
are wealthier and more educated are more likely to turnout on election day
(Verba, Schlozman, and Key 1995; Lijphart 1997), the percentage of 25 year
olds and above who report some or more college/university to the USCB and
the per capital income of the state are included. Population density (popu-
lation per square mile), population stability (change in population from pre-
vious year) and population heterogeneity (percentage state population which
is black)are included as demographic controls following Geys (2006).
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Union density is included to control for the possibility that unions, aside
from their collective bargaining capacity, also perform a mobilization role.
It may also be the case that as the electorate becomes more politically and
socially liberal, their tendency to voice their concerns are also increased. As
such I continue to use the citizen ideology variable. Given the entrenched
culture of real or perceived discrimination in the former Jim Crow states, I
include a control for South, which is supplemented with a variable controlling
for the degree to which states are rigid in their electoral institutional setting
- a measure of a state’s level of felon disenfranchisement is included which
is equal to 0 for no restriction on felon voting to 5 for state that restrict all
felons and ex-felons from the vote. As Lewis-Beck et al (2011) illustrates,
voters are, among other things, concerned with the state of the economy,
and vote both by the pocket book and by the national state of the economy.
To account for economic downturns, I include a measure of unemployment
which differs from the previously used measure as it measures the unem-
ployment rate in the month before an election. Finally, I include a dummy
variable to account for presidential elections which are known to raise turnout
substantially. A separate model is then run with a lagged dependent variable
to control for turnout in the last election as a measure for path dependency.11
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Political Participation Effect on Spending
Formal Welfare Spending
Table 2.3.1 reports the results from the pooled regression analyses using panel
corrected standard errors. Typically for studies of this type, most researchers
utilize a standard corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent variable
(LDV) (Beck 2001). However, since these methods have been argued to sap
other explanatory variables of their power (Huber and Stephens 2001), I have
opted to reserve such a method for those models where the variable of inter-
est shows initial signs of promise. Three out of four of the regressions on the
specified welfare categories refute the hypothesis that voter turnout at T-2
has any statistically significant impact on spending allocations as measured
by percentage share of total expenditure. These are discussed first.
11Note that the lagged dependent variable is the election turnout at T - 4 years to
account for the nature of presidential and mid-term elections.
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General Welfare: Results for general welfare expenditures reveal no sig-
nificant effect of participation on the share of expenditures spent on overall
welfare functions.12 Union density plays a significant and negative role for
spending, while population density has a significant and positive effect on
general welfare spending. This may indicate that as states urbanize, citizens
come into more frequent and closer contact with social problems which create
demands on some forms of welfare spending. This would fit with the signifi-
cant and positive effect of citizen ideology on general welfare spending. Per
capita income, conceptualized as the wealth of the population, is significant
and negatively associated with spending on general welfare. While greater
wealth is theorized to lead to increased ability to afford public spending on
services, these initial results are contrary to this line of argument. However,
confirmatory results are borne out once the dis-aggregated spending cate-
gories are analyzed.
12Cash assistance paid directly to needy persons under categorical programs - Old Age
Assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and any other welfare programs.
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Both measure for partisan effect on spending (the share of upper and lower
houses controlled by Democrats) are significant, in line with the literature,
however in opposite directions. A 1 Std.Dev. increase in Democratic repre-
sentation in the lower house (approximately 16 percent) increases the share
of spending on general welfare by roughly a .25 SD. Unexpectedly, increased
representation in the upper house decreases spending by half that rate. Fed-
eral funding as a percentage of overall general state revenue is positively and
significantly associated with general welfare spending. The percentage of the
state’s population which is Black has finds no significant effect on general
spending.
Cash Benefits Despite these discouraging findings for voter turnout on
general welfare spending, the model for cash expenditures is statistically sig-
nificant and in the hypothesized direction (i.e., positive). Of the predictor
variables used, AFDC/TANF rate has a substantial and significantly positive
effect on spending on cash benefits as a share of total expenditures, while
per capita income has a positive effect on spending. This is in line with what
would be expected. States with more resources are expected to be able to
finance more redistribution, as increased wealth may also mark less strain on
resources. Turnout is the only other predictor variable to have a significant,
and positive, effect on cash spending at roughly .10 SD. Interestingly, and in
contrast to much of the literature on state spending on welfare, percentage
black continues to have no significant effect on cash spending. Additionally,
citizen and institutional ideology, as well as the share of control of govern-
ment by Democrats, have no significant effects. The amount which states
receive from the federal government in transfers also appears to play no sig-
nificant role in cash spending.
Vendor Payments: The results for vendor payments are markedly dif-
ferent from cash benefits.13 Union density, per capita income, and the rate of
AFDC/TANF recipients are significantly and negatively related to spending
in this category. Population density, citizen ideology (social liberalism), the
unemployment rate (p<0.10), share of Democrats in the lower house, and
the proportion of revenue received from the federal government are all sig-
nificantly associated with vendor payments. Voter turnout, percent black,
13Payments made directly to private purveyors for medical care, burials, and other com-
modities and services provided under welfare programs; inclusive provision and operation
by the government of welfare institutions.
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institutional ideology, and the share of Democrats in the upper house are not
significantly associated with vendor payments.
Other Spending: Other spending, that is spending on all other wel-
fare needs not covered in the previous categories, appears more related to
cash spending than vendor payments.14 AFDC/TANF rates, union density,
and citizen liberalism (socially) are significantly and positively related with
increased spending in this category. Per capita income, institutional ideol-
ogy, the level of unemployment, and the share of Democrats in the upper
house are negatively associated with increased spending. One might assume
that because this category is a conglomeration of rather non-specific areas
of spending (e.g., transfers to administration and services not covered by
the previous two categories), that this area would be largely insulated from
public pressure.
Functional Welfare Spending
These welfare programs are, however, not the sole means by which states re-
distribute resources to citizens. In addition, states provide for hospital care,
health, housing, unemployment, and cash assistance accounted for in local
level efforts. Additionally, I include correctional expenditures to investigate
welfare system expenditures. This facet will be explained in detail in the fol-
lowing chapter; suffice to say, correctional departments across the US (and
internationally) provide many comparable welfare maintenance programs to
their clients. The interpretation herein is complex, however in order to as-
sume that the services provided by the correctional services of states are to
be viewed as a component of aggregate welfare system provision, it would
seem counter to this claim to omit this area from analysis.
I expect that those areas which provide broad benefits will be affected by
electoral turnout. By contrat, areas of spending which are highly exclusive
should not exhibit a reaction to political participation. Specifically, I expect
that hospital expenditure will be insulated from electoral politics, as the
expenditures reported apply primarily to administrative capacity and other
areas which would not be overtly on the agenda of political competition.15
14Payments to other governments for welfare purposes, amounts for administration,
support for private welfare agencies, and other public welfare services.
15Administration is also affected by technological capital and other improvements which
may increase costs for particular components while being offset by reductions in others.
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I expect that voter turnout will not have any substantive effect on correc-
tional spending, but for different reasons as these programs are set by policy
decisions made “behind closed doors”. This is not an ad hoc rationalization.
Correctional budgets are autonomous from other welfare provision budgets.
Judging from the findings of cash benefits, I expect to find similar results for
assistance and subsidies, as this area represents direct expenditure to con-
stituents and is highly correlated to the categorical area of cash benefits - that
is, assistance and subsidies make up cash benefits to recipients and as such
this is in a matter of sense a redoubling of the analysis on cash benefits. No
impact is expected on unemployment, as these programs are insurance based
and do not represent the same nature as cash benefit redistribution programs.
Given that health care expenditure is likely to reflect more so the demand
for medical treatment and factors less likely to rely on electoral threat, I do
not expect this area to be significantly related. That said, I do expect that
political ideology of the states, that is the degree to which electorates are
more politically liberal, and the share of Democratic Party control of govern-
ment (excluding the governorship) to have a positive and significant impact
on spending across categories including corrections. Two analyses are shown,
with only the predictor variables for unemployment and corrections altered
to reflect their explicit beneficiaries. AFDC/TANF rates are substituted for
corrections and instead include a measure of total supervised population per
100,000 voting age population. For unemployment, I drop AFDC/TANF
rates and only maintain the included unemployment rates. Tables 2.2 and
2.3 show the panel corrected standard error pooled OLS regressions.
The results for the non-formally delimited welfare programs are telling.
Across categories, voter turnout shows, as expected, only significant effects
with assistance and subsidy spending and, surprisingly, correctional spend-
ing. Because the measure of voter turnout is based on the eligible population
which excludes disenfranchised (ineligible) offenders, it cannot be that an in-
crease in turnout entails a decrease in offender populations, though this may
well travel together. That is, my measure of voter turnout is ”insulated”
from overlap with felon populations. Citizen ideology is a significant pre-
dictor of share of expenditure across all but two categories, corrections and
unemployment, with institutional ideology filling in where citizen ideology
falls short.
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Table 2.2: Functional Spending and Political Activity (1)
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Table 2.3: Functional Spending and Political Activity (2)
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Hospital Spending Citizen ideology and heterogeneity of population (as
measured by the percentage of the population which is black) are the strongest
relative predictors (standardized betas of -0.450 and 0.416 respectively) of
hospital expenditure.16 Share of the lower house represented by Democrats,
unemployment rate and federal revenue all contribute positively to hospital
spending. Population density contributes, as with citizen ideology, to less
spending on hospitals. This may signify a tradeoff between investment in
operations and that of health, which is predicted by citizen ideology.
Health Spending: Only three predictors proved significant for health
expenditure in the model tested.17 Citizen ideology, union density, and the
share of the population which is black are all positively and significantly re-
lated to increased spending on health spending p<.01. However, the strength
of the model is considerably weak (r2 = .097). A more specified model would
benefit from inclusion of a myriad of variables to account for research and
development costs, education programs and so forth. From the results here,
it seems evident that what drives spending on the formal welfare programs
is largely separate from health spending across states.
Correctional Spending: As mentioned earlier, correctional spending is a
contentious area, and one which is not covered in welfare system literature.18
One exception is Paul Norris’ examination of public order and safety (see
Castles 2007; Ch.6). However, Norris’ focus does not include expenditures
within corrections, but rather their macro-social determinants. Chapter 3
points out the current flaws in welfare accounting for correctional institu-
tions, many of which must necessarily be dealt with to gain an accurate
picture of this area. Model 3 shows that racial heterogeneity of states have a
significant and positive effect on correctional spending. Additionally, union
density and federal spending have significant negative effects on correctional
spending, while institutional ideology and per capita income both have posi-
tive effects. Unexpectedly, voter turnout has a negative effect on correctional
spending which is significant at p<.05. This finding is explored further in
the lagged dependent variable subsection. However, it may suggest that a
16Financing, construction acquisition, maintenance and operation of hospital facilities,
provision of hospital care, and support of public or private hospitals.
17Outpatient care including public health administration, research and education, cate-
gorical health programs, treatment and immunization clinics, nursing and environmental
health activities, and other general public health services inclusive school health services
provided by state agencies.
18Confinement and correction of adults and minors.
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more engaged citizenry and electoral threat play a role, though small, on
restraining expenditures on corrections. This relationship holds when the
total supervised population is included into the model.
Unemployment: As expected, voter turnout at T-2 has no impact on
spending for unemployment.19 Institutional ideology, union density, popu-
lation density, and the unemployment rate are all postively associated with
higher levels of spending on unemployment. Percentage black, per capita
income, and (rather surprisingly) the share of the lower house represented
by Democrats are negatively associated with spending. This holds even
when unemployment rate is the only measure of demand (i.e., when the
AFDC/TANF rate is dropped).
Housing: Looking at housing expenditure, there remains no significant
effect of turnout or any of the political variables asides from citizen ideology.20
Percentage black, union density, per capita income, rate of AFDC/TANF
beneficiaries and federal revenue are all significantly and positively associated
with higher housing benefits. Unemployment is the only negative predictor of
housing expenditure. This however makes sense, as housing and development
are largely state funded programs, and as such it would not be expected that
political actors have much discretion at diverting these funds to constituent
pressure.
Assistance and Subsidies: Finally, looking at assistance and subsidies
provided by states, there is a significant and positive effect of turnout on this
category.21 This is in line with my expectations owing to the results from the
analysis on cash benefits. The effect of turnout is reproduced in this model.
Union density plays a more significant, and negative, role, while the share
of the upper house represented by Democrats is negative. AFDC/TANF
rate per 100,000 is strongly associated with increased spending, while citizen
ideology is also related to higher spending.
19Payments made to beneficiaries under basic provisions of unemployment compensation
programs and special program payments, such as extended benefits triggered by economic
conditions.
20Construction and operation of housing and redevelopment projects, and other activi-
ties to promote or aid housing and community development.
21Cash contributions and subsidies to persons. Local government: Direct cash assistance
to public welfare recipients. State government: veterans’ bonuses and direct cash grants
for tuition, scholarships, and aid to nonpublic education institutions.
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Lagged Dependent Variable Analysis
Having fleshed out which programs are most sensitive to electoral turnout, I
run an additional set of regressions using lagged dependent variables (LDVs).
The LDV approach is widely used in comparative welfare state and political
analysis (Beck 2001). Because of its tendency to “knock out” the explana-
tory power of other independent variables (Huber and Stephens 2001), it
has been reserved to thresh out the significance of voter turnout where it
has been found in the non-LDV analysis. I therefore run three additional
analysis which attempt, in essence, to invalidate the effect of turnout on my
dependent variables. While this by no means entails that the effect of turnout
is no longer significant if negated by the LDV regressions, it does provide a
check for robustness of my assumptions.
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As table 2.3.1 shows, the effect of voter participation at T-2 for cash
spending (both cash benefits and assistance and subsidies) remains after in-
clusion of the respective LDVs. This washes out all other effects, leaving only
the turnout variable as a significant predictor of cash benefit spending. The
results for corrections removes the significance of voter turnout, and shifts
the significance of population density to better than p<0.10. Additionally,
the significance of Democrats in both houses of government are now signifi-
cant at the p<0.05 (House) and p<0.10 (Senate) level.
Turning from these results, I now turn to the analysis of an alternative
measure of potential electoral effect on welfare systems. The results to this
point indicate that cash spending is partially predicted by electoral turnout
at T-2. However, this aggregate measure of welfare masks an important fea-
ture of different welfare systems. States receive federal block grants under the
1996 PRWORA reforms which they are able to use, with some restrictions,
largely at the discretion of the state governments. This provides a valuable
proxy by which to judge how electoral participation is related to welfare
outcomes.That is, by employing these methods, it is possible to calculate
(roughly) how generosity within programs relates with political participa-
tion.
Welfare Generosity and Political Participation
Continuing under the assumption from previous research that political par-
ticipation and inputs are directional into welfare policy, I extend the analysis
by focusing finally on the effect of electoral turnout and other variables on
the benefit level of AFDC/TANF for a family of four as a percentage of the
federal minimum wage at full-time hours (40 hours per week). The same
variables are chosen for this model as the previous analysis on spending.22
This information is not reliant on the data obtained from the USCB, and is
solely based on analysis from the UKCPR data with own calculations. As a
percentage of the federal minimum wage, it provides a standardized measure
of states against a single level. States have uniformly migrated from direct
cash transfer to vendor payment methods. Table 2.3.1 illustrates the potent
impact which voter turnout has on cash benefit expenditure and the generos-
ity of that benefit. Union density, per capita income, citizen ideology and the
AFDC/TANF rate all play positive roles in benefit generosity. Percentage
22An alternate specification was performed with the exception of Alaska due to the
disproportionate impact which oil revenue and citizen subsidies have on spending. Results
did not vary significantly and are available on request.
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black significantly decreases benefit generosity.
Figure 2.2: AFDC/TANF Benefit as Share of Full-time Employment at Fed-
eral Minimum Wage
Using the LDV panel-corrected standard error model as proposed by Beck
(2001), I find that, controlling for other variables, electoral turnout contin-
ues to have an impact at the level of generosity in policy decision while the
previously significant factors all turn insignificant, while democratic share of
the two houses and federal revenue enter as significant. After inclusion of
the LDV, the main political variables make up the significant predictors of
cash benefit generosity, with both lower and upper house Democratic rep-
resentation becoming significant in different directions. States with higher
electoral turnout at T-2 have more generous spending levels holding all other
variables constant.
The robust results for electoral effect on cash spending, the consistent
significance of political ideology both at the institutional and citizen levels,
and the importance of party control of legislatures confirms the assumptions
of previous works concerning the importance of political factors in welfare
spending in the face of both demand and resource explanations. Having ex-
plored these relationships with alternate specifications, I now turn to analysis
of these categories of spending on the reduction of post-transfer income in-
equality.
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Table 2.5: State AFDC/TANF Generosity
(M:20) (M:21)
Generosity GenerosityLDV
Turnout 0.161** (2.35) 0.054** (2.16)
Perc. Black -0.303*** (-5.42) 0.010 (1.05)
Union 0.269*** (5.64) 0.000 (0.02)
Pop Density -0.124*** (-2.88) 0.015 (1.30)
Per Cap Inc 0.346*** (3.89) -0.024 (-1.00)
Cit. Ideology 0.127*** (3.48) -0.019 (-1.11)
Inst. Ideology -0.049 (-0.97) 0.004 (0.30)
Unempl. Rate 0.009 (0.23) 0.008 (0.42)
House Dem -0.080 (-1.56) 0.044** (2.21)
Senate Dem 0.066 (0.91) -0.036** (-1.97)
AFDC/Tanf 0.388*** (4.63) -0.026 (-0.96)
Federal -0.048 (-0.90) -0.034* (-1.79)
LDV 0.985*** (46.72)
R2 0.665 0.975
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Beginning with an initial analysis of the formal welfare programs, I have
isolated that the impact of electoral participation at T-2, a time which allows
for budgetary policy making process to be enacted, significantly impacts wel-
fare spending on cash and correctional spending. Using a lagged dependent
variable approach to wash out ”weak” variables, I find that electoral partic-
ipation remains the most consistent predictor of expenditure as a share of a
state’s total expenditures in terms of non-demand variables. This serves to
answer one part of the path explained in Figure 2.1. The next sections pro-
vide analysis for the subsequent pieces of the puzzle. That is, the following
sections investigate the effect of welfare spending on income inequality, and
the subsequent effect of income inequality on political participation.
2.3.2 Welfare Spending and Inequality Reduction
Moving to the analyses of welfare spending on post-transfer income inequal-
ity, I set out 4 models. Model 1 includes the control variables (all of which
are significant at the p<0.001 level, aside from union density which is signif-
icant at the p<0.05 level) and the main categorical and functional spending
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variables of interests. The results indicate that spending on service oriented
spending - corrections and vendor payments - are positively associated with
higher post-transfer inequality, while those which focus spending on cash
spending are negatively associated with post-transfer income inequality -
unemployment benefits, cash benefits, and other. All are significant at at
least p<0.10 or better.
Model 2 presents results from including the burden of expenditure of
spending programs between state and local governments. It is the share of
state level spending as a percentage of total spending between governments.
Thus, higher values indicate more centrally organized (at least by expendi-
ture provision) spending programs, while lower values indicate more local
autonomy. Unemployment is not included as it is unitary across states (i.e.,
an overwhelmingly state level spending program). These variables suggest
that the degree of centrally organized spending programs have, across the
board, significantly negative relationships with post-transfer income inequal-
ity. The inclusion of these variables reduces the significance of unemployment
on inequality. This provides an interesting development in the interpretation
of the effects of these centralization variables. It suggests that the degree to
which state level governments have control over their spending processes, as
opposed to devolving such control to local authorities, is significantly related
to the state’s ability to reduce income inequality.
Model 3 reports the results when the spending categories are omitted
and only the degree of centralization remain.23 The non-significance of un-
employment remains, however the strength of the centralization coefficients
are weaker than the previous model. Model 4 then uses a multiplicative in-
teraction term for the spending categories, asides from unemployment, and
finds a significant effect of the interaction variables on gini reduction. That
is, in the states where cash benefits are responsive to voter turnout, inequal-
ity reduction is most responsive when the two work together. Both cash and
other spending are negatively associated with post-transfer inequality, while
vendor and correctional spending are positively associated with post-transfer
gini inequality. 24 The results here validate the expectations that cash spend-
23I do not specify a LDV model for this analysis as I have not found theoretical evidence
that a previous year’s level of inequality would necessarily predict a rise or fall in the
following year. It has thus been omitted from consideration.
24For corrections, as the dynamics of what is exactly included on all the budgetary
spending in this category, this seems to indicate that in some way correctional spending
effects those outside the correctional supervised tier. How this might be, and indeed if it
is so, is a matter which is left for future investigation.
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ing is a significant, and electorally dependent, variable in the reduction of
incomed inequality; supporting the proposition of the path model presented
earlier.
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2.3.3 Inequality and Political Participation
Finally, I investigate the assertion that inequality affects voter turnout. As
I put forth, I hypothesize that the experience of income inequality, and the
institutions which are conducive to it, affect individuals’ probability of vot-
ing, of which the actual measure of inequality is a proxy to perceive of these
effects. It is the experience of inequality (institutional and social) which give
the process much of its weight. A more adequate research agenda would cer-
tainly benefit from a more qualitatively defined set of measures which oper-
ationalize the capacity increasing or decreasing aspect of welfare institutions
and the impact on electoral participation - the work of those scholars invest-
ing into capability approach modes of analysis (e.g., Amartya Sen) comes to
mind. As I have suggested previously, and as others have diligently illustrated
(Campbell 2003; Soss 2002; Soss, Fording and Schram 2011), it is likely that
the experiences which the poor have with the state (or even forego having
with the state) form a part of the negative relationship with political activity.
Inequality travels uneasily in universal-redistributive institutional envi-
ronments, it is thus logical that the level of inequality, especially post-tax
and transfer performs as a proxy of this environment.25 Measurements of in-
equality have had a large amount of heavy lifting to do, and it is impressive
that they have accomplished as much as the bulk of the literature indicates.
As such, I expect (despite the arguments against inequality as an explana-
tory factor for turnout; for a critical assessment see: Stockemer and Scruggs
2012) a significant effect for inequality following transfers with the advanced
measures provided by Voorheis (forthcoming).
The operationalization of these models were conducted against a back-
drop of extensive scholarly debate on the importance of particular variables in
determining turnout (e.g.,Verba, Schlozman, and Key 1995; Lijphart 1997;
Geys 2006; Galbraith and Hale 2006; Schneider and Ingram 1993, 2007).
As such, only two of the hypothesized predictors, union density and citizen
ideology, failed to achieve significance in Model 1. Presidential years elec-
tions, per capita income, unemployment rate just before an election, felon
disenfranchisement laws, and the share of the population who have college
education are all postively and significantly related to turnout. Of these,
the level of felon disenfranchisement seems the most out of place. However,
considering that the measure of turnout here is the eligible population, this
finding is in line with what should be expected. It would stand to reason
though that by removing potential low-turnout voters from the voter pool,
25Currently post-transfer is the only accessible measurement at hand.
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states are essentially creating artificial distortions in turnout rates - reducing
the denominator of voting age electors.
Table 2.7: Effects on Voter Turnout of Eligible Population
(M:26) (M:27) (M:28)
Union -0.053 (-1.21) -0.077* (-1.92) -0.074* (-1.96)
Cit. Ideology 0.060 (1.51) 0.073* (1.74) 0.065 (1.47)
Unempl. Rate 0.113** (2.08) 0.178*** (3.39) 0.153*** (2.86)
Presidential 0.674*** (9.75) 0.696*** (11.12) 0.958*** (8.58)
Per Cap Inc 0.151** (2.26) 0.207*** (3.62) 0.166*** (2.84)
Pop. Change -0.172*** (-5.86) -0.177*** (-6.04) -0.128*** (-4.51)
Pop Density -0.201*** (-6.03) -0.169*** (-5.14) -0.131*** (-3.42)
South -0.129*** (-5.33) -0.072** (-2.45) -0.045 (-1.55)
Felon Dis. 0.043* (1.92) 0.054** (2.13) 0.046* (1.93)
College 0.161*** (4.53) 0.172*** (4.68) 0.111*** (2.93)
Perc. Black -0.179*** (-5.08) -0.125*** (-3.51) -0.071* (-1.74)
Post-Trans. Gini -0.240*** (-6.08) -0.145*** (-3.63)
LDV 0.368*** (2.96)
R2 0.732 0.764 0.801
Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Model 2 tests for the impact of the post-transfer gini coefficient. As can
been seen in Table 2.3.3, the introduction of the gini variable is significant
and negative for voter turnout. In addition, introducing this variable makes
both union density and citizen ideology weakly significant (p<.10). Finally,
Model 3 attempts to “wash out” any weak variables by adding the LDV to
the specification. Only citizen ideology and the dummy for South fail to
reach significance with the included LDV. The model is exceptionally strong,
accounting for approximately 80 percent of the variation in turnout across
states.
2.3.4 Summary
This chapter has laid out a conceptual model for the reciprocal path of po-
litical participation and welfare state effects. I have theorized that instead of
simply an indicator of income distribution, the measure of income inequality
represented by the (post-tax) gini coefficient represents a proxy by which
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to track the ebb and flows of policy movements. It has been shown that
the effect of political participation on welfare spending, in contrast to find-
ings by Huber and Stephens (2001) at national levels, are significant and
positive at the sub-national level for cash benefit expenditures. This is cor-
roborated by Toikka et. al (2004) who also found that decisions to allocate
resources towards cash spending were primarily politically in nature. It would
seem premature then to rule out political participation as a non-starter in
discussions of welfare state dynamics. Second order effects of political par-
ticipation may also be apparent in the impact of democratic seat share in
government, itself dependent on electoral competition. That is, where voter
turnout/electoral threat is not directly instrumental to service policies such
as vendor payments, there is considerable evidence that the offices of policy
makers who sign off on decisions are sensitive to electoral participation. It
is viable that their agency filters and even diminishes the first order effects
of electoral threat. As such, it is not outside the realm of reality that the
variance of cash expenditure, even at the level of nation states, is to a degree
a function of the political participation of the (working aged) electorate (See
Castles 2009 for variance of cash expenditure cross-nationally).
Secondly, this chapter has shown that the effect of welfare policies on
inequality after transfer distribution is significant and variant over spending
categories. While spending on cash and other spending are significantly re-
lated to decreases in post-transfer income inequality, the service spending
category of vendor spending is significantly and positively associated with
inequality. Clearly all spending is not created equal. In addition, the results
on spending and inequality illustrate that it is not only the amount of money
which states spend on these areas which matter for income inequality reduc-
tion, but also the centralization of these policy responsibilities which help
predict reduced inequality measures. That is, the degree to which spending
is concentrated at the local level affects the effectiveness of welfare spending.
This is enticing to say the least. It would suggest that the degree of devo-
lution for autonomy for welfare spending to the various authorities at the
local level creates a democratic paradox. While communities demand more
control over the way they spend their welfare dollars, increased local control
of spending may accentuate inequality. The multiple veto points inherent in
localizing welfare administration resonate in this account. I find ample room
to support this approach from the Power Resources Approach (Immergut
1990; Jochem 2003).
Finally, this chapter shows that, in contrast to Horn (2011) and Stockemer
and Scruggs (2012), income inequality does appear to have significant effects
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for democracy. This is reasonable as redistributive politics likely take time
to manifest themselves. Where Stockemer and Scruggs find that “income
inequality does not have much impact (substantive or statistical) on turnout
in Western countries”, I find that it does have a significantly positive effect at
the sub-national level in the US. This holds even after utilization of a lagged
dependent variable intended to “wash out” the predictive ability of the main
independent variable (i.e., Post-Transfer Gini). The findings of Stockemer
and Scruggs may be due to the variable sample which the authors employ,
or perhaps the level of aggregation masks the extent to which inequality op-
erates at the lower levels of government (i.e., an ecological fallacy). In any
case, these findings satisfy the theoretical assumptions of the reflexive citizen-
ship approach proposed by Olson and the components of citizenship which
Marshall and others have long argued. This chapter has shown that (H1)
political participation does not affect all areas of public spending equally, but
rather is concentrated on areas of spending that are distributed directly to
constituents (i.e., cash benefits). In turn, (H2) cash benefits are associated
with reductions in incomed inequality by both aggregate spending measures
and more detailed generosity measures. The reduction of incomed inequality
(H3) is associated with increased electoral turnout, which most likely stems
from a greater showing by lower-income constituents. It stands for future
research to investigate such relationships at the same or even more disag-
gregated levels of authority. The prospect for larger comparative research of
local level authorities nested within state typologies looks promising. Such
an endeavour remains outside the scope of this work.
One further matter remains from the analysis: the interaction of correc-
tional spending and inequality reduction.That is, as the amount of spending
increases for correctional services, the level of post-transfer inequality in-
creases as well. Institutional populations are not counted in labor market
surveys, nor are they present in their communities. However, as inequality
produces environments which are conducive to social unrest and criminality,
the increase in expenditure would be considered a result of such increase in
policing efforts in the face of lean social protection institutions. This brings
to light a substantial issue (or rather non-issue) in the current agenda of
general welfare state research. Aside from passing commentary on the corre-
lation of correctional populations and inequality, the services which correc-
tional agencies provide have largely been ignored as concerns welfare systems.
This, as I will lay out in the next chapter, is both theoretically and prac-
tically unwarranted. As such, welfare state scholars have lost out in fully
interpreting welfare system dynamics because of the omission of this insti-
tution in the general field of inquiry. As I will explain further in chapter 3,
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correctional institutions have a distinctive place in welfare systems and are
not inconsequential for our understanding of how many political economic
developments have come to pass, especially for the United States. For the
argument I present further in this thesis, that of the fundamental role of
political rights in redistributive policy making, the clientele of correctional
spending programs comprise one of the least understood groups in political
science, let alone welfare state research. I examine first the theoretical de-
bates surrounding correctional systems, and then forward my argument for
its inclusion into welfare systems as a formal structural component.
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Incorporating Corrections Into
the Welfare State
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have outlined the explanations and justifications for
welfare states and their intersection with political agency. Chapter 1 has
focused on the the definitional aspects of welfare states, the ways in which
their formation have come to be studied, and key streams in interpreting
how to legitimize state intervention on behalf of citizens. Importantly, this
chapter introduced the areas of moral and political justification for state ac-
tion. These two areas often interact to produce conjoining policy outcomes.
Of these, this thesis has focused increased interest on the political agency
aspect of welfare state legitimization. Following from the growing field of
feedback-policy research, this area emphasizes the role which welfare states
have on shaping the very political inputs which form the basis for policy man-
ufacturing. Thus, in chapter 2, empirical tests were conducted to ascertain
to what degree such a conception of the relationship of political agency and
welfare states would hold up. As opposed to a direct relationship of policy to
politics, or politics to policy, this chapter posited that (in fact) the path to
political feedback is only partially available through policy institution. That
is, chapter 2 defined the relationship as one in which the state makes pol-
icy which either negatively or positively affects spending in particular areas.
Of these, direct cash benefits (as both shares of aggregate state expenditure
and in terms of comparative generosity) were shown to associate (negatively)
with the measure of gini inequality. This state of inequality, explored in the
final analysis, impacts the citizen negatively - reducing political turnout at
the state level.
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These steps in the thesis form the background theoretical basis for explor-
ing the focal point of this research - the en masse political disenfranchisement
of criminal offenders. However, before such an analysis can be presented,
one further theoretical challenge remains. That is, citizens of this status
are rarely, if ever, conceptualized in terms amiable to the political economic
research agendas inherent in the field of political sciences - and much less
so as pertains to the narrower field of welfare state studies. This chapter
disputes this omission and presents a detailed case for (re)inclusion of social
corrections into formal welfare system accounting and mainstream academic
analysis.
As Frances Fox-Piven has so rightfully noted, “we really should continue
to [the] inquiry about what welfare does, how it’s related to labor markets
and which programs are the welfare programs after all. . . is it also the penal
system?” (Fox-Piven 2012). This introduces a rather taxing issue for the
task at hand. Correctional systems have been (by and large) the domain of
the criminological sciences and scholars of penal and legal policy. Rarely do
scholars of the political sciences, let alone those of the welfare state, pursue
issues in this area. While it has occurred - notably Marie Gottshalk (2006),
Vanessa Barker (2009), and Jonathan Simon (2007) - it is certainly not an
issue commonly explored through the political economic lens of welfare state
studies – though it may be surveyed as a minor side comment.1
The disciplines of welfare state research and penal/correctional scholar-
ship, though long divided, have begun to emerge as functional compliments
to uncover the role of political economic developments and social policy in
the management of disadvantaged groups. In line with the innovative work of
Nicola Lacey, David Downs, Lo¨ıc Wacquant and others, this chapter presents
a theoretical framework for such inclusion biased heavily in favor of the po-
litical economic research arena of the welfare state.
Rather than overlaying worlds of “prison states” on existing typological
accounts, this work proposes a framework for reconciling redundant research
agendas to the benefit of multiple research areas. It argues that welfare and
penal policy have not come to form a unified policy regime at governing the
new advanced marginalized populations as a result of emergent advanced
1Addressed in some detail in Castles (2007), the issue is rarely in scholarly work, and
remarkably absent from other compilations of welfare state anthologies and readers, with
exceptions of where it forms a location crime deterrence - see Castles (2007).
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market fundamentalism policies. Rather, penal policy is and has been indi-
visibly connected to the welfare state as it is a functional component of the
system – what I term as the social corrections tier. 2
Outline of Chapter: I first address central arguments pertaining to the
increasing use of punitive sanctions via social corrections (Section 3.2), and
argue that one of the more controversial areas amongst these explanatory
theses, that of racial control (3.2.1) yields to more operationalizable, po-
litical economic explanations (3.2.2) (e.g., employment patterns, education,
social spending). The goal is not to argue that the issue of race is either
irrelevant or inconsequential. Rather, I forward that while racial prejudice is
a phenomenon in the US, its use as a malleable variable is limited. These is-
sues are addressed while recognizing claims that the changes to policy in the
United States since the 1970s has come to form a new form of governance
over the most disadvantaged in society. I also investigate the assumption
that the decline in AFDC/TANF recipient rates across time has coincided
with welfare reform policy, finding a changing relationship with enrollment
and incarceration rates at the state level.
Section 2 specifically addresses arguments which consider the punitive
movement in policy to be a genuine and new phenomenon. I argue that it is
unnecessary to recast correctional institutions as new or novel compliments
to the ascendant neo-liberal state. I argue that the neo-liberal policy trans-
formation over the past four decades has affected both welfare and penal
policy alike because the two are indivisible components of a single welfare
system. In as much, I trace key points of the neo-liberal trajectory and raison
d’eˆtre, to not necessarily the creation of market friendly institutions, but the
conversion of communitarian ones into traversable obstacles. In as much, this
section has variable crossover with arguments laid out previously in chapter 1.
Section 3.3 looks at the burgeoning cross-pollination of ideas, notably
within the field of correctional studies, and examines claims of connections
2I thank the participants at the Howard League for Penal Reform conference at Oxford
2013 for their insightful comments regarding this topic. Specifically, I must strongly em-
phasize that as the term “social corrections” is a contentious phrase, it is used throughout
this work to describe the place of correctional systems within the welfare state institu-
tional structure. As such, the term “social” is used as a signifier of institutional placement,
while “corrections” implies not corrections to the individual for any socially or politically
defined “deficiencies”, but rather to the concept that this institutional setting operates
to correct for institutional failures outside of the individual but in which s/he ultimately
must inhabit.
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between punishment and the macro-political economic institutions of the wel-
fare state. This section turns to the level of cross national comparisons, as
opposed to the predominantly US focus of previous sections. I first illustrate
the accuracy of claims by others that nations cluster not just on political eco-
nomic patterns, but also on punitive variables. This relationship is largely a
matter of governmental willingness and ability to alleviate monied inequality.
Examining disaggregated welfare options across time for the US, I illustrate
that the relationship of social programs with crime rates (property and vi-
olent) have changed in the post-PRWORA era. Governments which devote
a larger portion of their resources towards the reduction of monied income
exhibit lower rates of incarceration . In addition, I show that it is likely the
extent to which inequality is brought under control (i.e., pre- vs post-gini
scores) that contribute to clustering regime typologies. This section then
returns to the US to illustrate similar findings at the subnational level.
Section 3.5 argues for a (re)incorporation of correctional systems with
welfare systems. Penal systems should be brought directly into a frame-
work of welfare state studies to increase understanding and comparability of
welfare providing institutions. This calls for the incorporation of penal sys-
tems into welfare accounting (in both financial and participation definitions),
which I have conceptualized using an adaptation of the framework provided
by Titmuss (1965) and Abromovitz (2001) (3.5.1). I show that this tier of the
welfare state, using the United States as a working model, is an area which is
almost entirely left to the direction and resource allocation of the individual
states - notably with clientele who have no voice in the political arena to
negotiate their treatment. This entails that because their political voice is
muted directly by political disenfranchisement, and indirectly through the
mechanism laid out in chapter 2 (i.e., depression through punitive welfare
policy feedback loops), the distortion created by omitted demand registra-
tion is greater than would otherwise be the case. As chapters 6 and 7 report,
these preferences are significantly biased towards more government interven-
tion, particularly in the social protective areas of public policy.
Finally, I provide a descriptive analysis of the workings of this area us-
ing a case study of the state of North Carolina, exploring the dynamics of
correctional spending allocations and program participation (3.5.2). While
inexhaustive, it is an initial step towards a more comprehensive assessment
changing activities of social corrections - not addressed in the current debate
on welfare states. By citing ballooning correctional budgets and growing
populations, media outlets, policy makers, and academics do not accurately
depict the (functional) realities of these costs outside punitive goals. By
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presenting social corrections as a component of the larger welfare state, it
is hoped that, as with some Scandinavian nations, clients of this tier may
be “upgraded” from social science civis non grata to an investigated benefi-
ciary population. Section 3.6 provides discussion points and concludes with
highlights of the chapter.
3.2 Penal System Growth
The analysis of the growth, let alone the function, of correctional incarcer-
ation – especially in the contemporary United States – is a topic of which
the breadth of the matter is only matched by the depth of the scholarship
dedicated to it. A central problem stems not necessarily from the multitude
of functions of the prison, but rather the breadth of theories developed to
account for its growth. One important caveat must be pointed out before
proceeding. The bulk of the work here focuses on one aspect of correctional
systems. This decision is made due to the massive amount of variety at play
in dealing with both community and custodial research areas. Thus, much
of the research presented explicitly reports on custodial issues, leaving aside
community supervision areas. I leave the work in that field to future and
more dedicated research agendas.
What the prison does, from a functional point of view, seems straight-
forward: it is an institution which confines convicted (and on occasion those
awaiting sentencing) offenders to a spatially delimited area to serve out their
allotted sentences. As I will discuss further, social corrections are much
more than this. A primary concern for many scholars in the area of prison
studies is that of the path to prison - that is, who is going to prison and
why. Many notable theories have developed around these topics, and the
key points are discussed herein. I begin, however, with a survey of the topic
of racial disparity. Perhaps one of the most enduring legacies in the US is
that of slavery, and more specifically the centrality of racism. It seems ap-
propriate, therefore, to begin the analysis by addressing racial explanations.
A complete survey would surpass the limits of this thesis. Instead, I look
primarily at key works which have provided arguments which revive debate
around the racial correlates of punitive correctional policies. This is followed
by an overview of debates which provide a more contextual analysis of race
in criminal justice.
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3.2.1 Racial Correlates - Hyperghetto and the New
Jim Crow
Racial critiques of the American penal system have been popular rallying
points in both academic and mainstream debates. The disproportionate
number of minorities, especially African American men, under supervision
of the criminal justice system is and has been cause for concern among pol-
icy makers and academics alike (and for good reason). While some view a
different interpretation of the War on Drugs as something other than a war
on minorities, Michelle Alexander (2012) - a leading advocate of the New
Jim Crow (NJC) thesis - is firmly in opposition. Alexander dismisses those
who offer alternative explanations for the war on drugs as anything other
than a new form of racial oppression of America’s African American popu-
lation. In her words, “the triumphant notion of post-racialism is... nothing
more than fiction. . . the mass incarceration of poor people of color in the
United States amounts to a new caste system” (Alexander 2012:1). These
are strong sentiments indeed, and they are reminiscint of Wacquant’s earlier
work (Wacquant 1997a; 1997b; 1998).3
For proponents of the NJC analogy, America’s incarceration growth is
conceived of as a return to the oppressive legislation and social interactions
which consolidated all African Americans into a single group of second-class
citizen, regardless of other factors. While the arguments laid out by Alexan-
der and NJC advocates are compelling, they focus largely on prisons and the
beleaguered welfare system, while providing anecdotal evidence in support
of matter-of-fact racial intent. This analogy, argues Forman (2012), does
disservice to both the subjects of investigation (criminal offenders) and the
tyranny of Jim Crow (Forman 2012). In this view, it is jeopardous to copy
and paste the lessons from the complex rationales and operating logistics
from Jim Crow and apply them where they appear to fit best, especially so
where such use supports an accusation of a new caste system in an entire
country. First, under Jim Crow, the second class citizenship demarcation was
all-encompassing. Low-income African Americans were treated the same as
high-income African Americans. Such blanket segregationist policies did not
discriminate on the basis of income or circumstance.
3To be fair to Wacquant, his interpretation of race, racism and racial domination
across time is so immersed in the complexities of political and economic factors that
racial delimiters (i.e., black or African American) lose nearly all conventional meaning.
It is not clear how important race really is for Wacquant, and as such including this
“thesis” of hyperghettoization risks distorting the depth of his work on political economy
and punishment.
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Secondly, the NJC analogy fails to take into account the punitiveness
of African American communities themselves, perpetuating the alternative
spoiled collective identity of “white America” as irredeemably ignorant of, or
actively participant in, the amplification of tough-on-crime policies (Loury
2002). 4 That is, African American communities are not necessarily victims
of white preference for harsh penalties. If white preferences were concretely
related to punitiveness, in this view, one would expect that a dearth of any
white preferences would lead to an abundance of soft-on-crime policies. This
proposition, then, reduces the agency of citizens to that of racial factors.
Hypothetically, if the solution to more lenient and egalitarian criminal pol-
icy consisted of increased racial parity in government, one would expect that
(given a situation where the power of African American communities was
dominant) we would see quite different policies (Forman 2012).
However, while African Americans occupy such a position in the city of
Washington D.C., Forman notes that criminal policy does not vary the way
advocates of racial prejudice might expect, and in fact mirrors other major
American cities. Compared to Detroit, a predominantly African American
inhabited city in a majority white state, Washington D.C. has higher rates
of adults under criminal justice supervision.5
Of course, some may regard this as evidence that African American com-
munities and their representatives are merely “going along” with punitive
policy trends. That is, this might indicate that African American communi-
ties are merely complicit with tough on crime policies, while in fact disagree-
ing with them below the surface. This certainly may have some support from
evidence of efforts by defense attorneys and practitioners devoted to staving
off disparate racial sentencing rates. However, while legal professionals may
regularly advocate for softer punishments and alternatives to incarceration,
their pleas fall on largely deaf political ears, even in a legislative body domi-
nated by African American representatives. Furthermore, there is no reason
to believe that the average community member who happens to be non-white
4Loury’s spoiled collective identity thesis posits that groups identify with manufactured
stereotypes of racial groupings, which inform their decision making process. In addition,
members of the group may assimilate the characteristics of these ”spoiled” collective iden-
tities, which reinforces the process. This is a bimodal process
5“The Jim Crow analogy, which attributes mass incarceration entirely to the animus or
indifference of white voters and public officials toward black communities...might explain
the sky-high incarceration rates in Baltimore and Detroit, [but] they do not explain those
in Washington D.C.” (Forman 2012:121)
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is less punitive than their white counterpart after controlling for other factors
such as exposure to crime, employment security and satisfaction, education,
and so forth. If the NJC thesis is to hold for areas with extremely high rates
of African American incarceration, it seems that it cannot include the gov-
ernment of Washington D.C. unless the status of “white” is a power status
and not a racial one.6 Here the congruency with the NJC thesis and Wac-
quant’s own approach diverge.
According to Wacquant’s hyperghetto thesis (which has since its original
publication been supplemented and refined), the massive expansion of police
power has come to form a core instrument for the subjugation of precari-
ous low-wage labor from the 1970s on-wards – overwhelmingly focused on
African Americans and other minorities. The prison has come to form the
most recent attempt to isolate and control African American communities
as the most vulnerable of the precariat, ensuring their place as a permanent
sub-proletariat. From slavery (1619 – 1865; slaves as the dominant social
type), to the Jim Crow south and Ghetto north (1865 – 1965, 1915 – 1968;
sharecroppers and menial workers as dominant social types, respectively),
to the modern era of Hyperghettos and Prison (1968 to the present; welfare
recipients and criminals as dominant social types); the American experience
for African Americans evokes despair and outrage (Wacquant 2002:42). This
has been enabled by a “double movement” across welfare and penal systems
to regulate the poor (Piven and Cloward 1972) - to the disadvantage of the
poorer, disproportionately minority, members of society.
While the (black) men of these communities are regulated by the punitive
arm of the state; the wives, sisters, daughters and mothers are managed by
an increasingly stigmatized and punitive social assistance and (inaccessible)
social insurance arm. The prison apparatus is the final effort begun by slav-
ery, perpetuated by Jim Crow, and extended into the 21st century in the
form of the urban ghetto and the emergence of the carceral-assistantial com-
plex at the hand of hyper-incarceration (Wacquant 2001b; 2002; 2008). This
has been accomplished by the paramilitary brand of operations against illicit
narcotics, of which African American communities far outweigh all other af-
fected communities.
6Interestingly, Penner and Saperstain (2013) find that this indeed has some merit.
Social status and race combine to form a type of confirmation bias wherein successful
persons are more likely to be thought of as white: “receiving welfare reduces the odds of
a woman being classified as white, but doesn’t matter for men. Prison time reduces the
odds of a man being classified as white, but doesn’t matter for women” (Munsch 2013)
110
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
While Wacquant places African American communities within the struc-
tural setting of wage labor and institutional arrangements (thereby attaching
one argument on the heels of the other), the NJC thesis does not. This is
not to say that the NJC thesis does not provide an impressive array of re-
search, Alexander and other scholars have done an impressive job of calling
attention to race disparities and the persistence of mass incarceration. How-
ever, it subsumes other relevant details to its main argument- the observation
that African Americans make up a disproportionate share of the correctional
population compared to their share of the general population. Wacquant’s
approach has multiple points which intersect and interact, but are difficult to
disentangle. As I will discuss further, Wacquant’s arguments do not rely on
a single focal point for addressing the rise in punitive social control. Rather,
racial disparities are descriptive of mutating economic class within institu-
tional structures, which gives an enormous flexibility to advanced marginality
(an area Wacquant elaborates on in later works) as an approach. The NJC
thesis is, however, firmly convinced of the explanatory power of racial animus
in society and especially in institutional arrangements.
The main benefactor of the NJC thesis is the argument against the War
on Drugs, and this is borne out in statistics. Much of the NJC thesis relies
on the war on drugs. Certainly, it is difficult to look at the extraordinary
impact of policing for narcotics on minority communities without some em-
pathy with the NJC thesis. Figure 3.1 illustrates this vividly. Taking the
percentage point difference of new court commitments between non-hispanic
whites and non-hispanic blacks to state prisons from 1993 to 2009, the dis-
parity of new commitments for drug offences falls squarely on the shoulders of
African American men. However, aggregation often obscures more elemental
facets of issues. The devil, as they say, is in the details. Using data from the
FBI Uniform Crime Survey, I have disaggregated the numbers for arrest and
new court commitments by offense. First I investigate arrest rates, excluding
drug offences outside drug abuse.
Values represent the percentage point difference of the percentage of each
racial groupings share of their own categories of total offences. For exam-
ple, robbery offences made up .86 percent of all offences charged in 2010. For
whites alone, robbery offences made up .54 percent of all offences within their
racial category. The score for white robbery offences in figure 3.2 represents
the difference of whites from the total share of robbery offenses (i.e., .54 per-
cent - .86 percent = -.32 percent). This captures the relative occurrence of
offences by grouping – white robbery rates are .32 percentage points lower
than the average. Racial grouping by income would provide a more reliable
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estimate.
African Americans are, on average, arrested at higher rates for violent
crimes and “other” crimes than their white counterparts, with whites more
likely to be arrested for violations involving alcohol. Are these arrest rates
translated into more disproportionate punishments? Data is taken from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics to investigate the incident of commitment to
state prisons between whites and blacks by offence category. This decom-
position allows investigation into trends disaggregated from the ambiguous
titles of “violent” or “property” crimes. The composition of commitments
to state prisons of black men in the US remains intractably higher for drug
offences compared to whites. Beginning around approximately 2000, African
Americans began to pull away from their white counterparts for commit-
ments as a result of violent offenses, while the difference for commitments
for drug offenses remains high, but at a declining rate - figure 3.17
Figure 3.1: Disparities in Prison Sentencing 1993 - 2009
Whites continue to make up the lion’s share of commitments for property
offences and public order offences. Notably, the rise in violent crime com-
7Values indicate higher percentages for blacks; negative values indicate higher percent-
ages for whites.
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mitments since 2000 is largely attributable to the increase in commitments
for robbery, with all other violent crimes showing negligent differences be-
tween groups (i.e., less than or equal to 1 percent). Within drug offences,
convictions for trafficking remain the most serious qualifier, at an average of
approximately 7.5 percentage points above their white counterparts.8
Once disaggregated, the main disparity in the rise of violent crime be-
tween groups (at least in terms of commitments to supervisory institutions)
falls into two categories. On average, African American men are 5.5 percent-
age points more likely to face commitment to prisons as a result of robbery,
with white males 3.6 percentage points more likely to be committed for sex-
ual assault not including rape (Figure 3.2). Arrest data from 2010 shows,
with the exception of robbery and gambling, whites made up the overwhelm-
ing majority of arrests for all crimes. However, one could argue that the
rationale for including robbery as a violent crime, as opposed to property, is
misleading. When robbery is disassociated with violent crime counts, arrests
for property crime and violent crime converge.9
In addition, if we were to simply reclassify drug trafficking and possession
in the class of property crime – that is if illegal sales of controlled substances
were considered more a form of “market bypassing” (Posner 1985) – our pic-
ture of property and violent offences committed to state prisons shifts to
depreciate the lead of punished property offences for whites and punished
violent offences for African Americans. In other words, things may not be
as racially skewed as they appear - but skewed none-the-less. Reconcep-
tualization does not put all races on par - non-Hispanic whites make up
approximately 63.4 percent of the population compared to 13 percent for
blacks in 2011 (Census 2012). They are less skewed racially, I contend, be-
cause one must reconcile with factors which are policy driven, as opposed to
8According to UCR: “Violent crimes are offenses of murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes are offenses
of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.” Robbery has been included in
the class of property crimes for this analysis.
9In 2010, the white/black make up for violent crime was 59.3 percent / 38.1 percent
respectively. When robbery is removed from the calculation, that distribution becomes
63.4 percent / 33.8 percent. Property crime arrests, similarly are reported at 68.4 percent /
28.9 percent before, and 66.8 percent / 30.6 percent after robbery is included (FBI 2010).
This is not to say racial disparity is not a cause of concern. While African Americans
were only slightly more likely to be arrested on drug offences (1.73 percent; 2010), their
commitment to state prisons are higher than that of their white counterparts (9 percent).
Whites, however, were committed for property offences 9.8 percentage points more than
blacks.
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Figure 3.2: Disaggregated Commitments to State Prisons - White/Black
static variables such as race or ethnicity. In particular, I refer to the instance
of relative poverty. That is, the instance of poverty in the US is unequally
distributed and this facet of the life-course is much more approachable than
that of race. Nationally, 35 percent of African Americans are categorized as
living in poverty, compared to 13 percent of white Americans (Kaiser 2013).
It is this disparity, as compared to personal or group based prejudices, which
social policy stands a better chance of resolving - at least as far as welfare
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Figure 3.3: Actual and Adjusted Property and Violent Crime Arrests (2010)
systems are concerned.
Certainly, rearranging definitions, and hence data, is a convenient method
of proving any theory one has interest in, and this is much the point I would
like to make. We should ask how much arrests and convictions become inter-
twined with racial explanations because of the classifications used for both
offender and offence. That the drug war affects minorities more than whites
is not disputed. However, it is one thing to attribute the enormous policing
effort to prosecute illicit drug use and sales to racial control and caste estab-
lishment; it is quite another to focus on causal factors of criminal intention
and activity. This point, and the preceding paragraphs outlining it, are not
simply incidental arguments. These factors are central if we are to explicitly
understand criminal offenders and the institutions which operate with and
around them as functional elements of the larger welfare state superstructure.
A substantial portion of the crime problem is a labor market problem,
which is exacerbated by the externalities created by the incorporation of crim-
inal justice policies into this area of policy making (e.g., denial of occupational
licenses and other opportunities, loss of educational grant opportunities, and
so forth); notably by advocates of diminished government intervention in the
welfare sphere. Individuals with a criminal background in the United States
are at a severe disadvantage, especially where racial animus might be embed-
ded in the employer/hiring process. The compounding, vicious cycle effect
that this has on minorities is apparent, with 1 in 3 African American men
carrying a serious criminal record (Wakefield and Uggen 2010). With the
increasing ease of criminal background checks, the barriers to employment
(and the concomitant pressures to adapt to such exclusion) become manifold
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(Lageson and Uggen 2013). Thus, as Bruce Western eloquently frames the
issue, America has a poverty problem, not a drug problem - and it has this
poverty problem because of a welfare system which is unwilling or incapable
(and perhaps both) of decommodifying individuals from the market. That
is, policy “must begin to restore order and predictability to economic and
family life”(Western and Pettit 2010:2), and an effective way of pursuing this
goal is to insulate individuals and families from the effects of a commodified
life.
This leads to a principal concern; that is, how much attention should be
given to race? One cannot change race, and cultural transformations aimed
at reducing inter-group hostility demarcated by racial or ethnic characteris-
tics are undeniably difficult (and perhaps impossible) for short term policy
to address. The NJC thesis, like the hyper-ghettoization thesis, is a com-
pelling narrative, but with considerable policy limitations. Though African
Americans and other minorities make up a disproportionate share of correc-
tional populations in relation to the general population, such a focus itself
tends to discriminate against certain political, economic and social realities.
“The conventional measure of disproportionality is only useful assuming all
racial groups are on equal social footing”(Russel-Brown 1998:29; Wolfgang
and Cohen 1970); African Americans and minorities make up a larger share
of the incarcerated population because of their position in society (Uggen
2007). This is exacerbated by devolution of governing responsibilities which
have coincided with increasingly disciplinary policy regimes aimed at the
poor (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Statistics referencing race as indica-
tive variables can be misleading, calling our attention to visible indicators
of segregation rather than areas of policy which are more readily tenable.
While race is certainly a readily evident variable, its importance should not
overshadow other variables which social policy is able to resolve.10
10This is not to say that segregation is not an area where social policy is removed from.
Indeed, racial and ethnic segregation was endemic in the US before the advent of neo-
liberalism. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HLCO), set up under the Federal Home
Loan Bank(FHLB), spurred increased ethnic and racial spatial segregation, in combination
with the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) – both New Deal programs(Greer 2013;
Hiller 2005). Government officials literally ”redlined” particular areas of cities where
investment was either recommended or discouraged. That is, officials with the help of real
estate experts would, in many cases, literally draw red lines on maps around areas which
were considered not acceptable loan considerations. While secret, these hidden maps were
known to some interests and assumed by others (i.e., private lenders).
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3.2.2 The Poverty of Welfare (Systems)
A vast amount of the literature on the disproportionate impact of tough on
crime policy has focused on African American communities, African Ameri-
can men, and the poor. Even within these studies, a seemingly tacit interpre-
tation of the role which poverty reduction programs play in the amelioration
of criminogenic environments and the overwhelming numbers of poor under
correctional supervision all but elude direct attention. To put this in simpler
terms, the disparities in criminal activity and punishment seem artifacts of
classification. While a large percentage of offenders are black, nearly the en-
tire population is poor.11 Even the war on drugs, undoubtedly a (if not the)
major driving force in increasing punitiveness, focused its massive efforts on
the black market of narcotics and made an “enemy of the poor” (Western
and Pettit 2010). 12 Returning to a proposition made earlier in this work
- if one considers drug trafficking a result of disassociation with the formal
economy – and a form of protest against low-wage, discriminatory labor ac-
tivity – then the dramatic skyrocketing of correctional supervision among
Americans is particularly a problem of regulating the marginalized members
of society who have little alternative to crime and less allegiance to a system
which perpetuates their situations. This is in large part due to the fact that
the war on drugs, and its effect on minority communities, was largely a result
of political maneuvering, devolution, and above all the resurgence of a more
virulent form of market fundamentalism (Tonry 1994). Thus, while the NJC
11This is not to say that there are not gross racial disparities in criminal justice. Mauer
(2011) and others have reported extensive disparities in racial criminalization rates. Even
without racial bias in policing, such bias is perpetuated in other areas of criminal justice
such as bond levels and availability for African American offenders (Hawfield Foster 2008).
However, as with Mauer, I contend that reconciling these issues relies on more political
and economic policy making instead of strictly dedicated race neutral agendas which prove
difficult to operationalize for practitioners and policy makers alike.
12The lessons from the entirety of the formation of the narcotics war is telling in its own
right. “The War [on Drugs]”, according to Simon (2007), “was fought largely from partisan
political efforts to show that Bush and Reagan administrations were concerned about
public safety”. (Simon 2007:27). It is important to note that the groundwork for much
of the Drug War was laid well before the dawn of the ascension of neo-liberals, with the
diligent efforts of Harry J. Anslinger (the first official drug czar) who remained the center
point for narcotic legislation in the US from 1930 until 1962. Anslinger consistently evoked
racist imagery of Mexican outlaws, reprehensible Jazz musicians and psychotic criminals
to create sentiment to pursue a series of legislative moves to prohibit and maximize the
criminality of Marijuana and other narcotics. Ironically, Anslinger himself admitted that
the prohibition of Alcohol had led to the creation of illegal supply chains and markets
– organized crime. The drug trade, and the war against it, had created a “substitute
economy for the populations most affected by the shrinkage of the low-skilled industrial
labor market” (Caplow and Simon 1999).
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and the hyperghetto thesis pick up on these trends, their conclusions may be
so of the symptoms of causes and less the causes of symptoms.
According to Lageson and Uggen (2013), “almost 90 percent of serious
offences reported in the USA concern remunerative crimes”(202). Read-
justment for robbery pushes African American property crime arrest rates
further away from whites, and this is what we ought to expect. These rates
are understandable given what is known of the connection between poverty,
inequality and property offences. Property offences are particularly respon-
sive to income inequality, unemployment and one’s perception of economic
well-being, more so than violent crimes (Uggen and Thompson 2013; Uggen
2012; Cantor and Land 1985; Brush 2007; Rosenfeld and Fornango 2007).
What’s more, relative income inequality is robustly associated with robbery
and burglary (Choe 2008; Brush 2007; Deutsch, Spiegel and Templeman
1992). Add to this that property and violent crime victimization are increas-
ingly concentrated among the poor, as the rich have been able to employ
more risk reductionary measures (e.g., security services, relocation, property
security devices), and stratification of crime is increasingly more a class issue
than a racial issue (Levitt 1999). This is not simply an aspect of American
Exceptionalism. Similar evidence has been found even in the quintessential
egalitarian stronghold of Sweden (Nilsson 2004).
Political Economic Correlates
“Crime is social rather than individual” - Uggen and McElrath
(2013)
A compelling argument which incorporates political economy into its purview
has also been forwarded by Wacquant and others.13 The “advanced marginal-
ity” thesis – what Wacquant sees as a new regime of urban marginality –
attributes increasing punitive policy (and subsequent rising penal trends) to
the close of the Keynesian, Fordist era, and has a definite political and eco-
nomic trajectory to it. It is in line with a branch of research that focuses
on direct political and economic factors (i.e., educational attainment, labor
market activity, social networks,etc). It is an approach which is more policy
friendly, so to speak, and more historically consistent (in an operationalizable
13Wacquant is certainly not the first scholar to incorporate the integration of political
economic developments into the study of penal systems. Here the focus on his argument
of the advanced marginality is taken as an argument which is overlaps with the majority
of other scholars in the field.
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sense) than race based approaches. This advanced marginality is produced
by neo-liberal doctrine and policies emanating from therein. This argument
is one firmly rooted in the analysis of labor relations and the dynamics of
economic inequality. From this approach, one is able to dissect the intricacies
of policy choice and outcomes, of which criminal deviancy is both.
The debate turns, essentially, on the following arguments. The global re-
structuring of capitalism, and the growth of technology, enables producers to
minimize labor at astounding rates and depth. It is characterized by growing
inequality with extreme rewards to the highly educated, technical worker and
the elimination of lower end, unskilled opportunities for uneducated workers.
This is a product of the desocialization of workers by increasing competition
for low-skill employment on one hand, and the reduction of social protection
for losers on the other. Economic growth without socialized employment has
been, and will continue to be, a driver of increased real and relative poverty.
Policy Transformations - Welfare and Penal Changes These macro-
level events are important as they illustrate the significance which policy has
downstream, not least of which pertains to the manner in which welfare sys-
tems must adapt in order to meet the demands placed on it by policy makers
of any ideological stripe. “States do make a difference...when they care to”,
and this is welcoming news for scholars of social policy. States are “major
producers and shapers of urban inequality and marginality...[they] are major
engines of stratification in their own right” (Wacquant 1999b in Crompton
2000: 112). Specifically, welfare state retrenchment and disarticulation are
drivers of inequality. The “triple transformation” of the state – “amputation
of the economic arm...retraction of the social bosom...expansion of its penal
fist”(Wacquant 2008a:4) – as seen in the US, results in a double regulation
of the poor via disciplinary programs and the deployment of the penal net.
This “new government of social insecurity”, according to Wacquant, “does
not mark a historical reversion to a familiar organizational configuration, but
heralds a genuine political innovation” [emphasis added] (Wacquant 2008a:
12). Corrections, and prisons in particular, have found ardent patrons in the
neo-liberal/conservative political revolution. This, unavoidably, leads one
into a more protracted analysis of what exactly neo-liberalism is and how
it operates, a complicated endeavor for even seasoned scholars (Lacey and
Soskice 2013). The epistemic advantage that Neo-Liberal doctrine holds is
that it is itself an un-provable thesis. Here again the moral justifications of
the state are called into the fore with the recognizable Malthusian thought
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experiment - that is, the poor will change when they are no longer protected
(i.e., welfare state retrenchment) (Somers and Block, 2005: 275).
Neo-liberalism, in contrast to the progressive liberalism of the late 1800’s
and early 1900’s which saw the rise of penal-welfarist tradition, is a much
more determined breed of liberalism.14 This is a central feature of the correc-
tional system, its manifest use to cope with changes in upstream policy. The
correctional system, and the prison in particular, provides a useful package
for the creation of the neo-liberals’ desired offenders – homo oeconomis. The
prison works as a sort of magic show for measurement in such a regime. It
can, for instance, conceal “inequality by removing low-wage men from the
labor market” (Western and Pettit 2005:574).15 Thus, gains over a variety
of metrics (e.g., unemployment, wage differentials, voter turnout, and wel-
fare take-up) can be presented to the public as proof of the superiority of
market-oriented policies, while hiding the true scope of the shortcomings of
market friendly policy (Pettit 2012; Shannon and Uggen 2013).
Neo-liberalism Ascendancy and Rising Penality: One may then
question how the rise in such seemingly detrimental policies came to be. A
complete answer to this is more satisfactorily addressed in dedicated works
such as Harvey (2005) and the numerous writing of Wacquant and others
on the subject. However, for the sake of contextualization, I give a only
brief expose´ of the argument as it pertains to welfare and penal policy, the
morality argument having been addressed previously in Chapter 1.
Declining Trust in Institutions The emergence of the policy regime
in the 1970s and afterwards was a hydra of circumstances for which free-
market solutions were seen not as the problem, but as a panacea for social
14However, the state never really retracts, it just moves the furniture. Reality, in the
philosophy of the Austrian-borne neo-liberalism, ought to adapt to theory, and not the
other way around. This is in stark contrast to the previous domestically bred pragmatic
liberalism of the progressive era under Dewey and others who saw theory as a means and
not an end. The pragmatic liberals would certainly not object to complete market control
if it proved itself to be in the best interests of society. They would equally not object
to state intervention and massive redistribution if this proved a better option to govern
society (Thorsen and Lie 2006; Harvey 2005; Andersen. C 1980).
15“Almost invariably, the unemployed have a high probability of being criminalized and
a high probability of being sent to prison. Once they are there, they do not show up in the
unemployment statistics...Crime has become an outcome of dysfunctional and misguided
social policy.” (ILO, 2004)
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disorder and economic distress. Support for such programmatic change re-
sulted from declining trust in public institutions, efforts to decentralize the
state, and a curtailment of protective social policies in favor of restrictive
social arrangements. These facets worked in tandem to perpetuate a system
of organization which is most readily apparent in the social corrective tiers.
As confidence in the penal-welfarist era deteriorated, political elites on the
right, and academic elites as well, began to question the framework of the
rehabilitative ideal.16 The developing conceptions saw the system as pater-
nalistic and robbing the individual of their freedom, rather than specialized
and tailored to the circumstances of the individual as had been the norm
during the formative progressive era. (Garland 2001).17 It called for the end
of deterministic sentencing in favor of uniform rules (to address abuse of local
cultures), the de-professionalization of corrections in favor of more populist
control of criminal policy, and the replacement of specialized treatment with
an overriding focus on efficiency.18
Decentralization and Punitive Politics The US is unique in the
extent to which offices are exposed to the electorate, making greater decen-
tralization precariously meaningful for offices such as school boards, plan-
ning, and (crucially) public order administrations. Political accountability
for public order offices coupled with movements to standardize punishment.
Power to the courts under (low-turnout) elections created two reinforcing
events: First, the diffuse nature of politically elected offices promoted a
“blank check” response by elected officials by claiming to only be acting
in accordance with the demands of constituents. This “governing through
crime” phenomenon encouraged a “don’t blame us” culture among political
actors, leaving many in the lower end of the electorate to ponder the useful-
ness of their ballots (Lacey 2012; Simon 2007). Second, a further message of
standardized punishment disassociated policy makers from the idea of “just
deserts” for criminals, regardless of the socio-economic background of origin
16In 1975, based on the book by Ken Kesey (1962), One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest
epitomized two movements underway. A popular view of mental institutions as oppressive
and intolerable institutions, and criminals who were primarily concerned with circumvent-
ing their punishments by any means and avoiding their debt to society.
17Gottschalk(2006), p.37: “The [Struggle for Justice, a 1971( report by the American
Friends Service Committee)] [charged] that the rehabilitative model perpetuates race and
class discrimination by giving criminal justice professionals, the majority of whom are
white and middle class, enormous power to decide who has been ’rehabilitated’ and who
has not, and thus who is deserving of early release and who is not.”
18It comes as no surprise that calls for efficiency and “consumer choice” are red flags
for opponents of neo-liberal reforms (Larsen and Stone 2011).
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(Simon 2007). The tough on crime rhetoric of “do the crime, do the time”
harmonized with a belief in homo oeconomis, a “rational, utility-maximizing
individual”, allowing the public, academics and policy makers to generalize
“micro-behavior into macro-phenomenon” (Kittel 2006:657).
However, the culpability of these movements cannot be entirely put on
the shoulders of conservative politicians, business interests, or victim’s rights
advocates - all of whom shared in the benefits of streamlined, punitive policy
movements. The academic community deserves to share some responsibil-
ity for the propagation of policy movements as well. The calculus of the
rational actor model of crime, legitimized through research by Becker and
others, (over)emphasized the individual’s capacity to resist vices. That is,
individuals from low-income and sub-urban communities ought to be able to
resist the same temptation towards criminal activity regardless of external
pressures. The message shifts from communal fidelity to personal responsi-
bility. Targeting such mala prohibita as intolerable “gateway” offences hid a
slippery slope of punitiveness (Lacey 2007). These seemingly neutral policies
do not violate any non-discriminatory precepts, legally, as such laws apply to
all regardless of race, age or income (i.e., it is illegal poor or wealthy to sleep
under bridges) (Tonry 1994).19 Ironically, such processes were backed by sim-
ilar pro-scientific methods which brought about the particularistic methods
during the advent of the penal-welfarist era. However, the more economic
based theories were centered on ideals of atomistic conceptions of personal
agency.
The Timing of Change Americans in the 1970s were not so much
inclined towards more punitive policies, so much as those who were became
much more vocal and dogmatic in the midst of retrenched public tolerance,
asserting increasing control of the legislative agenda. The drug war allowed
sweeping changes to be made for both welfare and penal policy in line with
a changing economic and political strategy (i.e., the disciplining and dis-
mantling of organized labor, low-wage employment growth, and stigmatized
social protection legislation). Popular media stoked public anxiety of crime,
19In contrast, Progressivist policy makers in the late 19th and early 20th century, and
Theologians such as Walter Rauschenbusch, resisted interpreting personal vices as causal
and instead attached the issue of poverty to the issue of “the competitive system” and
“the industrial machine”. The vices of the poor were not sins, so much as they were ways
to cope with the harsh living conditions of life at the bottom. (Schwarz 2000)
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which political figures readily co-opted for their gain (e.g., Willie Horton).20
Manufactured fear of crime and media driven disgust for dependency moved
popular opinion and policy in opposition to a professionalized corrections
system, for the ill advised deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment,
and enabled the drastic stigmatization and cuts to social assistance and in-
surance (Wacquant 2009; Raphael and Stoll 2010; Harcourt 2009).21
De-funding and De-populating Mental Health Perhaps one of the
most telling targets of this new era was the curious assault on institutions of
mental health care. Mental illness facilities were among the first causalities
in the neo-liberal revolution. Reagan’s policies in the 1980s served “special
interest groups and the demands of the business community, but failed to
address the issue: the treatment of mental illness.”(Thomas 1998:Abstract).
The resulting burdens which politicians, well-intentioned or not, placed on
community and family resources were enormous. “Throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, hundreds of thousands of mentally ill people concentrated in the
inner cities” (ibid). For all intents and purposes, it appeared that the wel-
fare state had been demoted to passenger with the penal state at the wheel.22
Compliance or Custody With the end of the Fordist era, and the
ascendancy of neo-liberal doctrine, the welfare state has, according to many,
retrenched and left its citizens in a precarious economic dilemma (Huber and
Stevens 2011; Iverson and Soskice 2001;Wacquant 2001b). Citizens may ei-
ther accept increasingly low-paid and insecure employment or face a life of
destitution – or the alternative (i.e., illegal activity). “This neo-liberalist,
20“Rampant” criminality was linked with devastatingly stigmatized representations of
welfare recipients and the systematic abuse of social assistance. Ronald Reagan’s indict-
ment against “welfare queens” in his 1976 presidential campaign found resonance among
middle class voters and deficient reaction in the subsiding efficacy of political power at the
lower end of the income distribution (Quadagno 1996; Hays 2003; Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote, 2001).
21Ironically, much of the support for the end of the progressivist mode of care, rooted in
more social democratic policy than the replacement, was advocated by intellectual elites
(Fuller 2012; Harcourt 2011).
22“The Left hand” of the state, that which protects and expands life chances, represented
by labor law, education, health, social assistance, and public housing, is supplanted (in
the United States) or supplemented (in the European Union) by regulation through its
”Right hand,” that of the police, justice, and correctional administrations...(Wacquant
2009: loc.391). See also the comparable ”hydraulic” process approach, akin to double
regulation. (Whitman 2009)
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paternalist regime, of poverty governance or management is very carceral,
very punitive, very much focused on saying to the poor: ’shut up and go
along’” (Schram 2012; 56min). The alternative is either a life dependent
on charity (private or state subsidized “faith-based” organisations), or one
of criminal activity.23 The losers of labor market competition, primarily the
less educated, are pressed into a proverbial finger-trap, where welfare institu-
tions cannot/ will not decommidify the individual’s exposure to the market,
and where exit options are limited to those with higher human capital in-
vestments.
Labor Market Participation and Crime Because criminality (and
hence probability of incarceration) is a function of motivation and oppor-
tunity, employment (especially in unprotected labor markets) has become
a proxy for predicting crime rates. “When labor markets are slack and
unemployment rises, the prison population expands” (Rosenfeld and Mess-
ner 2013). Conversely, when individuals have employment, and more so for
adults, the incidence of criminal activity declines. Interestingly, Lageson and
Uggen (2013) note, the employment effect is not a constant, its effects are
not uniformly beneficial across the lifecourse. For young adults, individuals
benefit from having employment which occupies their time and introduces
them to life skills, but in less amounts than adults, and particularly not in
positions which lack the promise of skill progression. In addition, these jobs
should not replace scholastic opportunities. In essence, the more the youth
are commodified, and the more they are absorbed into adult roles early on,
the less they adapt to their “age-appropriate roles”.
Thus, the shift in many communities to low-paid service sector jobs may
have left many young adults in precisely the situation which is detrimental
to their own development. The effect of work is greater for adults. Here
the quality of employment is key. That is, individuals require work that is
respectable and more than “just enough”. In other words, “labor markets
characterized by high unemployment rates and low-quality jobs are associated
with increased crime, even after statistically controlling for various sources
of selection and background characteristics”(Lageson and Uggen 2013:203-
204). The relationship with labor markets, and the importance of labor for
23During the New Deal Era, spending on social protection, ”[crowded] out religious
based private charity during the 1930s” (5). Spending “so carefully targeted at the lower
end of the income distribution during a major economic crisis, appears to have [staved off
criminal activity] during the 1930s” (Johnson, Kantor and Fishback 2007:20).
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personal well-being, is thus remarkably intertwined. This facet contributes
to the difficulties which many encounter in the face of decreased social pro-
tective institutions. Figure 3.4 illustrates the association of shifts in the
unemployment rate in the United States with increases in incarcerated pop-
ulations.
The dramatic rise in incarceration rates from the 1970s onwards is clear and,
Figure 3.4: Historical Unemployment and Incarceration Rates
as seen in figure 3.5, the connection with unemployment remains relatively
consistent across time until approximately the close of the 1980s.24 Towards
the early and mid 90s, the relationship between incarceration and unemploy-
ment began to change. Whereas in the past, movements tracked each other,
with enormous leaps in magnitude during the ascendancy of the neo-liberal
policies. Following the devolution of welfare policy, however, something in
the mixture took on a different form. Clearly much more research is needed
to truly find how social protection policy is tied to these phenomenon.
It is this dramatic rise in incarceration which illustrates possibly the stark-
est use of social corrections - as the true final layer in the social safety system,
24According to Frances Fox-Piven: “. . . large segments of the American population. . .
have become redundant in the American labor market. . . One reason is that their work
can be replaced, easily and cheaply by low-wage workers everywhere, including migrant
workers. And the other reason is, indeed, that they are rebellious and so we have under-
taken a program of mass incarceration at a cost somewhat higher than what it would cost
to send these young men to Harvard. . . ” (Fox Piven, 2012; 21min)
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(a) Unemployment Rates and Male Incarceration Rate Change Over Previous Pe-
riod 1925 – 2009
(b) Incarceration Rate Change and Unemployment Rate Change 1949 - 2009
Figure 3.5: Unemployment and Incarceration Historical Trends
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which shall be explained further. Whereas its European counterparts have
traveled a criminal justice road which reserves heavy punishment for typi-
cally only the most serious offences, the US has included lesser violations into
its criminal sanction regime (Lacey 2007). This propensity to use criminal
policy as a replacement for softer measures has resulted in a meteoric rise in
arrests and sentences - leading some to conclude that the welfare state has
been uprooted in favor of a penal state. In fact, when one adds the share of
incarcerated to the unemployed population, the US has not outperformed its
EU counterparts as has been touted in the past - a central argument of free-
market/minimal state advocates.25 The rate of change in male incarceration
briefly changes directions around the close of the 1990s.26
Client Shifting Particularly intriguing is the break around the early
1990s with previous trends. This break occurs in close temporal proxim-
ity to introduction and implementation of the PRWORA policies. Such a
movement of clients would certainly support the advanced marginality the-
sis’ claims of client migration (i.e., movement of clients of welfare programs
into custodial services).
Figure 3.6 tracks AFDC/TANF recipient and Prison rates per 100,000
of the population across 50 US states for the time period 1992 – 2008.27
The percentage of African Americans in the population is included to simul-
taneously investigate claims from the NJC thesis. From 1997 to 1998, the
relationship of AFDC/TANF to prison populations changes direction com-
pletely and had not reversed as of 2008.
This initial evidence (weakly) supports the hypothesis that the decen-
tralizing welfare reforms post-1996 coincide with the changing relationship
of social assistance and rates of incarceration. That is, as welfare client
25The US, in particular, has developed its criminal justice system to handle not just
criminal activities, but also those activities considered more “forbidden” (mala prohibita)
than truly criminal (mala in se) (Lacey 2007).
26Some have argued for what would best be termed as “target absence”. Levitt (2004)
has offered an intriguing interpretation of this pattern, where the rapid decline (and in
this case decoupling) during the period can be largely attributed to “increases in the
number of police, the rising [nominal] prison population, the waning crack epidemic and
the legalization of abortion”, the latter of which has garnered no small amount of media
and academic attention (Levitt 2004). Others have argued that increasingly popular video
games account for significant decreases in crime rates (Cunningham, Engelsta¨tter and
Ward (2011), see also (Uggen and McElrath (2013).
27The analysis here draws from the same TSCS data used for Chapter 2 analysis
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(a) 1992 (b) 1994
(c) 1996 (d) 1998
(e) 2000 (f) 2002
Figure 3.6: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates Selected Years
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numbers were curtailed, social corrections rolls rose. The results do not nec-
essarily help or hinder the NJC thesis. The application of this thesis seems
most relevant to the southern states, where populations of African Americans
are historically high. It is difficult to know for certain, however, if the results
are indeed indicative of racial animus or merely an artifact of residential and
ideological stability - not to mention labor market deficiencies. This further
adds doubt to the merit of the NJC thesis compared with that of the more
political economic arguments.28 These trends have implications for systems
outside the correctional sphere, especially when such evidence is used to cor-
roborate theories of “prison states”. This is evidenced with calls by some to
see these processes as unique, as an institutional revolution in governing that
is “not a simple return to a past state of affairs, but a genuine institutional
innovation”(Wacquant 2009b:327).
Indeed, such processes are not a simple return to the past; however, such
processes are not as genuine as it is claimed. If such arguments entail that
the disciplinary strategies honed in the punitive policing and judicial areas of
the state are being increasingly adopted in the social insurance and assistance
areas of the welfare system, then such a position garners little opposition.
It would seem undeniable that welfare policies are coming under increasing
pressure to exhibit more targeted and punitive measures to ensure client
behavioral compliance and reduced participation. The definitive answer on
whether scholars of correctional systems believe in an actual set of institu-
tional devices segregated as autonomous and new phenomenon is less clear.29
However, the popular view posits that penal and welfare policy work in
tandem with each other, “penal and welfare institutions form a single policy
regime aimed at the governance of social marginality” (Beckett and Western
2001:55). This argument, while extremely supportive of aligning institutional
settings in a cooperative setting, fall short of the extra yard in fully integrat-
ing services. That is, such arguments are correct, but not necessarily for the
right reasons. Demarcation of borders between welfare institutions and penal
institutions suggests independent institutional settings. Such logics are con-
ducive to propagating notions of prison states vs welfare states, a situation
which has developed in recent debates. If there is such a thing as a prison
state, one must be able to demarcate its borders. Furthermore, as with wel-
28That is, it is tremendously problematic to operationalize racial bias in most studies.See
Loury (2002)
29Whether such autonomous institutions work together or are merely working with the
same clients still requires that we see them as two distinct settings effected by the same
policy regimes, not as unified institutions.
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fare states, such a conception must inevitably involve some temporal stage
where such institutions began, as well as their functional purposes. That is,
they would be novel and autonomous statuses not subsumed to the welfare
state framework. The following section argues against novelty and examines
how scholars are looking to reconcile the autonomy with the larger welfare
state framework. For the sake of brevity, the historical novelty and autonomy
are addressed simultaneously (See Morris and Rothman (1998) for detailed
reading).
3.3 Correctional Institutions and the Welfare
State
“Poverty, as Disraeli once said, was declared a crime by industrialism. Laws
about poverty became associated with laws about crime” (Titmuss 1965:15).
This story has been retold by those who see the crushing effect of the return
of market fundamentalism as a new hydra to be thwarted. However, his-
torical research clearly indicates that correctional institutions have been far
from separate institutions of welfare systems, where the main mode of public
service provision was either through workhouses or charitable sources. As
such, this thesis disagrees with the view of these arrangements as peculiarly
new or parallel “states”. It is not that neo-liberalism is creating a Prison
State (or multitudes of), but rather reviving an old relationship. As the
American state has rolled back the ability and scope of social assistance and
social insurance, it has come headlong into a re-emergent state of punitive
affairs.30
Novelty and Autonomy: Penalization of poverty has occurred before,
though the modern implementation is obviously evolved with technological
and administrative developments.The step-wise description of this transfor-
mation is convincing in a strategic game setting, however it may afford too
much credit on the part of policy makers in terms of (intelligent) design ca-
pabilities. Capitalism, like the neo-liberalist school which promotes it, is in
30As Titmuss later noted about early welfare state developments: “. . . with the limited
instruments of policy and administrative techniques to hand in the past, the system could
only function by operating punitive tests of discrimination; by strengthening conceptions
of approved and disapproved dependencies; and by a damaging assault on the recipients
of welfare in terms of their sense of self-respect and self-determination. Within the estab-
lished pattern of commonly held values, the system could only be redistributive by being
discriminatory and socially divisive” (Titmuss, 1965:15)
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many ways a creature of opportunity. Such policies advocating policies echo-
ing survival of the socially fittest, it does not necessarily (or actively) create
successors to defunct institutions. If anything, it contorts existing institu-
tions to the point where, no longer being fit for purpose, they face collapse
from the weight of their own inadequacy. That is, opponents of policies,
in the political arena, often allow institutions to drift or pursue conversion,
rather than overtly challenging the status quo of institutional bases (Hacker
2004; Hacker, Thelen and Pierson 2013).31
This produces an environment where inequality becomes the accepted
norm. This increased tolerance for inequality, and even a glamorization of it,
results in more punitive measures which thereby enlists the corrective com-
ponent of the state to compensate for institutional deficiencies; that is, those
institutions better suited for the reduction of real or monied inequality.32 It
turns on a “culture of inequality” as opposed to Murray’s (1984) culture of
poverty (Crutchfield and Pettinicchio, 2009). This breed of social Darwinism,
which was touched upon earlier, destroys barriers to its realization and leaves
the communitarian policy of the Kropotkin (1902) Social Darwinian camp to
pick up the pieces. The mutual aid inherent in the alternative [Kropotkin]
conception of society is rarely conceptualized in terms of social institutions,
let alone in punishment settings. Thus, the expansion of the penal fist is less
strategy than necessity, constrained by lack of a better (or available) option.
That prisons and other correctional institutions are increasingly called
in to deal with social distress seems much more the result of a beleaguered
and punch-drunk social welfare system attempting to stay afloat than finding
ways to control unwitting citizens by outsourcing the problem to a distinct
institutional setting. Furthermore, such arguments promote an over-inflated
novelty of the role which penal institutions play in the larger scheme of gov-
ernance and social order.
Past Can be Prologue It is worth revisiting the history of correctional
institutions to properly contextualize their modern operation. While mass
incarceration is truly surprising, it is novel only in so much as concerns its
31Drift refers to situations where institutions are not adjusted in respect to the changing
environments of their intended coverage area. Conversion refers to the use of institutions
outside their intended goals.
32Tolerance for inequality, argue Crutchfield and Pettinicchio (2009)“reaches its highest
form among those modern-day social Darwinists who believe that the problems of the
poor, the unemployed, and the uneducated are due to their own failures” (135).
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magnitude - not function. We can draw much from revisiting these historical
legacies. The early houses of correction, it should be noted, which developed
in the 16th century were not solely institutions of punishment, but insti-
tutions for poverty management. The Pennsylvania system at Cherry Hill,
which lasted well into the 20th century (until 1971), was primarily reform
based – in stark contrast to the Auburn system which among many things
was as profitable as it was retributive. Elmira, as well, was based on the
ideal of rehabilitation not retribution (Morris and Rothman 1998). It does
not seem at all that contemporary penal institutions have evolved from sepa-
rate institutional bases. So much was argued by Garland (1981, 1985). Penal
systems, as with welfare systems, continue to hold a functional role for polit-
ical and economic interests well before the prison explosion in recent decades.
Recalling the previous assessment of the policy transformation in the US
in the later part of the 20th century, one can decipher a distinct co-incidence
of policy movements across penal and welfare policies. The neo-liberal policy
transformation which transpired in the 1970s onwards sought to dismantle
the social protections and regulations which were seen as impediments to
competitiveness. In so doing, those who espoused this view reproached the
welfare state as a barrier to the free-market and prosperity, leaving many
more open to the forces of market competition. This at best illustrates a re-
turn to market fundamentalism with greater tools at its disposal than classic
liberals had.
Recycling Market Losers From Walnut Street Jail to the Cherry Hill
and Auburn contest for supremacy, Americans have been well aware of the
function of penal policy in accommodating capitalism and the labor market.
Across time, correctional institutions have supplied the most basic means to
absorb and repatriate the laboring classes back into the political economic
system from which they came. They have done so, as with the Quaker
led administration in Pennsylvania and the Theodosian code long before,
with an aim of rehabilitation at their core – despite movements to extract
retributive justice. Thus, novelty and autonomy seem excessive typifications
of this joined up policy movement. In academic debates, it appears that the
focus of welfare state institutions and penal systems are converging. The
evolving trends in research clearly seem to indicate a need to conceptualize
penal systems as literally part of the the larger state network of services, as
opposed to a (semi)sovereign area under the explicit and exclusive concern
of criminal justice researchers and penal policy experts. In the final part of
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this chapter, I lay out this argument with this explicit purpose.
3.4 Merging Political Economy and Correc-
tional Institutions
A growing sub-set of literature has increasingly focused on the importance of
welfare states and punishment, incorporating the work of welfare state schol-
ars in their own attempts to understand how the macro- political economic
policy world interacts with their own interests. It is no surprise then that
many scholars view the welfare state as an antithesis or accomplice of the
Prison State (Downes and Hansen 2006; Useem and Piehl 2008), Penal State
(Lacey 2012,2013; Wacquant 2001b, 2001a, 2000c;2002,2002b, 2001b, 2000a,
2003, 2008; Owens and Smith 2009; Simon 2007; McLennan 2008 2001; de
Koster et al. 2008), Carceral State (Gottschalk 2008, 2006, 2007, 2013, 2009;
Owens and Smith 2009; Simon 2007; Mukamal 2007; Uggen 2007; Weaver and
Lerman 2010; Dolovich 2001; Thompson 2011, 2011b; Weaver 2009; Murch
2012; Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Ross 2010; Martin and Wilcox 2012;
Dillon 2012; Fortner 2013; Metcalf 2011-2012; Glassey-Tranguyen 2011; Sim
2009), Carceral-Assistential State (Wacquant 2008a), Centaur State (Wac-
quant 2010), Punitive (Un)WelfareState(Rosenthal 2004) and even an An-
drogynous State (Owens and Smith 2009).
The proliferation of terminologies describing the interplay between the
state’s presumed responsibility to protect its members from harm, and its
obligation to prevent those same citizens from doing harm, thrives in aca-
demic debate. However, where it concerns an analysis of what welfare systems
do – and moreso what social corrections does outside of the punishment of
crime – these terminologies make incorporation unnecessarily complicated.
Many scholars are now directly overlaying research of penal systems directly
on welfare state typologies.
This interest has come forward because of the significant effect which neo-
liberal policy has had on the fundamental practices of institutions. Rightly
so, leading researchers in the area of criminal justice and penal policy are
aptly concerned with outcomes - i.e., crime reductions and re-integration.
The welfare state for them is a tool, but still seemingly outside penal policy.
This conception of the welfare system is misguided, at least as much
as those who work for the rehabilitation of offenders are performing paral-
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lel functions of their colleagues in the social assistance and social insurance
tiers, albeit with differing tools at their disposal. Fortunately, the process of
acknowledging the unity of welfare institutions and penal policy looks to be
developing rather than waning. According to Rosenfeld and Messner (2013):
“the most effective and realistic way of producing enduring crime reductions
in the developed nations is to reduce the dependence of populations on the
performance of the market economy”. Or as Lacey (2012) has eloquently
promoted, we must construct an “institutional account of the defining fea-
tures of political systems integrated within a broad comparative political
economy of punishment” (Lacey, 2012). Pratt (2008a, 2008b) has laid out a
thoroughly significant argument in respect to Scandinavian Excpetionalism
in both welfare and punishment strategies. Downes and Hansen (2006) show
that prison rates, cross-nationally, are negatively correlated to spending on
welfare as a share of GDP, and that the relationship is increasing. Cavadino
and Dignan (2006) exemplify attempts to incorporate correctional systems
with welfare state institutions, advancing our ability to conceptualize mea-
surement of correctional systems in the larger state apparatus.
Lacey (2006) has illustrated, using the VoC approach (Hall and Soskice
2001), discernible differences between Liberal Market Economies, Northern
European Coordinated Market Economies and Scandinavian Coordinated
Market Economies. Furthermore, we are starting to see the joining up of
political economic research fields and penal system studies. Barker (2009),
Tonry (2007), Lacey and Soskice (2013), and Gottshalk (forthcoming) have
even more recently moved debate into the realm of political institutional set-
tings.33 That said, and given the research that is proliferating outside of
welfare state research, I investigate these findings using, first, data from the
OECD and the International Prison Centre for the years 2000 - 2009, 2012.
This is followed with an analysis using the previous TSCS data in chapter 2
investigating the corresponding measures for the 50 US states over the time
period 1993 - 2008.
Comparisons of Prison Rates, Inequality and Welfare Policy
Cross-National: Data has been taken from the OECD Social Expen-
diture Database for the years 2001-2009 and 2012, corresponding to the
regime typologies outlined by Esping-Andersen (1990). These typologies have
proven robust over time and are desirable in this respect. Four measures are
33Marie Gottshalk: Caught: Race, Neoliberalism, and the Future of the Carceral State
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(a) Welfare Spending (b) Pre-Gini
(c) Post-Gini (d) Gini Reduction
Figure 3.7: Welfare v Incarceration Rates for Selected OECD Countries
plotted against the rate of imprisonment per 100,000 of the population ob-
tained from the International Centre for Prison Studies for the respective
years. Prison rates are plotted against total public spending on welfare as
percentage of GDP (Figure 3.7a), pre-tax/transfer Gini (Figure 3.7b), and
post-tax/transfer Gini (Figure 3.7c). Figure 3.7d plots the relationship be-
tween the point reduction from pre- and post-Gini measurements.
As with previous findings, Figure 3.7a indicates that the amount states
devote to welfare services correlates with their respective prison rates. Na-
tions which spend more as a percentage of their GDP on public spending
(i.e., welfare) exhibit lower incarceration rates per 100,000. Furthermore,
nations which have lower degrees of market income inequality also exhibit
lower degrees of the use of imprisonment. However, this pre-governmental
intervention is less striking than the result of post-tax/transfer income in-
equality and imprisonment rates. That is, there is less of a relationship, at
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least from the data presented here, between the market wage inequality and
imprisonment rates than the post-governmental intervention relationship and
imprisonment rates. Clearly, incarceration is a function of criminal policy.
However, the evidence here - which supports Downes and Hansen (2006),
Cavadino and Dignan (2006), and Lacey (2008)- demonstrates that welfare
systems matter.
The result in Figure 3.7c poses interesting insights. It suggests that the
degree to which a country reduces inequality (i.e., the total effect of the sys-
tem’s design), and not just the amount it spends on public services, brings
about stronger clustering among the regime typologies. Rather unexpect-
edly, the Mediterranean regime states cluster with their Liberal counterparts.
At first this clustering may seem incongruous. However, once we take into
account the functional aspects of correctional services, the phenomenon be-
comes quite rational. It might be assumed that the inability of these states
to address inequalities of low-wage (foreign and domestic) workers by means
of transfers is absorbed by their prison facilities. Due to eligibility policies,
many migrant workers are unable to benefit from social welfare institutions
and as such will find themselves housed and fed (albeit against their will)
by those institutions of last resort. These findings are shared across the Lib-
eral regime typology and the (largely understudied) Mediterranean grouping.
While we might assume that the clustering might be the result of similar
justice systems in the Liberal regimes, it does not fit so well with the systems
of Spain, Italy and Portugal - countries which do not share the same common
ancestry (so to speak) as the Anglo-Saxon-Liberal states. It may be more
appropriate to consider that the ability of the welfare state to accommo-
date precarious life-courses in the low-wage sectors accounts for some of this
variation - though the mechanisms and collateral influences are not readily
given in the literature. Thus, in the case of Spain, for instance, the growth
in Spanish inmates has come largely from the influx of migrant background
workers who, for lack of work and/or social rights, are more prone to illegal
activity. Indeed, the foreign born population, in Spain and across Europe,
has historically seen much higher rates of incarceration than native popu-
lations (Wacquant 1999a). Here the advanced marginality thesis returns to
the fore as a powerful tool in understanding these trends.
Also interesting to note is that the amount by which states reduce in-
equality does not generate the same relationship seen in post-tax/transfer
Gini. This may suggest that the type of message which is sent to benefi-
ciaries of these systems, in the vein of the policy design matters camp. The
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fact that the decommodification characteristics first introduced by Esping-
Andersen (1990) are so strikingly inline with another (seemingly external)
outcome (incarceration) proves an exciting new avenue for research both in
the fields of penal policy and the welfare state research. Taken together,
the amount of resources as a percentage of the country’s GDP does coincide
with lower imprisonment, however there are obviously many other subaque-
ous variables involved. Future research may do well to focus on how political
and economic negotiating configurations act in tandem to impact not only
reductions in inequality, but systems of punishment. This would be in line
with those who posit that the economic and political nature of governments
are important to punitiveness both in social corrections and social welfare.
For the purposes here, it corroborates the proposition that vulnerable popu-
lations are systematically rerouted into more capable welfare institutions.
Sub-National - The United States: Pushing further, I investigate
whether these trends are also apparent for units which vary less in cultural
and historic, not to mention political, backgrounds. In particular, I focus
my attention on the US. Preliminary analysis on the US as a whole shows
that the previous findings are consistent over a comparably long time period
(1947 – 2009).
Trends in Inequality and Imprisonment Plotting the Gini coef-
ficient against male and total incarceration rates (Figure 3.8), I find a rela-
tively stable relationship until the end of the 1970s, where upon the rate for
males begins its upward climb. It is clear that changes made to the nations’
institutional structure have significantly coincided with a dramatic increase
in incarceration, especially among males. In contrast to the fluctuations in
the data from unemployment, the correlation with income inequality and
incarceration rates is consistent across time. Additionally, adding unemploy-
ment rates to the time series data indicates that whereas income inequality
is highly correlated to (total, male, and female) incarceration rates (r(62) =
.976, p< .01; r(62) = .976, p < .01; r(62) = .968, p< .01 – respectively),
unemployment is not statistically significant. However, the unemployment
rate does correlate strongly with changes in the rate of incarceration for men
(r(43) = .459, p< .01) and women (r(43) = .341, p< .05).
In addition, taking the bi-variate relationship between Pre-Tax/Transfer
and Post-Transfer Gini’s plotted against the population of prisoners per
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Figure 3.8: Income Inequality and Male Incarceration Rates : 1947 - 2009
Figure 3.9: Regressed Income Inequality and Male Incarceration Rates : 1947
- 2009
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100,000 (overlaid with measurements of citizen ideology), the relationship
found with those regime typologies cross-nationally hold for individual states.
As figures 3.10a and 3.10b indicate, the difference between the inequality
measures remain closely related, with the post-transfer measurement show-
ing a slightly higher degree of clustering.34
Replicating the analysis on welfare expenditure as with the analysis on
the cross-national data, I find a weak, yet significant, bi-variate relationship
r(675) = -.217, p< .01)- as also seen in the cross-national findings. Addi-
tionally, looking at the generosity of states (as defined by the amount of the
average AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of four to a full-time worker at
the Federal minimum wage), I find that more generous states also exhibit,
generally speaking, lower prison rates - Figure 3.11.
Generosity comparisons were also run with an alternative variable com-
prised of a state minimum wage level in place of the federal (to account for the
possibility that the state set minimum wage might better approximate state-
wide living costs), however the differences were only slight. While the nature
of the data used does not allow for the difference of pre- and post-transfer gini
to be directly assessed (given the different sources of these measurements),
the evidence here supports the contention that the dynamics at work at the
cross-national level also appear to apply with individual US states. Thus,
even at the sub-national level, the degree to which states are able to reduce
the income inequality of their citizens, the smaller their prison populations. 35
As Rosenfeld and Messner(2013) have argued, “if criminal opportuni-
ties are proximate causes of crime, criminal motivations and the conditions
that stimulate them are closer to ultimate cause” (Rosenfeld andMessner
2013:np). The take-away message is clear: Welfare states which (a) resolve
income inequality on (b) an increasingly egalitarian (or social capitalistic)
basis, reduce the take-up in correctional populations (e.g., prisons) more
successfully by preventing the criminogenic effects which market fundamen-
talism (be it in the guise of classical liberalism, neo-Victorianism, or neo-
Liberalism) instigates (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). One could go further,
as Steve Hall has commented, and argue that “any abrupt move to a neo-
liberal form of political economy will result in almost immediate increases
in property crime, violence and homicide in the regions most badly hit by
unemployment and the breakdown of the family, community, and collective
34Two states (Alaska, New York) were omitted from the analysis as outliers.
35No relationship was found for probation and parole rates in separate analysis.
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(a) Pre-Tax/Transfer
(b) Post-Transfer
Figure 3.10: Income Inequality and Prison Rates 2008
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(a) Spending on General Welfare
(b) Generosity
Figure 3.11: Welfare Expenditure and Prison Rates 2008
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civil and political organizations” (Docksai 2010).
This owes itself , on the one hand, to the observed relationship between
criminality and economic conditions. As noted earlier, crime (property and
violent) has increasingly become concentrated among the poor, while the rich
have been able to employ more risk preventative measures -“target harden-
ing” (Uggen 2012; Levitt 1999). Reduction in income disparities decreases
property crimes in general (Choe 2008; Brush 2007; Scorzafave and Soares
2009; Ehrlich 1973), and reductions in income inequality between racial
groupings further reduce the distortion in violent crime rates (Blau and Blau
1982; Stolzenberg, Eitle, and D’Alessio, 2006). On the other hand, more
egalitarian and less discriminatory policies based not on norms of efficiency
and targeted assistance, but stability and protection, promote trust and “the
discipline of delayed gratification” (Soss 2002; Sennett 2006:31).
These issues return us to earlier discussion of the effects of means-tested
systems. Because of its very nature, a targeted welfare system must select
out citizens as worthy or not worthy, as it must assign determination of
eligibility. That is, the targeted welfare system coincides de facto with strat-
ification. “The very act of separating out the needy almost always stamps
them as socially inferior, as ‘others’ with other types of social characteristics
and needs, and results most often in stigmatization.” (Rothstein 1998:158).
Thus the targeted system produces a question which is fundamentally differ-
ent than universal policy: one that focuses on how do we fix their problem,
rather than how do we fix our problem. Or taken to its extreme, how do
we avoid their problems from becoming our problems. By reducing inequal-
ity, universalistic welfare systems increase social and political solidarity and
participation, exactly the types of support network dynamics which offender
reintegration efforts seek to maximize (Horn, 2011). This leaves the task of
fitting correctional institutions into the structure of the welfare state.
3.4.1 Summary
It is clear that external welfare services and policy have a direct effect on
penal institutions. The literature on the repercussions of slack social pro-
tection systems in the face of inequality producing market economies is well
documented. The argument which this chapter has put forward thus far is
modest but distinct compared to other views of correctional systems. While
a large amount of scholarly work implies a connection between correctional
systems and welfare systems (and a growing amount of work has questioned
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how to interpret this connection), this thesis argues that the correctional
system is an explicit internal component of welfare systems - as opposed to
parallel and/or substitutive institutions. This view is built upon extensive
readings of the literature and (more importantly) on first hand accounts of
the services experienced in this tier. Interviewees (conducted with survey
respondents and expert/practioners) consistently reported that many super-
vised offenders had achieved professional qualifications for their present work
while incarcerated, many had achieved their high school equivalency while
supervised, and all had received medical care while “guests” of the NC Di-
vision of Prisons. These results are presented in detail in Chapter 7. This
evidence bolsters the work presented here, and prompts a further exploration
of the concept hereafter.
From a welfare system accounting perspective, a central matter of in-
terest concerns the share of resources which these services make up in the
total amount of welfare services. These are explicitly welfare maintenance
programs. As such, these programs and services are necessarily (or ought to
be) included in a country’s National Accounts. However, this is currently
not the case. What is more, these services are in some cases explicitly sought
out by clients who cannot access services in the social assistance, insurance
and private welfare markets.
The following section combines the arguments in favor of viewing criminal
justice services as primarily remedial of other institutional (i.e., welfare sys-
tem) deficiencies with the larger political economic developments in research
agendas to form a unified conception. The unique contribution of this is the
direct incorporation of this area into welfare state research so as to concomi-
tantly reframe offenders as continuant clients of the system as opposed to
outcasts. This small facet is central to understanding the importance of the
political demobilization of felony offenders. That is, with the following incor-
poration of correctional services into welfare systems, as opposed to a passing
acknowledgement of its parallel functions, we necessarily and formally accept
that political demobilization falls on a definable class of welfare system client
- citizens reliant on the state for assistance.
3.5 Functional View of Correctional Systems
The chief contribution which this section proposes is the disambiguation of
“what” the realm of correctional systems means for political economic stud-
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ies. The difficulty in such an endeavor lies not in the justification of service
accounting (i.e., which services ought to be included), but rather how these
services are categorized across authorities. This is an area ripe for investi-
gation and harmonization, as cross national differences abound, as well as
sub-national differences. Across countries and sub-national entities, the prac-
tice of harmonizing services within prisons with those on the “outside” is a
central part of penal policy. They are pivotal programs to reintegrate the
offender as best as possible into the communities where they have originated.
However, these services vary widely across nations and across sub-national
jurisdictions. Examples taken from personal communications with correc-
tional officials and examination of national cases are particularly instructive.
In Europe, basic healthcare services are continuously in flux, with adminis-
tration and support continually shifted between public and private financing
and provision (Coyle 2007). In the UK, prison health services are under a na-
tional umbrella which works in parallel with local authority providers (NHS
CB as of 2013).
Additionally, the NHS CB has authority over children’s homes, training
centres, immigration removal centres, police custody suites, and courts (NHS
2013). In Norway, local authorities are charged with the provision of health-
care since 1980. More tellingly, Norwegians operate on an “import model”
for their social corrections which directly situates corrections as part of the
network of welfare institutions. This model utilizes resources from the lo-
cal community funded by those ministries involved (i.e., the same process is
applied for education and other services to inmates). Prisoners serve their
sentence as close as possible to their home municipality. As such, there exists
consistent contact between the prisoner and the service provider on release.
This has knock-on value as well for both community and corrections client.
. . . the community becomes more involved in the prison system,
so that some possible prejudices about prison may be removed or
weakened . . . The same goes the other way around, the prisoner
may learn that service providers actually want to do something
for them instead of chasing them around with bureaucracy.
In addition,
...correctional services do not have to buy these services. . . pro-
vision is the right of any person legally living in Norway, and
prisoners are no exception to this rule – this is known as the
principle of normality (Norwegian Ministry of Justice, Personal
Communication, 2012).
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Finland, in contrast, operates from a particularlized budget scheme, where
all expenses are paid for by the state and not the municipality. Health ser-
vices, psychiatric services, and dentistry are under the budgets of the Crimi-
nal Sanctions Agency. Education and childcare are provided for by external
agencies in coordination with the relevant prison authorities (Finnish Crim-
inal Sanctions Agency, Personal Communication, 2012).
For the US, the situation is particularly more discommodious. As with
many European countries, the US states provide healthcare to their social
corrections clients via the budgetary allowances of the respective ministries
of Justice – with only a few countries handing over this authority to their
ministries of Health (COE 2014). With a federal corrections system and 50
state systems (not counting special systems and other administrative author-
ities), provision of services to correctional populations is vast and uncharted
for the most part. The fact is that under custodial supervision, the aver-
age client is entitled to a social protection package which is not shared by
those not under this supervision. Prisoners in the United States, unlike non-
institutionalized offenders or non-offenders, are constitutionally guaranteed
health care (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976)). Add to this the required,
though increasingly cost re-appropriated, services of food, clothing and shel-
ter, and the distinction between the Prison State and Welfare State becomes
even less defined.
Welfare functions, not punitive services, are the main budgetary concerns
for penal systems. “Medical care is one of the principal cost drivers in cor-
rections budgets. . . From 1998 to 2001, healthcare spending in state prisons
grew 10 percents annually” (Warren 2008:12). This is true across the board.
For the US, with a reported one of every 99 persons behind bars, this is a
considerable service provision issue (Warren 2008). In 2002, nearly 2.3 mil-
lion persons were reliant on their jailers for medical treatment. Roughly 38
percent of federal inmates and 43 percent of state inmates suffered a chronic
medical condition (Wilper et al., 2009). Forty-four percent of state inmates,
compared to 39 percent of federal inmates, reported having medical prob-
lems, of which 70 percent and 76 percent respectively sought and received
medical attention. From 1998 to 2001, healthcare spending in state prisons
grew 10 percent annually. In 2004, medical costs accounted for USD 3.7
billion annually and, with the ageing of inmates, that number is on the rise
(Warren 2008).
Correctional services are better seen as remedial of other sectors of the
welfare state, mediating deficiencies in many social programs such as health
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and education. As much can be seen once we look at what happens between
entry and exit from this tier. Chronic medical conditions (for instance) are,
across the board, generally worse for the incarcerated compared to that of
the general populations. As much is readily known about prison popula-
tions across space and time. However, upon entering custodial supervision,
offenders are brought up to levels above those “on the outide”. According to
Patterson (2010), “the mortality rate of African American men in prisons is
actually lower than among African American men outside of prison” (found
in Schnittker, Massoglia, and Uggen (2011:3)). In addition, the racial dis-
parities in mortality essentially disappear in prison. The fact that so many
in prison arrive in poor health and are then elevated to a level not only on
par with the non-incarcerated population (and this does not begin to include
the myriad of counseling and other services provided post-incarceration), but
above the level of some non-offenders is a clear indicator of the functional
merit of this area of the welfare state. Social corrections - as a component
of the welfare system - is corrective from an institutional standpoint in that
it ultimately corrects for shortcomings in the overall system.
Thus, while there is evidence that many correctional environments suffer
varying degrees of health ( physical, mental, and emotional) conditions, over-
all it must be said that much should be touted for the ability of correctional
institutions across the US (and other countries) to appropriate means to deal
with some of the most extreme outcomes of (politically created) deficiencies
in the greater welfare system.36 As Uggen and McElrath (2013) have noted,
and the historic record attests to, “under the right or, more precisely, the
wrong social conditions, we are all prone to commit criminal acts”. The fol-
lowing is an effort to contextualize its placement not only for researchers of
criminal policy, but also for scholars of the welfare state that we do not limit
our understanding of welfare to those locations where we feel most comfort-
able.
3.5.1 A Framework for Inclusion
One problem to surmount within the fields of welfare systems and correc-
tional systems research is one of perception. There exists an allure with
36As such, this chapter (and this thesis) aims not to lambaste correctional establish-
ments as locations of social control and abusive power relations - though these issues are
undeniably present. Rather, given the overwhelming evidence of the larger political eco-
nomic restructuring of the American welfare state, it is difficult not to see correctional
services as unwitting victims of market fundamentalist restructuring.
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viewing welfare systems as magnanimous institutions which exist divorced
from punitive systems. The idea that correctional facilities can equate to
welfare facilities is often overlooked by researchers of the welfare state. Pris-
ons, youth group homes, detention centers and even jails provide beds, food,
medical care, psychiatric treatment, recreational activities, and a host of
other services. Except in special circumstances, these are provided to the
beneficiary from the resources of the general population, (i.e., tax revenue
- thus redistribution between identifiable populations). By a strict welfare
accounting philosophy, this makes the field of social corrections immediately
entitled for inclusion. This section illustrates the placement of this compo-
nent into an analytical framework and presents evidence of this tier from the
United States.
The Welfare State, according to Titmuss (1965), consists of not only so-
cial welfare (the social assistance and social insurance tools of policy), but
also fiscal and occupational welfare. These varying tiers of welfare provision
are beneficial to differentiated groups of households depending on their risk
portfolio. Taking this as a starting point, I posit a conceptual framework
which situates social corrections at the base of an adapted schedule. This
adaptation of Abramovitz (2001) and Titmuss (1965), Figure 3.12, includes
four areas (tiers) of welfare involvement. In ascending order of clientele de-
limited by socio-economic status, they are: the social corrections tier (prisons
and non-institutional settings), social welfare (social assistance and social in-
surance), fiscal welfare (predominantly tax credits and other policies aimed
at market subsidization), and occupational welfare (those benefits defined by
Titmuss as accruing to higher income households).
The objective of this framework is to layout a comprehensive schematic
to record, analyze and compare beneficiary/client take-up rates across tiers.
This framework incorporates a holistic treatment of state welfare services
which include social corrections (custodial and non-custodial) and other tiers
of benefit receipt. The impetus, laid out in the arguments presented in this
work, is the inclusive treatment of welfare systems to establish cross-tier mi-
gration rates and policy impacts. In as much as we may wish to study how the
state is involved in enabling or disabling citizens, it is key that policy mak-
ers, and those who inform their decisions, reconcile the entire system in their
investigations. Resources and policy reform patterns in the social insurance
tier impact on costs and take-up rates in the social assistance and/or fiscal
welfare tiers, as well as the social corrections tier. Additionally, this frame-
work enables simpler comparisons (within and between states) by registering
funding and service provision characteristics of each tier. This framework
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does not create new accounting items. It is meant to be mapped to existing
national account data available from each country. As such, it represents an
initial effort to begin mapping the entirety of the welfare functions of the
state where social corrections makes up an internal and integral component
on par with other tiers.
Sourcing Funds: Using this framework, analysis of social corrections be-
comes comparable to other services. One of the defining features of this tier
is its revenue stream, shown below. First, a look at the state programs by
funding source. Figure 3.13 shows the breakdown of state total expenditures
including all sources of funding. Clearly educational services make up the
bulk of state spending on public services, however further inspection reveals
what states actually spend their resources on. As figure 3.14 illustrates, fed-
eral monies received in the way of transfers account for a substantial amount
of state financing of services to constituents. Of these, medicaid is by far
the largest recipient of federal dollars. State own sources, on the other hand
(figure 3.15), devote nearly half of their indigenous resources to education -
and within that, the majority (36 percent) goes to elementary and secondary
education. Public welfare programs, in contrast, make up 24 percent of gen-
eral fund financed expenditures.
Taking these three categories of spending together (i.e., medicaid, public
assistance, and correctional spending), one can see that the responsibility for
each is dramatically heterogeneous. While medicaid and social assistance are
heavily funded by federal redistribution, the social correction tier is nearly
exclusively indigenously financed.
“State funds (general funds and other state funds combined, but exclud-
ing bonds) accounted for 95 percent of total state corrections spending in
fiscal 2009”(NABO 2010:54). Thus, as an expenditure of state budgets, so-
cial corrections is by far the most reliant on state resources to provide goods
and services, making it the one component of the welfare state (at least in
the US context) which sub-national actors possess the overwhelmingly legal
and financial authority. Put another way, correctional budgets (on average)
absorb mental healthcare, medical care, housing, nutrition, and education
services at a fraction of the cost of its social insurance and social assistance
counterparts. States, naturally, vary considerably in the amount of resources
they devote to social corrections of their own resources. While deeper inspec-
tion is outside the scope of the present work, it is clear that simply assuming
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states spend more because they have higher correctional populations does
not help us understand the entire picture.37 Just as one can analyze variance
among program costs and take up rates in the social assistance and insurance
tiers, or the money deferred through the oft referred to Hidden Welfare State
of tax benefits and exemptions, so too can we decipher the social correction
tiers of individual states.38
The evidence illustrates the vast differences in the responsibility for fund-
ing and provision which exists across the tiers; however, they fall short of
uncovering the inner workings of the tier of social corrections. Returning
to a previous point: in terms of comparable costs, social corrections are, at
least at first glance, more expensive than their social welfare tier counter-
parts (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013; Wacquant 2002). This view is imprecise.
That is, according to Wacquant (2002), for example:
“In California . . . each state prisoner costs USD 21,400 per an-
num, or three times the maximum AFDC benefits paid out to a
family of four before the elimination of that program (USD 7,229,
inclusive of administrative costs). . . . in Mississippi, for example,
the yearly price tag for one prisoner comes to USD 13,640 but
that sum represents nearly ten times the annual AFDC bene-
fits per family, which averages a princely USD 1,400.”(Wacquant
2002:21)
This assumption at first seems logical. If we take the cost of total corrections
and divide it by the aggregate population, it appears that prisons are sub-
stantially more expensive operations compared to the benefits received in the
social welfare tier. This would be a very attractive argument, and to many
it is, if it were not for the evidence that the social corrections tier provides
more services and goods than AFDC/TANF did/do directly, at least in their
functional outlays noted earlier.
In particular, there is a central component of social corrections which
makes it a far more dynamic participant in citizen welfare maintenance than
other areas of the system. Aside from the services listed above, the social
corrections tier also provides (and this is perhaps a much more significant
objective of this tier) employment training and experience - predominantly
in the manual labour sector. This component is by far the largest, longest
37This is a pertinent point in fact. Analyzing correctional populations primarily as a
beneficiary group, it is simpler to decompose this area of welfare spending by looking at
the consuming components of expenditures within the sub-fields of this tier.
38For further reading see (Howard 1997)
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running and most resilient feature of the social corrections tier and has not
been presented previously due to the sheer magnitude of analysis it deserves.
This is not to mention the ramifications it has on the functioning of other
areas of the welfare system in general.
As noted previously, incarcerated persons are, generally, not counted in la-
bor market statistics. As such, arguments have been made that this disguises
unemployment. However, more importantly, the correctional tier disguises
employment as well. In light of this, it difficult to account for exactly how
much of prison employment can be considered training, how much is under-
paid employment, and in some cases, how much is simply publicly subsidized
income replacement.39 Whatever the uses of labor in the correctional tier,
the practice is historic, universal and international.40
That said, it is worth knowing what the internal operations of social cor-
rections are. In so doing, we obtain a glimpse into what this tier contributes
to the aggregate welfare package of states - as we cannot rely on statistics
of other areas of the welfare state to account for these services in measuring
the extent of welfare system effort. To address this, I use the case of North
Carolina to illustrate over a sufficiently long time period.
3.5.2 North Carolina: Mapping Program Usage
North Carolina (as with the many correctional departments) provides in-
mates with a menu of services and programs with the aim to both occupy
inmate time as well as promote integration back into the “outside” world.
While it is itself a unique case, North Carolina provides an adequate illus-
tration of the types of programs and services which clients use and at which
rates across time. The following tables show the growth and diversification
of programs for North Carolina for the years 1993 – 2006. 41
Since 1992 there has been a general increase in service programs and work
programs among inmates in North Carolina (Figure 3.19). Many of the pro-
39Many states allow workers to accumulate money into savings accounts for use both
inside and outside the social corrections tier. Those making at or near market wages are
more often than not required to use their earnings to pay for accommodation at their
supervisory institute, in an effort to “make crime pay”.
40The UK also terms this ‘prison industries’ and maintains approximately 300 work-
shops, employing roughly 10,000 persons each week. (MOJ 2012). For an excellent
overview of prison labor, see Rothman and Morris 1998
41The data presented are based on publicly available data from the North Carolina
Department of Correction’s Office of Research and Planning. All calculations are my own.
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grams experienced a shift in 1996. This is due, officially, to changes in the
reporting system used by the department of corrections. However, coinci-
dentally, this data shifts around the same time as PRWORA was signed into
law.42
Figure 3.20 shows that participation rates in certain service programs
fare better than others, with academic education dropping dramatically in
both real and relative terms, and vocational education witnessing moderate
declines and then stabilizing after 1997. A variety of programs came into
play after bottoming out in 1996. In their place came drug rehabilitation
programs and personal development programs, of which drug rehabilitation
programs increased dramatically as a share of the social corrections menu of
services. Figure 3.21 shows the corresponding information regarding work
programs in the state, with unit services taking the lion’s share of participa-
tion in both real and relative terms. Work in kitchen and food services took
a considerable drop in relative terms.
42Work programs are categorized as those activities which involve labor that would re-
ceive waged income outside correctional supervision. Service programs entail participation
in well-being programs such as education or personal counseling.
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Figure 3.12: Adapted Framework
152
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
Figure 3.13: Total State Spending by Major Category 2010
Figure 3.14: Federally Funded
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Figure 3.15: State Funded
Figure 3.16: Spending on Medicaid by Source 2010
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Figure 3.17: Spending on Social Assistance by Source 2010
Figure 3.18: Spending on Corrections by Source 2010
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Figure 3.19: Participation Rates of General Population in Work and Non-
work Programs
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The breakdown here of the actual functions performed in this particular
area of the social corrections tier is twofold. One, it lays out the dynamic
variation in programmatic structure that has taken place over time, enabling
comparison with other tiers in the welfare state (e.g., vocational rehabilita-
tion for social assistance beneficiaries). Second, it illustrates that the aggre-
gate costs which are budgeted for social corrections should not be “lumped
together” and compared to the costs allocated to other welfare programs in
the neighboring tiers without due respect to which types of programs are on
offer in the respective units of analysis.
Within this mode of analysis it is easier to analyze the effectiveness of
different strategies regarding assistance to clients. It is already documented
that correctional services reduce the mortality rates of those under supervi-
sion, and eliminate racial disparities - thus indicating that the rehabilitative
services provided within the social corrections tier is able to somehow inter-
vene more effectively than those in the social, fiscal, or occupational welfare
tiers for particular cases. It could very well be, hypothetically, that those
facilities which provide inmates with low rent housing while on work-release
are actually more efficient at the reduction of long-term unemployment than
social welfare unemployment schemes. It may also be that the converse is
true, and that encroachment of such methods actually further perpetuate dis-
advantage and high-unemployment trends an other maladies. Clearly deeper
investigation is needed within and between the distinctive tiers of welfare
systems. What I have endeavored to illustrate is what the social corrections
tier is doing, in at least one state in the US. Thus, while assertions are right
that the costs of incarceration are outpacing costs per AFDC/TANF recipi-
ents (one of many social welfare programs), they overlook that these costs are
not directly comparable due to the variety of programs and services within
their calculations. 43
Without due accounting, it is possible to believe that the state is ram-
pantly throwing good money after bad in an effort to repress an entire
(sub)proletariat class brought into the social corrections tier via the neo-
liberal doctrine of marketization and individual responsibility. States do face
increasing costs in incarceration due to declining client turnover (residents
remain in prison for longer durations, requiring longer and more expensive
late-years care) and fluctuations in sentencing trends.
43AFDC/TANF is only one program within the social welfare tier, the way the Earned
Income Tax Credit is but one program within the fiscal welfare tier.
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However, even these headlines fail to come to terms with fundamental
economic calculations. First, the idea of steep increases in correctional bud-
gets are somewhat distorted. When correctional budgets (North Carolina;
1992 – 2010) are adjusted to constant prices, we see that while the amount
being invested into social corrections has risen over time, it has not done so
at such an alarming rate. The difference lies, for example, between reporting
that the costs for social corrections has increased by USD 570 million (cur-
rent year prices) between 1992 and 2010, and saying (in constant 2011 USD)
that spending has increased USD 289 million over those years, Figure 3.22.
Figure 3.22: Current and Constant Prison Spending with Population
Second, budgets do not necessarily represent increased client uptake.
That is, budgets are not increasing per inmate, but have rather a ceiling
defined by programmatic concerns which are not contingent on democratic
oversight. The clients which make up this area of spending simply have no
personal political power and very little external support. When the func-
tional services are broken down to their constituent parts, it appears that
(in fact) the social corrections tier is providing services to its beneficiaries
with less money per inmate, Figure 3.23. Increasingly, programmatic choices
come at the expense of of certain “non-essential” programs such as academic
education.
These figures illustrate particularly insightful issues. Contrary to popular
belief, prisons seem less expensive than many would have us believe. Whilst
only one state out of 50, and one country out of many welfare regimes, the
case presented here signifies that scholars of the welfare state must look
deeper into those areas which are traditionally “off limits” to our investi-
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Figure 3.23: Constant (2011) Spendng Per Prisoner and Population
gation. It also entails that, as Uggen and Inderbitzen (2010) have argued,
there is a place for criminologists in the field of welfare state research - one
which ebbs and flows with the waxing and waning of policy regimes across
the history of the US and other countries (Pratt 2011)
3.6 Discussion
What I have posited here is that social corrections, far from existing as a
separate entity from the Welfare State, is an essential component of the it.
The use of social corrections to manage the urban (sub)proletariat is nei-
ther unique historically (as seen in the growth in houses of corrections and
poor houses beginning around the 16th and 17th century in Europe), nor
spatially (as seen with varying uses of incarceration internationally). The
correlation between welfare regime and “prison state” are so distinctly clear
not because they are separate systems competing for clientele, but rather
because researchers are measuring the same system with different indica-
tors. One might also imagine announcing a “maternity leave” state or a
“flexible work” state. Thus, as scholars look to unravel the impact of rising
incarceration rates (not to mention the grossly disproportionate rise in mass
convictions), they do so outside this framework of understanding the welfare
state’s true reach. I find the separation of Welfare State and Prison State
difficult to accept in light of the evidence to the contrary.
There is ample evidence that punitiveness increases as we move from a
Social Democratic to Liberal regime, at least using the indicators available
161
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
thus far. That the Scandinavian co-ordinated markets incarcerate at a lower
rate than their North European coordinated market and Liberal market econ-
omy counterparts should not be so surprising. Rather, it may merely serve
as further proof that scholars have overlooked a portion of the Welfare State
puzzle. While past logic did tend to interpret social corrections in terms of
part of the aggregate Welfare State in America in the early 20th century, if
not before (Garland, 1981), the focus of attention has moved away from such
a unitary model. Garland’s Culture of Control marked a clear shift to this
direction (Garland 1981, 2001). Clearly, penal policies are moving in tandem
with other welfare policies across time and space, and an investigation into
the types of policy changes across all tiers, jointly, would greatly compliment
our understanding of welfare systems across regimes.
In terms of the surface data I’ve presented here: states acquire more so-
cial corrections clients as they enact stricter penalties for new and existing
criminal violations. These policy changes develop in tandem with broader
attitudes towards social, fiscal and occupational welfare and definitions of
the deserving and undeserving poor. Welfare system generosity constricts,
in the case of neo-liberalism, citizens witness a system wide effort to control
costs while managing the precarious (sub)proletariat who have been displaced
by larger macro-economic developments. In contrast to its social, fiscal, and
occupational welfare counterparts, the social corrections tier is (a) able to re-
duce costs literally overnight, (b) reduce these costs even with an increasing
beneficiary population and (c) do so without large scale political opposition.
Such total control of a segment of the welfare system, with resources almost
entirely at the discretion of sub-national elected officials - themselves by-and-
large unaccountable to the citizens whom are under their remit. This latter
fact is the focus of the rest of this thesis and its importance for both political
and economic studies is functional as much as, if not more than, its symbolic
value.
That prisoners often go without say in public discourse, are unattractive
recipients of political affection, receive the most highly discretionary and con-
trolled social benefits, and are highly sensitive to fluctuations in sub-national
politics and budget shortfalls brings to mind Foucault’s earlier observation
that the prison persists not because of its successes, but because of its fail-
ures (Foucault 1977). Such a reduction of costs in the face of growing usage
would be highly questionable in the other tiers and makes social corrections
the last stop for the needy and the first stop for the state’s accountant.
The social corrections tier, in this view, is entailed as a warning to those
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who would fall prey to dependence on the social welfare tier, and as a tool
for disciplining those who the social welfare tier has failed to deliver from the
commodified life events, as opposed to becoming claimants of the social rights
arduously won by preceding generations. However, this does not exclude it
from the welfare state, it merely entails that the welfare state might not be
as complaisant as might be imagined. Where the system is well funded and
universally available to citizens, we find the lack of such growth in this (social
corrections) tier. As states construct ever more restrictive welfare regimes
and move to the neo-liberal ideal, we witness a ballooning in the bottom end
of the social corrections tier as the system adjusts to the criminalization of
poverty. Further research into social corrections linkages is necessary includ-
ing a better understanding of the programmatic structure and developments
for this tier.
The social corrections tier as an area of inquiry, especially as relates to its
interaction with the entire welfare state, has many gaps and opportunities for
study. Perhaps it is the case that mass imprisonment and increasingly puni-
tive criminal policies, paralleled with ever increasing cuts to basic programs
such as elementary education and healthcare, is the natural complement to
the type of neo-liberal welfare state regime which the US has embarked on
since the early 1970s. There can be no meaningful change for the social
corrections tier without simultaneous modifications in the adjoining tiers. If
the social corrections tier is conceptualized as an integral component of the
welfare state, as I have argued, then opening this field to investigations con-
cerning the dynamics between this tier and others enables pragmatic study
for the state as a whole.
3.6.1 Summary
This chapter has been intended as a bridge between understanding the im-
portance of appreciating the centrality of political participation on the one
hand, and the need to reconceptualize the area of social corrections on the
other. Whereas the preceding chapter has shown that political participa-
tion remains an important component in welfare state processes, and that
the welfare state itself becomes author to such participatory dynamics, this
chapter has illustrated that citizens involved with this area of the state are
indeed recipients of welfare services and are (as such) necessarily important
for feedback processes. However, these constituents are the last and largest
politically demobilized group of citizens in the US. This chapter has analyzed
initial data comparing the two lower tiers of the welfare system (social assis-
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tance/insurance and social corrections), primarily in the United States across
individual state entities. It has shown that changes in the policy of other
tiers is significantly related to outcomes in the social corrections tier. Having
assessed core arguments describing the increasing use of punitive sanctions
via social corrections (in the form of incarceration), I have argued that racial
control as an explanatory thesis yields to more operationalizable variables
such as employment patterns, education, and above all social spending in
the area of welfare which reduces monied inequality. This work has investi-
gated the assumption that the decline in AFDC/TANF recipient rates across
time has coincided with welfare reform policy, supported by surface observa-
tion and further called into question by deeper analysis.
Furthermore, this work has argued that the neo-liberal policy transfor-
mation over the past four decades has effected both welfare and penal policy
alike because the two are inseparable. In as much, this chapter has traced
key points of the neo-liberal trajectory and raison d’eˆtre, to not necessarily
the creation of market friendly institutions, but the conversion of commu-
nitarian ones into traversable obstacles. In as much as the private market
is allowed and encouraged to overtake the responsibilities of the state, this
work proposes that these processes are not novel events but adaptations of
previous strategies enabled by new methods and emergent technologies.
This chapter has found, supporting Downes and Hansen (2007) and Cavadino
and Dignan (2008), initial evidence that (as with states in the US) countries
which devote a larger portion of their resources towards the reduction of
monied income inequality exhibit lower rates of incarceration. In addition, I
have shown that it is likely that it is not the amount of spending which states
exert to reduce inequality, but the extent to which this inequality is brought
under control (pre- vs post-gini scores) that contribute to clustering regime
typologies. Importantly for the study of welfare states, this entails that incor-
poration of penal systems, which I have conceptualized using an adaptation
of the framework provided by Titmuss (1965) and later Abramovitz (2001),
is a viable effort which increases our ability to understand the welfare state.
I have shown that this tier of the welfare state, for the United States, is
an area which is almost entirely left to the direction and resource allocation
of the individual states, notably with clientele who have no ability in the
political arena to negotiate their treatment. I have described cross national
variation in the financing and provision of social corrections services from
selected cases (owing to the absence of readily available comparative data).
I have carried out an initial exercise in exploring how such a schema can re-
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veal pragmatic information on the functioning of social corrections, using the
state of North Carolina as a case study. The findings from this exploratory
analysis have shown that the view of social corrections as a location of coer-
cive power relations and uneconomical policy planning forms only one part
of a larger story. The alternate view, which deserves due consideration and
investigation, regards those functions which successfully correct for external
(inter-tier) deficiencies. The investigation which follows into the preferences
of these clients could not proceed without an understanding of how it fits
in with other considerations that stand out in the current literature. These
areas were addressed first to provide the conceptual and practical compre-
hension which validate the importance of political demobilization, especially
of the very citizens most needy of it.
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Chapter 4
Political Disenfranchisement
Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere,
diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong remedies. -
Groucho Marx
The preceding part of this thesis laid out the three central themes concerning
the welfare state and political participation. First (Chapter 1), a duality of
arguments has persisted across time. As opposed to political or insurance ra-
tionales of legitimizing state intervention, moralistic debates have persisted
well before the advent of the modern welfare state. Two strands are dis-
cernible: one of which has found a particularly strong resonance with market
capitalism, emphasizing (often in the extreme) individual agency, and re-
moval of impediments; and the other, a more collectivist camp, emphasizes
the place of social protection as a bulwark against inequality. It is these latter
strands which have informed, as well, the debates surrounding political rights
in the arena of public opinion. Second (Chapter 2), it has been shown that,
even by conservative accounts, political participation remains significant for
social policy. More so, political participation matters precisely for programs
which, counter-intuitively for many neo-liberal critics, positively impact the
agency of the less advantaged members of society. The condition of relative
deprivation in modern capitalist economies has a nocent effect on political
agency. This reduced agency, when aggregated to the group level, reduces the
probability that citizen preferences (especially of the lower economic classes)
are registered or even solicited for inclusion.
While these effects are often considered to be minute at the national level,
the nature of policy making in a federal structure entails that impact must
be evaluated at the sub-national and even sub-state level. As an additional
point, if we are to take seriously any effect which the welfare state has on
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citizen agency, as well as the importance of democracy on policy making, we
must be concerned with all institutions which contribute to the services of
the welfare state - not solely those whose clientele are seen as “worthy”. Thus
(Chapter 3), a framework of welfare states incorporating correctional services
provides an encompassing picture of modern welfare systems which admits
those whose service and benefit take-up is supervised and administered (in
most situations) by authorities outside the formal social assistance and social
insurance tiers. In so doing, the clients of the correctional tier are formally
brought under the umbrella of programs aimed at negotiating the conditions
created by market capitalism in a democratic system. For the purposes of
investigating political activity and redistributive policy, this entails that of-
fenders continue as clients of the welfare state rather than temporary (or in
some cases permanent) exclusions.
The second part of this thesis is devoted to addressing the issue of po-
litical demobilization, specifically in the US. In particular, this chapter is
interested in the rationale behind the extension of the right to vote from the
elite classes to the lower rungs of society.1 Political rights form an integral
component to understanding how systems of welfare provision develop, and
consequently how they may be dismantled. As Scher (2010) has pointed
out “the existence of social pathologies, including inequality and discrimi-
nation, is not a matter of inevitability or a result of “naturally occurring”
conditions, but one created by the deliberate decisions—or nondecisions—of
human beings.” (282-284). Thus, if we are to discuss seriously about political
disenfranchisement (and for the purposes here, criminal disenfranchisement)
we must contextualize how the franchise has been conceived of and which
parts of society disenfranchisement benefits. While the extension of the fran-
chise in the US may seem a natural progression to many, the long march of
democracy does not proceed straightforwardly, but rather proceeds in ebbs
and flows. The seemingly radical franchise extension in the early years of
the nation’s history, before the Civil War and ahead of European states, was
not the result of benevolent elites who saw democracy as a universal good to
be advanced for the sake of the nation. Rather, the extensions were due in
large part to the mistaken belief that the US would remain a static, largely
agricultural nation. As Keyssar (2009) points out:
1As Scher 2010 argues, “the pillars of the American economy want regularity, consis-
tency, and predictability in elections. They don’t want hordes of new voters coming to
the polls, especially if they are poor, marginalized, less-educated groups ...[who] might not
ascribe to the centrality and importance of big business, big labor, big agriculture, big
financial services, big banking and insurance, big medical care, big oil and gas, big media,
and all the other major sectors of the U.S. economy.” (Scher 2010:loc 508)
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The constitutional conventions that removed property and even
taxpaying requirements did not aim or intend to enfranchise the
hundreds of thousands of factory operatives, day laborers, and
unskilled workers who became such a prominent and disturbing
feature of the economic landscape by the mid-1850s—certainly
not immigrant, and especially Irish Catholic, operatives, laborers,
and unskilled workers...The broadening of suffrage in the United
States took place in the absence of a large or very developed
industrial working class. (Keyssar 2009:1777-1780; 1806)
As will be illustrated in the following chapter, the right to vote, following an
impending clash between two distinct political-economic systems of produc-
tion, progressed into a practical necessity.
Means of Exclusion: There are essentially two manners in which polit-
ical power can be wrested from the electorate - restricting the electorate or
reducing their effective power (i.e., through fraud, disproportionate individ-
ual of interest group influence, and/or outright non-compliance on the part
of political actors). Both, according to Scher (2010), are viable methods of
depreciating the power of given groups in society. Of the two, restricting
access to the ballot is a much simpler, if not philosophically tedious, task.
The most common manner is that of membership requirements for electors.
In order to be qualified in the US, as with many other nations, voters must
be citizens and have reached a (rather arbitrary) defined age. These are the
most basic of qualifications. From there the electorate can also be restricted
by mental capacity and residency (many short term residents in local elec-
tions and expatriates of certain nations may not participate).2
These exclusions are arguably based on universal application and, with
the exception of mental incapacity, are all generally temporary statuses.3
Further, the restriction of voting can be, and has often been, defined by
means testing (e.g., poll taxes, literacy tests, tax liability). These exclusions
are more tenuous as they can and often have been used to target partic-
ular groups in society. Residency also deserves a mention herein, as it is
used to exclude many transient persons who would otherwise be eligible to
participate, ceteris paribus.4 Literacy tests and income tests have a partic-
2While some nations still exclude women and minorities from the right to vote, these
are the exceptions and not the rule.
3Naturalization, residing for the qualifying amount of time, and of course aging all
enable the individual to become electors.
4The homeless in the US, and travellers (e.g.,Roman and Sinti groups in European
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ularly ominous history in the United States. These exclusions aside, more
stationary exclusions have also been implemented in the lead up to universal
enfranchisement - gender and race based exclusions. Both of these strategies
deserve their own treatment in dedicated works, and it is outside the work
here to delve far into their use. Needless to say, the justifications used to
legitimize gender and race based exclusions have long since been refuted in
the United States and other nations; however, racial exclusions remain at
the forefront of many challenges to voter exclusion strategies in contempo-
rary discourse.
A final status, however, carries with it a permanent attachment unlike
the means tested or physical characteristic based exclusions; one particularly
based on a person’s past behavior - criminal disenfranchisement. Because
of the intersection of this form of political disenfranchisement with criminal
justice policy, and the disproportionate impact which the latter has on mi-
nority populations, felon disenfranchisement has become interminably mired
in debates about the racial impact of voter disqualification.5 Challenges to
criminal disenfranchisement based on racist intent have repeatedly failed, and
perhaps for good reason. The continuing existence of criminal disenfranchise-
ment is, I argue, a hold over from earlier liberal and republican conceptions
which shaped the formation of today’s democratic structure in the United
States. Disentangling this connection is thus central to discussing the exclu-
sion of citizens based on criminal activity.
The focus of this thesis is, at its core, the relationship of political de-
mobilization and social protection policies. As “the single largest group
of disenfranchised adults in the [US]” (Scher 2010:1350), felons represent
a unique opportunity to investigate the types of preferences which continue
to be excluded by state sanctioned policies. The existing work devoted to
criminal disenfranchisement is a small yet succinct collection of scholarly at-
tention, much of which focuses on a small band of related issues. As with the
alternative focus of correctional systems and institutions laid out in Chapter
3, I endeavor in the following chapter to lay out an alternative interpreta-
tion of felon disenfranchisement. In as much, this chapter attempts to steer
away from racial narratives of felon disenfranchisement, or even general po-
nations, especially in Eastern Europe) in other nations are often excluded precisely because
of their perceived disconnection with their host communities
5It is surprising that such exclusion has not been also attached on the merit that it
overwhelmingly affects the male vote in affected communities. The male disenfranchise-
ment rate is well over the 95 percent threshold of the disenfranchised criminal population.
However the racial narrative remains the most publicized challenge to these policies.
172
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
litical disenfranchisement for that matter. This thesis offers a decidedly more
socio-economic, class based narrative of the origins and impact of felon disen-
franchisement, one which draws attention to the place of the lower, laboring
classes of the electorate and these policies.
This is not to say that racial factors do not exist or are not palpable
explanatory phenomena for the institution of economic or electoral exclu-
sionary policies. The case of racial discrimination as relates to political dis-
enfranchisement is well documented, to say the least.6 However, as with the
discourses regarding welfare reform and prison policy, race based narratives
overwhelm almost any other investigative viewpoint. The sheer conspicuous-
ness of racial disparities and indicators of prejudicial motivations across time
and space has made inquiry outside this narrative a prospectively pernicious
undertaking. That is, while a substantial amount of the work to date appears
more amenable with discussing race and racism as a central feature of wel-
fare retrenchment, punitive penal policies, and the political demobilization
of citizens, this thesis sees these phenomena through the lens of class based
narratives involving political economic motivations.
To contextualize this alternative view, I proceed by embedding the devel-
opment of political rights, and by extension the exclusion of criminals from
them, in historical accounts of policies and movements which sought to dif-
ferentially impact the strength of conflicting factions in labor relations. I
begin with a brief overview of the current research on felon disenfranchise-
ment to provide the reader with a sense of the positioning of scholarly work
on the issue at hand. Following this, I proceed with a historical construction
of a labor perspective of political rights as they have developed in the United
States. As much of the foundation of critiques of criminal disenfranchisement
stem from the crucial period of the pre- and post-Civil War years, this section
treats this time period from the perspective of labor relations as well. This
Chapter ends with a treatment of the constitutional amendments which form
much of the basis for arguments for and against criminal disenfranchisement;
the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments - and to a lesser extent the 1964 Voting
Rights Act. It concludes with a view that the labor market position of many
offenders, and therefore disenfranchised, should move from an ancillary issue
to a more principal concern, especially in light of the findings of political
mobilization and social protection policies.
6Volumes have been devoted to the overtly racist violence meted out on the poor
of African decent who attempted to cast their ballots - from the countless individuals
intimidated by paramilitary supremacist groups, to the several hundred gassed in Selma,
Alabama.
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4.1 Current Discourses on Felon Disenfran-
chisement
La plus belle des ruses du diable est de vous persuader qu’il
n’existe pas.7 - Baudelaire
Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is
time to pause and reflect. - Mark Twain
A substantial amount of the literature on the subject of criminal disen-
franchisement focuses on its justifications (Dilts 2008) philosophically (e.g.,
Katzenstein,Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010; Lippke 2001; Mauer 2011a, 2011b;
Manfredi 1998; Clegg, Conway, and Lee 2006; Furman 1997), strategicially
(e.g., Hasen 2007; Siegel 2009; Katz 2007), or from interests of offender rein-
tegration (e.g., Uggen, Manza and Thompson 2006; Uggen and Inderbitzin
2009; Kerrison 2008; Dhami 2005). These studies overwhelmingly acknowl-
edge the racially disparate results of the escalated trend of punitive criminal
justice policies, whether as primary themes to address or as secondary consid-
erations to corroborate their main arguments. That is, while racial disparity
has not been shown to be intentional, it is argued that its existence is enough
to merit the same conclusion.
The time span of the debate on felon disenfranchisement, at least the bulk
of publications in scholarly literature, is equally rather narrowly defined. Of
the 103 sources surveyed, only 9 were published before the Gore-Bush elec-
tion of 2000.8 Earlier works focused on the issue of felon disenfranchisement
as a violation of the 8th Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punish-
ment (Reback 1973; Demleitner 1999), violation of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (VRA) due to racial impact (Shapiro 1993; Harvey 1994; Hirschfield
2001), the political and legal philosophical underpinnings and incongruities
of criminal disenfranchisement (Manfredi 1998; Fletcher 1998), and the bar-
riers created by such policies for reintegration of the offender (Mauer 1999).
7“The greatest trick of the devil is to convince you that he does not exist”
8Literature was chosen using the latest annotated bibliography of resources on felon
disenfranchisement available from the Sentencing Project and a Google Scholar search of
a series of key terms (e.g., felon voting, felon disenfranchisement, criminal disenfranchise-
ment, felon political rights), as well as a detailed reference tracing of key literature sourced
from both previous modes. While it does not represent the complete listing of existing
works, I have endeavored to provide a thorough account of the work to date available to
the public and academic community at large.
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Figure 4.1: Surveyed Works on Criminal Disenfranchisement
The emergence of the sudden “popularity” is not surprising. Following
the events in Florida, the field of discussion opened up across the board.9
Over half (54 percent) of the works surveyed occurred between the years
2001 and 2006, with nearly all of those citing the racial impact facets of
criminal disenfranchisement. Many of these either directly assert (Uggen
and Manza 2002; Manza, Uggen and Britton 2001; Manza and Uggen 2004)
or indirectly infer that criminal disenfranchisement plays a role in electoral
outcomes (McDonald and Popkin 2001; Burch 2007).10 Beginning around
2004, likely due to the interest which these earlier works enabled and/or
were sparked by public interest, a growing number of authors began focusing
on the partisan factors underlying criminal disenfranchisement (Stuart 2004;
Conn 2005; Uggen, Behrens, and Manza 2005; Yoshinaka and Grose 2005;
Ewald 2009).
With the mixed bag of arguments currently available (ranging from ex-
planatory narratives, to descriptive statistical accounts, to challenges of con-
stitutionality) it is surprising that a more in depth treatment has not oc-
curred from the political sciences regarding what is at its very core a matter
9In the Presidential election of 2000 between George W. Bush and Vice President Al
Gore, nearly 600,000 citizens were barred from the vote based on criminal disenfranchise-
ment policies. Because of the closeness of the race - George W. Bush won the popular vote
by just over half a thousand votes - and the instances of citizens being wrongfully denied
their vote because of inaccurate felon purging techniques, the election became a catalyst
for social commentary and research.
10For the sake of brevity, only those works with explicit mention of their reasoning are
listed.
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for the field. Where political scientists do interject, it is primarily to assert
that the deleterious effects of political disenfranchisement are inconsequen-
tial to election outcomes (Miles 2004; Haselswerdt 2009; Burch 2012) or that
voting rates among felons and pre-felons is so low as to essentially entail
irrelevance on the political landscape (Burch 2011; Behan 2011; Haselswerdt
2009). Closer investigation bears out some of the reasoning that lies behind
challenges to criminal disenfranchisement in the United States.11
4.1.1 Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement
There are generally three themes which the discourses on felon disenfran-
chisement follow: (1) its justifications, (2) affected populations, and (3) its
impact. Of those, the second has weighed in considerably in the scholarly
literature. Arguments for its rationale (1) and those concerning its impact
(3) remain in flux, with considerable room for debate on either side of the
issues. A more stable certainty is witnessed in the remaining area of debate,
resulting principally from its enumerative character.
Disproportionate Racial Impact
Felon disenfranchisement currently affects massive numbers of citzens, with
the overwhelming majority of those affected serving their time in the commu-
nity. In 2008, the Pew Foundation found that 1 of every 99 adult persons in
the US were behind bars. This statistic pails in comparison to the number of
adults who are denied the right to vote. Uggen, Shannon, and Manza (2012)
found that 2.5 percent of the voting age population in the United States was
disenfranchised due to criminal disenfranchisement - or 1 in every 40 adults.
Furthermore, 2.6 million of those who lack the vote are based in only eleven
states, accounting for 45 percent of entire disenfranchised population. The
rise of these numbers has been astronomic with the rise of mass convictions
in the US (Chin 2011).12 Rates have risen by nearly 400 percent between
1976 and 2010. For African Americans in particular, these rates are truly
alarming. One in every thirteen African Americans of voting age, nearly
11A subset of literature approaches the effects of the criminal justice system on political
participation and civic education. These are described in chapter 5.
12While mass incarceration is truly an astounding phenomenon, mass convictions
presents a much more significant issue for political rights. In an effort to decrease govern-
ment spending, states have begun to reassign those convicted of lesser crimes to community
supervision instead of prison sentences.
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four times the rate of the non-African American voting age population, is
politically disenfranchised. In three states (Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia)
23, 22, and 20 percent of African American males were disenfranchised re-
spectively. Uggen, Shannon, and Manza (2012) contend, “when we break
these figures down by race, it is clear that disparities in the criminal justice
system are linked to disparities in political representation” (Uggen, Shannon
and Manza 2012:15).
In this vein, Owens and Smith (2009) find that larger black incarcerated
populations indeed correlate with narrower citizenship rights. However, the
descriptive representation that such an increase in minorities is often ex-
pected to entail (i.e., that more minority representatives, presumably elected
by a larger minority electorate, will diffuse racist policies) does not impact
punitiveness in felonious citizenship (Owens and Smith 2009). Rather, it is
the overall institutional punitiveness that drives such citizenship.13 A partic-
ularly intriguing development is the increasing conviction, incarceration, and
disenfranchisement of the growing Hispanic population in the United States
(Martinez 2004). This development is not simply a statement of contribu-
tory work to the field; rather, it illustrates a particular instability in racial
animus challenges. It poses a central dilemma with the position of past racial
narratives, one that the racial narrative adjusts itself to. As Hispanics are
increasingly facing the fate of the black inner-city populations, the narrative
changes to advance the idea that institutional racism is adapting to include
Hispanics, regardless of the fact that other racial divisions at varying ge-
ographic locations are not facing the same fate. Here a subtle difference is
perceptible between race and class narratives, one not often expounded upon.
The race narrative becomes flexible to incorporate developments, whereas the
class narrative only requires that one recognizes the commonality of the class
position and lack of social protection for the “new” laboring class. The ex-
planation provided by the race-based narrative revolves around the idea that
elites have always intended to expel other races, despite the fact that other
races have experienced varying degrees of success and failure in the political
and economic arena.
13Owens and Smith find that the racial composition of the electorate is not particularly
relevant as regards punitiveness, while the punitiveness of the correctional system corre-
lates with punitiveness in welfare policy (Owens and Smith 2009). This finding further
corroborates the inclusion of correctional institutions into the overall welfare system in
Chapter 3
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Partisan Impact
The logical conclusion many draw from this is that these glaring differences in
criminal convictions entails significant effects for the electoral process. That
is, given that the general population of African Americans tends to support
Democratic candidates, it is expected that the impact of criminal disenfran-
chisement is particularly partisan in nature. It has been suggested that the
contested election of George W. Bush, mentioned previously, would have
swung in favor of former Vice-President Al Gore (Manza, Uggen and Britton
2001; Manza and Uggen 2006). However, Burch (2012) counters that Bush
would have still defeated Gore by five to seven thousand votes in the absence
of restrictions. Additionally, Burch finds that not all those barred from the
vote are necessarily Democratic supporters. In the state of North Carolina
(2008), for example, Burch (2011) finds that “56.3 percent of registered ex-
felons signed up as Democrats, compared with 22.8 percent as Republicans
and 20.9 percent unaffiliated or Independent”(Burch 2011:720). Of that,
blacks registered at 72 percent Democratic, while their white counterparts
were split evenly across categories. Equally, Manza and Uggen (2006) also
find that the disenfranchised turned out to be more Independent than would
be expected by population characteristics. Thus, the conventional wisdom
that felon disenfranchisement is particularly detrimental to the Democratic
vote share is not a given. Indeed, the impact on a partisan level might not
be as extreme as many would assume (Gottschalk 2006).
The lack of understanding of the political orientations of the disenfran-
chised population has a tendency to promote the notion that one party ex-
ploits the criminal justice system to its own ends (i.e., directly utilizing dis-
enfranchisement laws for strategic purposes).14 This despite the fact that it
was a Republican Governor, George W. Bush, who liberalized felon disenfran-
chisement policies in the state of Texas in 1997, eliminating the 2-year waiting
14For example,under these assumptions, Lacey (2010), one of many authors, proposed
that “the widespread practice of felon disenfranchisement inevitably excludes a dispro-
portionate number of African Americans from political participation. Disenfranchisement
laws, which tend to take more votes from Democratic than Republican candidates, played
a decisive role in Senate and presidential elections from the 1990s, thus creating a clear
incentive for Republican politicians to support extensive criminalization and incarcera-
tion, even in the context of diminishing crime rates.” (Lacey 2010:107). This is certainly
supported sentiments on the right. In an interview with disenfranchisement proponent
Norman Deforrest, Abramsky records: “the felon leftist axis has its dream scenario in
place...the majority of felons, I’d say about 75 percent of them, are liberals or Democrats.
Only about 25 percent are conservatives or Republicans. Democrats will go out of their
way to put anybody to vote for them” (Abramsky 2006:91-92).
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period for restoration; and it was the Republican Governor of Florida, Char-
lie Crist, who instigated an automatic restoration in 2007 of former felons
who had satisfied all other requirements.
While it is yet to be proven that any Machiavellian strategies have been
deployed with such explicit intent, it is certainly plausible (and suggested)
that criminal disenfranchisement laws are intended to reduce the natural
limit of the Democratic party’s support. However, the fact that policies per-
sist regardless of Democratic or Republican controlled governments would
call partisan interest into question. While it may be that a large portion of
the disenfranchised may be projected to support Democratic candidates, the
reality may be somewhat disappointing. The results from Burch (2011) and
Manza and Uggen (2006) clearly indicate that the disenfranchised popula-
tion deviates from expectations. Indeed, the results presented in Chapter 6
indicate that, at least for the state of North Carolina, felons are much less
likely to self-identify with the Democratic party than might be expected.
Turnout Depression
Yet another aspect of criminal disenfranchisement, which might work against
theories of impact, is that of the low probability of participation of felons both
before (Burch 2012) and after (Burch 2007, 2011; Behan 2012). Burch (2007)
found that the effect of conviction halves the registration rates of ex-felons,
while controlling for registration before first conviction reveals that “pre-
felons” are additionally less likely before their convictions to vote (Burch
2012). Registration rates are equally low in work conducted in Ireland by
Behan (2012). Following the re-enfranchisement of prisoners by the Irish
government, only 15 percent of the 3200 eligible offenders registered to par-
ticipate. However, of those who registered, 75 percent turned out to vote
(Behan 2012). That is, the potential impact of felon voters may simply be
a figment of the imagination. Felons, in this view, are simply not likely to
use their time to support any party or candidate. However, participation
itself is a variable state, and many election upsets have occurred because of
premature discounting of participation likelihoods.
As Behan (2012) notes, the leading reason for demobilization among felon
voters for non-participation was the belief that they were “neglected by politi-
cians in general and parliamentary candidates in particular”, as it is “not
politically advantageous to be seen to be supporting the rights of prison-
ers” (22,29). These sentiments were echoed in interviews conducted for this
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research (Chapter 7). Burch’s findings are enticing in another aspect, one
which relates to the effects noted previously on program participation and
political agency. That is, it may be that the same mechanism at work for
clients of other tiers of the welfare system are replicated in the correctional
tier. It could be (1) that the low participation rates cited Burch may be tap-
ping into the effects of the welfare system effect on pre-conviction offenders
(which is reasonable considering the criminogenic environment which means
tested systems are shown to aggravate) and/or (2) Soss and other may be
also picking up the residual effects of felon disenfranchisement on the com-
munity. The two effects may, as well, be working in tandem. Obviously more
investigation is needed to address this area.15 Thus, we ought to expect a
sliding scale of participation rates as clients move to ever more stigmatized
and agency reducing programs. The final, and perhaps most active, area
of debate concerning criminal disenfranchisement finds its home in the legal
fields of scholarship.
4.1.2 Legal Challenges
Court challenges to the practice of felon disenfranchisement are among the
most concrete examples of reasoning behind the practice. They inform the
public about the professional views of the rights and proper place of those
with felony convictions, as well as setting precedent for future challenges. One
of the pitfalls, however, is that unsuccessful challenges (based on incomplete
reasoning on the side of either party) create barriers to future challenges.
Opponents of felon disenfranchisement, and political disenfranchisement in
general, must therefore make strong cases, strategically placed, to avoid fight-
ing against themselves in the future. To date, the bulk of legal challenges
have focused on the racial disparity of criminal disenfranchisement.
Legal Rulings: In Washington v The State of Alabama, the court ruled in
favor of maintenance of criminal disenfranchisement as a protective measure
against the corruption of government. As Furman (1997) points out, in
Washington v The State, the court upheld the ban on criminal voting by
touting the civic republicanist interest in preserving the purity of the ballot.
More so, it was not the offender’s own lack of requisite moral qualification
that formed the threat, but the prospect of her “lack of moral fortitude to
15That is, post-disenfranchisement demobilization may be in part due to interaction with
this tier of the welfare state, as well as a function of the documentary disenfranchisement
which Allen (2011) has cited.
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spread to others” (12). The Court ruled
It is proper, therefore, that this [criminal] class should be de-
nied a right, the exercise of which might sometimes hazard the
welfare of communities, if not that of the State itself, at least
in close political contests... the manifest purpose is to preserve
the purity of the ballot box, which is the sure foundation of re-
publican liberty...exclusion is imposed for protection, and not for
punishment.
Two years later, the Court in Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886) would contradict this
ruling, on the basis that even though policies may be facially race neutral,
the context in which they arrive at their conviction may not be so - thereby
violating the Equal Protection Clause (Section 1) of the 14th amendment.
What is particularly interesting in Yick Wo v Hopkins is that the case it-
self was not brought to the court on the basis of voting rights, and yet the
court felt the need to exemplify the importance of the right to vote. In the
delivery of the opinion of the Court, Justice Matthews stated: “The case of
the political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded strictly as a
natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its
will, under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental
political right, because it is preservative of all rights.”.
This early case lost significance after the Plessy v Ferguson ruling es-
tablished a popular conception of “separate but equal”. In Trop v Dulles
(1958), the Court ruled that the rights of citizenship are not forfeited unless
by explicit intent. That is,“citizenship is not a license that expires upon mis-
behavior...as long as a person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his
citizenship...his fundamental right to citizenship is secure” (Furman 1997).
In Carrington v Rash (1965), the Court further solidified the permanence
of electoral participation by invalidating a Texas statute which barred those
serving in the Armed Forces, and making their residence in the state, from
participating in state elections while serving. According to Manza and Uggen
(2006), the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a state to deny the
vote based on how prospective electors might use their ballot.16 Meanwhile,
16According to the text of the opinion delivered by Justice Stewart: “The theory un-
derlying the State’s first contention is that the Texas constitutional provision is necessary
to prevent the danger of a “takeover” of the civilian community resulting from concen-
trated voting by large numbers of military personnel in bases placed near Texas towns
and cities. A base commander, Texas suggests, who opposes local police administration
or teaching policies in local schools, might influence his men to vote in conformity with
his predilections. Local bond issues may fail, and property taxes stagnate at low levels
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in a complete turn around, Green v Board of Elections (1967) ruled against
a communist party member who was denied his civil rights based on his con-
viction under the Alien Registration Act (aka: The Smith Act) of 1940. The
Court ruled that because those who violated the law would pose a threat to
the standing of laws by concerted effort, the constitutionality of felon disen-
franchisement stood; quite in the face of Carrington v Rash.
However, these rulings were not the nail in the coffin of challenges to
criminal disenfranchisement. That came from the 1975 ruling in Richardson
v Ramirez which would effectively bar any further challenges under the 14th
amendment. The interpretation of “other crimes” by the Court in Richardson
has led many subsequent challenges to the practice of criminal disenfranchise-
ment. Hinchcliff (2011), which will be argued below, contends that the courts
have mistakenly miscontextualized the meaning of the phrase, and that due
concern should be given to the actual conception that the framers had in
mind.
Two further contradictory cases based on racial intent followed Richard-
son. In Wesley v Collins (1985), Tennessean plantiffs were rebuked in their
claims that “as a consequence of centuries of racial discrimination, Ten-
nessee’s blacks have suffered under debilitating socioeconomic pressures which
account, in part, for the significantly higher rate of felony convictions – and
disenfranchisement – among blacks as compared to whites”. The court re-
jected the claim on the basis of a lack of proven connection between the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons and discriminatory intent of the laws. The
historical past of discrimination did not, in the Court’s view, lead to invali-
dation of felon disefranchisement laws (Harvey 1994).
In the same year, the Court invalidated Alabama’s felon disenfranchise-
ment policy in Hunter v Underwood (1985) declaring the state’s “moral ter-
pitude” reasoning to be racist in intent (Manza and Uggen 2006). It would
be another 20 years until a resurgence of challenges would materialize. The
first of these, Johnson v Bush (2002), stemmed from the aforementioned 2000
election scandal. Eight plaintiffs filed a class action suit on behalf of 600,000
disenfranchised citizens in the state of Florida. The plaintiffs argued that the
because military personnel are unwilling to invest in the future of the area”. The Court
went further to state, “Fencing out” from the franchise a sector of the population because
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible. “[T]he exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions,” Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161, cannot constitutionally be obliterated because of a fear of the political views of a
particular group of bona fide residents.”
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state’s disenfranchisement policies and clemency provisions violated the 1st,
14th, 15th, and 24th Amendments, as well as Sections 2 and 10 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. The Court ruled against all claims. In Hayden v Pataki
(2003), the Court again dismissed the arguments for racial discrimination
due to the lack of evidence that the policy was purposely discriminatory in
nature. A later ruling in Farrakhan v Gregoire (2010) would further solidify
the legal perspective that felon disenfranchisement could not be challenged
under the existing amendments and, in this case, the Voting Rights Act.
The ruling claimed that the VRA did not intend to apply to felon disenfran-
chisement. Rather, it was the criminal justice system which would bare the
burden of challenges and, as such, plaintiffs must show “that the criminal
justice system is infected by intentional discrimination or that the felon dis-
enfranchisement law was enacted with such intent” (Sgro 2012:162). Such a
necessity from the courts is often disputed.17
Others have argued that it is perhaps better to avoid litigation in favor
of legislation, and there is some merit to this strategy (Gottlieb 2002, Hasen
2004).18 Given the fickle history of legislative success, such a strategy ap-
pears fraught with peril. A key impediment remains the causal assertions
necessary to invalidate the policies under the current system. Courts have
consistently ruled the necessity of clear intent to discriminate based on race
or color in order to invalidate felon disenfranchisement laws from a racial nar-
rative. Because the policies themselves, which shall be elaborated in depth,
are the results of a filtering process of criminal justice, such intent has proven
impossible to show.
Detrimental Impact: Legal challenges, however, remain the predom-
inant strategy in favor of repealing parts or all of current policies and as
such a large portion of the literature favors these events and their interpre-
tations. Where the optimism of reform of these policies is substantial among
legal scholars, the perspective from the political sciences seems decidedly
less enthusiastic. The findings are quite mixed as to what, if any, effect dis-
solution of criminal disenfranchisement policies would have on current and
future election results. Taking an alternative tact, others have suggested the
negative impact which such policies have for the individual, the community,
17See: Manza and Uggen (2006); Chin 2011; Re and Re 2011; and Sgro (2012)for more
detailed review of legislation.
18For a detailed list of court cases predating 1987, see The Brennan Center’s Right To
Vote: Key Decisions in Felony Disenfranchisement Litigation
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and the reintegration of the former into the latter. These include the dam-
aging aspects of felon disenfranchisement on the extension of democracy, the
incongruity with public sentiment, and the reduction of racial disparities in
representation (Uggen and Inderbitzin 2009). Such challenges, however, have
not played out robustly in legal or social scientific research; however, the field
remains open for investigation.
American liberalism is infused with exclusionary practices, thus defenses
based on it are fraught with peril (Katzenstein, Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010).
Those in favor of maintaining the ban on felon voting operate from legal
precedent laid out in both philosophical and legislative debates. The crimi-
nal, so it goes, has willingly broken the social contract and therefore becomes
a “slave of the state”. She has proven her inability or unwillingness to abide
by the rules established by the body politic. Thus, as seen in Wasington
v The State of Alabama, the act of disenfranchisement and exclusion is a
boundary setting process which solidifies and protects the community from
collapse (Altman 2005; Katzenstein, Ibrahim, and Rubin 2010; Clegg 2001;
Clegg, Conway, and Lee 2006). To cite Senator McConnell (R) of Kentucky,
“we are talking about rapists, murderers, robbers, and even terrorists or
spies...those who break our laws should not dilute the vote of law-abiding
citizens” (Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003:572-573). However, they are
also policies which remove the agency of individuals and their communities
by predicating their participation on a selective view of how their votes might
be utilized, a position clearly refuted in Carrington v Rash. That said, it is
not the purpose of this work to argue the constitutional validity of criminal
disenfranchisement laws.
What has been cited here has introduced the prevalence of challenges
based on racial narratives and the many defeats they have faced. However,
the successes of the earlier Yick Wo v Hopkins and Madison v Washington
(2006) challenges may bear out productive fruits. In Yick Wo, the Court ac-
knowledged the environmental circumstances of the plaintiff as contributory
factors; while in the preliminary Madison case, the Court ruled that discrim-
ination based on wealth violated section 1 of the 14th amendment. It should
not be taken without merit that the few successes to challenging felon disen-
franchisement are not those based on race but on class. Given the historical
foundations of political rights, opponents of criminal disenfranchisement may
seek to propose arguments which sidestep racial narratives and focus on the
evident class nature of these policies in both intent and outcome.
184
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
4.2 Labor and Disenfranchisement
As the eminent historian James Lowen has noted, the history of American
exceptionalism is flavored with the absence of events and actors who led to
subsequent possibilities. History books teach of how Helen Keller (blind and
deaf from birth) learned to read, write and orate; but fail to detail her radi-
cal Socialist advocacy or condemnation of the individualist ethos long since
perpetuated. Lincoln is seen as a proponent of racial equality, in the face
of historical records to the contrary; and Woodrow Wilson as a progressive
leader reluctant to enter the First World War - not as an avid believer in
white supremacy, race segregation, and opponent of women’s suffrage.19
The role of class conflict in American political and economic development
runs a parallel course. Class, and in particular the laboring class, has played
a central role in the formation of political dynamics in the US - arguably
more broadly and at greater length than cleavages such as race or ethnicity.
Unfortunately, this often goes under-emphasized. Class status intertwines
with ethnic, religious and racial factors, often subsuming its place as a mere
incidental characteristic of those facing exclusion both politically and eco-
nomically. In a sense, we lose sight of class not because of the fluidity of
the groups affected, but rather because of the mercurial character of class
and its attachments to variable ethnic and racial groupings across time and
space. In much of American political discourse, mentioning class differences
is a taboo subject.20 This is endemic to racial debates regarding felon disen-
franchisement. The plight of African Americans, to cite the most popularized
example, is inextricably married to the nature of their labor market position;
in conflict with ever increasing numbers of immigrant laborers vying for po-
litical, economic and social position. Indeed, the perpetuation of subsuming
and repudiating the presence of class positions very likely contributes to a
myriad of disadvantages which in turn author the fate of many lower and
working class (especially male) citizens.
Obstacles to voting have been a primary strategy for dis-empowering
19Wilson eventually supported women’s suffrage after eventually understanding the
political costs of opposition. So too have many glossed over the avowedly anti-
communist/socialist stance of his administration and US intervention to overthrow the
Soviet Revolution and his belief that ”there are apostles of Lenin in our own midst. I can
not imagine what it means to be an apostle of Lenin, It means to be an apostle of the
night, of chaos, of disorder” (Lowen 1995, 16)
20“There are three great taboos in textbook publishing...sex, religion, and social class”
(Loewen 1995: 24).
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labor and their threat to the higher classes when their interests did not co-
incide. Such was the interest of the emerging capitalist classes in political
power that at various points striking workers were threatened with disen-
franchisement owing to their unemployment and hence participation in so-
cial assistance (pauper exclusion policies), or driven to the polls by political
machines. The exclusion of the electorate based on property ownership or
other socio-economic factors forms arguably a much more potent approach
to understanding the current use of felon disenfranchisement than race based
issues. This is not to say that race and prejudices therein were not and are
not employed to tap into latent attitudes among the electorate. However,
race as a driving force gains its momentum from underlying economic inse-
curity and competition among various classes, especially in the evolution of
American political rights.
This proposition is put forward more forcefully in the following section,
illustrating the degree to which vested interests saw the instrumental value of
the vote. Others, however, saw the solidifying effects of the vote for the lower
classes, emphasizing this facet as many in contemporary debates continue to
extend. As reformer JT Austin put forward in the early 19th century, “by
refusing this right to [laborers in factories], you array them against the laws;
but give them the rights of citizens . . . and you disarm them.” (Keyssar
2009:45). But the apprehension of the landed classes in the early US ran
deep. There was growing concern that the rise of industrialist capitalism
brought crowds of uneducated and manipulatable masses to the states which
would lead to the decline in wealth of the powerful.
“Universal suffrage [would jeopardize] property, and [allow] the poor and
the profligate to control the affluent” (48). The property-less poor, so the
thinking went, would be sent to the polls by their employers and would vote
in their interests if the restrictions based on property were not left standing.
Where race had a place in restricting the vote, it was as an unhappy side-
effect of their labor market position. For early American communities, the
right to vote was an evolution in progress, and the attractiveness of having
a say in the distribution of collective resources was a significant issue. More
so, states were acutely concerned that allowing blacks to vote would lead to
mass exoduses, their states would be “overrun with runaway slaves from the
South”(57). Such a rush of labor from the Southern states loomed large on
the minds of many laborers, both “native” and immigrant alike.
In the build up to democratic governance in the US, labor worries played
a significant role in constructing the American political system - enfranchise-
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ment is a recent addition, and universal enfranchisement even more so. This
fact often goes under-appreciated in the literature on voting rights.21 The
applicants to the franchise may have pursued the extension for symbolic rea-
sons, however the record shows that there were much more pragmatic reasons
for pursuing the right to vote. For instance, during the shifts to disenfran-
chise African Americans across the US, affected communities vocalized their
demands to halt discrimination not only because it separated out their par-
ticular racial category, but also (importantly) because it dispossessed them of
control of public resources. One appeal from the black community facing the
prospect of blanket disenfranchisement in the city of Philadelphia petitioned
the people of Pennsylvania: “We ask a voice in the disposition of those public
resources which we ourselves have helped to earn” (loc. 1552).22 The right
to take part in controlling the collective resources of society has been at the
heart of restrictions of the vote. It is curious how such concerns have found
themselves excluded from debate.
Southern states which disenfranchised blacks, but allowed whites of the
same socio-economic background to participate, did so strategically - to main-
tain the status quo and to avoid having to court an enlarged working-class
vote. The upper classes feared that a “biracial alliance of blacks and non-elite
whites would superintend the erection of a new and inhospitable economic
and political order”(92). Elsewhere, outside the South, opponents of uni-
versal suffrage sought to “limit the political participation of the Irish and
Chinese, Native Americans, and the increasingly visible clusters of illiterate
and semiliterate workers massing in the nation’s cities.”(102), primarily for
economic gains.
Race, in America, forms one of the most central issues in nearly all nar-
ratives on social, political, and economic life - criminal disenfranchisement
21In a review of works directed at felon disenfranchisement, none provides a significant
treatment of the subject from a class based perspective. Typically, authors focus on
disparities enumerated by race or ethnic characteristics, while class affiliation and market
position occupies, by and large, a cursory examination of the initial treatment of newly
arrived immigrants.
22Notes Keyssar: “A gathering of African Americans issued an angry public statement
called the Appeal of Forty Thousand Citizens, Threatened with Disfranchisement, to the
People of Pennsylvania. ’We ask a voice in the disposition of those public resources which
we ourselves have helped to earn; we claim a right to be heard, according to our numbers,
in regard to all those great public measures which involve our lives and fortunes,’ the
statement declared. Similarly, New York’s African-American population protested against
the state’s discriminatory property qualification, and in Providence, blacks — thanks to
an extraordinarily complex political situation — succeeded in getting their political rights
restored.” (Keyssar 2009: loc.1552)
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has proven to be no exception. In order to understand why “race is a logical
culprit” (Uggen and Manza 2006:44), it is instrumental to trace the histori-
cal evolution of these laws, and not simply their disproportionate impact on
minority populations. Given the recurring failures of legal challenges against
the practice on the basis of racial impact, such an inquiry helps to uncover
not only possible avenues for future challenges, but also provides contextual
background for the findings of this work concerning the preferences of disen-
franchised felons.
“Understanding why the Civil War began informs virtually all the atti-
tudes about race that we wrestle with today” (Loewen 2011). Exploration
equally informs our understanding of the role which labor relations played
in the construction of political rights in the contemporary United States.
The failure to adequately include the historical significance of labor relations
into the debate on the political disenfranchisement of criminals illustrates an
important gap in contemporary debates, covering this area aims to partially
rectify this.
If opponents of criminal disenfranchisement wish to advance their cases
against the practice, it may serve their purposes better to refocus efforts
away from causal claims of racial animus and towards other considerations.
This section explores the historical evidence that the disenfranchisement of
felons, in contrast to many legal challenges, poses primarily a threat to that
of the political influence of the (increasingly unprotected) worker. The racial
disparity evident in criminal justice statistics and further witnessed in disen-
franchisement levels is evident of disparities manufactured by weak employee
relations in the labor market, which were exacerbated by the (re)emergence
of the market fundamentalist policies of the 1970s and onwards. This reading
places felon disenfranchisement as an outcome of contests between political-
economic interests, where race has formed a secondary consideration. The
failure of legal challenges to successfully dispute felon disenfranchisement on
the grounds of racist intent should be taken seriously, and not as a mis-
interpretation of the related amendments and acts which these arguments
forward.
4.2.1 Antebellum Labor Disputes
The American government had set out to fight the slave states
in 1861, not to end slavery, but to retain the enormous national
territory and market and resources. (Zinn 2008:181)
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The Civil War and its aftermath are monumental events in the development
of US society. As such, it is useful to develop the context in which both the
onset of hostilities began, and from which Reconstruction sprang. Under-
standing this informs the logic of how political disenfranchisement is viewed
from a class based approach (Uggen, Manza and Thompson 2006). While
racial oppression certainly played a significant role in allying many to the
cause for and against abolition, it was not the idea of racial equality which
moved support in favor of war or emancipation and the subsequent amend-
ments. Rather, the impetus for action lay in more fundamental concerns for
the the new nation - political economic systems and the idea of Manifest
Destiny.
Manifest Destiny, the idea that growing republic had the moral authority
and obligation to spread enlightened ideas and civilization across the new
continent, resonated with elites north and south of the Mason Dixon line.
The distinguishing characteristics of interests of these two sides were not
solely their racial, religious or ethnic compositions (though these were un-
deniably important contributory factors). Their discerning characteristics,
rather, rested in their political and economic systems of production.
On the one hand lay the industrializing Northern states, with booming
immigrant populations (originating largely from Europe), urbanized popula-
tion centers, significant degrees of capitalist development, and (importantly)
a system of “free labor”. On the other hand sat the agricultural Southern
states with an increasingly “home-grown” population, rural settlements of
small farm owners and large plantations, stagnant capitalist development,
and an ingrained system of slave labor. These two systems faced one com-
mon problem – in order to continue to prosper, both must spread further
into the interior of the continent and towards the shores of the Pacific.23
The rapidly industrializing, immigrant laden, Northern states required
new lands to act as a pressure valve against the social ills which industrial-
capitalist urbanization brought. In the words of then Chair of moral philos-
ophy at Harvard, Frances Bowen, the growing “’class of laborers, who must
always form the majority in any community, and who, with us, also have
the control in politics, will not be satisfied without organic changes in the
23According to Zinn: “It would take either a full-scale slave rebellion or a full-scale war
to end such a deeply entrenched system. If a rebellion, it might get out of hand, and turn
its ferocity beyond slavery to the most successful system of capitalist enrichment in the
world. If a war, those who made the war would organize its consequences.” (Zinn 1980:
155)
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laws, which will endanger at once our political and social system’” (Huston
1983:43). As opposed to their former English rulers, whose “police power...
was firmly in the hands of the propertied class” (38), the structure of the
American system put the policing authorities, at least in theory, at the whims
of the common man.
The South, on the other hand, suffered from a slightly different dilemma.
Her system of labor required a continuing supply of fertile land if she was to
progress. In addition, and compounding this issue, was the “natural growth”
of the African slave population within her boundaries. If the Southern agri-
cultural economic labor system were to survive, it must spread into new
areas and alleviate the threat to the oligarchy from growing discontent from
poor white farmers and African slave labor. As much was evident during the
era. In a speech at the Secessionist Congress, Senator Toombs of Georgia
expressed an all too real concern among many in the region - “In fifteen
years...without a great increase in slave territory, either the slaves must be
permitted to flee from the whites, or the whites must flee from the slaves”
(Marx 1861). If Southern Elites could not disperse the discontent, it would
be their property – and lives – under threat. Thus the two systems were
destined to impasse. The tensions inherent between the two played out on a
number of fields, but to one end.
Both systems needed to expand, however the North needed the support
of the working class vastly more than the South. The Republicans, who were
fresh from the solidarity enforcing events of Kansas, pushed forward their
program against the idea of unfair competition and for the respect of the
laboring man. They began with defining the issue of slavery as an affront
to not only the value of working men as antithetical to the popular Euro-
pean conception of labor, but also as a diminution of the theory of popular
governance by the people. Then Senator William Seward of New York gave
his now famous “Irrepressible Conflict” speech at Rochester,illustrating the
separation of the two systems based not on racial equality, but on moral
legitimacy:
The laborers who are enslaved are all negroes, or persons more
or less purely of African derivation. But this is only accidental.
The principle of the system is that labor in every society, by
whomsoever performed, is necessarily unintellectual, groveling,
and base; and that the laborer, equally for his own good and for
the welfare of the State, ought to be enslaved. The white laboring
man, whether native or foreigner, is not enslaved only because he
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can not as yet be reduced to bondage. (NYHN 2013)
Two years later, before the US senate, Seward (on the heels of a visit from
the Kansas Legislature endorsing its prospective statehood) argued again,
this time defining the political consequences of the opposing systems:
The State protects not the slave as a man, but the capital of
another man, which he represents. On the other hand, the State
which rejects Slavery encourages and animates and invigorates
the laborer, by maintaining and developing his natural personal-
ity in all the rights and faculties of manhood, and generally with
the privileges of citizenship. In the one case, capital invested in
slaves becomes a great political force, while in the other labor
thus elevated and enfranchised, becomes the dominating political
power. It thus happens that we may, for convenience sake, and
not inaccurately, call Slave States capital States, and Free States
labor States. (NYT 1860)
Eschewing the North as a respectable labor system, and the South as an
unjust capitalist one, Seward and others had readied the powder kegs for
political warfare and then found the means to light the fuse. For the Re-
publicans, the challenge lay in dislodging the marriage between Northern
merchants and capital which were against Lincoln’s election. They were chal-
lenged with whipping up enough electoral support to ensure control of the
Whitehouse. As the eminent historian, Richard Hofstadter, argued in 1938,
“commercial and financial capital in the North was, on the whole, strongly
opposed to Lincoln’s election. Merchants were apprehensive that it might
result in the cancellation of orders from the South, and bankers expected the
repudiation of Southern debts amounting to over USD 200,000,000 [approx-
imately USD 5.5bn in 2011 dollars]” (Huston 1983: 54).
In addition, the Republicans, in the wake of the decline of the Whigs and
Federalists, were hard pressed to persuade the masses of the working-classes
outside the South to take the issue of slavery to heart. Writing soon after
the events of the civil war, Fox (1917) noted that in New York, it was the
working class man who refused to back enfranchisement. This was not based
on race so much as on the threat that the allegiance which the association
of enfranchised former slaves would have with the upper classes. Because
slaves were a luxury and not a necessity for Northern slaveholders (though
the case could be argued that it was equally so on a monumental scale for
their southern counterparts), manumission meant that former slaves threw
their support behind Federalist party members, who in turn backed efforts
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to enfranchise them.
Not surprisingly, machine bosses, Republicans (pre-federalist dissolution),
and Democrats all rallied against enfranchisement. When Republicans gained
the backing of freedmen, Democrats stood fiercely against enfranchisement.
“The Democrats had every reason to subscribe to the opinion the Negroes,
born in slavery, and accustomed to take orders, would now vote according to
the dictates of their employers” (260). 24
In New York, it was the elites who fought for enfranchisement, along
strict party lines. Party leaders knew that the black voter “‘would recall
that it was the Democrats of 1821 who had excluded them, when ‘every
Federalist in the convention strenuously opposed the proscription’” (266).
The Whig/Federalist party leaders, on the other hand, fought for the enfran-
chisement of freedmen, but exclusion based on property ownership. It was
a win-win for the party of the elite. When first-order (strategic) reasons for
disenfranchisement failed to gain momentum, opponents turned to embedded
racial prejudice. With this derivation from the true schism came arguments
citing biblical verses and criminal tendencies. The division of enfranchise-
ment was based on strategic concerns, and “acquaintance with the black man
seemed to count for little” (272). “The Democratic party in the cities was
the party of the little man, the day worker and the mill-hand...reason was
supported by race prejudice in the heart of the mechanic” (274). It was
the existence of the massive population of slaves in the south, accustomed
to the severe plantation labor economy, which the Democrats (North and
South) feared, and which both enabled Republicans to pursue emancipation
by framing the issue with the core concerns of the Democratic supporters in
the North – labor.
The Republican strategy was as simple as it was powerful. The system of
slavery in the south threatened working men everywhere because it put waged
laborers in direct competition with forced labor and degraded the status and
therefore claims of laborers in the political sphere. Prejudice no doubt ex-
isted among many whites both north and south of the Mason Dixon Line.
24The anxiety of how groups of potential voters might vote as a reason for extinguishing
the right to vote at conception is a recurring theme in the history of franchise extension.
The case has been used for former slaves, youth, women and most consistently convicted
felons. The call for disenfranchisement contained prejudice, without doubt, but prejudice
was a second order (and possibly even third order) reason for their hostility. Paupers also
faced exclusion as their reliance on the state made them open to coercion. Women also
faced disenfranchisement for nearly the same reasons.
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This was an ever changing landscape with immigrant groups constantly al-
lying against “others” from successive waves nearly (almost literally) on top
of the next. The rise of the Republican party, and especially the Radical
Republicans, presented a more active voice. “To [the Republicans], the man
who worked for wages all his life was indeed almost as unfree as the southern
slave” (VanderVelde 1989: 474). The unified Democratic party, however, left
very little room to maneuver for Republicans.25
Trade Winds: An important opening came in the form of trade pol-
icy. At least in the Northern view, if the premise for government in the
burgeoning American nation was popular representation (as had been evi-
denced from the gradual enfranchisement of its citizens), and if those classes
making up the bulk of the population were toiling in the factories, then the
political order of the day was pacification of the laboring man’s interest –
or strategic exclusion. In the South this was less an issue owing to the iron
fist with which the roughly 300,000 slave owning oligarchs ran the region.
Thus, Northern elites found themselves precariously positioned. On the one
hand, they could not tolerate a stronger Southern system which also had its
eyes set on Manifest Destiny. 26 On the other, growing labor dissatisfaction
threatened the stability of the Northern system. Faced with these issues,
elites took the moral high ground.
Following the conflict in Kansas, Republicans rallied and pushed a pro-
tectionist agenda in trade policy, leading to the passage of the Morill Tariffs.
The move attracted both working class support and industrialist acquies-
cence. The argument was put forward thus: by raising tariffs, the US would
raise the wages of domestic workers and encourage the development of in-
ternal competition. In parallel to this strategy, an altogether different view
of the laboring man was put forth by American capitalist thinkers, such as
Henry Charles Carey and New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley, which
25Lincoln, notes Loewen (1995), played all sides of the debate to gain support for the
elimination of the slave economy. Speaking to abolitionists in 1862, Lincoln pleaded: “We
shall need all the anti-slavery feeling in the country, and more; you can go home and try
to bring the people to your views, and you may say anything you like about me, if that
will help. . .”. (164). While for the less religiously based audience, Lincoln would argue,
”Labor is prior to, and independent of, capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and
could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital,
and deserves much the higher consideration.” (194).
26This was especially crucial in a bicameral system where one house based representation
not on population, but on territorial allegiance (i.e., Senatorial distribution of 2 seats per
state regardless of population)
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emphasized the exceptionalism of American labor. This theory presented a
considerably more optimistic view of labor than their European counterparts
– which they sought outright to discredit.27
According to Huston, Carey differentiated England’s political economic
foundations on the premise that “the primary objective of England’s eco-
nomic system was the establishment of a class of nonproducers whose sole
purpose was to transport goods from one nation or colony to another”, in or-
der to provide employment to (non-producing) merchants (Huston 1983:42).
High tariffs, argued Carey, were essential to protect the American laborer
from the products gained from “ ‘the ill-fed and worse-clothed workmen’ of
England and Europe” (42).28
Democrats, fully aware of the dangers to their power in the North, equally
saw an opportunity in tinkering with trade policy. As an adviser to President
Buchanan counseled, “the only way to outmaneuver the Republicans was ‘to
raise the tariff, so as to concentrate and keep attached to the [Democratic]
party the working masses’” (52). However the tariff issue belonged to the
Republicans, and with the secession of the Southern states following the elec-
tion of Lincoln, the Morill tariffs were destined to pass the Senate devoid of
Southern opposition.
The Morill tariff legislation was itself part of a tri-partite menu of policies
explicitly designed around the interest to marry labor with the Republican
party. It aimed at maintaining “the capitalist system and yet advance the
lot of the laborer”, in order to “create a national economic climate that
would provide industrial workers with sufficient reward so that they would
never disown their loyalty to the state and to society” (54). Like Bismarck
before, policy makers were designing a welfare program to ensure political
and social continuity and pacification. The Morrill tariffs were joined with
the Homestead Act (to encourage westward movement and depressurize the
27The evolving political-economic thought of the North Americans first disassembled
European assumptions and at the same time altered the conceptual status of the laboring
man. They argued that Britain, primarily, had failed because it sought to subordinate pro-
ducers to merchants. By forcing its colonies to produce only raw materials, which it then
manufactured and sold back to colonies and other consumers, Britain forced pauperism
on its subjects.
28For the protectionists, the Malthusian and Ricardian naysayers missed out on a critical
element of the free laborer – the spirit of men. Laborers in the United States were not
simply inputs into the machinery of production to be used towards the cheapest possible
production costs. Idleness was condemned and industry was acclaimed as the path to
virtue and reward.
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urban centers in the East) and the Morrill Land Grant College Act (to pro-
vide an overall better material wellbeing of workers). Together these acts
formed what Huston considers “the nation’s first positive use of the federal
government’s powers to combat the social ills that attended the rise of the
factory system; it was the government’s first positive response to industrial-
ism” (ibid.), predating the later New Deal era by nearly 70 years.
While war was certainly directed against slavery, slavery is better under-
stood as it was suggested at the time of agitation than against a modern
race-based conception. This contention was not premised solely on the sub-
jugation of one race to another, to the contrary. Many in the North, like
their Southern neighbors, had little desire to see equality between the races
instituted– a fact which survived long into the 20th century. Instead, the
ideal that slavery was an unacceptable exploitation of labor was a central
argument for intervention, one that resonated strongly outside the South.
With the election of Lincoln, the South declared war on the Union. The
Union responded in kind, though in defense. The Republican stance on pre-
and post-civil war issues, while incorporating moral calls of abolition, were
at their root pragmatic measures to ally the working classes with the party.
The strategy to bring in working class support, prosecute the destruction
of the free labor system’s rival (including halting its westward expansion to
preserve its own interests in the opening territories), and quell class tensions
was a top-down strategy from the middle classes which relieved some of the
pressure from growing unease produced in the face of industrialization.29
4.2.2 Felon Disenfranchisement and Reconstruction
The consideration of the grounds on which the Civil War in the US was
prosecuted allows us to approach the challenges to the legality of felon dis-
enfranchisement from an alternate perspective. The import of the issue of
labor’s role for the Civil War, and that of the entire political economy of the
US, bled over into the drafting of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
amendments to the constitution. Given that much of the contemporary chal-
lenges to felon disenfranchisement has attempted to justify the abolition of
the policy on the basis of violations of these amendments, it is instructive to
29The reforms brought in were not sufficient to subdue labor tensions, and it was clear
“even by the 1850s...that workers had determined their economic salvation lay in organiz-
ing trade unions....The Republican labor policies...constituted a middle-class solution for
working class problems” (Ibid.)
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explore these developments. The following draws heavily from the work of
VanderVelde (1989) and Re and Re (2011).
The 13th Amendment and the Labor Floor
Following the close of the war, Union victors were quick to draft and imple-
ment the terms of the South’s surrender and the framework for which the
future of the nation would be constructed. The first of these, the Thirteenth
Amendment, abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, “except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted” in the
United States or any area under its jurisdiction. This amendment, argues
VanderVelde, was steeped in the pro-labor vision embedded in the Radical
Republican vision for the nation. According to this view:
The Reconstruction Congress could not have contemplated the
abolition of slavery without anticipating the profound affect this
action would have upon the entire legal structure of labor rela-
tions...the abolition of slavery raised the floor, and in turn altered
the internal logic of the remaining [labor market] structure.(441).
“The pro-labor interests...coalesced in the grounding of the Free Soil party[;]
the Radical Republicans of the 1860s evolved from the politically oriented
Free Soil movement rather than the religious-centered Abolitionist move-
ment” (447). For the Republican Party of Reconstruction, “the degradation
of one worker was the degradation of all working people”(445). They un-
abashedly pandered to the interests of the growing working classes (whether
out of conviction or strategy). While racism was not absent, the conception
of race at the time was far from contemporary standards. The (literal) un-
chaining of the mass of the laboring class in the South brought with it very
real consequences which did not escape those charged with formulating the
highest laws of the land.
While the abolitionists “eschewed politics” and advocated emancipation
on grounds of moral righteousness, the Radical Republicans - having evolved
from more politically oriented populist roots - had larger concerns, not least
of which was the conflict between capital and labor. The conglomeration
of support which amassed to enable the passage of the 13th, 14th and 15th
amendments stemmed from interests which sought to see the opening of the
western areas to the free laborer (e.g., the Barnburners), more strategic in-
terests which sought to limit the growing power of industrialists (e.g., the
Conscience Whigs of Massachusetts), and (significantly) the mass of Free
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Soilers who saw the existence of slavery as a degradation of labor of any race
and an impediment to wage levels, upward mobility, and social improvements.
“Labor autonomy was [the goal of the Radical Republicans]. Slavery
was the obstacle to attaining this goal....free labor meant not just upward
mobility of a few workers but the leveling of class differentials between la-
borer and employer, by raising the status of laborers” (452 - 459).30 The
strength and irony of the Radical Republican ethos was its focus on acquired
virtue, of nobility through action. When Bingham spoke of property and
the constitutional protection of it, he spoke from a standpoint which saw all
property as the product of the efforts of labor and “attacked all class sys-
tems that subordinated laborers to those who did not labor” (461). Property
was to be valued only as it was the creation of the effort of the laboring class.
Obviously, such a rhetoric struck less than accommodating sentiments
from the landed Southern gentry. In the defense of their political and eco-
nomic system, Southern advocates would draw comparisons to the forced
labor of their slave class and that of northern laborers under a wage-system
– asserting that theirs was superior and less debilitating. Whereas the aboli-
tionist was rather unconcerned as to the political or economic fate of former
slaves following emancipation, “Labor groups...found poverty to be as debil-
itating and objectionable as slavery” (464).
With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, the process
turned to the specifics of defining what degree the Freedmen ought to be
protected. While divisions arose in the ranks of the Republicans, the Rad-
icals maintained that the Freedmen could not be left to the law of supply
and demandThe implications were consequential. No sooner had the amend-
ment passed than employers in the South began a program of reconstitut-
ing their grip on employees by limiting their work opportunities (thereby
curtailing their prospects of terminating their employment voluntarily), cre-
ating stricter employment codes (normalizing obedience and subordination
to the employer), and strategies designed to restore the employer-employee
relationship which reconstruction had aimed at overturning.
The post-amendment debates were not solved with the passage of the
amendment, and they were not limited to the South. Efforts to establish
30As one commentator of the time elaborated the Southern employment relationship
problem: “‘You will find that this question of the control of labor underlies every other
question of state interest.’ Former masters were neither prepared nor disposed to deal
with former slaves on the grounds assumed by free labor ideology” (452)
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national labor rights flourished. The Anti-Peonage Act and prohibitions
on imprisonment for debt were created to solidify the rights of labor above
capital.31 In the South, however, organized control over labor continued to
hamper the realization of a free labor economy. Area wage levels were set
by large-scale agricultural employers and state legislatures which “prevented
the freedman’s wage from rising in response to competitive demand...[and]
under the [James River Farmer’s Compact], employees could be discharged
for drunkenness or statements of indicating want of respect that occurred in
the privacy of their homes. Other agreements provided for the discharge of
employees who exercised the right to vote” (493-494).
Removing Barriers and Excluding Vice - the 14th and 15th Amend-
ments
The Thirteenth Amendment had a rather perverse knock-on effect for the
North’s efforts to stabilize the political economic system of the US. The
Reconstruction Congress had released slaves from bondage, but it had not
established the fate of the addition to free labor. If former slaves were to
avoid a return to their previous labor relations, they would need to be cloaked
in the protection of civil and political rights. The Fourteenth Amendment
attempted to resolve this deficiency, but not without due consideration of
the effects to the power of the victorious Union.
The 14th Amendment: In slavery, and as a concession to Southern
states for joining the Union, the black laboring class was a discounted popu-
lation for allocation of seats in the houses of congress. The three-fifths rule
meant that southern states could use their slaves to gain representation even
while considering them as chattel property devoid of political input. The
electoral college further helped them retain influence in central government
and the continuation of strong “state’s rights” policy – with a strong judi-
ciary to ensure the status quo (Manza and Uggen 2006). This was explicitly
established protect the south from being outbid by the industrial/populous
North. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, made the new freedmen cit-
izens of the United States and henceforth enumerable for the purposes of
apportionment - increasing at once the allotment of seats to the defeated
31“[In New Mexico], white settlers captured Native Americans and forced them into
service. Refinements of this practice involved lending money, goods, or credit to Native
Americans and holdingthose individuals to work off their debt” (490)
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southern states.
The apportionment calculations for the South would make the North re-
alize that by freeing the masses of laboring blacks, the South would actually
gain in influence - obviously an undesirable prospect. As a result, the recon-
struction congress could: (1) enfranchise all freedmen – a proposition which
the divided North, still dealing with divisions among its own laboring classes
and the special attachment of freedmen in the North with the past Whig and
Federalist elites, did not relish; (2) apportion states based on the number of
eligible voters – however this would obviously still negatively effect northern
states with large numbers of recently arrived aliens and women; or (3) set up
an apportionment penalty – imagined to be a catch-22 for the southern states.
The rationale for the latter, and ultimately executed, option was strate-
gic. Southern states could choose to bar citizens from the exercise of the
vote and/or the occupancy of public office; however, in so doing, “the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the num-
ber of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State” (Amendment XIV; Section II). Many
states, even in the North, still disenfranchised on the basis of race. Should
the Southern states choose to disenfranchise their former slaves, they would
face a massive loss of political power at the federal level. To further press
their hand, Section 3 (a Senate version) stripped the elites of the Southern
political (and economic) order of any future participation in government.32
The latter option became the basis for the ratified amendment (Section 2).
The contemporary mindset which exalted the value of the working man
over non-producers found its way into the formation of Reconstruction pol-
icy and the subsequent amendments. It is here that the strong contractarian
philosophy of formal equality came into play. Combined with the stand-
ing of the Radical Republicans that free labor deserved the utmost respect,
the Reconstruction congress enshrined in the language of the 13th and 14th
amendments the exclusion of criminals from the protection of the consti-
tution. The basis for these exclusions was both a matter of philosophical
consistency, political maneuvering, and legislative expediency. Consistent
with the view that virtue was a status conferred through one’s own labor
and determination, and that by freeing laborers from barriers to realization
32An alternate, House measure advanced, but which ultimately failed, advocated strip-
ping all rebels of their ability to participate in government. In addition, many southern
states flouted reconstruction directives and returned rebel officials to office, infuriating
many in the North from lack of deference in defeat.
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of the fruits of their labor, it was natural to exclude those who proved their
unworthiness through acts of vice.
Congress certainly intended for the laboring class, freedmen or otherwise,
to enter into the halls of political power.33 However, the egalitarian mood of
the time aimed “to defend the disenfranchisement of criminals even as [leg-
islators] fought for the enfranchisement of black Americans” (1592). Only
a handful of legislators are noted as opposing the continuation of political
disenfranchisement on the basis of criminal conviction. The Radical Repub-
licans viewed the right to vote as part of their impartial and just system of
governance, which viewed “willful violators of the law – criminals – as ene-
mies and outsiders” (Re and Re 2011: 1596). Their reasoning was steeped in
the Lockean contractarian ethos of the time, justified using moralistic con-
cepts of good and evil, and backed by a firm belief that the common man
had only but to lack barriers to his achievements to advance in the new na-
tion. Virtuous policies and rights, as a consequence, ought not be extended
to those devoted to vice as evidenced by conviction under the rule of law.
Likewise, the “formal egalitarianism” espoused by these authors drew lines
at loyalty. Such a condition is all the more reasonable given the times these
policies were constructed, in the shadow of nation building.34
33To re-administer states into the Union, congress instituted legislation which turned
the former confederate states into military jurisdictions. States were assigned to appoint
delegates to administer state conventions to draft their respective constitutions. One of the
stipulations of re-admittance was the ratification of the 14th amendement which explicitly
included the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement.
34The issue of felon disenfranchisement might well have been thwarted by a single
amendment at the very beginning of the reconstruction process, and thus never making
its way into current debates. What is known about the reconstruction era is that the
occupying military were directed to create a register of eligible voters to elect delegates
to draft their reconstruction constitutions. Registerees were mandated to take oaths to
the effect that they had not occupied state or federal office before the rebellion or been
convicted of crime. African Americans voted in droves, however repressive strategies
persisted. While former slaves were allowed to be registered, current criminals were not,
nor were former confederate operatives.
What is less well known, according to Re and Re, are the debates concerning the extent
of the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement from protection under the reconstruction
amendments. Notably, Thaddeus Stevens - already renowned for his adamant prosecution
of the rights of labor leading up to the civil war - moved to strike this exemption from
the amendments language. According to Re and Re, Stevens urged the adoption of an
amendment which would provide that “the conviction for crime except for treason shall
not take away the right to vote”, arguing that he had received information “that in North
Carolina and other states where punishment at the whipping-post deprives the person
of the right to vote, they are now every day whipping negroes for a thousand and one
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That the drafters of the amendments anticipated the extent to which
criminal convictions would pervade the American landscape is hard to imag-
ine. From the evidence at hand, and considering that such an amendment
covered the entirety of the Union - of which many states still barred blacks
from voting in elections - it seems evident that the precepts of contemporary
theories of governance formed the prevailing justifications of excluding crim-
inals from protection against disenfranchisement policies.
Thus, as Re and Re argue, felon disenfranchisement is not a mistake of
negotiation or racist intent. Rather, the existence of such policy is a result of
the desire to enshrine, in even the extensive policy horizon of constitutional
amendment processes, the ideal concept of a contractarian system while rec-
onciling their current predicament with a shifting market hegemony. The
authors of the reconstruction amendments could not have envisaged the type
of mass convictions which are now so common in the US. They certainly
could not have imagined the ease with which plea bargains and conspiracy
charges are brought against the many (predominantly poor and alarmingly
minority) who lack resources to pursue their defense through adequate rep-
resentation. Thus, as Hinchcliff (2011) argues, the 14th amendment does
affirmatively sanction criminal disenfranchisement; however, a textual inter-
pretation of the legislation would lead to reasoning that the framers did not
and could not have imagined the extent to which this sanction would reach,
“when a much smaller portion of the population had a criminal record” (235).
By preceding the “other crime” stipulation with rebellion, Hinchcliff argues,
it is most likely that the framers intended the severity of “other crimes”
to reflect the nature of the preceding disqualification (i.e., acts against the
solidarity of the Union). Though even this challenge faces evidence to the
contrary. As Re and Re and others have pointed out through the historical
record, many advocates for maintenance of the ban on criminals frequently
cited crimes which made explicit reference to particularly heinous crimes as
murder and rape - extending the definition to crimes less akin to rebellion
and treason as advocates of a textual interpretation argue.
The 15th Amendment: The deficiency of the 14th amendment came
to light following the resounding (Electoral College) defeat of Democrat Ho-
ratio Seymour to Republican Ulysses S. Grant in 1868. As one sided as the
trivial offences” (1625-1626). Stevens may or may not have foreseen the implications of
the exclusion of criminal disenfranchisement, but his argument was an eerie forshadowing
of the events to come.
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Electoral College defeat was, Grant only narrowly won the popular vote,
even with many Southern whites disenfranchised at the time.35 Political op-
eratives, Democrat and Republican alike, quickly recognized the strategic
importance of the black vote, both North and South. The 15th Amendment
took shape to remedy this fact. However, argue Re and Re, the congress was
unambiguous about its intent to leave criminal disenfranchisement intact.
Former slaves were to be included explicitly for the same principles under
which criminals were to be excluded - the logic of contractarian government.
Even the most radical of the Radicals sanctioned the rights of states to dis-
enfranchise citizens on the basis of criminal convictions. Rep. James Ashley
of Ohio, a staunch opponent of President Johnson and avid abolitionist, had
argued that “each state...may disenfranchise any person for participation in
rebellion against the United States, or for commission of an act which is a
felony at common law” (Re and Re 2012: 1634). This from the supporter of
the repeal of section 2 of the 14th amendment and replacement text which
would have enfranchised all residents (including women), and made a con-
stitutional right of public education. Consequentially, the 15th Amendment,
which explicitly set out to resolve political disenfranchisement on the basis
of race, was also not devoid of debate regarding the constitutionality of felon
disenfranchisement powers. It is, in light of this duality of debate rhetoric of
the time, difficult to attribute the existence of criminal disenfranchisement
in the United States to racist intent, as the evidence put forward calls into
question the basic arguments made be many. That is, the right of states to
politically disenfranchise its members on the basis of criminal conviction is
not convincingly a priori a result of racist intent. This is not to say that the
manipulation of such policies have not been racist in nature, only that the
construction of such policies were based on alternative concerns outside the
domination of a particular racial grouping.
There is, it ought to be noted, a degree of danger that such an inter-
pretation downplays the very real impact which racism has had for political
participation in the US; not least of which stemmed from the brutal repres-
sion of African Americans and other minorities leading up to the advent of
the revolutionary period of the 1960s and 1970s.36 In the decades following
reconstruction, and accelerated by the premature removal of Federal protec-
tion following the election of President Hayes, southern states would redefine
35Re and Re note “Grant bested his rival by only 300,000 popular votes - fewer than
the 450,000 Southern blacks who overwhelmingly voted Republican” (1630).
36This second reconstruction (Manza and Uggen 2006) was the result of the deficiencies
of the first reconstruction. I would argue that it may also be seen as simply a continuation
of the first.
202
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
many crimes as felonies which were explicitly intended to attach themselves to
the probability of commitment by minority communities (Manza and Uggen
2006).37 From this perspective, those who see disenfranchisement laws as a
racial project could be forgiven for confusing its manipulation with its intent
- however, such a view should not, in the view of this work, perpetuate be-
yond reason.
Prisons as Labor Profiteering: What is particularly interesting from
the perspective of the use of Reconstruction Era policies is the effect which
the re-tooling of criminal justice policies had on not just the electoral op-
portunities of freed slaves, but also on labor-employer relations in general.
Legislative action aside, the South remained in dire straits. The economic
impact of the war was unprecedented and social and political stability in flux
(Goldin and Lewis 1975). With the war over and Reconstruction Adminis-
trations in power, much of the South was opened to the efforts of industry
and capitalist interests from both regions, to which the Federal government
had at least attempted to make provisions for the protection of those recently
moved into the free labor market.38 When the chains of slavery were lifted,
the shackles of the chain gang were fitted. The need for dependable (read
expendable) labor was required for the construction of many Reconstruction
projects, and courts answered in the manner in which elite economic interests
saw best - the re-subjugation of former slaves and poor whites. Where the
North had long developed their industrial prison workforce (e.g., under the
Auburn system of prison labor), the South soon caught up and surpassed its
northern neighbors. This resubjugation was embedded in an environment
where capital and labor remained at war long after the Civil War ended. A
telling example is the Southern Homestead Act of 1868, a central piece of
legislation which spurred vehement disdain among economic interest in the
North and South.
According to the act, nearly 48 million acres of Federal lands in the South
were “off the market” for non-homesteaders and, for one year, ex-confederate
soldiers. Southern Redeemers despised the act, viewing it plainly as an ob-
37Following the reversal of reconstruction policy following the pull out of Federal forces,
the state of Mississippi alone saw black turnout rates plummet from 66.9 percent in 1867
to 8.2 percent in 1896. The comparable white turnout rates were 55 percent and 72.4
percent respectively. (Emerson, Haber, Dorsen, and Greenwalt 1967)
38The scale of destruction was one thing, the sudden influx of new corrections clients was
quite another. Previous to the war, prison institutions were reserved for white offenders,
blacks were dealt with within the slave apparatus (McShane and Williams 1996).
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stacle for “capitalist groups that would otherwise come south and develop
the region’s rich resources” (Les Benedict 1980). Concerns in the North,
however, saw a different incentive for the capitalists and their Southern Re-
deemer allies, that of economic and political exploitation. The interminably
frugal Democratic Representative from Indiana, William S. Hollman, lead
the call to maintain the act, arguing that its repeal would “enable capitalists
to monopolize large portions of the public domain at a price greatly dispro-
portionate to its value”, resulting “in the impoverishment and wretchedness
of the multitudes” (ibid.). Hollman was no socialist. It would take the Great
Betrayal of Tilden to Hayes in 1877 by Southern Democrats to move the
Reconstruction forces out of the South and usher Southern elites back to full
power, ultimately resulting in the grave race-based inequities which domi-
nated long after Reconstruction ended.
The compromise, however, did not come overwhelmingly from the South-
ern Democrats, but from “weak-kneed bondholding [Northern] Eastern Demo-
cratic capitalists” (510).39 Hayes’ reward was the sidelining of the Republican
regulars (i.e., Radicals who wanted to keep to the party’s founding principles,
including their affiliation with labor) to the benefit of his reformer Republi-
can members, with a peaceful transition into power following the contentious
election through the Electoral Commission. Regardless of whether or not
southern Democrats were more or less in favor of fighting Hayes’ election
(or for Tilden’s), it was the business elites in the South and the North who
moved the election in Hayes’ favor. What split the Democratic party was
less sectional than ideological.
Race to the Top: The propositions forwarded here are by no means
novel. Indeed, they are at the core of Marxist views of the purposes of racial
divisions in society. Racism on a systematic scale was enabled by the reaction
of elites to popular demands during and after Reconstruction. “Populists,
either alone or in combination with Republicans, threatened Democratic
supremacy, and a situation emerged in which the plea for white supremacy
could be made effectively” (Key 1949: 541 – found in Brown-Dean 2003:
39The victory of Hayes in 1877 over Southerner Tilden has been seen as a betrayal of
southern capitalists to Tilden. But it was also a means to survival following the war. In the
south, Southern Democrat elites tried to salvage as much out of their defeat as possible
and maintain their hold on power by ridding any northern interference in their affairs.
“Fear of violence, or at least instability, played a large role in moderating the belligerence
of the Democratic businessmen whose influence predominated in the northeastern wing of
the party as southern Democrats disgustingly recognized” (Les Benedict 1980:520).
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64). This was a direct effect of political maneuvering against the anti-elite
populist movements of small-scale cotton farmers and others who opposed
the reach of the industrialist railroad capitalists and their drive for capital.40
As Horance Mann Bond found in Reconstruction Alabama
...after 1868, [there was] “a struggle between different financiers.”
Yes, racism was a factor but “accumulations of capital, and the
men who controlled them, were as unaffected by attitudinal preju-
dices as it is possible to be. Without sentiment, without emotion,
those who sought profit from an exploitation of Alabama’s natural
resources turned other men’s prejudices and attitudes to their own
account, and did so with skill and a ruthless acumen.(emphasis
added)” (Zinn 2008: 190)
The deliberate exploitation and intensification of divisions among the labor-
ing classes pushed penal policy in the South following Reconstruction. To
ensure their dominance, the ruling elite would co-opt habituated prejudice
and insecurity to funnel former slaves into penal servitude where possible,
sever any ties with similarly situated whites, and decimate their electoral
and economic power to restore class power in the South.41
The collapse in the main markets in the South, labor migration westward,
the boll weevil pestilence, and the dramatic decline in European immigrant
laborers (not to mention the ramifications of foreign military operations)
led a massive migration of black laborers North. The infirmity of exclusion
based on race was not shed as these laborers moved to their new northern
40Business interests were not passive in advancing their interests, even outside the tu-
multuous South. In late 19th century Chicago, the Chicago Union League Club, backed by
the city’s commercial establishment, wrote and passed legislation that set out a package
of regulations for qualification for voting that included house to house inspection and a
diffuse board of non-elected officials to oversee voter registration. The package of restric-
tions were so numerous and rigid that one only need move several blocks or be suspected
of being a fraudulent voter to be removed from the register of eligible voters, a fact that
bore heavily on socialist supporters. Similarly, San Francisco Republicans designed an act
to remove the power of Workingman’s Party by vesting power in a mayor and appointed
public servants.(Keyssar 2009)
41As McKelvey (1935) notes: “Now the vicious character of the race conflict... rapidly
increased the number of Negroes in the criminal population until it exceeded ninety per
cent of the total. Slave methods naturally suggested themselves as the logical patterns for
penal discipline...there were no annual investigations by disinterested citizens, as in the
North, to uncover the harsh realities. Slave standards and race hatreds were to debase
Southern penal practices for a generation...many thousands of happy-go-lucky Negroes
awoke from rosy dreams of freedom and forty acres and a mule to find themselves shackled
to the task of reconstructing the South in hopeless penal servitude.” (McKelvey 1935: 154)
205
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
worksites. To the contrary. The dramatic rise in southerners coming into
the urban North posed a severe problem for political machines, especially as
the influx of cheap labor undermined previous gains. This competition at the
lower ends of the labor force led to “tensions between Black migrants and the
lower-class whites that felt threatened by the attractiveness of this new Black
labor class” (Brown-Dean 2003: 92). For the employer, a heterogeneous labor
force enabled wages to be lowered for both black and white laborers. As Peter
Bohmer notes:
By hiring both white workers and black workers, but paying a
lower wage to the black workers, employers as a class gain by
racism and racial inequality, and each individual employer also
maximizes profits. Paying unequal wages in a firm based on race
divides workers, makes unity weaker than it would be if all work-
ers received the same wage or if the workforce was racially ho-
mogeneous. The resulting disunity from racial division lowers
average wages and increases profits. (Bohmer 2005: 97)
Thus, while racial animosity may have existed among laborers in the North
(of which there is very little doubt), the exaggeration of those cleavages by
employers contributed to disunity. The race riots did not evolve from in-
herent racial prejudices, but rather from the manner in which the recent
arrivals from the South were used to undermine social gains made by estab-
lished (European) laborers (Brown-Dean 2003: 92). As Wacquant (1997) has
stated: “’race’ is a fiction that has been made real” (Wacquant 1997: 228),
the strategic play of prejudices against one another certainly did not help to
stave off the creation of such a reality.42
During the heavy days of the anti-communist purges, law enforcement was
particularly keen to pursue those who were believed to harbor sentiments of
racial equality, noting the congruency with socialist and communist agendas
(Lipset and Marks 2001).43 The duality of the war against organized crime,
with the monumental expansion of the criminal justice apparatus, and the ef-
fort to fight the “enemies within” are telling. The civil rights movement was
made possible by the stability of the social protective order of the New Deal
42According to Scher (2010), “it was the development of American racial attitudes and
views, not just the existence of slavery, that gave rise to policies of disenfranchisement of
blacks.” (866).
43”Because the Communist party had been strongly committed to racial equality, many
[McCarthy era] loyalty investigators believed that party members could be identified by
their support for civil rights and participation in interracial activities” (Schrecker 2004:
47).
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Era and the official anti-colonialist stance of the US in foreign policy.44 By
adapting the lessons learned from India and elsewhere in the midst of global
decolonialization, the Black Power movement was able to “redefine the mean-
ing of racial identity” and address the degraded status that had emerged as
a result of the sub-division of the laboring classes by employers and elites
(Omi 1994: 99; Harvey 2005; Chang 2010). With the decline in confidence
in the rehabilitative ideal and the social upheaval of the 1960s, neo-liberal
and neoconservative forces were able to co-opt growing anxiety and escalat-
ing crime to devastating ends.45 While Friedman and others promoted their
views of an unregulated market which would necessarily wipe out racism by
sheer force of profit margin, the advocates of social protection and collective
responsibility were not able to make compelling cases for why the welfare
state did not entail ruin, especially in the midst of the apparent failures of
communist governments around the world.46 The race-coding which ensued
following the changing of the guard has ensured that discussions of political-
economy have remained mired in what Cornel West (2001) has termed the
problem of “racial reasoning”, which has permeated public discourse. This
infestation has depressed the political agency of the black community by
incubating a market driven nihilism; both neo-liberals/conservatives and mi-
nority community leaders over-emphasize the importance of race and ignore
more fundamental splits in American society.47 That is, race as a driving
factor has evolved from earlier efforts to subsume class differences by split-
ting the laboring classes.
44As Harvey 2005 points out, Roosevelt’s New Deal message saw “the primary obligation
of the state and its civil society was to use its powers to allocate its resources to eradicate
poverty and hunger and to assure the security of livelihood, security against major hazards
and vicissitudes of life, and the security of decent homes” (Harvey 2005: 183).
45As Thomas Edsall noted in 1985: “During the 1970s, business refined its ability to
act as a class, submerging competitive instincts in favor of joint, cooperative action inthe
legislative arena. Rather than individual companies seeking only special favours...the
dominant theme in the political strategy of business became a shared interest in the
defeat of bills such as consumer protection and labour law reform, and in the enactment
of favourable tax, regulatory and antitrust legislation” (found in Harvey 2005: 48)
46As Chang (2010) has argued, much of the opposition to an enlarged and active welfare
state stems from the accusations (primarily from business interests) that “When the rich
are taxed to pay for [welfare programs], this not only makes the poor lazy and deprives the
rich of an incentive to create wealth, it also makes the economy less dynamic”. However,
what the opposition to such accusations have been lax to retort is the stabilizing nature
of the welfare state for laborers who are more able to develop greater human capital and
increased skills, rather than gravitating to low-skill, low-wage employment.
47“The gangsterization of America results in part from a market driven racial reasoning
that links the White House to the ghetto projects. In this sense, George Bush, David Duke,
and many gangster rap artists speak the same language from different social locations”
(West 2001: 48)
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Looking now at the evolution of disenfranchisement as a policy with a re-
vised history of the setting in which those policies were rooted in the United
States informs us about how their effect can best be interpreted. Further-
more, understanding the centrality of labor relations and class tensions is
crucial when discussing the importance of democratic participation and re-
distributive politics. While race-based inequality has evolved disturbingly
virulently in the United States, I argue that such evolution is under-examined
with respect to the role which class conflict and the containment of labor has
contributed to its existence.
Summary
This chapter has outlined an alternative narrative of felon disenfranchise-
ment, drawing on historical findings to underline the importance of labor rela-
tions in the formation of political enfranchisement boundaries. These histor-
ical details provide a contextual understanding for the evolution of political
disenfranchisement, particularly as it pertains to criminal disenfranchisement
today. Opponents of criminal disenfranchisement based on the proposition
that such laws are rooted in racist intent have met with disappointing results
in the courts. As Re and Re (2011) and others have illustrated, challenges to
current criminal disenfranchisement policies based on accusations that such
laws are inherently racially motivated, and thus unconstitutional, will likely
continue to face substantial barriers to success. While such policies may have
and/or continue to be manipulated by racial prejudices is insufficient (in this
view) to adequately challenge this policy. The record of debates following
the 13th amendment concerning political rights evidences that criminal dis-
enfranchisement was not an unintended side-effect of negligence on the part
of the drafters. Rather, such policies were supportive of the rationale at the
time which saw the virtuous status of free labor, ostensibly, as the defining
qualification for enfranchisement. Whereas this virtue was, and still is, used
to enfranchise those who had by their labor proven their worthiness, those
who had violated the social contract were seen as antithetical to this ideal
and unfit to participate in political decision making.
By removing the support which underpinned the protection of political
and economic rights for former slaves and sympathetic whites, Federal au-
thorities and elites turned their back not just on the re-subjugation of former
slaves; they had helped instigate an evolved, free-market system of exploita-
tion of labor steeped in racist propaganda which played on anxieties amongst
the working classes and enabled the atrocious acquiescence to discriminatory
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legislation which split the laboring classes along racial and ethnic lines. As
many authors cite in their advance of the difficulties of racism in the US,
“The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line” (DuBois
1903: 1).
Because later efforts to equalize rights and opportunities between the
races were important to social democratic and socialist movements, the issue
of race in America would become indivisible from the issue of anti-capitalism,
but for the wrong reasons. Later accommodation, as advocated by Booker
T. Washington, led many blacks to “accept” their plot in life and acquiesce
to their subordinate roles in the market economy guarded by Jim Crow leg-
islation - not least of which was the exclusion from political participation.
DuBois’ “color line” certainly pertained to racism and the many mani-
festations of its septicity; however, many scholars appear less likely to cite
DuBois’ political and economic concerns. DuBois recognized the dubious na-
ture of racial division in the US, and he also saw Washington’s “propaganda”
as expediting the “disenfranchisement of the Negro, the legal creation of a
distinct status of civil inferiority for the Negro, and the steady withdrawal
of aid from institutions for the higher training of the Negro” (25). Indeed,
many of DuBois’ concerns were concentrated in the political, civil and (at
that time) the social rights afforded to all other citizens. DuBois was opposed
to Washington’s programme and derided his efforts at education as a means
to give the capitalist class the type of obedient laborer which the promises
of the Radical Republicans stood in opposition to.48
The aim of this chapter has been to contrast racial narrative based ex-
planations of criminal disenfranchisement, which downplay the role of class
tensions and development, and situate criminal disenfranchisement in the
context of larger projects of political disenfranchisement. Similarly, it has
been an effort to emphasize the prospective to operationalize a more class
oriented view of felony disenfranchisement. The following chapters lay out
the findings from field research in the state of North Carolina. Using a battery
of tested survey items and interview guides, it has been possible to measure
the preferences of the disenfranchised felon population in both community
and institutionalized settings. These findings corroborate the theoretical ar-
48According to DuBois in an interview just before his death in 1963: “I went with
[Washington] to see some of the Eastern philanthropists who were helping him with his
school [the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute]. Washington would promise them
happy and contented labor for their new enterprises. He reminded them there would be
no strikers.”(McGill 1965)
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guments presented herein and illustrate the types of policy attitudes which
inference based on general survey results of the general population may over-
state. As such, these findings provide the first known effort to record the ex-
plicit policy preferences of offender populations, especially as it concerns the
redistributive policies which are effected most by political (non)participation.
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Chapter 5
The Political and Economic
Preferences of Felony Offenders
- Rationale and Methods
The preceding chapter illustrated the class weighted nature of the creation
of modern electoral policies, and with it the explicit use of racial narratives
which have subsumed class awareness to divisions of ethnicity and other
cleavages - not least of which is the conception of the criminal actor as homo
oeconomis. The difficulties which opponents to criminal disenfranchisement
have faced in the courts stem from the firm opposition of judges to inter-
preting the basis for such laws as inherently and intentionally racist. The
historical evidence outlined in the previous chapter certainly supports such
argumentation. However, the impact which these policies has for policy
formation (as well as the impact of these policies on communities) forms
another facet of the issue. That is, by refusing to allow felon disenfranchise-
ment policies to be dismantled on the basis of purported racial intent, they
have inadvertently brought to the surface questions about the identity of the
disenfranchised voter. More specifically, the controversies have enabled dis-
cussions regarding what the disenfranchised felon voter would support, with
speculation in both directions. This chapter gives the reader information
on the underlying rationale for pursuing the issues at hand, as well as the
means and methods used to acquire the primary data which will be reported
in subsequent chapters.
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5.1 Rationale
Regarding political orientations and views on government, there does ex-
ist a certain degree of evidence available to decipher the potential leanings
of the disenfranchised. In particular, using the Youth Development Survey
(YDS), Manza and Uggen (2006) point to significant differences between
groups based on criminal activity. These center on issues of political efficacy,
political orientation, and trust in government. They indicate that respon-
dents differ significantly in the percentage who self-identify as independent,
rather than Democrat or Republican. This is perhaps the most important of
the items for political actors. They also reveal that the those arrested and not
imprisoned, and those imprisoned are less confident in the trustworthiness
of political and administrative officials. Not surprisingly, these respondents
also ranked lower on levels of confidence regarding the criminal justice sys-
tem. Bolstered by Burch (2008, 2012) and others, there is clearly a growing
body of work suggesting that what many have thought as givens is clearly
over-estimated - i.e., that the majority of felons (especially non-white felons)
are Democratic. Add to this the evolving literature on the effect of inter-
action with criminal justice systems and civic education, and the picture of
depressed political agency among the most marginalized becomes somewhat
more precarious. As Weaver and Lerman (2010) ascertain, increased “crimi-
nal justice contact weakens attachment to the political process and heightens
negative perceptions of government” (Weaver and Lerman 2010:817; See also:
Justice and Meares 2014).
These studies are insightful and provide a strong basis for continuing
investigation, however much of the focus skirts around the edges of polit-
ical economic concerns of democratic participation. The evidence to date
regarding what policies the electorate non grata might prefer in terms of
real spending and priorities remains elusive. There is some respite for this
dilemma. In a fitting, and surprising, brief remark at the end of their sem-
inal work on socialism in the United States, Lipset and Marks (2000) note
that a disproportionate amount of convicts surveyed in the beginning half of
the 20th century identified themselves as socialists, and many could identify
themselves as a discernible class (Lipset and Marks 2000). The remark is
as brief as it is curiously included. It does, however, provide a compelling
reference point for investigation, and one which overlaps directly with what
is known about political disenfranchisement policy historically - that the
franchise has been used as a strategic tool by the powerful to suppress the
collective voice of those it sees as detrimental to the standing order.
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There is simply little debate as to whether the modern day incarcerated
or non-incarcerated voter has a class consciousness, especially considering
the near universal absence of class debate in contemporary American dis-
course. Steinmetz (2003) found, however, that many of the incarcerated
felons she interviewed expressed the view that the elite denied their right
to vote because the policies which they enact do not favor persons in their
socio-economic category. Interviewees exhibited perceptible understanding
of the role of political decisions and redistributive issues, pointing to an in-
trinsic appreciation of class divides despite the lack of articulated ideologies
(Steinmetz 2003). Though not explicitly investigating class issues, Steinmetz
(2003) illustrates a valuable facet echoed in the historical findings of Lipset
and Marks. Uggen (2010) also confirms a considerable knowledge of and de-
mand for redistributive policies among female respondents, and a noticeable
leaning towards libertarian ideologies among male respondents.1
Despite the findings by Manza and Uggen, Steinmetz, and others, the cur-
rent state of research into this area suffers several significant shortcomings.2
The primary gaps in the current research remains:
• First, the lack of detailed and comparative data related to policy rel-
evant areas persists. At the time of this research, no dedicated data
existed which recorded the political and economic preferences of polit-
ical disenfranchised felons in the United States.3
• Second, while there exists a vast collection of detailed spatial informa-
tion collected on the origins of offenders, this data has not been in-
corporated to investigate directly where the loss of voting power stems
from.
1As questions were not directed towards specific types of policies, Uggen’s observations
were limited to freely expressed opinions. Libertarian characterization of male respondents
was observed by their reference to rights such as rights to own firearms and freedom of
speech. No indication was given of respondent views towards redistributive spending.
Source: Personal Communication, August 15, 2010.
2As Manza and Uggen note: “Felon disenfranchisement would be almost certain to
have a more dramatic electoral impact in the urban legislative districts which the largest
share of felon population is drawn. Unfortunately, we do not have reliable data regarding
the exact locations and legislative districts in which the largest concentrations of voters
are lost. . . . disenfranchisement surely plays a role in the election of mayors, city councils,
state representatives, and other officials.” (Manza and Uggen 2006)
3According Manza and Uggen (2006), “the main problem is that there is simply no
nationally representative survey or polling data that contains information about both the
respondents’ criminal behavior and their political participation and voting behavior”.
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There is good reason for this lack of opinion data. Felon populations are
generally excluded from social and economic surveys distributed both na-
tionally and sub nationally. Many, if not all, surveys exclude this group from
their sampling either by failing to oversample on the basis of their felonious
status, or due to the restrictions of sampling respondents from group quar-
ters. Essentially, when it comes to many surveys, especially those regarding
items of interest to social scientists, including prisoners implies an additional
layer of complexity that is seen as providing too little added benefit for the
cost (Bialik 2012).4
Omitting potential respondents from surveys removes, in no uncertain
way, non-random actors from analysis. Incorporation of inmates into sur-
veys can alter commonly held assumptions of American life (Western 2006;
Pettit 2012). While Western, Pettit, and others delve into questions regard-
ing the potential impacts of excluding incarcerated offenders on the view of
American realities, there is value in pushing forward. There is beneficial in-
formation to be gathered from those who are least likely to be represented
either in popular surveys or political legislatures. These excluded citizens,
occupants of the most marginalized communities, are in essence markers of
the outputs of government policies - most prominently, the output of the co-
ordination (or lack thereof) of the welfare system and the larger economy. In
simpler, comparison terms, we might imagine this exclusion akin to silencing
or disregarding the feedback of customers of private services who report near
identical failings with their experience. Unlike private services, however, the
welfare state does not generally rely on personal feedback, but rather incor-
porates policies driven by political actors, themselves driven (at least in some
degree) by electoral stimuli. As political voice and mobilization of that voice
shows a clear effect on the redistribution of income, it is useful to take into
account not only which voices are being mobilized and registered, but also
those which are excluded or demobilized.5
The main assertions regarding political disenfranchisement of felons in
the United States revolve around two core hypotheses:
• H1: The blanket political disenfranchisement of felons represents a
4Also, there are, as illustrated further, many institutional and methodological barriers
which impede access to this population of interest, making any effort at inclusion too
complicated for consideration by many researchers and their organizational sponsors.
5There are of course variations in the source of that voice and the degree to which it is
mobilized. In the Jim Crow South, for example, the predominant political voice was that
of affluent, white, males – reflected in the policies which came to dominate that region
and to some degree persist to this day.
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demobilization of particularized interests.
• H2: The political disenfranchisement of criminal offenders is spatially
unique across political-geographic space.
Answering these assumptions is the focus of the remainder of this work.
H1 necessitated the employment of two primary methods of research, one
quantitative and one qualitative. H2 employs the data gained from the pro-
cesses involved in H1 research, however the analysis of the data has been
managed with techniques appropriate for the issue addressed (i.e., GIS Data
techniques). The methods and techniques employed in this research forms
the subject of this chapter. It is followed further by the quantitative (survey)
and qualitative (interview) results in Chapters (Chapter 6) and 7. Analysis
addressing those of H2 are addressed in Chapter 8.
5.2 Methods
The primary research activity of this project employed a self-administered,
paper based survey to measure the political and economic preferences of
current felons in the state of North Carolina. The sampling and procedu-
ral methods implemented for this project were developed to conform to the
concerns of sample access and reproducibility. That is, given a similarly sit-
uated felon population in either the same context or another, this process is
able to be reproduced to ascertain the reliability of this analysis - insuring a
main tenant of research, the ability to replicate a study. This was necessary
due to the complexity of circumstances involved with the unique situation
of felons as a protected population.6 Because of the idiosyncratic nature of
the population characteristics, the following section is divided into respec-
tive sub-samples - i.e., those incarcerated (DOP-S), those under community
supervision (DCC-S), and those under supervision but approached outside
the authority of the department of corrections (CSI-S). I note beforehand the
practical caveats which accompany conducting research with hard-to-reach
populations in general, and protected subjects in particular.7 Following this,
a description of the population under consideration is given. This is then
followed by more detailed description of the individual sampling processes
6This survey benefited enormously from advice from the Odom Institute at the Uni-
versity of Chapel Hill, the National Centre for Social Research (UK), and the Community
Success Initiative of Raleigh (without whom this research would not have been possible.)
7The purpose of relating these issues is intended less to preemptively address any
controversy with the methods and approaches employed, but moreso to inform the reader of
concerns which are not normally associated with primary research with survey instruments.
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employed, accompanied thereafter by a description of the instrumentation
employed. Following this, the exact procedure by which the project was con-
ducted is outlined, followed by results from the stratification stages, including
spatial representation of the project participants. To note, descriptive results
of response rates are not reported here, but are instead located in Chapter 6
Section 6.1.1. The choice of setting rests on the desire to aggregate all find-
ings of the research as much as possible. Given the nature of this population
as hard-to-reach/hard-to-survey, such reporting is consistent with efforts en-
visaged here.
5.2.1 Caveats
General Issues
As discussed previously, felon populations represent a unique population of
investigation, even within the category of hard-to-reach populations.8 Unlike
the general population of the surveys used to create the combined survey for
this study, felon populations are a uniquely complicated set of individuals
to contact and entice to participate using available methods. As opposed
to other populations (e.g., homeless persons or children), working with felon
populations is further complicated by their legal status.
First, because of past ethical misconduct, supervised populations are con-
sidered a protected population under the US Department of Health and Hu-
man Services (DHHS) regulation 45 CFR 46.301 – 306 – Subpart C - Addi-
tional Protections for Prisoners. Permission to access potential respondents
requires significantly longer and more in depth considerations regarding the
composition and delivery of research materials; these strategies are detailed
further in the description of subsamples. Second, the population under study
is not fully incarcerated. While some felony convictions carry a sentence of in-
carceration, many convicted felons receive community supervised sentences.
Indeed, the vast majority of felonious offenders, 2/3 of the entire population,
serve their sentences outside custodial supervision. This fact differentiates
between the phenomenon of mass incarceration and mass convictions, the
latter arguably less the focus of popular attention. Thus, for a study which
seeks to gather the attitudes of individuals politically disenfranchised because
of felony convictions, both custodial and community supervised populations
8Hard-to-reach populations are most generally defined as populations of interest which
are not easily accessible or participant for research and data gathering. For a more detailed
review of this topic, see Brackertz 2007
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must be targeted. For this reason, strategies must be made as uniform as
possible while complying with the situation of access and security restric-
tions.
Specific Issues
In addition to these general concerns, more local issues were encountered
which necessitated further planning and strategy. These areas were broadly
found in the procedural requirements particular to the North Carolina De-
partment of Corrections (NCDOC), the adjuvant material issues inherent in
administering the survey instrument, and the resource constraints placed on
the field research for such an appetant project. These are described in order.
DOC Procedural Requirements: The NCDOC maintains a comprehen-
sive, though accessible, system of safeguards to protect the supervised pop-
ulation from potential ethical abuses which may occur over the course of the
scientific research process. This process is included here to illustrate the addi-
tional constraints implicit when working with protected participants - Figure
5.1. These procedural stages are in addition, and parallel, to those processes
required by academic Institutional Review Boards (IRB). 9 First, an appli-
cation for research is submitted to an internal Merit Review Board, laying
out the specifics of the study and benefits to the prospective respondents.
Following approval, a second review is then carried out after acceptance from
the previous by an internal Human Subjects Review Board. This process en-
sures that the project goals are reasonable and in the interests (or at least not
against the interests) of the granting authorities. Following this, information
is sent to each institution (i.e., individual prison administrations) for which
access is requested.
Further, all direct contact with an incarcerated respondent requires a re-
allocation of prison staff from their routine duties for supervision of both
the researcher and the respondent. This proved to be a significant barrier to
access approval from the DOC for obvious reasons.10 Further to this, it is
questionable whether or not the presence of staff during a survey interview
would affect respondent returns (e.g., response bias). Additionally, in order
9This project was underwritten by the Ethical Ombudsman of Jacobs University and
the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science, Germany as well as the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s official IRB.
10During the course of this research, the DOC was faced with considerable limitations
on their resources as a result of budget decisions by the NC Legislature. This prompted
concerns about even minor re-allocations of staff for research purposes.
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to facilitate such face-to-face interviews, the size and costs of the research
team would be considerably larger, thus making such a short study of felon
populations both temporally and financially prohibitive. This concern is also
reflected for the DCC-S study. Incentivization for survey participation was
prohibited under DOC guidelines. This meant that all participation was en-
tirely un-coerced, and more so in the case of DCC-S.
For the state of North Carolina, a survey of all inmates in state cor-
rectional facilities would require approval from each of the 66 correctional
locations. Even after excluding those facilities for which access is restricted
(i.e., Close/ Maximum Security prisons for more serious offenders), the time
needed for approval can increase exponentially. Following consultation, this
research study selected 15 sites for inclusion, for which approval was for-
warded to. A parallel IRB process under the cooperation of the University of
North Carolina - Chapel Hill was undertaken correspondingly. Taking these
factors into account, an abbreviated list of facilities was chosen with guid-
ance; these facilities are discussed further. These requirements eventually
necessitated the development of a parallel sub-sample outside the NCDOC
authorized project, discussed below.
Material Issues: Conducting surveys with self-administered question-
naires with felon populations under supervision has additional, though ulti-
mately slight, stipulations not normally required of otherwise similar projects.
This fact owes itself to the specific concerns of security of both staff and
clients in the respective survey sites. The survey itself necessitated appro-
priate security measures itself, while maintaining the features needed for
functionality. The design of the survey booklets themselves was tailored to
the target populations for this project. In consultation with a community re-
entry organization (discussed further) and other community actors involved
with current and former offenders, booklets were designed to maximize com-
prehension by potentially lower literacy enabled respondents, while maintain-
ing their measurement validity or reliability. That is, ever effort was made
to maintain the original format of the items taken from the respective survey
instruments while creating an attractive format for hard-to-reach subjects.
Furthermore, delivery and collection methods for instruments were regulated
under the security guidelines of the NCDOC. This consideration necessitated
its own strategy for administration. These issues are discussed in more detail
below.
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Time Constraints: The brief time horizon inherent in the field research
phase of this project obliged that appropriate measures be taken to combine
maximum coverage with minimal administration.11 The geographic spread
of research sites also needed to be taken into consideration when developing
strategies for delivery and retrieval of materials. In addition, while those
participants at custodial institutions (DOP-S) were (for the most part) sta-
tionary, their community counterparts (DCC-S) were only accessible during
their assigned, periodic reporting moments. That is, DCC-S participants
are accessibly only to the extent that materials are present at the time of
their mandated visits to the respective reporting offices. These occurrences
are spread over 30-, 60-, and 90-day periods. The allotted time frame for
this research was 8 months. The sampling and procedural strategies outlined
below reflect this reality.12
5.2.2 Population Characteristics
At mid-year 2011, the number of individuals supervised by the DOP and the
DCC in North Carolina was 36,520 and 39,042 respectively - excluding su-
pervised individuals who were non-citizen, under the age of 18, or non-felons
(e.g., misdemeanor offenders).13
Males accounted for roughly 93 percent of the DOP supervised felon pop-
ulation, compared to approximately 80 percent of the DCC supervised felon
population. Blacks make up larger shares of both supervised populations,
however make up a significantly larger portion of the incarcerated popula-
tion compared to whites. The ratio between sexes appears constant across
racial groupings, with some exception for white females for both DCC and
DOP populations compared to their counterparts. There is a clear difference
between reported educational attainment between DCC and DOP respon-
dents, with incarcerated offenders reporting greater instances of educational
attainment less than a highschool degree or equivalent.
11In addition to time constraints, this research was conducted without the assistance
of research staff outside the primary researcher. This facet was less the result of time or
resource constraints, so much as the security process necessary to recruit associates with
proper clearance to enter facilities and interact with personnel.
12None of the cases here are weighted and are not intended to be taken as representative
of the population at large (i.e., the entire correctional population) in the state of North
Carolina. Control groups (those respondents from the respective surveys in Chapter 6)
are also unweighted.
13Note that groups are mutually exclusive.
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Table 5.1: Aggregate Numbers of DCC and DOP Populations by Sex and
Race
DCC DOP
F M Total F M Total
White 4606 13039 17645 1427 11699 13126
Black 3194 16699 19893 981 21078 22059
N.Amer. 143 584 727 42 722 764
Asian 14 92 106 6 59 65
Other 94 528 622 22 443 465
UNKN 12 37 49 1 40 41
Total 8063 30979 39042 2479 34041 36520
Table 5.2: Percentage of DCC and DOP Populations by Sex and Race
DCC DOP
F M % Total F M % Total
White 26.1% 73.9% 45.2% 10.9% 89.1% 35.9%
Black 16.1% 83.9% 51.0% 4.4% 95.6% 60.4%
N.Amer. 19.7% 80.3% 1.9% 5.5% 94.5% 2.1%
Asian 13.2% 86.8% 0.3% 9.2% 90.8% 0.2%
Other 15.1% 84.9% 1.6% 4.7% 95.3% 1.3%
UNKN 24.5% 75.5% 0.1% 2.4% 97.6% 0.1%
% Total 20.7% 79.3% 100.0% 6.8% 93.2% 100.0%
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Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the percentage of felony offenders across the
state at the county level - symbols represent the felony offenders based on
the exclusions mentioned previously as a percentage of the total of the state
population of the same criteria at county centroids. As expected, the distri-
bution of both DCC and DOP felons are noticeably concentrated in those
counties with large urban communities. 14 This preliminary data enables
a more data driven process. That is, by mapping out the social, economic,
and spatial variables of the population of interest, it is possible to confirm
that the sampling process has indeed located, approximately, those of inter-
est. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report the distribution of educational attainment by
both gender and race. These variables are presented to illustrate the pri-
mary variables related to socio-economic status available on this population.
The goal of the sampling process which follows is to obtain the closest ap-
proximation to the population of disenfranchised citizens in urban districts,
based on the assumptions of previous authors (See: Manza and Uggen 2006).
14The public use data available for offenders via the online resources at the NC DOC
Office of Research and Planning does not facilitate disaggregated geographical data anal-
ysis. All information is given at the county level. However, the NCDOC Research and
Planning Office, as will be illustrated later, has allowed access to disaggregated data for
the year 2008 for the purposes of this research.
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Table 5.3: Educational Attainment (by Year) by Percent of Gender Groups
DCC DOP
F M % Total F M % Total
0 4.8% 3.2% 3.5% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
1 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
4 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
5 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
6 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8%
7 0.7% 1.1% 1.0% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9%
8 4.1% 5.7% 5.3% 7.9% 9.3% 9.2%
9 8.5% 11.9% 11.2% 14.0% 16.6% 16.4%
10 12.1% 16.3% 15.5% 18.4% 20.9% 20.8%
11 14.0% 18.4% 17.5% 19.2% 21.4% 21.2%
12 54.1% 41.7% 44.2% 36.7% 27.1% 27.7%
13 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4%
14 0.6% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5%
15 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
16 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
17 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
18 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
19 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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5.2.3 Sampling Process
Sampling of the respective sub-populations was based on a number of re-
strictions and practical considerations. These issues are discussed below per-
taining to their respective groupings. As noted earlier (5.2.1), this research
was subject to specific access restrictions. As such, sampling was conducted
on the basis of noted issues stemming from the literature on felony popula-
tions. The decision was made to limit sampling to urban centers if there was
sufficient evidence to support claims that offenders come largely from these
areas. Judging from the assertions from Manza and Uggen (2006), and the
evidence from the geographic mapping of felon populations in the state, this
selection criteria proved satisfactory for the purposes of this research. All
other sampling decisions were driven by access possibilities communicated
by the DOC Office of Research and Planning (NCDOC-RP). NCDOC-RP
staff retrieved data based on the exclusions agreed upon during application
for research. This data was then used to randomly sample for the following
research. The following is a description of those processes.
DOP Sampling
This sub-sample was chosen using a stratified random sample approach. In
accordance with the concerns NCDOC-RP, DOP-S respondents were re-
stricted to minimum and medium security facilities. Close facilities (i.e.,
those housing heightened security offenders) were excluded from the sam-
pling process. Jails and other facilities holding inmates not considered cor-
rectional institutes or centers were also excluded from this sub-sample, not
least due to the high rate of turnover in these facilities. Additionally, due
to time constraints attached to the study period, the number of facilities in
total which could be sampled was limited to suggested number of 15.
Facilities were chosen so as to maximize the number of potential respon-
dents from each of the six chosen Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs).15
As the NCDOC does not keep track of the exact residences of origin of of-
fenders in their supervision, or at least does not make this information pub-
licly available, targeting was conducted by selecting the offender’s county of
15Respondents were sampled on urban populations which are indicated by areas known
as metropolitan statistical areas. These areas are defined by the US Census Bureau as areas
consisting of ”a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a
high degree of social and economic integration with that core. Metropolitan areas comprise
one or more entire counties, except in New England, where cities and towns are the basic
geographic units.” (USCB 2014 ).
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residence at the time of their conviction. While not ideal for limiting the
sample frame to urban populations only, this was determined to represent
the optimal method available to draw a sample of respondents which would
represent the disenfranchised of urban populations in North Carolina. Re-
spondents were then further narrowed to those with sentences remaining of
three months or more to ensure likelihood of contact. That is, without this
restriction, there would be a good chance that some of the selected partic-
ipants would not be at the locations given in their files. Out of the fifteen
facilities chosen, one facility (NC CI Women) was further excluded due to a
combined supervision operating system (i.e., this facility acted as a height-
ened security and minimum-medium security facility. Female offenders were
thus excluded from this sub-sample. This was deemed non-critical to the
study as the female population made up 6.8 percent (2,470) of all felons oth-
erwise able to participate in an election, and 6 percent (891) of the felon
population from urban counties. Two further facilities (Durham CC and
Charlotte CC), both minimum security facilities, were later excluded due to
planned closures which therefore produced uncertainty regarding the ability
to contact respondents and retrieve materials as necessary.
Restrictions for sub-sample:16
• Gender: Male and Female
• Race: ll
• Age range: 18+
• Security: Minimum – Medium
• County of Residence (at time of conviction): New Hanover (Wilming-
ton MSA), Wake and Durham (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA),
Guilford and Forsyth (Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point MSA),
Cumberland (Fayetteville MSA), Mecklenburg and Gaston (Charlotte-
Gastonia-Rock Hill MSA), Buncombe (Asheville MSA)
• Unit: 15 units of minimum to medium security covering suitable pop-
ulation sizes
• Sentence: Persons with at least 3 months of supervision remaining
16The term restriction is a technical denotation for criteria which potential respondents
must meet to be included in the sampling process. This process is required by the NCDOC
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The results of sampling for DOP-S are given in the appendix of for this
chapter.17 A sample frame (N = 5163) was supplied by the DOC of the final
13 facilities chosen. Omitting persons not resident in one of the urban MSA
and with at least 3 months left to release resulted in a final sampling frame
of 2437 persons.
DCC Sampling
The community correction sub-sample was selected using a purposive sam-
pling method suited to the dynamics of this population (Teddlie and Yu 2007;
Barbour 2001). The DCC-S sub-sample was selected from nine districts cov-
ering the MSAs in the corresponding DOP-S sub-sample, with an estimated
9,400 persons eligible for participation as of mid-year 2011. DCC districts
are divided into units at which supervised offenders are required to report
in 30, 60 and 90 day intervals dependent on their sentences. In contrast to
DOP-S respondents, it was not viable to sample respondents based on sup-
plied information from the DOC. There is one primary reason for this. The
DOC does not allow the distribution of contact information for offenders su-
pervised in the general population to research interests that are outside the
direction the DOC itself, for obvious reasons. Thus, it was not possible to
perform a similar stratified random sampling method as with the DOP-S. As
such, a separate approach was designed in which respondents were solicited
via a posted study advertisement placed in the waiting area for the respec-
tive districts and units. Units were restricted, as much as possible, to the top
five units scaled by available numbers of supervised felons, above the age of
18. While some units are based at separate locations, many units are housed
in the same locations as other units, and others house all units in a given
district. Locations were selected with the assistance of DCC staff to optimize
responses and coverage. In total, 15 locations were used for this sub-sample.
40 percent of DCC-S respondents were female.
The selected method provided contact with all 30-day reportees and a
random sampling of 60- and 90-day reportees. Taken together, the nine dis-
17Total Med-Min indicates the number of available Medium and Minimum security
supervised individuals available for sampling. Init. S. Frame indicates the sampling frame
delivered to the investigator by the NCDOC following approval. S. Frame Urban indicates
those available from Urban MSAs; while S. Frame Urban-2 indicates those following the
exclusion of those facilities which became inaccessible over the course of research. The final
column, Random Sample, indicates those randomlly sampled from the preceding stage. X
indicates that the institution was dropped from the stage. Appendix table 3 reports total
counts of individual available by stage, while table 4 reports these amounts as percentages
of the total to provide more comparative understanding
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tricts selected supervise approximately 42 percent of the state’s entire DCC
felon population. In contrast to DOP-S, there was no way to assess the back-
ground information of DCC-S respondents prior to participation. 18
Restrictions for sub-sample:
• Gender: Male and Female
• Race: All
• Age range: 18+
• Security: Minimum – Medium
• County of Residence (at time of conviction): New Hanover (Wilming-
ton MSA), Wake and Durham (Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA),
Guilford and Forsyth (Greensboro-Winston Salem-High Point MSA),
Cumberland (Fayetteville MSA), Mecklenburg and Gaston (Charlotte-
Gastonia-Rock Hill MSA), Buncombe (Asheville MSA)
• Unit: minimum 18 units – maximum 45 units per county of residence
• Sentence: Not possible; Time frame adapted to solicit 30 day reporters;
random selection of 60 and 90 day reporters.
CSI Sampling
During the course of authorization to access participants under the super-
vision of the NCDOC, circumstances outside the tolerance of the research
agenda arose which necessitated the design of a second option to gather data
from felon populations. This sub-sample (CSI-S) became a parallel project
to the main survey sample and provided access to persons outside the respon-
sibility of the DOC. There are important differences between the strategies
used for this sub-population and the sampled populations in the original sur-
vey design.
For one, no IRB or other formal institutional approvals based in the US
were needed as individuals were independent of the DOC’s responsibility.
18While the use of sampling technique for this sub-sample may be considered much less
statistically valid, especially compared to the DOP-S, the exclusion of this sub-sample from
the study would only hinder research on the political and economic attitudes of politically
disenfranchised persons. As such, the benefits of inclusion greatly outweighed the costs
against incorporation of this sub-sample into the study, despite its shortcomings.
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All approval was therefore based on institutional regulations at the home
institute level, mentioned previously. Meetings with CSI-S were arranged
via local, non-governmental, re-entry organizations across the state; part of
a larger network of organizations in connection with CSI. Thus this sample
represents a convenience sampling strategy. Additionally, and in contrast to
DOP-S and DCC-S respondents, CSI-S respondents were given incentives of
10 USD for completion of surveys. 19
Further to this, and in relation to the selection of qualitative interview re-
spondents, CSI-S respondents were also solicited for participation in 1-hour,
face-to-face interviews covering the themes of the questionnaire. 33 of the 52
respondents indicated a desire to participate in an interview. 15 interviews
were arranged; however, only six interviews were achieved due to a variety of
reasons.20 While this number is small for an in depth qualitative analysis of
its own, the findings do provide a useful insight into the motivation behind
the answers given to the survey items and corroborate similar qualitative in-
terviews conducted by Manza and Uggen (2006).21 Participants in interviews
were given 20 USD for their participation. 21 percent of CSI-S respondents
were female.
Restrictions for sub-sample:
• Gender: Male and Female
• Race: All
• Age range: 18+
• Security: not applicable, Felon status.
• Area of Residence Replications of DOC study sampling using major
cities in urban counties: Wilmington, Raleigh, Charlotte, Asheville,
Tarboro.
19Analysis of differences between the DCC-S and CSI-S to investigate these two com-
munity supervised populations revealed only minor differences between the two.
20Many participants had little time to meet because of transportation issues, childcare
arrangements, job seeking appointments, or other issues.
21Additionally, I have added the qualitative data from my findings to those of Manza
and Uggen; as many of the questions asked in the interviews were taken directly from
their own interview script. The results build on the findings of their research and indicate
that attitudes towards the government and politics are similar across time and region
in the United States – even from a relatively liberal northern state as Minnesota and a
conservative southern state such as North Carolina.
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• Unit: not applicable
• Sentence: not applicable
Figure 5.4 shows the spatial distribution of sites of research differentiated by
community supervision (DCC - asterix), medium security facilities (MED -
black flag), and minimum security facilities (MIN - blue flag). Major cities
are labeled for reference.
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5.2.4 Instrumentation
The instrument used for this study consisted of a self-administered, paper-
based survey. It is a combination of selected items from the American
National Election Study (ANES), the International Social Survey Project
(ISSP) 2006 Role of Government series (ISSP06), the International Social
Survey Project 2009 Social Inequality series (ISSP09), and the International
Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA). Wording of items remained in their
original formats so as to maintain comparability with previously surveyed
populations and avoid distorting the reliability and validity of the tested
items.
Items were chosen for their relevance to political and economic issues use-
ful in deciphering the placement of respondents’ views in relation to political
preferences and attitudes towards welfare state policies. The ANES, ISSP 06,
and ISSP 09 are nationally representative for the United States and the US
South, however not for individual states. This makes comparison directly to
the specific population of North Carolina tenuous. Results for comparisons
between survey and control samples must be taken as comparisons and not
inferences to the larger population of felons across the region or the country.
As this is largely and exploratory study, more rigorous statistical analysis of
items is aleatory to the intentions herein.
ISSP 2006 Role of Government (ISSP06): The ISSP06 is one module
among eleven run by the International Social Survey Project. It was first run
in 1985 and consists of four waves (1985, 1990, 1996, 2006). This module
deals exclusively with measuring respondent attitudes towards the state, the
role government plays (or ought to play) in the affairs of citizens’ lives, and
issues of civil liberties and market balance. The ISSP06 was administered
by face-to-face with a multi-level stage sampling process (4 or more stages),
and was conducted at the household level. Interviews lasted 3 months or
longer and did not cover institutionalized persons (Scholz, Faass,Harkness,
and Heller 2008).22 The ISSP06 formed the main supplier of items to this
survey - 16 of 44 question groups.
ISSP 2009 Social Inequality (ISSP09) The ISSP09 is one module
among eleven run by the International Social Survey Project. It was first
22Only five of the thirty-three countries which administered this survey included insti-
tutionalized persons.
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run in 1987 and consists of four waves (1987, 1992, 1999, 2009). This mod-
ule is dedicated to attitudes regarding incomed inequality, legitimization of
inequality, societal conflicts, and class position. For the United States, the
ISSP09 was administered by self-completion via the interviewer, with strati-
fied sampling at the household level. The 2009 version was used as the basis
of items and forms a smaller contribution to the final survey - 4 of 44 question
groups.
American National Election Study (ANES): The ANES is one of the
most renowned sources of political attitudes for the United States. Beginning
in 1948, the ANES has been collecting survey data on a range of topics of
political and economic import with national representative samples.23 The
selection of items from this survey project was entailed to utilize those items
tested on the US population across time. In all, 16 items (i.e., not question
groups) were used from the ANES.
International Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA): The ISEA is
a collaborative project which has collected attitudes on issues of incomed
inequality, social class, and economic policy. The ISEA has, to the knowl-
edge of the researcher, not been run in the US - as such the results are not
compared in this survey. However, its battery of items specifically targeting
attitudes on welfare state policies, including the level of effort respondents
would wish to see, was chosen as the most suitable and tested items for this
study. Six question groups were borrowed from the ISEA, with changes made
only to the currency calculations for current and regional coherence.
Self-Created Items: Self created items included items addressing com-
munity of origin , gender, religious background, education, most recent in-
come, current employment status, and feelings towards housing policy. Six
question groups were self-created.
23This project used items from the ANES Cummulative file which employed a variety of
methods: ”Cross-section sample constructed with area probability (face-to-face) and RDD
(telephone) components. CAPI laptop instrument administered in person or by telephone;
qnaire adjusted to suit administration by mode.” Pre-election and Post-election weights
are each the product of household selection weighting, a nonresponse adjustment factor,
and a post-stratification factor (by age and education)(ANES Study Notes)”.
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5.2.5 Procedure
The procedure to address hard-to-reach populations is substantively different
than research with “normal” populations. Obtaining access to felons is, how-
ever, not a straightforward endeavor. The various legalities and stipulations
which needed to be adhered to in order to access participants have already
been given. However, steps were also needed to ensure the appropriateness
of the instrument itself.
Gatekeepers: In the year preceding the main field research (2010), a
one month gatekeeper exploration was conducted in the state of North Car-
olina. The process involves first identifying interested parties and stakehold-
ers whose interests are connected to that of those involved in felony offenses.
These interviews were conducted in an appreciative manner to allow informa-
tion to evolve from participants own experiences (Cooperrider, Whitney, and
Stavros 2008). Only one organization encompassed the desired criteria for di-
rect cooperation for future research, the Community Success Initiative based
in Raleigh, North Carolina.24 Once a suitable gatekeeper organization was
established, work began on constructing an instrument for administration.
Cognitive Levels and Item Comprehension: A primary concern with
implementing such a survey utilizing established items from several survey
sources is whether those exhibiting or suspected of exhibiting lower than av-
erage reading and comprehension skills are able to understand items given to
them. As offenders are known to exhibit these characterstics, care was taken
to select items with as little complexity as possible. Once selected, an addi-
tional round of visitation to the gatekeeper organization was arranged after
establishing suitable individuals to test the item lists. Cognitive interviews
consist of administering the proposed survey instrument to likewise situated
individuals in an environment where their thoughts on items may be recorded
and analyzed for pertinent issues. To this end, CSI arranged (through its net-
work of ex-offenders) a group of participants who participated in this part of
the research process. Participants were given a USD 10 gift card for a local
merchant to participate. Overall, 7 interviews (Table 5.5) were conducted
with both men and women offenders and no serious misunderstandings were
found in the item selections. This was to be expected given that these items
had already been fielded and vetted by previous surveys. The results of this
cognitive testing confirmed that respondents understood the context of the
24Organizations included: Democracy NC, NC Housing Coalition, Southern Coalition
for Social Justice; Individuals - upon request.
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items. 25 With the validation of the items supported, the process moved to
establishing the format of the instrument.
Table 5.5: Participant Descriptives of Cognitive Testing
Age Gender Race Education Residence
Participant 1 35 Male Black 9 Raleigh
Participant 2 32 Male Black Raleigh
Participant 3 51 Male White 12 Clayton
Participant 4 20 Male Black Raleigh
Participant 5 37 Male Black GED Raleigh
Participant 6 19 Male Black Raleigh
Participant 7 30 Female Black Raleigh
Survey Material: In addition to testing of the reliability of items, other
considerations necessitated attention. For one, the population under study
is not unfamiliar with forms and exhaustive questionnaire style applications.
In consultation with the UNC-CH Odum Institute, a plan of constuction
was developed which would address several concerns. First, the layout of the
instrument itself should be careful not to appear as an official document (i.e.,
appearing to be from a state department). This concern stemmed from any
inherent distrust that might be attributable to the nature of the participant
population. This entailed that the instrument was designed to incorporate:
• Colored elements to break up the visual space
• “Soft” shapes (e.g., boxes) to focus attention space
• Directional arrows to assist in item transition
Because of security concerns, the instrument itself was not allowed to con-
tain any binding mechanisms which might be transformed into illegal objects.
This meant that the survey must take on an unbound format. As such, a
25One item remained elusive to respondents, however. The liberal-conservative self-
placement item elicited responses that indicated that participants viewed the answer ”lib-
eral” to entail an active and aggressive attribute, while ”conservative” elicited an under-
standing of socially respectful and amenable to society. However, there is not sufficient
evidence to conclude that the control population participants viewed these items differently
than the cognitive test group, or potentially the main survey (sub)samples
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booklet format was designed to maintain functionality.
Booklets contained an opening description of the study and its rationale.
As incentivization was prohibited, it was necessary to entice those sampled
(as much as is possible) to participate with appeals to an intended sense of
activism and opportunity to have their opinions heard. Institutional book-
lets contained a single insert sheet which laid out the exact process to follow
in clear, easy to understand terms, using graphics and minimal text. This
insert also relayed information to respondents on where and when surveys
were to be collected (See the appendix for samples).
As pre-distribution contact was not possible, consent to participate was
implicit in completion of the survey by participants. A waiver of written
consent was approved on the basis that the project presented no more than
minimal risk of harm to participants and involved no procedures for which
written consent is normally required outside of the research context. This
was noted in the survey booklet itself. Participants were informed that their
participation would be completely voluntary and that they would not receive
any direct material benefit from participation.The following subsections re-
late to the specific processes used to administer the survey instrument to the
respective sub-samples.
Additionally, as respondents would not be able to (i.e., were not supplied a
method by the researcher) to return their booklets via post, drop-boxes were
placed at each facility where the survey was conducted. These drop-boxes
were non-transparent, 10-gallon poly-urethane tubs with insertion openings
removed from the tops. Lids were securely sealed using non-reusable security
ties and were fastened at the time of delivery to the respective locations. All
drop-boxes were unsealed by the researcher at the time of collection to ensure
confidentiality. Locations are shown in figure 5.4
DOP Procedure
Delivery: The DOP-S represented the most direct approach to access
participants. because of the availability of known addresses and personal in-
formation, a direct mail-in system was employed. Questionnaires were mailed
via UNC-CH mailing services to the respective respondents in individually
addressed envelopes.Return envelopes were not provided as providing postage
for return (i.e., stamps) was also prohibited and metering was unavailable for
this study.
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Return Process: Prior to the mailing of sampled packages, secure drop-
boxes were supplied to the respective correctional institute and placed in
a secure area at the advice of institutional staff. These drop-boxes were
sealed with marked security ties by the researcher and securely fastened to
universally accessible areas at the institution. These aras were typically at
or near the security station of each facility. Participants were provided with
a personalized description of where to find their respective return locations.
Collection: Collection of surveys were conducted following 90 days from
delivery, coinciding with the projected collection of DCC-S materials. Each
drop-box was unsealed by the researcher at point of pick-up and inspected
for tampering. Surveys were recorded and marked immediately collection.26
DCC Procedure
Delivery: As it was not possible to perform a similar stratified random
sampling method as for the DOP-S, a separate approach was designed in
which respondents were solicited via a posted study advertisement placed
in the waiting area of the respective districts and units. Survey booklets,
self-addressed envelopes and writing materials were left for 6 weeks in an
open area at the head of the respective unit’s reporting desk. These stations
were positioned outside any barriers.27 These materials were accompanied
by identical secured drop-boxes as in the DOP-S. Materials were delivered
at the same time as opposed to the DOP-S process.
Return Process: Respondents returned their booklets to the available
dropboxes where the survey materials were listed. As opposed to the DOP-S
and CSI-S, participants for DCC-S were given two other modes of return -
delivery by self-addressed envelope (without postage), or via an online survey
site.
Collection: Following the allotted 90 day waiting period, all sites were
visited and drop-boxes were collected following the same procedure as with
the DOP-S. No respondents chose to utilize the online survey option, while
two respondents chose to return their booklets via US Postal mail.
26One respondent returned via mail-in to the researcher’s host address.
27Many DCC reporting offices have closed reporting areas where reportees are not al-
lowed before entering. Also, there is little chance that a potential participant would have
time to participate during their official reporting appointment.
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CSI Procedure
The CSI-S involved a wholy seperate strategy than the previous DOP-S and
DCC-S. For CSI-S, respondents were gathered in group settings at a specified
time at the partnering organizations in the respective cities. Thus, delivery,
return and collection were achieved at the same time. Respective groups
were convened by CSI with their partner organizations in a public setting
with the researcher remaining in the room but outside the survey area. This
also allowed observation of any difficulties with the survey instrument itself.
In total, only one participant was noted having difficulty with the item lists.
5.2.6 Quantitative Results:
Coding
Once received, responses were re-coded to appropriate spectrum respondent
opinions. That is responses are coded as integers, with negative values in-
dicating more liberal/left views and positive numbers indicating conserva-
tive/right views. Here, support for state intervention is considered a leftist
view and is coded accordingly. Benefit levels are coded using natural num-
bers with no negative values.
Descriptive Results:
Analysis of the respective groups proceeds by first delivering an overall de-
scriptive analysis of survey respondents. These results report on basic de-
mographic variables, followed there after by the percentages of responses by
item against the respective control group. Control groups are defined as
those respondents from the survey series of origin - the American National
Election Survey Time-Series 2008; the International Social Survey Project
2006 Role of Government; and the International Social Survey Project 2009
Social Inequality.
Group Comparisons:
Analysis of Groups - Felon Sub-Samples: To allow the merging of
sub-samples, one must assume that there are no differences between the re-
sponses of those in the two treatment groups (CSI-S and DCC-S). While
there is a clear difference between the situations of CSI-S, DCC-S, and that
of DOP-S (in terms of the obvious supervision type), there is good reason
to also include the third treatment environment in overall tests of equality.
240
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
Given the non-normality of the data distribution, a series of non-parametric
analyses were carried out to ascertain the difference, if any, between (pri-
marily) the two community sub-samples.28 The analyses also included the
institutionalized condition. As no female respondents were sampled from the
DOP, a further series of tests was carried out excluding females from the
Homogeneity of Variance (HOV) analysis.
Two tests were selected to run the non-parametric analysis - the Kruskal
Wallis (KW) test and the Median Test (MT) of equality. These parallel tests
ensure the robustness of the findings and assumption about comparability.
The MT also substitutes the KW where the assumptions of the KW are not
met. That is, while the KW method is robust against violations of normality
and unequal sample size, it is not so against violations of HOV. The KW
test for multiple groups assumes that the variances of the samples are dis-
tributed equally.29 Therefore, it is not that the non-parametric test would
necessarily provide robust answers in the face of non-normality. As such, the
data must first meet the requirement of HOV in order to proceed with the
KW. Where the HOV is not met, the MT is opted for to provide results be-
tween the groups. Since the (parametric) Levene’s test for HOV is sensitive
to skewness and unequal sample sizes (both considerations for the data used
herein) and the robust Brown-Forsythe test also suffers from violations, a
non-parametric Levene’s test is used which is shown to be the most robust
against non-normally distributed and unequal sample sizes(See: Nordstokke
and Zumbo 2010). 30
Following the tests of HOV, 24 significant differences in means were dis-
covered between all three subsamples, with only 4 found between the two
community subsamples. Of these 4, one conflict was for an item from the
ISEA, one from the ANES, and two from the ISSP06. The bulk of the sig-
nificant differences (22 out of the 24)were seen between the DCC-S and the
DOP-S (Table: 5.6). The results provide convincing grounds to combine
the two community subsamples based on the theoretical and empirical ev-
28Shapiro-Wilks tests for normality indicate universal non-normality among the subsam-
ples. Normality tests on the ISSP survey items also reveal that the selected items from
selected samples also reveal statistically significant non-normality. It should be noted that
the respondents selected from the comparison surveys have not been weighted, as no such
weights exist once extracted from the overall region.
29The Levene’s test has been shown to be less sensitive to deviations from normality
than the Bartlett test. A significant Levene’s statistic indicates a deviation of variances
between groups (Fields 2009).
30Results of these tests are available in the appendix for this chapter.
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idence.31 The remaining results are based on this configuration. Only the
ISEA comparison reports the segmented results for felon subsamples.
31Supplemental analysis was conducted on males and females to assess whether the
preferences of female respondents and male respondents differed significantly from each
other. The rationale being that it is possible that there is an inherently different desire
among female and males as regards welfare related areas of spending or public policy.
Only 11 of the 107 items changed their significance. Of those, 5 of the 11 changed from
significant to non-significant deviations of variance.
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Analysis of Groups - Respondent and Control Groups: The pro-
cess carried out for the analysis of group differences was replicated for those
of respondents and control groups. Each pairing was analyzed using both
a traditional Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance, as well as the non-
parametric equivalent test. Where the non-parametric test was passed, the
Kruskall-Wallis test is used as the test of comparison. Where this test fails,
the Median test option is substituted. Post-hoc tests were supplied by the
statistical software using Dunn-Bonferoni corrected methods. Results are
shown following the descriptive results.
In addition, as is explained in more detail in Section 6.6, a matching pro-
cess was used on each series of comparisons to adjust for background variables
which might distort group comparisons. That is, the control groups were ma-
nipulated using the case matching routine in SPSS to distort the distribution
of demographic variables (i.e., race, income and gender) to match that of the
respondent groups. While case matching has evolved primarily from the
medical sciences to control for confounding variables with the (typical) aim
to infer causality, it is employed herein to test whether differences between
groups remain after matching respondents on available invariant background
variables.32
Political Party Identification: Because a primary concern of this re-
search is to establish the political identity of respondents, a further two
analyses using the items provided (again from the 2006 Role of Government
module) were conducted in order to assess likely party affiliation. This pro-
cess was especially useful as respondents, as will be shown in the following
sections, reported overwhelmingly Independent in their self-classifications.
Using a selection of items from the ISSP06, one analysis calculated respon-
dent scores on two “super-variables” using a derivation of the MANOVA
process in SPSS. A second process used the Discriminant Function Analysis
in SPSS to predict the probable 3-category membership of respondents. De-
tails follow below.
Canonical Variates/ Super-Variables: MANOVA was used to re-
veal the raw discriminant function coefficients. Two processes were under-
taken that used the largest items groups (i.e., government responsibility and
32The results are more conservative than many such analysis of groups in other projects,
however the results provide useful comparisons.
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government spending) to create these variables. The process involves SPSS
running a MANOVA on respondents’ (only ISSP06 respondents were used
in both analyses) answers to reveal the eigenvalues and canonical correla-
tions of 1 minus the number of groups used as the independent variable.
Party self-identification has been collapsed into a 3-category group, labeling
respondents Democrat if they had identified as some measure of Democrat,
Republican if they had identified as some degree of Republican, and Inde-
pendent if they had explicitly identified as Independent. The process uses a
set of items (the dependent variables in the MANOVA) and linearly extrapo-
lates roots (canonical variates) based on 1-Independent Categories. Thus two
roots are created for each analysis to maximally discriminate between the 3
groups based on the given dependent variables (responsibility and spending
variables).
Discriminant Function Analysis: An analysis was first run using
the entire US sample of the ISSP 2006 to investigate which variables (overall)
contribute to the most robust discrimination of the 3 states (i.e., Democrat,
Republican, or Independent). Only those variables which attempt to measure
preferences (e.g, what the government ought to do),as opposed to experiences
(e.g., items which are more likely to measure the impact of personal experi-
ences), are included in the analysis.
Using the full sample (step-wise, Wilk’s Lambda method, exclusion of
cases at 0.10), an overall “hit-rate” of 58.1 percent original and 57.2 percent
cross validated was given, with 75.3/ 74 and 64.7/64.4 percent Democrats
and Republicans correctly classified original and cross validated respectively.
This analysis was repeated using Mahalanobis distance as well as using seper-
ate covariance matrices, however no discernible (greater than 5 percent) hit
rate was achieved. An analysis which included all variables produced similar
results (78.5 and 68.5 correct classification for Democrats and Republicans
respectively).
This process was repeated for the South Atlantic sample with a greater
return for the step-wise analysis - 81/72.7 and 72.8/63 percent correctly clas-
sified for original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.33
Thus, the decision was made to utilize the South Atlantic subsample to clas-
33Analysis using all variables entered. Repeated model was run using the step-wise
entry with fewer correctly classified cases: 81.9/79.2 and 65.7/61.6 percent original/cross-
validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.
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sify the corresponding sample of felons. 34 In all, 34 variables are used to
discriminate between groups, containing items from government responsibil-
ity, government spending, government intervention in the economy, views of
taxation, views of justice, attitudes towards civil rights, and attitudes on
extremism.
5.2.7 Qualitative Results
Purpose: Because responses to items provide only a snapshot of respon-
dents’ views on a selection of items, a further analysis of interviews was
conducted using a group of individuals who had participated in the survey,
and using primary data from Manza and Uggen’s (2006) research focused
in the same area.35 As background for the present project, the findings of
Manza and Uggen (2006) provided a starting point by which to combine a
positivist (quantitative survey) approach with a more constructivist (qualita-
tive interview) approach - utilizing respondent interviews to provide deeper
interpretations of item responses.
The interview guide for this stage of the research process used interview
items from the interview guide reported in Manza and Uggen (2006), as well
as a selection of topics which pertained to that of the issues directly covered in
the survey itself (see Appendix for interview guide). While the primary aim
was intended to gain deeper insight into respondent results, a secondary pur-
pose consisted of comparing views from North Carolina offenders to that of
those from Minnesota offenders from the Manza and Uggen (2006) research.
That is, the results from the qualitative analysis represent a complementary
Qualitative Secondary Analysis utilizing both primary data and data from
the previous Manza and Uggen (2006) study (Heaton 2000; Irwin and Win-
terton 2011a, 2011b). The analysis here is based on an inductive approach,
utilizing semi-structured interviews from both North Carolina community
supervised offenders and Minnesota institutionally supervised offenders. All
analysis was carried out using Atlas.ti. Coding followed a limited depth of
34The results show a Box’s M value of 2191.42, F= 1.181; however log determinants are
approximately equal between Democrat and Republican categories (-26.124 vs. -27.424).
As such I proceed to use this configuration to classify following Burns and Burns (2008).
A parallel analysis using multinomial logistic regression produced no better classification
results and the predicted group membership is not calculated on those scores from the
control group (i.e., ISSP 06 respondents).
35In fact, the survey itself was compiled using the original interview guide from Manza
and Uggen (2006 Ch.6) to inform a degree of the selection of variables for instrumentation.
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analysis, using only two stages to first categorize descriptive aspects of the
data and then a further step to group coded segments into decipherable pat-
terns (Saldan˜a 2009). That is, a deeper investigation into the meanings of
respondents’ answers were not pursued given the purposes of the qualitative
analysis - triangulation of responses from the quantitative research. As such,
this process was not intended to produce or confirm any existing theory, as
much as to contextualize items in the views of felon respondents. This is es-
pecially important to consider in the perspective of the secondary use format
of the Minnesota interviewees. A brief overview of QSA is given in Section
7.1.
5.2.8 GIS Analysis:
Purpose: A final aim of this research was the analysis of offender popu-
lations at the state and sub-state level. This process involved three stages.
The first stage involved data gained from the North Carolina Department
of Corrections through an intermediary organization (i.e., Justice Mapping
Center). This data consisted of offender entry rates into prison for the year
2008. This data was available only at the census tract level for the state. The
data is then joined with electoral administrative data to analyze the district
level impact of felony disenfranchisement, using prison entries as a rough
proxy for felony status, for the state. A final stage of the analysis involved
the geocoding of respondent current or former addresses. Respondents were
provided an option to provide their current or most recent address in the
survey instrument. Overall, 90 percent of respondents were successfully pro-
cessed. This data enables both the determination of sampling accuracy (i.e.,
whether respondents were sampled from the desired areas of investigation)
and analyses of responses superimposed onto geographic coordinates. That
is, by obtaining their communities of origin, this research is able to more ac-
curately assess not just the results of respondents attitudes, but also where
those attitudes are located. A more detailed explanation of processes is given
in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 6
The Political and Economic
Preferences of Felony Offenders
- Results
The following chapter reports the results from the field research outlined
previously. These are the first findings of such a survey done exclusively
on supervised persons (to the knowledge of the author). Section 6.1 pro-
ceeds with a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of participants. First,
response rates and spread of survey participation is reported, including a
detailed account of the stratifying process of the DOP-S which is enabled by
matching respondents with their official records available from the NC De-
partment of Corrections public database (6.1.1). Matching the background
variables available from the NCDOC, with the data from the publicly avail-
able offender information and the information provided by respondents, it
is possible to follow the representativeness of (at least) the institutionally
supervised sampled respondents (Tables: 6.2 and 6.3).1
A detailed portrait of respondents is then given, providing a picture of the
survey participants on key demographic variables (6.1.2). Following this, the
aggregated results are delivered in 5 stages corresponding to item sources.
Items taken from the ANES are given in section 6.2, followed by the ISSP09
items on social inequality in section 6.3. Following this, the more numerous
results of items taken from the ISSP06 are presented in section 6.4, followed
by results from the ISEA items which present more detailed preferences re-
garding the generosity and provision of social benefits in section 6.5.
1Future research in this area should consider appropriating time and resources to better
track respondents by these identifying variables to better assess the spead of take-up by
this particular category of hard-to-reach population.
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These sections are followed by analysis of the variance between groups
based on both unmatched and matched (sub-section 6.6.1) samples. The de-
scription of these processes are given in the beginning of section 6.6. Finally,
an analysis of the predicted partisan affiliation is reported in subsection 6.6.2.
This chapter finishes with a discussion of the results. Following this chap-
ter, a more substantive analysis of disenfranchised preferences is given with
qualitative interviews carried out with participants and secondary sources.
These qualitative results assist in exploring the preferences of disenfranchised
citizens in their own words.
6.1 Descriptive Results of Respondents
6.1.1 Response Rates
General Rates: Of a total possible participation of 2100 (for DOC
and DOP only), 221 individuals completed and returned survey booklets.
Of those, 96 individuals from community corrections returned survey ma-
terials compared to 134 institutionally supervised participants (See Table
6.1).2 Comparable statistics are not available for CSI-S given the alternate
methods used. After controlling for drop-outs and those with total item re-
sponse on less than two-thirds of total items, 10 participants from the DCC-S
were dropped from the analysis.3 The remaining descriptives are from the
amended dataset. Figure 6.1 shows the geocoded current or last known res-
idence of respondents from all sub-samples. While response rates where, on
the whole, less than optimal - the consistency of the recorded background
variables matched with the spatial clustering of respondents salvages a cer-
tain degree of faculty lost by low-response rates and lack of simple random
sampling.4
2Type refers to the level and nature of supervised respondent sites, note figure 5.4
3This decision was made so as to normalize the data as much as possible across sub-
samples for the purposes of analysis.
4Not to repeat the entirety of confounding issues dealt with when researching hard-
to-reach and protected populations, however these results augment the existing research
with this population, especially as it concerns primary data generation.
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Table 6.1: Return Rates for DCC and DOP by Unit
Distributed Returned Rate Type
District 21 37 10 27.03% DCC
District 18 55 9 16.36% DCC
District 14 55 8 14.55% DCC
District 18 55 7 12.73% DCC
District 26 57 7 12.28% DCC
District 12 110 12 10.91% DCC
District 14 55 6 10.91% DCC
District 27 110 9 8.18% DCC
District 10 115 7 6.09% DCC
District 21 37 2 5.41% DCC
District 21 37 2 5.41% DCC
District 26 57 3 5.26% DCC
District 10 100 5 5.00% DCC
District 5 110 5 4.55% DCC
District 28 110 4 3.64% DCC
NASH CI 120 22 18.33% MED
HARNETT CI 125 19 15.20% MED
ALBEMARLE CI 135 20 14.81% MED
COLUMBUS CI 108 8 7.41% MED
BROWN CREEK CI 193 12 6.22% MED
BUNCOMBE CC 32 14 43.75% MIN
WAKE CC 61 13 21.31% MIN
ROBESON CC 37 5 13.51% MIN
NEW HANOVER CC 52 7 13.46% MIN
Forsyth CC 57 7 12.28% MIN
GASTON CC 44 5 11.36% MIN
DAVIDSON CC 36 2 5.56% MIN
Total 2100 221 10.52%
DCC 1100 96 8.73%
DOP 1000 134 13.40%
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DOP-S Specific: Following the DOP-S through the staging processes,
an option unavailable for the DCC-S and CSI-S subsamples, it is possible to
examine the distortion of participants by stratifying, at least on educational
and racial variables (i.e., these are the only publicly available data which are
matched for the respondents).5 As seen in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, the overall
representation of offenders by education and racial groups remains relatively
consistent across the sampling process.
Respondents are slightly more educated than the entire DOP population,
32.84 percent having at least a 12th grade education compared to 27.32 per-
cent of all DOP supervised individuals; respondents are also more likely to
be black than with the DOP population, 61.94 percent compared to 57.69
percent. Disparities in these rates seem to be a function of the stratifying
process, with education ratios changing at the first and third stage of sam-
pling. The selection of specific institutions based on county of residence first
shifts the highest education received upwards, followed thereafter by the ran-
dom sampling from the adjusted sample frame.
Racial ratios first change noticeably at the second stage, with the ex-
clusion by county of residence to narrow the focus to urban communities.
Particularly interesting, given the data gathered on educational attainment,
is the disparity between what level DOP-S respondents reported and what
their DOC provided biographical data reports. A full 22 percent of respon-
dents indicated they had completed some college or university, compared
with approximately 2.1 percent who reported higher than 12th grade (high
school or GED) by the DOC for the same respondents (these descriptives
are partially repreated below in Figure 6.2.). No such discrepancy was found
with the reports on racial variables.
5A supplementary breakdown of response rates by criminal activity, characteristics of
supervision, and other pertinent factors remains forthcoming. The results from such an
analysis is not deemed relevant for the overall purposes of this work.
253
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
T
ab
le
6.
2:
S
ta
ge
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
s:
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
al
A
tt
ai
n
m
en
t
fo
r
D
O
P
A
ll
D
O
P
S
e
le
ct
e
d
In
st
.
F
in
a
l
S
F
S
a
m
p
le
R
e
sp
.
O
ffi
ci
a
l
R
e
sp
.
G
iv
e
n
0
0%
0.
47
%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1
0%
0.
3%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2
0%
0.
26
%
0%
0%
0%
0%
3
0%
0.
52
%
0%
0%
0%
0%
4
0%
0.
26
%
0%
0%
0%
0%
5
0%
0.
62
%
1%
1%
0%
1.
50
%
6
2%
3.
19
%
3%
3%
1%
0%
7
2%
1.
98
%
2%
2%
1%
2.
2%
8
9%
7.
72
%
6%
7%
6%
2.
2%
9
16
%
14
.9
6%
14
%
14
%
14
%
6.
7%
1
0
20
%
17
.3
4%
17
%
15
%
17
%
4.
5%
1
1
20
%
19
.6
7%
24
%
23
%
26
%
7.
5%
1
2
27
%
30
.6
%
31
%
33
%
33
%
53
.0
%
1
3
0%
0.
71
%
0%
1%
0%
22
.4
%
1
4
1%
0.
88
%
1%
1%
1%
-
1
5
0%
0.
23
%
0%
0%
0%
-
1
6
0%
0.
2%
0%
0%
1%
-
1
7
0%
0.
05
%
0%
0%
0%
-
1
8
0%
0.
03
%
0%
0%
1%
-
254
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
Table 6.3: Stage Descriptives: Racial Category
All DOP Sel. Inst. S. Frame Sample Resp.
WHITE 34.44% 32.95% 22.04% 23.28% 32.09%
BLACK 57.69% 55.22% 67.75% 65.73% 61.94%
INDIAN 2.01% 2.23% 0.33% 0.20% 0.75%
ASIAN 0.28% 0.46% 0.57% 0.70% 0.00%
OTHER 4.9% 7.75% 7.71% 8.29% 2.99%
UNKN 0.68% 1.38% 1.52% 1.60% 0.75%
6.1.2 Characteristics of Respondents
Respondents were generally in their late to mid-30s, with an overall mean age
of approximately 38 years: DCC-S mean age was 33.69, DOP-S was 40.59,
the corresponding age for CSI-S was 38.43. Respondents were predominantly
African American (Figure 6.2), and largely reported having at least a high
school education or equivalent (i.e., some respondents indicated that they
had obtained a General Education Diploma (GED) at the time of the sur-
vey) (Figure6.3a). Parental educational attainment, overall, was reported
largest among the mothers of participants, with 32 percent reporting at least
some college or more for mothers (Fig: 6.4a) as compared to 20.8 percent
overall for fathers (Fig: 6.4b). The percentage reported for father educa-
tional level achievement was particularly higher for incarcerated individuals
(20.8 percent) than for community supervised respondents (8.3 - CSI-S; 18.3
DCC-S) (Fig:6.4).
Respondents were not overwhelming religious, with just under 60 per-
cent (59.8) reporting that they either do not attend religious services (15.9
percent) or do so infrequently (43.9).6 Of those who reported a religous de-
nomination, the overwhelming majority of respondents reported belonging
to the Baptist denomination (79.2 percent). This is compared to 81.6 per-
cent for the ANES control group (Fig: 6.3b). Additionally, respondents were
overwhelmingly drawn from the lower ends of the income distribution, with
a full 77.6 percent of respondents reporting current or past incomes of less
than 25,000 USD; 45.5 percent of respondents reported incomes below 10,000
USD annually, below the national poverty threshold set by the US Census
6Responses counted as infrequent attendance included: attend once a month, a few
times a year, and only on holidays.
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Bureau (Fig: 6.5).7 Fully three-quarters of respondents were non-violent of-
fenders (75.7 percent), with 33.5 percent drug related offenders at the time
of survey (Fig:6.6)8
Figure 6.2: Reported Racial Groups by SubSample
The following sections lay out the responses of participants, divided into
groups based on the original survey instruments. First, those items taken
from the ANES (primarily the 2008 Time-Series data file) are given, followed
by those from the ISSP09, and the ISSP06. ISEA responses follow last. An
important note is needed in the following sections. For the sake of parsimony,
results from the CSI-S and DCC-S have been merged to form the category
of Community, representing those individuals who are supervised under the
remit of the Department of Community Corrections, as opposed to those
of the Division of Prisons. This decision is based on an analysis of means
carried out between the three sub-sample groups mentioned previously.
7According to the US Census Bureau, the poverty threshold for individuals under 65
years of age in 2011 was 11,702 USD
8Reported convictions were reclassified into a three category variable for property,
violent, and drug related offenses. A full breakdown of these categories is available in the
appendix for this chapter.
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(a) Education
(b) Denomination
Figure 6.3: Respondents Education and Relidious Affiliation
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(a) Mother
(b) Father
Figure 6.4: Educational Attainment of Parents
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Figure 6.5: Reported Income by SubSample
Figure 6.6: Main Crime Type by SubSample
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6.2 ANES Results
The American National Election Survey is the oldest and, arguably, most
renowned source of opinions of the American public. Beginning in 1948,
the ANES has measured public perceptions continuously with both pre- and
post-election surveys; capturing a range of attitudes about preferences re-
garding candidates, issues de jour, and modes of participation (to mention
a few areas). For the purposes of the research here, only 11 variables were
selected for inclusion into the compiled survey instrument. These variables
were selected so as to measure areas of political interest and activity which
were not overtly emphasized in the associated items from the ISSP06, ISSP09,
and ISEA.
Political Identification: The item measuring political self-identification
was taken from the ANES 2008 pre-election survey, obtained from the 2008
Time-Series dataset. The item asks:
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as: [Check
one] - followed by seven Lickert scale choices ranging from Strong
Democrat to Strong Republican. 9
Regarding the self identified political partisanship, both felon groups report
considerable differences from the ANES control (Fig:6.8a). Almost half of
both community and institutionally supervised participants (46.3 and 54.5
percent respectively) identified with neither the Democrats nor the Republi-
cans. This is in contrast to 12.8 percent of the ANES control which identified
themselves as Independent. These results, and those in the following sections,
bolster the research that the disenfranchised are not necessarily a windfall
for the Democratic party, though there is an obvious skew in favor of the
Democrats for those who do not identify themselves as Independent. That
is, 32.5 and 43.4 of community and institutional participants identify them-
selves as Democrats to some degree, while only 13 and 10.3 percent identified
as Republicans of some degree (respectively).
Ideological Divide: When asked about their political ideological posi-
tion, respondents do not appear markedly dissimilar from the ANES control
group (Fig: 6.8b). Posed with the item, When it comes to politics do you
usually think of yourself as: [options], respondents reported nearly equal posi-
tionings across the spectrum; with community groups reporting 30.7 percent
9Refer to the appendix for this chapter. Items are recoded to range from -3 to 3.
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liberal to some degree, 33 percent middle of the road, and 36.3 percent as
conservative to some degree. For institutional groups, the results are 31.7,
30.5, and 37.8 respectively. For the ANES control, the scores were 22.2,
32.9, and 44.9 percent respectively. Thus, while the disenfranchised identify
as somewhat more liberal to some degree than the control group, it is not a
considerable amount (nor is it significantly so, as shown in Subsection 6.6.1.).
Additionally, when asked if they saw any difference between the two major
parties, respondents mirrored the answers of the ANES control group (Fig:
6.7 ).
Figure 6.7: Differences Between Democrats and Republicans
Contact with Political Parties: One of the more under-emphasized
facets of political disenfranchisement is the unattractiveness of these groups
to political actors. As Abramsky (2006) asserts in interviews with political
actors (i.e., politicians), the disenfranchised, aside from being unappealing
on account of their criminality, are equally disadvantaged because of their
lack of value to elected officials. That is, there is very little reason for elected
officials to court the preferences (sincerely or not) of those who cannot con-
tribute to their electoral success. The effort of campaigning and canvassing
must weigh the return to investment in any political campaign. The evi-
dence here, however, is not sufficient enough to categorically support this
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(a) Party Self-Identification
(b) ANESLIBCON
Figure 6.8: 7-Point Party and Ideological Responses
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contention. The results show that both community and institutional popu-
lations report having been contacted by one of the major parties at approxi-
mately the same rate, however the institutionally supervised population does
report lower levels (22.3 percent compared to 33.6 and 35.4 percent for com-
munity and ANES control respectively) of contact by the Democratic party.
Interestingly, both groups of respondents indicated they had been contacted
by a party other than the Democratic or Republican party. The lack of con-
tact is also reported in individual interviews and from secondary analysis.
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Participation: On the other end of the spectrum, looking at the civic
volunteerist perspective, respondents report considerably high rates of inten-
tion to be involved in campaign activities compared to reported instances.
Given five areas, respondents were asked:
During the next election which you are able to participate, would
you be likely to: (1) Work for a party or candidate? (2)Wear a
button or put a bumper sticker on your car? (3)Attend political
rallies or meetings? (4) Donate money to a campaign? (5) Talk
to others and try to show them why they should vote for or against
one of the parties or candidates?
A note of caution, however. The items are not completely comparable as
the ANES on these items are based on the post-election questionnaire. As
such, the scores from respondents measure intent, whereas those of the ANES
control measure reported occurrence. This is an important distinction.
265
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a
)
D
o
n
a
te
(b
)
A
tt
en
d
R
a
ll
ie
s
(c
)
A
d
v
er
ti
se
(d
)
V
o
lu
n
te
er
(e
)
C
o
n
ve
rs
e
F
ig
u
re
6.
10
:
A
N
E
S
P
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
266
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
Participation in Elections: Given the nature of the population un-
der investigation, items were composed to measure respondents views on the
likelihood of their participation at varying levels of government. The ratio-
nale behind these items explores the aforementioned assumptions that the
disenfranchisement of felons is most likely to affect those offices at the sub-
national, and even sub-state, levels. If this assumption is to hold, we should
expect higher intentions from respondents on those elections that are closer
to the local level. As such, four items were included which were not included
the ANES, however are presented here owing to their congruity with the po-
litical items reported in this section. Respondents were asked: If you have
voted/ or if you would vote, how likely do you think you would vote in the
following elections: (1)City, (2) County, (3) State, (4) Federal.
The majority of respondents across subsamples report that they would be
likely to participate in elections at the city and county level if allowed to
vote, while the amount asserting their desire to participate at the state and
federal level are noticeably higher.
Table 6.4: Would Participate in Election: Very Likely or Definitely
CSI DCC DOP
City 56.82% 58.97% 64.00%
County 53.33% 56.41% 66.40%
State 68.89% 72.73% 78.40%
Federal 68.89% 72.73% 78.40%
Table 6.4 paints a very ambitious picture of respondents. Given that
turnout in municipal, county and even state elections are dismally low. Even
in the high profile election of 2008, in which President Barack Obama won
the state of North Carolina (a key battleground state), only 70 percent of
registered voters turned out to vote. In the 2010 mid-term elections, which
ushered in a Republican dominated government in the state, only 44 per-
cent of registered voters turned out to vote (NCSBE 2014). Indeed, city
and county turnout rates are even more depressed. However, should this
optimistic turnout rate hold, and assuming that respondents are not signifi-
cantly over-biased towards participation themselves (a fact which this initial
exploration of this population cannot confirm nor deny), it would provide
justification for pause among some local actors who fear the participation of
those who have interests directly impacted by their offices (e.g., elected court
officials, sheriffs, county bonds officials, and even local school boards).
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At present, and with the prodigious work conducted by Burch and oth-
ers, the results should be taken with ruminative heed. Be that as it may,
the results provide insight to a measure of political interest among the dis-
enfranchised not previously reported.
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While these results are interesting in their own right, they form only a
part of the identity of respondents. In essence, the results so far indicate only
where respondents place themselves on the political spectrum and possible,
and likely abeyant, modes of participation. What is more useful for the
analysis of the political disenfranchised is not their placements on metrics
of participation, or even items of group membership, but rather what these
respondents see as the role of those who govern. These items describe in more
detail, and with more precision (as will be shown in Subsection 6.6.2), the
types of preferences which citizens base future action upon. These preferences
are the crux of policy platforms, not to mention campaign promises, and
therefore apropos to the purposes here.
6.3 ISSP 09 Results
The module on Social Inequality is one of eleven under the auspices of the
International Social Survey Programme. Beginning in 1984, it consists of 4
waves conducted in 41 nations. Five items were selected for inclusion into the
survey instrument. These items concern the amount of conflict respondents
believe exists between particular categories of society, as well as their own
placement on a class scale. In addition, the ISSP09 includes three items
which are also covered in the ISSP06 instrument, as well as the political party
identification item reported in the previous section with ANES items. The
results for the ISSP09 and ANES Party Identification are nearly identical, as
can be seen in Figure 6.12a.
Social Class: Respondents were asked:
Most people see themselves as belonging to a particular class.
Which social class would you say you belong to? (1) Lower Class,
(2) Working Class, (3) Lower Middle Class, (4)Middle Class, (5)
Upper Middle Class, (6) Upper Class
As with the skew (or rather lack thereof) in the political self-identification,
respondents tended to differentiate themselves in comparison to the ISSP09
control (Fig: 6.12b.
Approximately three-quarters of respondents (77.2 and 73.1 percent for
Community and Institutional groups) identified themselves as Lower Mid-
dle Class, Working Class, or Lower Class; compared to just over half (53.2
percent) of the ISSP09 control. Nearly a quarter of community respondents
(24.3 percent) and just under 15 percent (14.6) of institutional respondents
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(a) 7-Point Party Identification
(b) 6-Point Class Identification
Figure 6.12: Party and Class Positions
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identified as lower class - compared to 4.6 percent of the control. Further-
more, while the control group shows a bi-modal distribution, the respondent
groups show a singular, albeit skewed, shape. Whether this is indicative
of an overall comprehension of social class standing amongst the majority
of disenfranchised citizens is not possible to determine, however the results
here suggest that such an awareness is not outside the realm of possibility.
Social Conflict: Following their views towards their own position in the
social class hierarchy, respondents were asked to what degree they believed
that society was faced with conflicts between certain groups. In particular,
respondents were posed with the quesion:
In all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between
different social groups. In your opinion, in America,how much
conflict is there between. . . Poor People and Rich People; Work-
ing Class and Middle Class; People at the top of society and those
at the bottom; Management and Workers; Those in power in Gov-
ernment and the governed.
As Figure 6.13 illustrates, respondents were much more like the control
group primarily on the issue of conflict between workers and employers (Fig:
6.15d). They differed quite substantially (and significantly)in their views
on the existence of conflict in the remaining aspects of society. Community
and institutional respondents were more likely to believe in strong conflict
between the poor and the rich (48.9 and 40.7 versus 15.9 percent) (Fig:
6.13a), and between those at the top and those at the bottom (63.8 and 48.4
versus 13.9 percent) (Fig: 6.13c). For beliefs in conflict between the working
and middle classes, the ISSP09 group manifested much lower beliefs of any
conflict, a full 70 percent of the ISSP09 group reported very little conflict, as
opposed to the 33.1 and 40.5 percent of community and institutional groups
respectively (Fig: 6.13b). While there is no comparison available for the final
item (governing vs. the governed), the finding that the strongest beliefs in
strong conflict are reported between those in power (i.e., government) and
those governed (the people) is an interesting one (Fig: 6.15e).
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Taken together, it is apparent that respondents do have particular views
on their place in society. In addition, they exhibit beliefs that society is
not only unequal, but it is unequal in certain respects. That the differ-
ences between the views on conflict between managers and workers show no
clear pattern could be interpreted as meaning that respondents and the con-
trol group simply are not extemely convinced of any conflict between these
groups. It could also be that there is indeed not sufficient conflict to be
observed or experienced.
However it could also owe much to the specific nature of the complex-
ity of employer-employee dynamics in the US.10That the ISSP09 group sees
very little conflict in contrast to the community and institutional groups is
also interesting, especially considering that the control group exhibits higher
income on average than the respondent groups. This matter is dealt with
further in subsection 6.6.1. That said, there appears a firm belief amongst
respondents in conflict between groups in American society which stands at
odds with those of the control group. I turn now to the more extensive
grouping of items, those of the ISSP’s Role of Government module.
6.4 ISSP 06 Results
As mentioned earlier, the ISSP Role of Government module comprises the
single largest item source for the research into the preferences of the disen-
franchised felon population. Indeed, the entire item list of this module is
used in the present survey. This inclusion facilitates further analysis used in
subsection 6.6.2. The results follow by reporting items pertaining to the role
which respondents believe government ought to play in the general manage-
ment of social life (6.4.1), followed by items reporting the degree to which
respondents see the incidence of taxation (6.4.2). Subsection 6.4.3 details
respondents’ preferences on items of government spending, subsection 6.4.4
reports the degree to which government ought (not) to involve itself in the
functioning of the economy, while 6.4.5 reports the degree to which respon-
dents approve of government’s handling of particular public issues.
These items are then followed by a selection of items which measure re-
spondents’ views on citizen agency and their own subjective agency. Subsec-
tion 6.4.6 reports on respondents’ views on the extent to which citizens ought
10The region, and particularly the state of North Carolina, is not known for strong
employee centered politics. The state is part of a band of states in the region which are
dubbed “right-to-work” states, designed to limit the power of unions.
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to be allowed to freely exercise their autonomy, 6.4.7 reports on items which
measure the degree to which the average citizen has an impact on govern-
ment and their own governance, while 6.4.8 details respondents perceptions
of their own personal agency.
6.4.1 Government’s Responsibility
Views on the government’s responsibility in the realm of governance are mea-
sured by ten items ranging from protecting the environment to providing as-
sistance to the unemployed. Overall, respondents where more liberal about
the proper role of government in the daily functioning of the country. On the
issue of whether the government ought to ensure full employment, respon-
dents were drastically different than their control counterparts. 51.5 and 42.2
percent of community and institutional respondents indicated they believed
that it definitely should be the government’s responsibility, compared to just
18.1 percent of ISSP respondents.
This skew is not as pronounced in the area of price control, where re-
spondents differed only slightly in trend compared with the control group
(95.6 and 83.2 percent of community and institutional versus 77 percent
ISSP06 in support of government responsibility). Respondents also track
their ISSP06 counterparts in the area of providing healthcare to the sick, but
are measurably more in favor of this area as well. Almost all community and
institutional respondents (98.5 and 90.2 percent respectively) report that the
government has a responsibility to provide healthcare to the sick, compared
to a nearly identical rate for ISSP06 respondents (89.3 percent). However,
community and institutional respondents reported that they believed the
government definitely had the responsibility at much higher rates. 83.8 and
72.7 percent of community and institutional respondents (respectively) re-
ported they thought it definitely should be the government’s responsibility,
compared to just over half of ISSP06 respondents (55.8 percent).
The degree to which respondents see the proper role of government re-
sponsibility is mirrored again by their ISSP06 counterparts, and again in an
area which is not necessarily limited in scope to their particular demographic
profile. When it comes to protection for the elderly (i.e., the responsibility
of government to provide a decent standard of living for the elderly), similar
levels are witnessed in aggregated support. 89.3 percent of ISSP06 respon-
dents, compared with 97.8 and 93.8 percent of community and institutional
respondents, answered affirmatively for government responsibility. The skew
in opinions returns when posed with the proposition that the government
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has the responsibility for providing sufficient assistance to help industry grow
(97.8, 93.8, and 89.3 percent of community, institutional and ISSP06 respon-
dents respectively).
One trend is particularly visible. The support among felon respondents
towards the responsibility of the state to interact with facets of the lives
of citizens is nearly stationary as compared to that of the ISSP06 control
group. What’s more, this stationarity is witnessed in the community group
more than the preferences of the institutional group. When looking at sup-
port for government responsibility for providing a decent standard of living
for the unemployed, the ISSP06 group shifts drastically to less responsibility,
with just over half (52.4) supporting government’s responsibility. In contrast,
institutional preferences shift to 73.9 percent, while the community prefer-
ence remains strong at 86.3 percent.
The preference for government responsibility remains stable when asked
whether it ought to be government’s responsibility to reduce inequality. 86.3
percent of community compared with 66.7 percent and 52.3 percent of institu-
tional and ISSP06 respondents. On the issue of providing financial assistance
for university to those from low-income families, there is near universal agree-
ment. 90.7 of ISSP06 respondents and 97.8 and 93.9 percent of community
and institutional respondents supported the proposition. However, again, it
is the intensity with which the support is given that differentiates the com-
munity and institutional respondents from their ISSP06 counterparts. 80
percent of community and 74.8 percent of institutional respondents felt that
it definitely should be the responsibility of government, compared with 55.2
percent of the control group. This “intensity”, as it were, dissipates for the
proposition that government ought to provide housing for those who can-
not afford it, with 66.7 of community and 50.8 of institutional respondents
opting for definite government responsibility, compared with 34.5 percent of
ISSP06 respondents (total support was 94.8, 89.2, and 75.8 percent respec-
tively). Finally, both the intesity and overall support re-align for the most
non-discriminatory (i.e., non-targeted) area of public policy (environmental
protection). Indeed, it is the only instance where the ISSP06 respondents
have higher rates of support for government responsibility (93.8 percent) than
the community (93.2 percent) and institutional (92.1 percent) groups.
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Clearly, the general population taken from the ISSP06 persists in a much
more conservative role for government than that of the community and in-
stitutional groups. The fluctuations seen across policy areas in the ISSP06
responses appear to measure quite dynamic views on the role of government.
It might be that felon respondents simply mark down the ranks regarding
government responsibility. That is, it might be argued that respondents
are, essentially, not deliberating on the items with the same sincerity. This
supposition seems more than marginally dismissive of participants’ views.
However, should this be the situation, it would also apply to those in the
control population which consistently rank in high support for government
responsibility. Moreso, it would stand to reason that such inconsistencies
would be borne out in the remainder of items given to respondents. Such
item responses are given in the following subsections.
6.4.2 Government Redistribution
Perhaps one of the most straightforward areas of public debate, especially
in the years surrounding the timing of the research project (e.g.,the Occupy
Movement and others), is that of the incidence of taxation. More specifically,
the issue of whether the rich are taxed enough and whether the poor are taxed
too much. Respondents were posed with the question:
Generally, how would you describe taxes in America today?(
Taxes include all taxes together, including wage deductions, in-
come tax, taxes on goods and services and all the rest. (1) First
for those with high incomes; (2)Next, for those with middle in-
comes; (3) Lastly, for those with low incomes.)
If the previous responses suggested a possibility of stationary views con-
cerning other policy areas, the responses concerning the incidence of taxation
clearly do not evince any such ambivalence among participants. Respondents
are not significantly more likely to “soak the rich”, at least not more so than
the control group. Interestingly, community respondents were more likely to
voice the opinion that taxes were too high or much too high for the rich ( 33.3
percent) compared to the institutional (20.5 percent) and ISSP06 respondents
(18.4 percent). 52.8, 43.9, and 53.1 percent of respondents, respectively, said
taxes on the rich were too low or much too low. Community respondents
also viewed taxes as too high for middle income earners at a greater percent-
age than their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts (70.4 percent compared
to 54.8 and 62.1 percent respectively). Finally, when asked whether they
thought taxes were too high for those of low income, respondents were all
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firmly of the opinion that taxes were too high or much too high for low income
groups; 87.1, 78.2, and 66.6 percent of community, institutional, and ISSP06
respondents respectively.
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While respondents are more likely to support lower taxes in general, this
is assuredly not surprising given the anti-tax environment characteristic of
many communities in the US in general. Most surprisingly is the strong (near
triple) response towards taxes being much too high for the high income.
While 5.2 percent of ISSP06 respondents viewed taxes as much too high
for the rich, 17.9 percent of community respondents and 12.3 percent of
institutional respondents voiced such a view.
6.4.3 Government Spending
Given that respondents, thus far, view a solidly positive role for the gov-
ernment in society, and taken with the results that respondents across com-
munity and institutional groupings do not view the incidence of taxation
similarly, the subject turns now to the area of specific areas of government
spending. The items concerning spending are particularly valuable as they
encourage participants to assess areas of spending which would have a direct
benefit to them or their communities, as opposed to more abstract concepts
such as the proper role of government. Respondents were posed with a list
of areas of spending:11
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please
show whether you would like to see more or less government
spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more”,
it might require a tax increase to pay for it.
Examining the results for government spending, the similarities between felon
respondents and the ISSP06 control are striking, with the exception of one
telling item. Community and institutional repondents were similarly con-
cerned with spending levels for culture and arts, environment, and military
and defense. The exception lies with spending on law enforcement. Commu-
nity respondents were more in favor of increased spending for the arts (37.1
percecnt) compared to the institutional (27.5 percent) and ISSP06 (28.4 per-
cent); while all groups ranked roughly evenly for spending on environmental
issues (60.8, 58.7, and 59.1 percent respectively). These similarities are also
witnessed in the area of military and defense, with all three groups averaging
around 40 percent in support of increased spending (38.8 (C), 38.5 (P), and
41.8 (I)), and approximately 25 percent in favor of reductions (23.9 (C), 26.9
11The iteending (i.e., healthcare, education, unemployment,ms here are grouped into
areas of spending which reflect more welfare oriented areas of public sp and retirement)
and those which are considered not directly welfare functions (i.e., environmental, culture
and arts, law enforcement, and national defense).
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(P), and 26.2 (I)).12 When it comes to spending on law enforcement, how-
ever, suspicions of a criminal voting bloc may find a degree of solace that, at
least for the participants in this project, both community and institutional
groups support reduced spending. While 63.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents
reported a desire to see some increase in spending for law enforcement, the
percentage was only around 25 percent for respondents (25.4 (C) and 24.8
(P)percent). 28.5 percent of community and 29.5 percent of institutional re-
spondents indicated they would like to see less spending on law enforcement,
compared with only 6.5 percent of ISSP6 respondents. That said, the major-
ity of respondents actually prefer to keep spending levels the same, with 46.2
percent of community and 45.7 percent of institutional respondents preferring
to maintain spending at current levels. Thus, one might conclude that, yes,
the disenfranchised would prefer less spending on law enforcement; however,
this is only relative to that of the general population. In fact, respondents
do not call for a total evisceration of resources towards law enforcement. To
the contrary, it appears that respondents prefer (rather) alternative modes
of solutions. Moving to the second grouping of spending areas, the profile of
the disenfranchised begins to materialize.
When it comes to public welfare goods, as much as they can be determined
from those items provided by the Role of Government instrument, respon-
dents are much more similar to their ISSP06 counterparts. The strength
of those preferences, however, is worth noting. While all respondents fa-
vor increased spending on healthcare (87.3(C), 84(P), and 81.3(I) percent),
community respondents were particularly more keen on much more spending
being appropriated (51.5 percent compared to 35.1 (P) and 39.1 (I) per-
cent). While all groups wish to see increases in education spending (86.7
(C), 90.2 (P), and 86.7 (I) percent), respondents are much more adamant
about increased spending - with 60.7 percent of community and 55.3 per-
cent of institutional groups preferring much more spending compared to 40.6
percent of the control group. The distribution for spending on retirement is
nearly evenly distributed across groups, with 68.7, 64.3 and 66.5 percent of
community, institutional, and ISSP06 respondents favoring increases. The
final category of spending, unemployment, sees a return of skewed distribu-
tion between respondent and control groups. While 40.4 percent of ISSP06
respondents preferred any increase in spending for unemployment, 79.1 per-
cent and 60 percent of community and institutional respondents preferred
increases. The skew is particularly strong for community respondents, with
44 percent favoring much more spending, compared with 26.2 percent of in-
12C = Community, P = Institutional, I = ISSP06
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stitutional and only 14.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents.
These results, of course, should always be taken with caution. However,
it is evident that on those areas of spending which are not, with all due
respect, directly weighing on the daily lives of respondents - those prefer-
ences generally reflect the same distribution seen in the control population.
When it comes to spending on health, education, law enforcement, and un-
employment, there is a discernible (and statistically significant, see Section
6.6) discrepancy between groups. More advanced statistical tests are pre-
sented later. The following section reports those preferences concerning the
interaction of government and the economy.
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6.4.4 Government and the Economy
Continuing on preferences regarding the role of government in areas of policy
which, for all intents and purposes, intrudes into the free-market, I turn now
to those preferences on the degree to which government should interact with
the economy. The ISSP06 provides six items which measure government
interaction with the economy. Respondents were presented the following
item:
Here are some things the government might do for the econ-
omy. Please show which actions you are in favor of and which
you are against. (1)Cuts in Government spending; (2)Govern-
ment financing of projects to create new jobs; (3)Less govern-
ment regulation of business; (4) Support for industry to develop
new products and technology; (5) Support for declining industries
to protect jobs; (6)Reducing the working week to create more jobs
and technology
The results for the government’s role in the economy, by and large, con-
form to those of the control group. Generally, all groups prefer cuts in spend-
ing (77.5 (C), 73.4 (P), and 67.4 (I) percent in favor or strongly in favor),
while paradoxically supporting government financing of projects to create
more jobs (97.7(C), 90.2(P), and 86.5(I) percent in favor or strongly in fa-
vor), deregulation of businesses (54.5(C), 40.7(P), 54.3(I) percent in favor
or strongly in favor), government support for industry to develop new tech-
nology (70.5(C), 80.2(P), and 87.7(I) percent in favor or strongly in favor),
and investment in declining industries to protect jobs (75.6(C), 71.9(P), and
68.4(I) percent in favor or strongly in favor).
This consensus splits when it comes to views on the role of government
and work hours. When faced with the question of where they stood as
regards government reducing the work week to stimulate jobs and technol-
ogy, community respondents break distinctively from their institutional and
ISSP06 counterparts. 54.9 percent of community respondents were in favor
or strongly in favor, compared with 39.7 and 37 percent of the institutional
and control groups. On the other end of the spectrum, 42.2 percent of ISSP06
respondents were against or strongly against reducing the work week, com-
pared to only 18.9 percent of community respondents, institutional respon-
dents fell approximately midway between the two at 26.4 percent. What is
most evident from the reported preferences concerning government interven-
tion in the economy is the distinct divsion between community respondents
and ISSP06 respondents. This is confirmed also by looking at the over-
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all means between groups, with community respondents accounting for the
largest absolute difference between ISSP06 means on all items of economic
intervention, with the exception of the regulation of businesses.13 Commu-
nity and, to a lesser degree institutional respondents are, by and large, more
liberal in their preferences for government intervention.
13As will be discusses in Section 6.6, and specifically in Table 6.9, mean community
responses were significantly different than ISSP06 respondents on all items save one.
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6.4.5 Government Success
Turning away from respondents’ views on the role and scope of governmental
interaction, the shift here turns to how respondents see government perfor-
mance. That is, the following subsections, beginning here, revolve around
respondents’ views on how successful government is in producing and imple-
menting policies, how much the government ought to be allowed to infringe
on the individual’s rights, how much influence the average citizen has on
their government, and how respondents see their own personal agency. Here
I begin with items concerning government success in selected policy areas.
A crucial consideration must be kept in mind as concerns the comparisons
reported between the respondents for this survey and that of the ISSP06.
First, the ISSP06 is a regional sample and not specific to the state of North
Carolina. Because assessment of government successes and failures likely
vary significantly state by state, and locales, these comparisons are illustra-
tive more than declarative. Unfortunately, state level identifiers were not
available in the ISSP06 dataset to directly compare responses across states
to test data. Second, and extremely important, is the item concerning views
on the nation’s security. Because the ISSP06 was run in a particularly differ-
ent period of time than the present study (i.e., in terms of the war on terror
and associated political rhetoric), the comparison between the two is even
more contentious than others. It is especially important to keep such issues
in mind when interpreting these specific results.14
Responses on the success of government to carry out its remit is especially
interesting given the nature of the participants. One might expect those who
have experienced the heavy “right hand” of the state, and the disparate
effects of the vanishing “left hand”, to espouse particularly negative assess-
ments of their custodians. However, this is surprisingly not the case. In fact,
it is these respondents who see the government as doing a more adequate job
than their ISSP06 counterparts. While respondents poll just about even on
the issue of protecting the environment (34.4(C) and 26.6(P) versus 30.1(I)
percent favorable assessments); when it comes to seeing government as suc-
cessful or very successful, community and institutional respondents respond
more positively on government’s achievements in providing healthcare to the
sick (34.1(C) and 27.9 percent compared to 23.9(I) percent) and providing a
decent standard of living to the elderly (29.5(C) and 25.8(P) percent versus
22.9(I) percent). They are even more so concerning efforts in dealing with
14One solution would be to analyze responses over multiple waves to compare average
responses amongst respondents. However, the items presented here were only included in
the 2006 wave of the Role of Government survey. As such, this strategy is no viable.
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threats to the nation’s security (61.1(C) and 76.4(P) percent versus 47.4 per-
cent (I)) and crime (42.3(C) and 47.2(P) percent compared with 33.3(I) per-
cent).15 This latter finding is especially interesting given respondents’ legal
status, and the trend of ISSP06 respondents in the opposite direction. The
final item, government success in fighting unemployment, is also telling. This
item evoked the strongest response from respondents from both community
and institutional groups. 72.7 percent of community respondents and 82.8
percent of institutional respondents indicated their view that government
was either unsuccessful or very unsuccessful in fighting unemployment (the
ISSP06 rate was 44.9 percent). This finding matches responses on employ-
ment related items previously reported. They paint a picture of respondents
that are only drastically dissimilar from their ISSP06 counterparts on one
thematic aspect, that of employment protection; a theme that has become
apparent across the course of these reportings. If respondents do hold nega-
tive views of government, it has not been revealed in their responses to items
on government performance.
15As noted earlier, these comparisons must be taken with a certain degree of caution.
Assessments of government’s successes are undoubtedly a function of local experiences and
changes in state policy. Crime and especially the item concerning national security are
time variant.
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6.4.6 Scope of Citizen Freedoms
The following group of items represent issues which concern how respondents
view the place of citizens in society. They focus on such topics as whether
one ought to obey the law in any circumstance, whether the government has
a right under certain circumstances to impinge on the rights of citizens, and
how they value freedoms of speech and protest. These items are, as opposed
to the previous grouping, less temporally sensitive; however such temporal
differences are no doubt still an issue of concern.
Asked whether they believed it was a better for persons to always fol-
low the law, or whether there were some occasion which provide grounds for
illegal actions, fully three fifths of community respondents (62.4 percent) be-
lieved that people should obey the law without exception, mirroring ISSP06
respondents (60.4 percent). Institutional respondents, on the other hand,
were almost evenly split on the issue, with 49.5 advocating for absolute com-
pliance and 50.5 of admitting of some circumstance in which it is acceptable
to contravene the law. Posed with the proposition of whether it is worse to
convict an innocent person or let a guilty person go free, respondents echoed
the preferences of the ISSP06 group, with institutional respondents voic-
ing opposition to “convicting an innocent person” at 89.4 percent, compared
with 81.1 percent and 73 percent for the community and ISSP06 respondents.
Three items were posed to respondents regarding cases where the gov-
ernment (i.e., the police) might require the abrogation of civil liberties to
protect public security. Respondents were given the item:
Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was
about to happen. Do you think the authorities have the right to:
(1)Detain people for as long as they want without putting them
on trial; (2)Tap telephones without a warrant; (3)Stop and search
people in the street at random.
The results are evident of a skew much more in favor of protecting civil
rights than is apparent int the ISSP06 group. While ISSP06 respondents
were approximately equally split on items concerning detainment and surveil-
lance (52.6 and 56.2, percent for), community and institutional respondents
were much less ambivalent (detainment/surveillance: 65.6/65.9 and 68.3/60.5
against respectively). ISSP06 respondents were slightly more inclined against
government stop and search (58.1 percent), on par with institutional respon-
dents (60.5 percent). Community respondents, however, were further against
such policies, with 77.9 percent against such policies. These results should
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be taken in context, with nearly half of community and institutional respon-
dents very strongly against such policies.
The final two item groups measure respondents’ views on the scope of
citizen rights to protest and the right to speech for those considered extremist.
The latter grouping may, as with the previous findings on government success
in national defense, need to be taken with caution, as these items refer to
matters which may be duly be considered matters of national security. In
the first item grouping, respondents were asked:
There are many ways people or organizations can protest against
a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which
you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed:
(1) Organizing public meetings to protest against the government;
(2)Organizing protest marches and demonstrations; (3)Organiz-
ing a nationwide strike of all workers against the government.
While all groups were strongly in favor of the right to publicly organize
and demonstrate, institutional respondents were particularly adamant about
maintaining such rights. 95 percent supported the right to organize public
meetings, while 92.6 supported the right to demonstrate. This compares to
81.9 and 82.8 percent, and 75.8 and 83.9 percent for community and ISSP06
respondents for the respective items. When posed with the proposition of
organizing nationwide strikes, all groups declined in support for such rights,
however just over half of ISSP06 respondents (46.4 percent) answered against
allowing strikes, while 54.9 and 57 percent of community and institutional
respondents supported such rights. As concerns the second group of items,
respondents were asked:
There are some people whose views are considered extreme by
the majority. Consider people who want to overthrow the govern-
ment by revolution. Do you think such people should be allowed to:
(1)Hold public meetings to express their views; (2)Publish books
to express their views
Across the board, all respondents were firmly in support of protecting civil
rights, even when contextualized as extremist activity. While community
respondents were more inclined to support these rights (86.1 percent for
holding public meetings compared to 75 and 75.7 percent for institutional
and ISSP06 respondents), the general trend is overwhelmingly in favor of the
protection of free speech, even for extremists.
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Whether the items concerning the unconditional compliance to the law
and mistakes of justice can be applied to solid policy questions is debatable.
What is certain, however, is that the evidence here provides a snapshot of
views by those who actually bear the brunt of policies which are philosoph-
ically based on these assumptions. As such, the views of the affected may
form a good in their own right. Where they may have an impact, assuming
a hypothetical situation wherein the disenfranchised were included into the
policy making process, it is not inconceivable that a enterprising actor would
not devise policy platforms to address which might indeed reflect preferences
for more lenient legal policy. Items concerning the civil rights of citizens are
concerning.
Whereas the former items showed no dramatic divergence with the con-
trol population, those of authorities’ powers to infringe on personal liberty
in extreme circumstances are directly relevant in public debate. Felon re-
spondents were clearly unambiguous about their support for the protection
of individual rights. While these findings may not come as much surprise, ac-
tual reports are more salubrious than conjecture. Leaving these areas aside,
I turn now to the final two areas of findings from the Role of Government
item list.
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6.4.7 Citizen Agency
Turning to perceptions of citizen effect on government (i.e., on areas such as
reliable commitments from politicians and corruption), there appears to be
across the board consensus on all but two facets of citizen interaction with
the government. Categorically, illustrated in Fig: 6.23, respondents are on
par with their ISSP06 counterparts. However, community and institutional
respondents are minutely less pessimistic about the impact which everyday
citizens have on politics. 58.9 percent of ISSP06 respondents disgareed or
strongly disagreed with the proposition that the average citizen has consid-
erable influence on politics, compared to 55.7 and 52.8 percent of community
and institutional respondents.
Similarly, 71.4 percent of ISSP06 respondents disagreed to either degree
when faced with the proposition that members of congress were committed
to election promises once in office, compared with comparable community
and institutional feedback at 67.4 and 68.6 percent respectively. Likewise,
respondents share near identical views on the reliability of government ad-
ministrators, an area which respondents would be assumed to have more per-
sonal (and presumably negative) perceptions. While 32.6 percent of ISSP06
respondents held favorable views of the reliability of administration, 28.2 and
27.7 percent of community and institutional respondents share such support.
Thus, it is clear that while respondents do differ on their views on admin-
istrators, their views are not out of step with comparisons of others. Respon-
dents are equally in line when it comes to the idea of “social corruption”,
here measured by the proposition
Do you think that the treatment people get from public officials
in America depends on who they know? Approximately half of
respondents in each group were of the opinion that treatment
definitely depended on one’s social capital (47.5(C), 53.7(P) and
50.7(I) percent - definitely does)
When we turn to explicit views on corruption, however, a disparity of
reflections begins to emerge. Community and control groups are not overly
divergent on their views, with 19.3 percent of community respondents and
17.6 percent ISSP06 respondents of the impression that almost all politicians
are involved in corruption (larger differences are seen in the view that almost
none were involved - 31.1(I) compared with 19.3(C) percent). Institutional
respondents, however, are almost completely reversed from the ISSP06 re-
spondents. 30.2 percent of institutional respondents were of the opinion that
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nearly all politicians were involved in corruption, while only 11.6 percent
believed almost none were involved. 43.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents
believed a few or almost none of non-elected officials were involved in cor-
ruption, compared to 27.2 and 22.9 percent of community and institutional
respondents.
What emerges from these items is a picture of the disenfranchised as not
as thwarted by interactions with government as one might think. That is,
it is not entirely unrealistic to suspect that those who have had experiences
with government officials in a wholly unique way than many other citizens
(e.g., court dates, lengthy and/or cumbersome administrative documentary
procedures, and so forth) would have increasingly negative views of the sys-
tem. The results, however, do not suggest that respondents are so different
from those respondents from the control group. Of the items shown here,
the two concerning corruption among both elected and non-elected officials
stand out as areas of disparate opinion. As much as can be said here is that
for all but these two areas, respondents are generally similar to their ISSP06
counterparts.
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6.4.8 Personal Agency
The final item group in the Role of Government has been categorized as the
personal agency side of respondents’ views. These items are concerned with
measuring topics such as interest in politics, subjective impact on govern-
ment, and comparative understanding of issues. It also reports on the degree
to which respondents feel secure in their attachments to others.
Beginning with general interest in politics, respondents were posed with
the question: How interested would you say you are in politics? In all, re-
spondents were, again, not markedly dissimilar to their ISSP06 counterparts.
More so, the disinterest in politics is relatively equal, with 14.4 percent of
ISSP06 respondents indicating they were not very interested in politics, com-
pared to 13.0 and 15.7 percent of community and institutional respondents
(by comparison, 21.3(I), 33.0(C), and 28.7(P) percent reported being very
interested in politics). The next items (i.e., how respondents feel treated
by public officials and their subjective impact on policy making) are not
as analogous with the control group. While opinion is essentially flat for
ISSP06 respondents on the issue of their treatment by public officials, re-
spondents (and particularly institutional respondents) have a much less am-
bivalent viewpoint.
23.8 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt that public officials rarely treated
them fairly, 43.0 percent of community respondents and 48.3 percent of insti-
tutional respondents felt they were rarely treated fairly. These differences are
matched also in respondents’ views on their impact on government. When
asked to how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement People like
me don’t have any say about what the government does, 45.3 percent of com-
munity respondents and 52.1 percent of institutional respondents indicated
they strongly agreed, as opposed to just 10.6 percent of ISSP06 respondents.
In all, 68.9 and 75.2 percent of community and institutional respondents
(respectively) agreed with the statement, compared to less than half (47.6
percent) of the control group. If subjective perceptions are anything to go
by, it cannot be assumed that the lack of agency is on account of interest or
understanding of politics. while 78 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt they
had a good understanding of the political issues facing the country, 87.2 per-
cent of community respondents and 81.6 percent of institutional respondents
indicated the same.
The distances between the two felon groups are equally close to the
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ISSP06 respondents when asked if they believed others were better informed
about politics than themselves. 52.7 percent of ISSP06 respondents felt oth-
ers were better informed, compared to 54.8 of community and 59.3 percent
of institutional respondents. Again, the similarities of respondent views are
as important as their differences. Community and institutional respondents
have lower opinions of their value as citizens from their treatment by pub-
lic officials, but this does not seem to be related to their general interest
in politics nor their feeling of understanding of the major issues. If such a
treatment effect is being measured herein, as the research by Soss and others
would certainly imply here, then a valuable strand of civic educative pro-
cesses is not without promise.
Turning to the final two measures of personal agency, respondents were
asked first whether there are only a few people [they could] trust completely
and whether if they thought that if [they were]not careful, other people would
take advantage of [them]. Community and institutional respondents were
clearly more likely to feel they were limited to only a few trusted persons,
with 94.2 percent and 90.5 percent agreeing in some degree, compared to just
over two-thirds of ISSP06 respondents (78.9 percent). While the percentages
of respondents across all groups was high when it came to being guarded to
avoid extortion (90.5(I), 91.6(C), and 91.9(P) percent in general agreement
with the statement), community and institutional respondents felt decidedly
stronger about potential abuse. 66.4 percent and 67.7 percent of community
and institutional respondents stronly agreed with the statement, compared
with 46 percent of ISSP06 respondents.
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(a) Trust Others (b) Take Advantage
Figure 6.25: Personal Agency (B)
6.5 ISEA Results
The results so far have focused on the views of the government’s role in soci-
ety, and how citizens interact with it. They have looked at the ways in which
respondents see the government as a guarantor of their rights and collective
goods. In many respects, community and institutional respondents are very
close to the control groups used to compare them, despite the obvious issues
of comparison at a disaggregated level. Such analysis has indicated that while
many assumptions look to have some merit, others lack some credibility - as
far as the data here are concerned. It has been shown that felon respondents
are supporters of welfare policies, and that these areas are likely policies of
special concern for those who find themselves under the supervision of social
corrections.
While the results presented thus far have given a detailed overview of
preferences for this group of citizens, they are still relatively vague questions
of policy - especially that of welfare policy. To address these concerns, a
final series of items is presented which has taken questions asked in the
International Survey of Economic Attitudes. Though a comparison group is
unavailable, as with the previous sections, these results are useful to decipher
how such policies would be manufactured by these citizens. At the very least,
they provide some indication as to what policies are more or less important
for those very likely to come into contact with them. That said, I now present
results of items which focus on levels of benefit generosity for working age
individuals, benefits for the elderly and childcare, and finally on the issue of
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housing policy.16
6.5.1 Benefit Generosity
The following results are telling. Respondents were given the proposition:
The average wage in North Carolina is about USD 35,300 per
year. (percent of average NC Wages, Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis) Should the government pay benefits: (1)To workers who lost
their job through no fault of their own; (2) To people who quit
their job because they did not like it, and can’t find another one;
(3) To healthy people who have never had a steady job; (4)To
someone who is physically handicapped and unable to work; (5)A
child allowance for any family with two young children, where the
father works and the mother stays home to care for the children;
(6)To single mothers who stay home to care for their children
For each item in this grouping, respondents were given seven options from
zero to 100 percent (categories were replicated from the ISEA questionnaire).
Fig: 6.26 shows graphs of the responses given. In all, these results are a ther-
mometer of the generosity of respondents. What is most striking is the rather
austere preferences of respondents across the board. If one expected that the
disenfranchised would soak society by demanding high benefits regardless of
scenario, they would be mistaken.
Respondents were in general favorable towards providing benefits towards
workers who had lost their job through no fault of their own, with 30.7 per-
cent (overall) endorsing a benefit 50 percent of the average state wage (i.e.,
approximately USD 340 per week), and just over 35 percent favoring even
higher benefits (approximately 37.8 percent). When faced with levels of ben-
efit for those leaving employment of their own accord and are not able to find
work, respondents are universally less generous than for individuals who have
been dismissed. 65.9 percent of community respondents and 71.4 percent of
institutional respondents would provide no assistance to a voluntary leaver.
Just 2.6 percent of respondents preferred benefits more than 50 percent of the
average wage. The situation is equally bleak for those of able body who have
never held a steady job (e.g., precarious workers). 72 percent of institutional
respondents, and 58.5 percent of community respondents favored no financial
assistance for such persons. There is some respite for the unemployed who
16All items are not reported here. Items have been selected which represent the most
intended areas of analysis. Full results are available upon request.
305
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
are physically handicapped.
Almost two thirds of respondents (62.5 percent) support benefits levels
over half the average wage, with 18.2 percent supporting benefits at half the
average state wage. 7 percent of DCC-S respondents support no assistance.
Responses for what is re-termed the “breadwinner” model are less clear. Re-
spondents faced with the proposition of paying benefits to households with
at least two children with a working father and a mother outside the formal
labor market, were relatively flat in their preferences. For context, the 2011
TANF-SNAP benefit level for North Carolina in 2011, according to the Uni-
versity of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, was approximately USD
668 per month (approximately USD 168 per week or about 25 percent the
average wage).
Just over half (53.1) of respondents supported this level and less. As is il-
lustrated in Subfigure 6.26e, the distributions are dissimilar. A bimodal trend
is seen in the CSI-S group. On the whole, however, nearly half of respon-
dents would prefer at least half the average wage as a benefit for traditional
breadwinner households (51, 54.1, and 45.9 percent for CSI-S, DCC-S, and
DOP-S respectively). Finally, respondents are, overall, favorable towards
benefits for single mothers who are not in employment. Over half of respon-
dents, 62.3 percent, would support benefit levels at or above 50 percent of the
average wage in such situations, with 10.4 percent preferring no assistance
what-so-ever.
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6.5.2 Elderly and Dependent Care
Turning to the issue of old-age care, an issue which is most likely off the radar
for much of the research dealing with criminal offenders, it is not readily
discernible. For comparison, the average monthly benefit received in NC
in 2011 for those 65 years and older was approximately USD 505 (SSA,
2012). The equivalent of that would be less than 25 percent (the lowest
category available for the relevant item). Respondents, as seen in sub-figure
6.27a, would spend considerably more than this if there was a government
pension.17 Further conditional propositions were put forward to participants
which asked
What do you think of these government policies for providing
income for retired people: (1) A government old age pension paid
from taxes, given only to poor people; (2)A government old age
pension paid from taxes, given only to families who contributed
by working and paying taxes for at least 10 years; (3)A govern-
ment old age pension paid from taxes, given to everyone of legal
retirement age18
Together, these items can be thought of as a measure of universality. Where
the first item measures a means tested policy which explicitly demarcates
special treatment for those without adequate resources, the second applies
to those who have contributed through benefit credits. The final item most
readily applies to a policy which is universal in character. For policy option
1, where only those who are poor receive governmental assistance, approx-
imately a third of all respondents favored such a policy, with 42.9 percent
against. For the second option, where a government pension is based on the
amount of time one has paid in, slightly over half of respondents were favor-
able. On average 54.5 percent of all respondents favored such a contributory
scheme, with a quarter neutral (25.4 percent) and just about a fifth against
(20.1 percent). For the final option, 59 percent of all respondents supported
a universal scheme, with 16 percent against and 25 percent neutral. Within
groups, 66.3 percent of DCC-S respondents favored a universal scheme, while
58.8 of CSI-S and 54.2 percent of DOP-S favored.
17Note: the option “no government pension” is not reported here as per the conditional
of the statement. However, as it was put forward to respondents: 25.5 pct CSI-S, 12 pct
DCC-S, and 13.6 pct DOP-S preferred no government pension.
18Note: An additional item proposed: No government old age pension, people save
for themselves. This item is reported in the appendix, however is not reported here for
relevancy.
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Respondents were then asked a battery of items concerning the suitable-
ness of care for both elderly parents and a child of 3 years. In all, two question
groups of six items each probed preferences for car provision in these two ar-
eas. Options included care provided by a daughter, a son, another relative,
a government run facility, a neighbor or other acquaintance, and a privately
run facility. Figure 6.27 reports on these responses in sub-figures 6.27e and
6.27f.
When given the option of whether or not they believed an elderly care
facility run by the government was a suitable option, nearly a third of respon-
dents (37.1 percent) felt that this was a suitable option, while 43.1 percent
found it to be not suitable. Thus, over half of respondents 56.9 percent were
willing to consider a government old age home a suitable option for the el-
derly (60.8 CSI-S, 60.5 DCC-S, and 53.1 DOP-S). Given the same options for
a child of 3, respondents were decidedly more accepting of government pro-
vision of dependent care. Overall, 78.1 percent of respondents felt favorable
towards a government provision of childcare (78.1 percent). The aggregate
results mask variation between groups, however, with only 64 percent of CSI-
S favoring such a policy, compared to 89.3 percent of DCC-S and 76.3 percent
of DOP-S respondents. Overall, the results here suggest that when it comes
to financing of pensions, respondents are generally in favor of a system paid
for by taxes.19
19Overall, only 17.5 percent of all respondents favored a system with no government
pension.
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6.5.3 Housing Assistance
The following items were not taken from the ISEA or other instruments, but
were constructed for the purposes of the research. Covering specifically is-
sues of housing provision, these questions aimed to cover the gap in housing
items in the utilized instruments. They are included here for consistency in
reporting welfare policy preferences.
Respondents were asked:
Let’s assume a person is unable to afford housing. Below are
several options for ways to deal with this situation. Please choose
only one option for each ranking.(1) The government should pro-
vide housing for such a person; (2)The government should provide
cash assistance to such a person/no housing; (3)Churches, char-
ities or NGO’s should take care of the person / no gov’t; (4)The
person’s family should take responsibility and house them / no
gov’t; (5)The person should be left to fend for themselves/ no
outside help
The results (Figure 6.28) indicate strong preferences for governmental
intervention when it comes to providing housing for distressed individuals.
Overall, 72.45 percent of respondents were favorable to government provision
of housing, with 77.9 percent of DCC-S, 72 percent of CSI-S, and 69 percent
of DOP-S agreeing or strongly agreeing. Slightly under half of community
respondents viewed cash benefits as a favorable option, with 48.8 percent of
DCC-S and 44.9 percent of CSI-S , with 28.8 percent of DOP-S respondents.
Less than a quarter of respondents supported reliance on the third-sector
(24.7 percent of DCC-S, 20.8 percent of CSI-S, and 21.09 of DOP-S in favor).
Reliance on family and other social networks for the provision of housing
for persons finding themselves unable to afford housing was also not well
received, with 20.5 percent of DCC-S respondents, 25 percent of CSI-S re-
spondents, and 26.8 percent of DOP-S respondents in favor. Turning to the
final option, that of absolutely no intervention (i.e., complete self-reliance),
respondents were unanimously against no public assistance of some sort.
Overall, only 6.5 percent of respondents (9.4 DCC-S, 8.3 CSI-S, and 3.9
DOP-S) favored isolation. Resoundingly, respondents were firmly against
such a policy.
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6.6 Comparison of Groups
The picture we receive of community and institutional respondents is a mixed
bag. On the one hand, respondents are heavily in favor of government’s role
in mitigating against risks, particularly the risks associated with loss of in-
comed labor. There are also quite apparent differences in areas such as party
ID, and social class issues. Advancing the descriptive statistical results pre-
sented thus far, a series of median tests was carried out to investigate which,
if any, statistically significant differences exist between respondent and con-
trol groups. As noted previously in 5.2.6 and Table 5.6, performing such
analysis requires a non-parametric approach, as the assumptions of normal-
ity and, in some instances, homogeneity of variance are violated. To adjust
for this, the same method applied to the inter-subsample tests was repeated
for community and institutional groups and all control groups. The results
of these tests can be seen in tables 6.5 - 6.10.
While the results are encouraging, there are particular problems with
comparisons between the control groups and respondents that need be ad-
dressed. The most apparent concern is that by drawing from the lower ends
of the income distribution, the findings may be representing what would be
expected should an oversampling of this population also be undertaken in
corresponding surveys. There are two major ways of dealing with this pop-
ulation mismatch. One is the propensity score matching method, the other
is a more simple control matching method.
Essentially, matching techniques have evolved from the medical sciences
to adjust for confounding variables in uncontrolled observational studies. Op-
timally, one would be able to gather enough information on subjects in two
states (i.e., treatment versus control) and then be able to isolate that effect
by matching cases with each other on the relevant potentially confounding
variables. For survey research, this is obviously not an optimal strategy given
the multitude of potential confounding variables in any sample. Randomized
designs are helpful in this regard. One would desire to match respondents
when there are particular background variables which will potentially impact
the dependent variable - here the responses on particular items.
Because of the limited availability of such data on the groups in ques-
tion, only 3 variables could be justifiably used by which to “control” for
confounders. The three variables of most concern, given the nature of the
items being recorded, were selected for their availability across surveys and
relevance to political and economic issues posed in the survey instrument.
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These were decided as income, racial grouping, and gender. Using these vari-
ables, matching was carried out to, in essence, “warp” the control groups to
match that of the respondent groups. Because of the large amount of data
needed to match on propensity scores, this technique was ruled out. Ad-
ditionally, because the aim of this method is not to forward a causal claim
(e.g., becoming a felon changes one’s political and/or economic preferences),
a less sophisticated method was opted for.
Using the case control matching option available in the statistical pro-
gram SPSS, respondents (demanders) were matched with cases (suppliers)
in each of the three control datasets (i.e., ANES, ISSP 09, and ISSP 06).
These cases were matched on the basis of income, race, and gender - with
income and race prioritized. The resulting match distributions are shown
with their initial states in figures 6.29 (Income), 6.30 (Race), 6.31 (Gender),
with an additional presentation of Age (not selected on) - Figure 6.32.
Cases were matched with no tolerance (fuzz), without replacement, and
with randomized case order. The identifier used was a dummy variable coded
1 for known felon, and 0 otherwise. These matched cases should be taken with
some caution. Ideally, treatment cases should be matched to control cases
using as many variables as is possible without over-specifying the model. The
analysis here errs on the side of caution. That is, matches were generated
with zero tolerance for deviation on income, race, or gender. As such, those
present in the matched analysis are only those who match a case exactly.
This greatly reduces not only those from the control group, it also “warps”
the respondent groups as well, resulting in a loss of data.
A significant problem is the lack of overlap between the respondents
groups and the control groups. Because this research does obtain respon-
dents largely from the lower economic strata, and a larger percentage of
respondents are non-white than in the control population, these factors limit
the amount of cases that can be demanded from the control groups.20 While
gender and age groups were not able to be matched as successfully, income
and especially race were better matched.
The following presents the analysis of medians on the unmatched groups
followed directly by the analysis of the matched groups. Each pairing was
20A more robust method would have been to run two parallel projects, sampling also
from the communities of origin on the key matching variables of interest to properly specify
the comparison. As this was not available, the use of the original survey respondents from
the selected region was chosen, as noted.
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analyzed using both a traditional Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance,
as well as the non-parametric equivalent test. Where the non-parametric
test was passed, the Kruskall-Wallis test is used as the test of comparison.
Where this test fails, the Median test option is substituted. Post-hoc tests
were supplied by the statistical software (SPSS) using Dunn-Bonferoni cor-
rected methods. Bold pairs indicate situations where two groups significantly
differed from the non-bold group. For example, in Table 6.5, for the item
Spending: Environment, both institution and community respondents dif-
fered significantly from the ANES control group. The figures shown are the
calculated means for each group. A + symbol indicates that both the tra-
ditional Levene’s test and the non-parametric equivalent were unsatisfied.
However, considering these instances were only encountered only twice out-
side the ANES comparisons, these were deemed not overly worrisome phe-
nomenon. This is especially so considering the items for which this occurs
in the ANES comparison should not be taken with too much statistical sig-
nificance to begin with. They are given here for illustrative purposes.21 In
the following analysis, means are used instead of medians to provide more
meaningful interpretation.
6.6.1 Unmatched and Matched Comparisons
ANES v. Respondents
Table 6.5 shows the results of the unmatched means comparisons between
community and institutional groups. Of the eleven items for comparison,
institutional respondents differ significantly from the ANES control group
on ten, while community respondents differ significantly on seven. Cases in-
volving both groups differing from the control group are denoted in bold font.
Going down the table in order, institutional groups are significantly more
likely to gravitate to the middle than their ANES counterparts, as seen in
6.8a. Both groups would spend less on the environment and law enforcement.
Institutional respondents were more likely not to have been contacted by the
Democratic party, and both groups less more likely to have been contacted
by a third party. Both groups were less likely, across all civic-volunteerism
items, to become involved. 22 These results hold for all but contact by
21That is, to repeat what has already been said, ANES respondents were asked whether
they had participated in the respective activities; whereas felon respondents were ques-
tioned as to whether they would likely participate in such activities. Thus the items
measure two different states.
22Note of caution: the results for civic-volunteerism items are not directly comparable
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Democratic party and spending on the environment.
Table 6.5: Significant Differences Felons vs. ANES Control/Unmatched
Institution Community Non-Felon Sig.
Party ID -.38 -.48 .000*
Spending: Environment -.62 -.75 -.96 .052/.002**
Spending: Law Enf. .09 .01 -1.05 .000/.000*
Contact: Dem. 1.78 1.65 .020**+
Contact: Other 1.90 1.92 2.00 .000/.000**+
Civic: Volunteer 1.7750 1.7143 1.9417 .000/.000**+
Civic: Advertise 1.5128 1.4667 1.8034 .000/.000**+
Civic: Rallies 1.5238 1.5465 1.9272 .000/.000**+
Civic: Donate 1.7297 1.7692 1.8956 .006/.001**+
Civic: Discuss 1.3415 1.5583 .001**+
(**)Kruskall-Wallis; (*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.
(+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.
Table 6.6: Significant Differences Felon vs. ANES Control/ Matched
Institution Community Non-Felon Sig.
Party ID -.38 -.61 .033**
Spending: Law Enf. .09 -1.15 .005**+
Contact: Other 1.90 2.00 .000**+
Civic: Volunteer 1.7750 1.7143 1.9507 .000/.006**+
Civic: Advertise 1.5128 1.4667 1.8028 .000/.002**+
Civic: Rallies 1.5238 1.5465 1.9296 .000/.000**+
Civic: Donate 1.7692 1.9225 .074**+
Civic: Discuss 1.3415 1.6127 .003**+
(**)Kruskall-Wallis; (*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.
(+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.
as those given to respondents are based on intention and not recorded events, compared
to the ANES respondents. It is almost certain that these scores are massively inflated
if one were to record actual events. However, it may also be the case that some ANES
respondents have also inflated their reports. These resuls are for illustrative purposes.
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ISSP09 v. Respondents
Turning to the results for respondents and the ISSP09 control, all groups
are significantly different from each other on the issue of unemployment and
government responsibility.23 Community respondents are the most in favor
of increased government responsibility for the unemployed, followed by their
institutional counterparts, and then the ISSP09 control. Community respon-
dents are significantly more apt to support the government’s responsibility in
reducing inequality. In addition, institutional respondents vary significantly
from both ISSP09 and community respondents on the issue of taxes for the
wealthy, tending towards taxes as too low for the wealthy. Interestingly, both
community and institutional groups are actually significantly more to the left
(i.e., Democratic party) than their ISSP09 counterparts. Both community
and institutional groups score significantly more towards the lower and work-
ing class than ISSP09 respondents, and are more likely to perceive of conflict
between poor and rich, the working class and middle class, and those at the
top of society and those at the bottom. All groups are significantly distinct
on the topic of conflict between management and workers.24
Table 6.8 shows the results of the matched analysis. As with the ANES,
the ISSP09 results should be taken with some consideration of the process
used to generate the analysis. However, even with the conservatism of these
tests, significant differences remain between respondent groups. When only
matched respondents are taken into consideration, the results (again going
down the table) indicate that community respondents are separated from
institutional and ISSP09 respondents on both responsibility items (i.e., gov-
ernment’s responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the un-
employed and to reduce inequality). Significant differences remain only be-
tween institutional and ISSP09 respondents for attitudes towards taxes for
high income earners, as well as party ID. Significant differences disappear
for institutional respondents on the social class membership, with only com-
munity respondents remaining versus ISSP09 respondents. On the 4 items
measuring conflict, community and institutional respondents remain signif-
icantly different on the item of conflict between poor and rich, as well as
for conflict between those at the top and those at the bottom of society.
However, community respondents become significantly different than their
institutional counterparts for the item for conflict between the working class
and the middle class, and the same shift is seen with the institutional group
on the issue of conflict between management and workers.
23C-I .014/C-NF .000/ I-NF .000**
24C-I .046/C-NF .033/ I-NF .000 *
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Table 6.7: Significant Differences Felons vs. ISSP09 Control/ Unmatched
Institution Community Non-Felon Sig.
Responsible: Unemployed -.77 -1.21 -.25 .014/.000/.000**
Responsible: Inequality -1.25 .42 .000*
Taxes: High Inc. -.57 -.10 -.24 .000/.001**+
Party ID -.38 -.79 -.18 .000/.000*
Social Class 2.69 2.46 3.12 .000/.001**
Conflict: Poor v Rich 2.27 2.37 1.81 .000/.000**
Conflict: Working v Middle 1.69 1.84 1.38 .000/.000**
Conflict: Top v Bottom 2.35 2.54 1.70 .000/.000**
Conflict: Mgmt. v Workers 1.88 1.99 2.11 .046/.033/.000 *
(**)Kruskall-Wallis; (*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.
(+ ) Violation of HOV; Bold = pairs versus singled group.
Table 6.8: Significant Differences Felon vs. ISSP09 Control/ Matched
Institution Community Non-Felon Sig.
Responsible: Unemployed -.6917 -1.1606 -.3421 .037/.002*
Responsible: Inequality -.5455 -1.1971 .2368 .021/.001*
Taxes: High Inc. -1.3209 -.4561 .030*
Party ID -.3788 -.6053 .030*
Social Class 2.4559 3.1316 .003**
Conflict: Poor v Rich 2.1102 2.3162 1.8158 .000/.009**
Conflict: Working v Middle 1.4574 1.7333 1.6930 .021/.000**
Conflict: Top v Bottom 2.2992 2.4444 1.8509 .000/.000**
Conflict: Mgmt. v Workers 1.7717 1.9044 2.5088 .001/.000*
(**)Kruskall-Wallis; (*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.
Bold = pairs versus singled group.
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ISSP06 v. Respondents
Comprising the majority of items in this survey, the ISSP06 items showed the
most variation of the analysis. As shown in Table 6.11, the most frequent phe-
nomenon was that of significant differences between community and ISSP06
respondents. Community respondents differed significantly on 40 items, as
compared to 32 such differences between institutional and ISSP06 respon-
dents. Further, community and institutional groups differed jointly on 23
items, community groups were solely different on 9 items, institutional re-
spondents were solely so on 5 items, while community respondents differed
significantly from ISSP06 and Insitutional groups jointly on 5 items. Institu-
tional groups differed from community and ISSP06 groups jointly on 1 item,
and all groups were significantly different from eachother on 3 items. These
are presented below. Deviating from the previous reporting format, the fol-
lowing does not progress in a straightforward manner, but rather reports on
groups of occurrences.
Community and Institutional Groups v. ISSP06: For the un-
matched comparison of groups, community and institutional groups jointly
differed significantly from the ISSP06 control on 23 items. Respondents were
significantly different on items of citizen influence on government, the right
to conduct national strikes, and two of the items pertaining to civil liberties
- detainment and covert surveillance. Respondents also differed in their at-
titudes towards both forms of official corruption by elected and non-elected
authorities, as well as general beliefs in unbiased treatment (i.e., social cor-
ruption). Respondents also differed on their self-identification on the 7-point
party scale. Both groups were significantly different from their ISSP06 re-
spondents on areas of government responsibility to provide a decent standard
of living for the elderly, control prices, provide healthcare for the sick, and
provide financial assistance to students from lower income households. Both
held significantly different views about the level of taxation for lower income
households, government success in addressing unemployment and govern-
ment success in national defense. Respondents were only jointly different
from their ISSP06 counterparts on one spending item, that of law enforce-
ment. Both were significantly different on the items pertaining to general
anxiety of abuse by others - being taken advantage of and numbers of others
who could be trusted. Both were also significantly different on their beliefs
for subjective impact on government.
Once respondents were matched, however, joint differences only remained
for opinions on detainment, the right to organize a national strike, subjec-
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tive impact on government, trust in others, spending on law enforcement,
and government’s success in fighting unemployment. In addition, following
control matching, both groups became significantly different on the issue of
cuts to government spending.
Community v. ISSP06 Community respondents were solely and sig-
nificantly different than their ISSP06 counterparts on eight items. These
items were approval for governmental use of stop and search, spending on ed-
ucation, freedom for persons with extremist views to publish books and other
materials, beliefs in understanding of important political issues. Community
respondents also differed significantly on areas of government intervention in
the economy; particularly on government’s responsibility to provide industry
with help to grow and those items which addressed supporting industry to
protect jobs, general cuts to government spending, and support for industry
to develop technology. Clearly, the community group has clear preferences
for government action in the area of economic development in contrast to the
control group and not matched by their institutional counterparts.
Once respondents were matched, however, only one primary item re-
mained from the original analysis, that of attitudes towards government
stop and search policy. Community respondents became solely significant
from ISSP06 respondents in the area of attitudes on government’s success
on healthcare, responsibility for providing a decent standard of living for the
unemployed, responsibility for providing jobs to all who want one, reducing
the work week to create jobs, responsibility for providing healthcare to the
sick, and attitudes towards covert surveillance.
Institutional v. ISSP06 Institutional respondents were solely signif-
icantly different from their ISSP06 counterparts in the areas of trust in gov-
ernment administrators, errors in justice (i.e., sentencing an innocent person
or letting a guilty person go free), and government’s success in reducing crime.
Once respondents are matched, only attitudes towards the government’s
success in crime policy and trust in administrative authorities remain. While
views of corruption amongst elected officials is no longer significant, corrup-
tion among non-elected officials is now added to this grouping. In addition,
Institutional respondents are now solely different, significantly, on the issues
of government’s success in national defense, tax rates for lower income house-
holds, and regulation of businesses.
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Community v. Institutional and ISSP06 Respondents differed sig-
nificantly on four items; community respondents were significantly different
from both the ISSP06 control group and their institutional counterparts.
These items were, noticeably, related to government’s interaction with the
market. Respondents differed from both other groups on the issues of gov-
ernment’s responsibility to provide jobs for those who desire one, and con-
comitantly of financing projects to create more jobs, reducing the working
week to create more jobs, the responsibility to reduce inequalities.
Following the matching procedure, community respondents only differ on
one of the reported items previously mentioned (government responsibility to
reduce inequality), however this group becomes significantly differnt from its
institutional and ISSP06 counterparts on the issues of government responsi-
bility for housing and government spending on unemployment.
Institutional v. Community and ISSP06 Institutional respondents
differed from their community and ISSP06 counterparts on only one item,
that of spending on healthcare. This difference, however, disappears once
groups are matched on control variables. Following the matching process, no
significant differences were detected between any group.
Mutual Exclusiveness On three items, respondents from all groups
were found to differ significantly from each other group. These items are
government’s responsibility to provide housing, government’s responsibility
to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, and government
spending on unemployment. It ought to be noted that community respon-
dents, as expected from the previous results, rank substantially more to the
left on these issues than their counterparts. None of the mutual exclusions
remain following matching process.
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Table 6.11: Significant Differences Felon vs. ISSP06 Control/Matched
Institution Community Non-Felon Sig.
Responsible: Jobs -.9701 -.0733 .000**
Responsible: Healthcare -1.7887 -1.5267 .010*
Responsible: Unemployed -1.1618 -.2192 .000*
Responsible: Inequality -.4571 -1.3333 -.4459 .005/.000**
Responsible: Housing -1.1299 -1.5714 -1.0743 .041/.014*
Taxes: Middle Inc. .7632 .6689 .019*
Spending: Law Enf. .0519 .0746 -.7724 .000/.000**
Spending: Unemployment -.6104 -1.1690 -.5570 .004/.000**
Favor: Cuts 1.1711 1.0896 .5570 .003/.000**
Favor: Regulation .4133 .4354 .050*
Favor: Work Week -.5625 -.1554 .004*
Success: Healthcare -.1176 -.6107 .025**+
Success: Defense .8158 .0068 .006*
Success: Crime .1918 -.2416 .027**
Success: Unemployment -1.0000 -.8841 -.4899 .003/.000**
Obey Law .0857 -.2667 .041*
Civil Lib.: Detain .6479 .6667 .1200 .051/.062**
Civil Lib.: Wire Tap .7971 .0333 .004**
Civil Lib.: Search 1.1250 .4106 .007**
Subjective Impact -1.0286 -.8909 .0709 .000/.000**
Admin. Trust .88 .59 .042*
Corruption: Unelected -.6809 .0313 .014*
Protest: Strikes -.3699 -.4355 .0728 .031/.041**
Trust People -1.3188 -1.4754 -.9357 .010/.016**
(**)Kruskall-Wallis; (*)Median Test; Dunn-Bonferroni Corrected Post-Hoc.
Bold = pairs versus singled group.
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Thus far, I have given a thorough descriptive and statistical account of
the distributional and group differences between community and felon groups
and the ISSP06 control group. Certain facets are readily apparent from this
analysis, and one particular point seems all too glaring to avoid mentioning.
Community respondents, unlike their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts,
are primarily concerned with the state of governmental action and spending
on employment related activities. Across items, in fact, community respon-
dents differ from their institutional and ISSP06 counterparts.
6.6.2 Predicting Party Affiliation
The final aspect of concern for this project is that of the likely political party
membership of the disenfranchised. As has been illustrated in the research
findings here, and in the literature evolving from many scholars, felon re-
spondents tend to counter supposition that they would vote overwhelmingly
Democratic. Indeed, when asked their chosen party affiliation, half of all
respondents (50.4 percent) identify as independent on a 7-point scale, with
54.5 percent of institutional respondents and 46.3 percent of community re-
spondents self-identifying as such. This compared to 21.9 percent of ISSP06,
12 percent of ISSP09 respondents, and 12.8 percent of ANES respondents.
The question remains, while respondents remain openly uncommitted to ei-
ther party, is it possible to infer their probably party affiliation some other
way?
The comprehensiveness of the ISSP06 module on issues related to sub-
stantive questions of what government ought to do and how it might pursue
those goals was a particularly important factor in its selection. To address
a longstanding debate in the literature, two similar analyses were conducted
which assessed respondent scores in more detail. Specifically, where the pre-
vious findings both described and compared differences across items, this
section looks at concerns about which side of the fence (Democrat or Repub-
lican) respondents might end up on.
To accomplish this, two analyses were conducted: (1) the computation of
two “super-variables” based on the use of canonical variates produced dur-
ing a manual MANOVA procedure using items on (a) government spending
preferences and (b) government responsibility preferences; and (2) the im-
plementation of a Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) using all items not
obviously connected to what would be considered assessment scores (e.g.,
government success or treatment by public officials). Using these two meth-
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ods, respondents were able to be classified into political parties based on their
answers given in the Role of Government items.
Canonical Variates/ Super-Variables: Utilizing manual syntax in
SPSS, a MANOVA was run to reveal the raw discriminant function coef-
ficients of the selected items on a three-category variable - reported party
affiliation. Two processes were undertaken that used the largest item groups
(i.e., government responsibility and government spending) to create these
variables. The process involves SPSS running a MANOVA on respondents’
(only ISSP06 respondents were used in both analyses) answers to reveal the
eigenvalues and canonical correlations of 1 minus the number of groups used
as the independent variable. I have collapsed party self-identification into
a 3-category group, labelling respondents Democrat if they had identified
as some measure of Democrat, Republican if they had identified as some
degree of Republican, and Independent if they had explicitly identified as
Independent. The process uses a set of items (the dependent variables in
the MANOVA) and linearly extrapolates roots (canonical variates) based on
1-Independent Categories. Thus, two roots are created for each analysis to
maximally discriminate between the 3 groups based on the given dependent
variables (responsibility and spending variables).
Government Responsibility: The tests for government responsibil-
ity utilized the ten items included in this group. SPSS produced two roots,
of which only one was significant and accounted for approximately 27 per-
cent (26.5) of the variation in the computed canonical variate (eigenvalue
= .35982; canonical correlation = .5144). Of the variance accounted for,
this root accounts for 92.328 percent. The second root ( eigenvalue =.0299;
canonical correlation = .17307) was not statistically significant (Sig. F =
.459), while the first was statistically significant (p<.001). Using the first
root, a variable was computed using the raw discriminate function scores
given by the analysis as weights for the ten responsibility of government
variables, which were then aggregated.
Government Spending: The tests for government spending utilized
the eight items included in this group. SPSS produced two roots, of which
only one was significant and accounted for approximately 31 percent (30.9)
of the variation in the computed canonical variate (eigenvalue = .43439;
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canonical correlation = .55031). This root accounts for 92.616 percent of the
variance accounted for. The second root ( eigenvalue = .03463; canonical
correlation = .18295) was not statistically significant (Sif. F = .172), while
the first was statistically significant (p<.001). Using the first root, a vari-
able was computed using the raw discriminate function scores given by the
analysis as weights for the eight government spending variables, which were
then aggregated.
Figure 6.33 shows the plots of these two “super-variables” by each group
based on their reported political identities (collapsed into three categories).
We can see that based on the two variables, both community and institutional
respondents tend towards the lower right quadrant of their respective graphs.
The direction of these graphs is arbitrary and not representative of any left-
right axis classification. It serves only to distinguish between groups using
a common metric. Looking at Figure 6.33c, we can see that in the control
group (i.e., ISSP06), Republicans dominate the upper left quadrant, while
Democrats largely cluster in the lower right quadrant, interspersed with self-
identified independents. This first step is useful, however a further step is
employed to predict group membership based on a wider array of scores,
using more sophisticated methods.
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Discriminant Function Analysis: Independents, as they are recorded
here, are those who have not indicated a leaning towards either the Demo-
cratic or Republican party. Those respondents who have indicated as much
have been categorized into those respective party categories. To advance the
research on potential party preferences of the disenfranchised, a discriminant
function analysis is employed to predict the likely group membership of re-
spondents of control, community, and institutional respondents.
First, an analysis is conducted using the entire US sample of the ISSP
2006 to investigate which variables, overall, contribute to the most robust
discrimination of the 3 states (i.e., Democrat, Republican, or Independent).
Only those variables which attempt to measure preferences (e.g, what the
government ought to do), as opposed to experiences (e.g., items which are
more likely to measure the impact of personal experiences), are included in
the analysis.
Using the full sample (step-wise, Wilk’s Lambda method, exclusion of
cases at 0.10), an overall “hit-rate” of 58.1 percent original and 57.2 percent
cross validated was given, with 75.3/ 74 and 64.7/64.4 percent Democrats
and Republicans correctly classified original and cross validated respectively.
This analysis was repeated using Mahalanobis distance as well as seperate
covariance matrices: no discernible (greater than 5 percent) hit rate was
achieved. An analysis which included all variables produced similar results
(78.5 and 68.5 correct classification for Democrats and Republicans respec-
tively).
This process was repeated for the South Atlantic sample with a greater
return for the step-wise analysis - 81/72.7 and 72.8/63 percent correctly clas-
sified for original/cross-validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.25
The decision was made to utilize the South Atlantic subsample to classify
the corresponding sample of felons.26 In all, 34 variables are used to dis-
criminate between groups, containing items from government responsibility,
25Analysis using all variables entered. Repeated model was run using the step-wise
entry with fewer correctly classified cases: 81.9/79.2 and 65.7/61.6 percent original/cross-
validated Democrats and Republicans respectively.
26The results show a Box’s M value of 2191.42, F= 1.181; however log determinants are
approximately equal between Democrat and Republican categories (-26.124 vs. -27.424).
As such I proceed to use this configuration to classify following Burns and Burns (2008).
A parallel analysis using multinomial logistic regression produced no better classification
results and the predicted group membership is not calculated on those scores from the
control group (i.e., ISSP 06 respondents).
333
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
government spending, government intervention in the economy, views of tax-
ation, views of justice, attitudes towards civil rights, and attitudes on extrem-
ism. The overall Chi-square test is significant (Wilks λ = .481, Chi-square
= 179.774, df = 68, Canonical correlation = .653, p<. 001).27
The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.34. Figure 6.34a
shows the breakdown of self-reported party membership according to the
consolidated three category arrangement, compared to Figure 6.34b which
shows the predicted party membership in the consolidated categories. While
a slight increase in Republican membership is predicted following the DFA,
a substantial increase in Democrat membership is evident following the anal-
ysis. While Republicans look to “gain” approximately 6 percent from both
community and institutional respondents, Democrat membership jumped by
25.85 percentage points for community respondents and 39.55 percentage
points for institutional respondents. The computations performed previ-
ously in the canonical variant process show that, once separated into their
predicted categories, respondents share clear divisions on the spending vari-
able than that of the responsibility variable. That is, the degree of overlap
between the two independently created variables is less for areas of spending
than that of government responsibility in policy areas.
Additionally, further analysis was undertaken to investigate the degree to
which predicted Democrat respondents differed from their predicted Demo-
crat control group counterparts. The results indicate that, given the infor-
mation available, respondents are statistically more liberal than their own
predicted party counterparts not disenfrachised. While these results are ten-
uous, given the available data, it does go some way to suggest that not only
are the disenfranchised likely to support Democratic candidates, they do so
with an eye towards a broader role for government in citizen welfare (Figure
6.37b) as well as more dedicated funding of services (Figure 6.37a). As I
will show in the following (and final) chapter (8), this aspect is particularly
intriguing given the assertions of the spatial exclusivity of political disenfran-
chisement.
27While multivariate normality was not tested, univariate normality was within tolerance
according to West, Finch, and Curran (1995). Results are based on results of valid cases.
Percentage accepted because of non-missing discriminate values = approx. 52 percent of
cases.
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(a) Spending SV
(b) Responsibility SV
Figure 6.35: Overlap of Predicted Parties on SV’s
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(a) Predicted Party ID and Discriminant Function Scores
(b) Predicted Party ID and SV Scores
Figure 6.36: Predicted Party and Discriminant Scores
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(a) Government Spending
(b) Government Responsibility
Figure 6.37: Differences Between ISSP and Felon Predicted Democrats
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6.7 Discussion
The results from this chapter have lead to interesting findings. First, to
recap, these are the first findings of such a survey done exclusively on super-
vised persons (to the knowledge of the author). This facet is not meant to
insulate the findings of this project, to the contrary. Because of the limited
amount of both quantitative and qualitative data on the specific preferences
on politically disenfranchised individuals both in the United States and inter-
nationally, the knowledge base of the views of not only those who don’t vote
in a given political unit, but also (and possibly of more concern) those who
may not participate, is simply non-existent at this time. This project, while
focusing on the case of convicted felony offenders, has aimed to help close
this gap. Social scientists in general, and political scientists in particular,
have an obligation to investigate such phenomenon.
It is difficult to say whether one ought to consider persons with felony
convictions in the United States and elsewhere as members of a particular
caste (as with the Dalits of India), a class (as with the Lumpenproletariat
of Marx and Van Parijs), or as a particular status (from a Weberian point
of view). It would seem, however, given the evidence on the intractability
of felony status in the US, this group of citizens is inevitably consigned to
the nether regions of social, economic and (even more distressingly) politi-
cal life. Thus, it is hard to not consider these citizens as a class, not least
owing to the fact that their status crosses racial, religious, and ethnic lines.
Thus, while the New Jim Crow proponents have vehemently offered up a
slew of evidence to cement the problem of mass incarceration and the “po-
lice state” as an undeniable race issue, this research questions such claims.
The question, from this perspective, is not what class of citizen felons are,
but rather which class have the majority of them originated from. Clearly
a racial or ethnic delimitation does not suffice - unless we feel comfortable
with relegating all other racial groupings to a subordinate position to that of
the large African American presence in and out of prison walls. While social
and economic opportunities are critical facets for citizenship, they cannot be
guaranteed without the ability to collectively shape policies. As President
L.B. Johnson remarked: “The vote is the most powerful instrument ever de-
vised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls
which imprison men because they are different from other men.” (Johnson
1965). The weight of Lyndon B. Johnson’s now immortalized speech at the
signing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has not diminished, though it might
have well been largely removed from public discourse in the following decades.
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Methods: Before commenting on the results of this research, I wish to
recollect the dynamics of the methods used to address the particular issue
of research with hard-to-reach populations, especially that of supervised in-
dividuals. The process by which respondents have been recorded are not
simply a matter of methods, but also a finding in and of itself. First, while
the focus of this research has been on the largest class of citizens removed
from the franchise (as opposed to those who have not previously obtained
that right - i.e., persons not yet of age, non-citizens, etc.), the justification
for this research is the exploration of political demobilization en masse of any
citizen, of any political unit. Because of their status, and owing to the abuses
incurred in the past, this group of citizens forms one of many groups which
are often under-researched in the social (and especially political) sciences.
Moreover, while a good deal of research involved with this particular pop-
ulation uses both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer questions
specific to their situations (e.g., research designed to predict or reduce of-
fending behavior), less has been done to include such groups into commonly
experienced research agendas. Because of the difficulty inherent in reaching
respondents, a good deal of research on public opinion simply overlooks this
population, especially so in the case of institutionalized populations. The
conclusions drawn from this research, and in no small way informed by the
invaluable cooperation provided by the supervisory authorities and inter-
ested community actors, is less cautionary than instigating. For the case of
supervised individuals, the immensity of data gathered by these institutions
and their offices, the networks in existence, and the comparative dearth of
issues covered thus far, this research sees much promise in advancing activity
in this area of research. For other areas (e.g., aboriginal groups, migrant
workers, and transient populations), this research points to a larger need for
advancements in techniques aimed at making hard-to-reach populations eas-
ier to approach.
Results: The fact that institutional and community based respondents
differed on more than a few areas of measurement is a significant finding, and
not just in a statistical sense. With more than two-thirds of America’s disen-
franchised population living outside institutional settings, it is clear that the
nation does have a mass incarceration problem, but it has an even greater
mass conviction dilemma. While politicians and administrators face key de-
cisions on reducing the costs of their correctional tier costs, such decisions
may not relieve the underlying problems in crime prevention - the regula-
tion of the policies which produce criminogenic environments (Rosenfeld and
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Messner 2013).
As concerns the likelihood of voluntary participation in elections at vary-
ing levels of government, the results are mixed. On the one hand, respondents
indicated high levels of self-intent to participate at municipal, county, state,
and federal levels. This is in contrast to the findings from Burch (2008,
2012) that clearly indicate convicted felony offenders are not particularly ac-
tive before a conviction or following re-enfranchisement. It could be that
respondents are particularly well intentioned to participate, but that this
intent may very well end there. It might also be that respondents intend
and a will participate, and that these types of pariticipants are more likely
to participate in such surveys as the one they were selected by (voluntary
response bias). It also might be that respondents simply respond the way
they hope to be acceptable (social desirability bias). In any case, more work
is certainly warranted.
For other political items, it is clear that respondents self-identified as
independents, a fact which is disputed by the aforementioned discriminant
function analysis. They are also more apt to regard themselves as belonging
to either the lower and (especially) working class. Respondents have much
stronger attitudes towards social conflict in America, Figure 6.13, when the
issues arose of such conflict between the rich and poor, and between those at
the top and bottom of society. Respondents were clearly in favor of a strong
role for government in the management of society, even if they did desire to
see cuts in government spending overall. In particular, respondents (both
before and after matching) are fervent demanders of government action on
unemployment and facets of social life connected to risks to personal wellbe-
ing. These are not respondents who wish to see a minimal state, quite the
contrary.
There is no ready reason why those who have been convicted for violating
the compact would have such a high regard for its strengthening. On eco-
nomic issues, respondents were not drastically different from the control re-
spondents in the areas of taxation levels for the rich and middle class, however
the same cannot be said for their views regarding lower income households.
As the results on government spending indicate, respondents are very much
similar to the control respondents on all issues asides from those concerning
unemployment and law enforcement. Taken separately, these two issues are
easy to dismiss as almost common knowledge. Criminals, in a hypotheti-
cal rhetoric, are lethargic non-actors, wishing to live off the law-abiding tax
payer. If allowed to vote, they would soak the middle class and vote down
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law and order policies to their benefit. This has been the debate of many op-
ponents of felon enfranchisement since the earliest moments of nationhood.
Taken together, however, these two policies ought to naturally form such an
alliance. Increased spending on benefits to adjust the citizen to the (mar-
ketized) risk of unemployment, decommodifying her from such eventualities,
reduces the onset of criminogenic environments. Nearly half of respondents
chose to merely maintain (not decrease) spending levels on law-enforcement,
while preferring increases in other areas which distance the client from abject
destitution. Indeed, the focus on unemployment assistance is the strongest
item across the respondent groups as compared to the control respondents.
This class of citizen (or rather citizens from this class of society) demands
protection from the market more than respite from law enforcement. They
are also more apt to be strongly in favor of the core values of civil liberty and
freedom of expression. They are, in addition, not the biggest believers in the
infalibility of public officials, most notably among institutional respondents.
Even with these apparent (and statistically significant) differences be-
tween respondent and control groups, respondents are not willing to spread
the resources of the state evenly amongst the population. Whatever their
views on government’s responsibility towards its citizens, and the degree to
which they believe certain social issues ought to be dealt with, respondents
are not out to provide all with a free ride. Leaving comparisons aside, results
from the items on detailed levels of benefit dispersal show respondents who
are relatively generous to the unemployed in circumstances that are outside
particular acceptable boundaries. In fact, it is only when the issues of sup-
porting a breadwinner model of households and single mother households
that respondents show very little mutual direction in attitudes. Compared
to the actual amounts devoted to pensions, respondents were more gener-
ous. Two-thirds of DCC-S respondents were favorable to a universal pension
scheme, while well over half (58.8) of CSI-S respondents and just over half
(54.2) of DOP-S respondents were so. Also on the issue of care, the major-
ity of respondents, contrary to the expectation that their experiences might
disuade them, were supportive of government provided elderly and childcare.
Finally, on the item of housing, respondents were firmly of the opinion that
government played a definite role in mitigating the risk of homelessness.
Again, these results are the “first in the field”, and as such it stands to
see whether future research might support or negate these findings within
or across other such populations. In either event, the prospect for research
applications is encouraging. The issues presented here are individual policy
items. they represent depictions of individuals’ preferences and perceptions
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of government on a piece by piece account. Political contests are neither
fought nor won on single issues such as these (though this is not to say many
single-issue campaigns aren’t powerful strategies). Generally, it is useful to
know, even in despite of conflicts over particular issues, which side of the
political party fence voters will end up. With approximately half of the dis-
enfranchised reporting as non-affiliated, it is not simple for political actors
to know why they should or should not pay attention.
Party Allegiance: The final stage of this research used two (similar)
methods to discern the political identities of respondents using not their
self-reported scores, but on the aggregated/weighted scores of their prefer-
ences on policy areas. Using both a MANOVA technique to calculate two
maximally discriminant variables, and a discriminant function analysis, this
final step has sought to provide evidence on the likely placement of dis-
enfranchised persons on a scale between Democrat and Republican. Both
procedures are particularly similar to eachother, and in fact use the same
underlying methods and assumptions to operate. The reason to utilize the
two, as opposed to only a single discriminatory function analysis, stems from
the desire to analyze respondents based on how they view themselves. By
using the MANOVA’s ability to create a canonical variate, and to use the
raw unstandardized values for the discriminant functions on a given list of
items (i.e., spending and responsibility items), it was possible to calculate
two variables which, when taken together, would be able to discriminate re-
spondents into quadrants. This simplistic procedure was then supplemented
with a more advanced discriminant function analysis to compute the pre-
dicted group memberships of participants.
It ought to be stressed that this attempt is not concrete proof that the
true likelihood is given. In truth, citizens have a diverse array of preferences
which make them prone to side with one political party or another (and in
the US, this is largely a contest between the Democratic and Republican
parties). It appears that based on the analyses, while respondents over-
whelmingly report their independent party status, their scores as based on
those of the control groups and their identifications entail that the majority
of disenfranchised are in fact likely to be supporters of the Democratic party.
In addition, as seen by the differences between the respondent and control
Democrats (Fig. 6.37), there is a real concern that the disenfranchised are
also a concern within the democratic party itself. This is discussed further in
chapters 7 and 8. Taken with their responses on the individual items, these
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Democratic supporters are likely to be ardent supporters of policies which
provide government assistance to workers and the industries which provide
employment opportunities. Respondents do not appear to be laissez faire
citizens, but rather citizens deeply in favor of government intervention into
the economy and social life. In addition, they are largely for the abatement
of inequality and the protection of civil liberties.
As Lipset and Marks reported towards the end of their seminal work on
the failure of socialism in the United States, “many convicts were imprisoned
for what they considered offenses against their class enemies, and a dispropor-
tionate percentage of convicts were Socialists” (Lipset and Marks 2000: 252;
see also Green 1978). The specter of socialism, at least in the dogmatic form
of the early 1900s, has long since depreciated in American culture. Large
swathes of the American collective psyche have been purified of thoughts of
collectivism from consecutive official and unofficial ideological purges. While
this account cannot follow the simple finding which Lipset and Marks (2000)
were able to affirm, it has uncovered a trend in values which are not entirely
congruent with the electorate at large. Indeed, given the evidence, it may be
that the large socialist tendency noted in the bygone days has, for all intents
and puposes, largely been returned to the community without its political
voice and/or opportunity to find gainful employment or governmental assis-
tance. The following chapter sets out to investigate the attitudes reported
here by an analysis of qualitative interviews from disenfranchised persons.
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Qualitative Results
The following chapter presents the results of qualitative interviews conducted
over the course of the quantitative research process. In as much as mixed
methods research has come to the fore in academic studies, this mode was
chosen as (first and foremost) a check on the validity of the assumptions
made from the results of the quantitative analysis of survey data, and (sec-
ondly) as an extension of the limited work in the area of qualitative work on
disenfranchised persons. In as much, this chapter corroborates the findings
of the quantitative work and ( serendipitously) bolsters the findings of previ-
ous research using approximate methods (i.e., Manza and Uggen 2006). The
interviews have been presented verbatim to the extent possible and present
the voice of participants and clients of the social welfare tier in their own
words on items of concern for both academics and practioners alike.
7.1 Overview of Methods
7.1.1 Primary Data
Over the course of the CSI-S survey process, participants were informed of
the possibility to participate in a further face-to-face interview at a timing of
their choice. On receipt of the completed survey booklets, respondents were
asked to sign a participation sheet which was used both to ensure the disper-
sal of a cash incentive for participation in the survey, as well as to indicate
their interest in participating in further one-on-one interviews. While thirty-
three participants indicated a desire to participate in these interviews, only
six interviews were able to be conducted due circumstances outside the con-
trol of the researcher. These interviews were carried out across four locations
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(a residential assistance center in Wilmington, NC; a place of employment in
Asheville, NC; an employment assistance center in Charlotte, NC and Tar-
boro, NC) and without supervision.
Given the limited number of participants, broad inferences of the deeper
contextual views of this population were obviously restricted. Fortunately,
because the initial quantitative survey was instrumented in parallel to key
items utilized by Manza and Uggen in their 2006 study, a secondary anal-
ysis of their primary data (transcribed interviews) was possible on a large
number of issues which were addressed in the primary interviews conducted
in North Carolina. In addition to items asked in the 2006 study, analysis of
issues which arose over the course of those interviews were also analyzed to
provide evidence of the drivers of criminal activity as well as policy issues.
Comparisons of the two interview guides as well as participant descriptives
can be seen in the Chapter Appendix. .
7.1.2 Secondary Data
The use of Qualitative Secondary Analysis (QSA) was chosen to supple-
ment the consequence of low turnout for primary interview responses. The
progression of secondary qualitative methods are addressed previously in
the methods section under subsection 5.2.7. A primary concern with using
two sources of qualitative data concerns the comparability of circumstances.
That is, the settings for interviews carried out in the primary research dif-
fered substantially from those in the secondary research. The respondents
in the Manza and Uggen study were under the supervision of the DOC of
Minnesota, while those for the primary study were unsupervised and from
North Carolina. Additionally, the majority of respondents in the Manza and
Uggen study were white, as compared to only one respondent from the pri-
mary study.
Despite these regional and demographic differences, the comparability of
responses found a significant degree of coherence around many topics. The
use of secondary qualitative data is recommended when populations of inter-
est are “hard to reach” (e.g., felon populations) (Fielding and Fielding 2000;
Gladstone et.al 2007) and where the use of such data augments primary data
to extrapolate new findings from both sets of sources (Holland and Thomson
2009; Bornat 2010; Irwin and Winterton 2011a). While the dissimilarity of
research contexts might be cause for concern in more direct comparison stud-
ies (i.e., if the goal were to compare the views of NC felons against Minnesota
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felons), these issues presented less such concern for confirmatory purposes.
That is, as the use of QSA here is complimentary in nature, this facet of
the data does not invalidate its value. This is especially so considering the
nature of the population under study. In all, the Manza and Uggen study
reported views from 33 participants.
7.1.3 Handling Primary and Secondary Sources
It is important to keep in mind that the data from the Manza and Uggen
(2006) study are used as corroborative for the purposes of this research.
Effort has been made to parallel the Manza and Uggen study, while gener-
ating new insights from the data already employed. As such, primary codes
were developed from the NC interviews and then applied to the QSA data.1
A secondary coding process was then undertaken in a spreadsheet format
with the developed codes to find grouping patterns from the codes. These
groups form the sections and subsections that follow. As SQA is a rather
under-utilized method, a strategy by which to utilize the two datasets was
needed in order to ensure that (a) data from the primary research was not
“overtaken” by that of the more numerous secondary dataset (i.e., that the
secondary dataset remain a confirmatory dataset as opposed to the primary
source of analysis), and (b) that inferences from the secondary dataset were
not simply reproduced from the results in Manza and Uggen (2006).
Because their original study focused largely along the same lines of the
primary research, and indeed formed much of the motivation for it, there is
a greater than average risk that the same inferences (e.g.,quotes) might be
repeated in this work.The aim of this work is not to reproduce their findings,
but to re-use their data to come to independent conclusions. To address this
concern, each reference from the original study results were accounted for and
noted for their use in the previous work. While all the information provided
from the previous study were analyzed, an effort has been consciously made
to defer to previously unreported accounts when possible. Instances where
the topics of interest did not have a matching code for the primary interviews
were omitted from reporting. This allowed for reporting topics which had
at least a 1:1 rate. That is, given a particular coded response from primary
interviewee X, there will also be a corroborative response from secondary
interviewee Y. However, where there is no primary interviewee response to
1Fortuitously, this initial coding sequence was sufficient to extract evidence from the
QSA data without the addition of new categories.
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an exact question, the code is omitted from reporting in this section. A com-
plete list of the code frequencies is given in the appendix with indicators of
which coded responses were used as quoted responses. Respondents from the
Manza and Uggen study use their assigned names from the original study
and are denoted with a (*) - e.g., Laura*.
7.1.4 Themes Addressed
Manza and Uggen differentiate between three main categories, with one
(Views About Government and Public Policy) further subdivided into two
areas covering Policy Views and the Criminal Justice System and Political
and Partisan Preferences. The remaining two categories address the Expe-
rience of Second-Class Citizenship and Rebuilding Ties to the community.
While mirroring the Manza and Uggen study, the primary study differenti-
ated between four categories, following secondary coding. These areas are
defined as issues regarding Politics, Public Policy Concerns, Public Welfare
Policy, and the Experiences of Criminal Sanction.
Politics, section 7.2, delves into issues such as participation, views of
parties, affiliation, and attitudes towards subjective impact. This section is
followed by section 7.3, which looks at interviewees’ views on the reach of
government as well as which areas policy would be most effective in reduc-
ing the tendency towards criminal activity. That is, this section asks not
only which areas of public policy are most important to respondents, but
also which areas they indicate as particular drivers for criminal activity and
consequent political disenfranchisement. Section 7.4 follows with evidence
regarding the role of welfare policy in interviewees’ lives. As the sections
are not entirely exclusive, there is a degree of overlap between this section
and the previous, however the issues dealt with herein relate particularly to
known welfare programs. In addition, this section includes interviewees rec-
ollections of services provided for in the social corrections tier. Section 7.5
wraps up with perspectives from interviewees regarding the experiences of
conviction, correction, and (most of all) political disenfranchisement. This
section ends with the views of interviewees regarding how society views them
on account of their legal status.
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7.2 Political Trust, Participation, and Pref-
erences
The evidence from the results of the quantitative research on preferences
revealed that respondents were considerably more left leaning than control
groups on areas of redistribution and welfare policy (especially as concerned
labor market policies), but not drastically so as related to their stances on
areas such as environmental spending or military outlays. Respondents were
also similar to their control counterparts in terms of policies which benefited
industry. In addition, respondents were considerably less trusting of not
only “others”, but the government and politicians in particular. This section
explores these issues in depth by reporting the responses of interviewees on
related topics as those presented in the survey study.
7.2.1 Trust in Government
Interviewees across both primary and secondary studies were unambiguous
about their distrust of government, supporting the results from the survey
instrument. Consider the views of William, a 51 year old white male recently
off all supervision, regarding his views on politicians:
Well, they...from what I’ve seen, they’ll say whatever, whatever
they have to to get into office. I don’t know. I think there’s a lot
of dirty, lot of dirtiness goin on. They, they’ll say whatever just to
get elected, then they get elected and everything they promised
they don’t do. Uhm. Talking about everybody gonna have jobs
and the economy gonna get better, and everything, and nothing’s
happened. It’s like eh. I don’t know. The rich are getting richer,
and uhm. Everybody else is just struggling, it’s just gotten bad.
Daryll, an African American male in his twenties, was equally descriptive
in his distrust of the government as a whole. For Daryll, the perception of
government as a reliable system had been informed not just from his own
experiences, but also from his upbringing. Thus, the collective history of
communities contributes to forming and maintaining perceptions of govern-
ment, regardless of what one has personally experienced.
Do I trust the government...I would have to say yes and no. And
the reason being is because, once again, from the age of 14, this
is when I really become aware of politics. And I was aware of the
negative side of politics. Once again, I was part of an organization
[name omitted]. And, you were taught history starting from ’68
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forward. And so, we dealing with the Carter, we dealing with the
Nixon history so on and so forth. And how that applied to our
race in general. And of course, we’re not hearing nothing positive.
We’re hearing pure-t negativity. Uhm, the whole crack epidemic,
how it was exposed to the streets. The theory of why it was even
exposed to, in the first place type of thing. And that definitely
shaped your views about the government. Getting older, as far
as reading and having different conversations ... a common thing
we here and start to believe is that individuals will say anything
to get into office. Ok. Realistically, we know, that when a presi-
dent gets into office, the first four years, more likely than not, is
cleaning up the previous president’s, and trying to shape his own
ideas and get his own things into movement. And so, that’s an
ongoing cycle, and so the government is not as stable as it should
be.
Lucas, 41, a father of two and grandfather, did not mince words when
it came to the question about his views. For him, the popular portrayal of
government as a system innately corrupted from the inside was not just a
matter of media portrayal, but an accurate depiction of facts on the ground.
Nah, I don’t trust government, no, uh uh. no. The government
manipulate everything that’s going on. These movies that you
see, they not just movies. These are events that happen, or going
to happen. You know, and if certain literature you read and un-
derstand, you see it. You see how crooked the government system
is. It’s a manipulation system... how can I trust my government?
If this, the people that are supposed to be there to help for us.
The taxes, you know...how they give the big corporations certain
tax breaks, but then, once again, what about the middle class
people? The lower class people? So, some, as I’m learning more
things, the big people don’t really care about the little people.So,
they just want to have it their way.
However, while Lucas saw the government and politicians as corrupt and
duplicitous, he also appeared to accept things as they were. While he was
despondent with the system, he accepted its “reality”.
...But this is America, and you gotta learn America’s system to
make things work for you in America. So, America becomes a
beautiful place to live. And what you make outta how you do it.
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While the former aspect of this perception of government is particularly
telling, the latter view also merits attention. While Lucas saw the government
as corrupt and dangerous, he also saw it as a matter of fact way of life in
America, even to be emulated in daily situations. At the same time, his
emotions towards this system were weighted by his distress over the apparent
divide between those at the top of society and those at the bottom. Thus,
acceptance of a perceived culture of corruption told and retold by popular
media and revelations of wrong doing may contribute in some way to citizen
actions. These views are not just isolated to interviewees in the primary
study either. Alex*, a 41 year old male serving a prison sentence, felt that
government was unscrupulous. According to him:
Uh, no, I don’t trust the government to do what’s best for the
country. Well, the reason why I don’t think they know what’s
best for the country is ‘cause they’re not out there living with the
people. They don’t...They don’t, um, understand what’s going
on in the daily life around the communities and that. They don’t
hear the voice of the people, the whole voice of the people.
James*, an African American male probationer in his twenties, felt simi-
larly about the soundness of placing faith in government officials.
Basically, no. I feel that the government’s real dirty, that’s for
real. And, I, I don’t know how the government, you know, they
do a lot of sneaky things a lot of people don’t know about. Un-
derneath, you know? And, you know, I think they care more
about themselves than anybody. And on the local level, if you
haven’t got the bucks, you’re guilty.
James* further related that he felt that while even those outside gov-
ernment should not necessarily be completely trusted, those in government
were more likely to act untrustworthy. Of those who remarked of some trust
in government, such views were either in respect to the belief that such
“crookedness” was apparent in any walk of life, or that government could
be trusted only in the presence of proper oversight. At least 3 of the Manza
and Uggen respondents had favorable views on government, while only one of
the interviewees from the primary study had positive feelings towards trust.
However, this view was conditioned on the fact that the respondent was in-
different to how government operated under his current and past daily life.
In general, the overwhelming consensus tended against trust in government
institutions.
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7.2.2 Trust in Politicians
Views on government were inextricably linked with views of political actors.
Outside questions expressly addressing views of trust in the government,
none of the interviewees from the primary study had any discernibly positive
feelings towards politicians. Indeed, the views which respondents shared
regarding political actors divulged more personal feelings of abandonment
by politicians. That is, interviewees felt that politicians were not attuned
to addressing the communities in which respondents resided. Jacob, a 41
year old African American male serving probation for drug charges, viewed
politicians as largely unconcerned with the interest of the least well off, which
in turn informed his views on their concerns towards him.
I mean, how you supposed to close the school for the deaf and
blind? And then, you know, you eh, you give a CEO a raise. So
it’s kinda like, you don’t care nothing about them, to the deaf and
blind? I know you don’t care nothing about me. If you don’t even
care about the disabled, and all the older people losing money and
they talking about cutting medicare, and it’s just eh...and these
are people, not in the military, but they actually served their
country... it’s just, everyone’s out to get their own and cover
their butts and to hell with the next guy.
Such strong sentiments carried over even into the meaning of politics in
general. When asked about his views on the meaning of the word politics,
David, a 35 year old African American male who completed his time for
larceny and assault, and Daryll (respectively) conveyed the impression that
politics is something which is outside the average citizen, a power strug-
gle in which agents are primarily self-interested and disconnected from the
communities they represent.
To me, it means people who write the law. [laughter] That’s what
it means to me. People with the power. Do whatever they want.
Not do whatever they want, but... that, mostly tell the majority
of the people what to do, and what to go by.
Scheming. A lot of what we know is by word of mouth. And so
once again, all we hear is individuals will say and do whatever
necessary to achieve a personal agenda. Get into this office, get
this bill passed, so and so forth. Say what sounds good. Even as
individuals we do that, we say what sounds good and don’t give
it a second thought once it comes to our goals. It’s bad enough
352
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
you have one individual doing that, here you have hundreds of
individuals doing the same thing. When necessary, well, they’ll
change their mind, or switch over, come together, and then you
know at a later time vear off again. So, yeah, scheming.
Markus, a 35 year old African American male on probation and working
with a local non-profit, gave an even more poignant view of why he lacks faith
in politicians. His views point even more towards a discontinuity between
lower income voters and the political process. Markus’ views are interesting
as well from the aspect of his detailed view of the president who was widely
considered the uncontested favorite of the African American community be-
cause of his racial background.
The wealth of this country is built on the back of people that’ve
just been through misery. It’s kinda like, how do you actually
change that system, how do you get it to go into a different di-
rection? It’s wave on wave. It’s the same old thing, you hear it.
Politicians don’t talk about anything different. They talk about
the same thing.
You know, Obama came in with the “Change” campaign, which
I thought, that’s really what deterred me from him. you know,
you talk about change and yet you have the same old regime.
They wasn’t about change...we know about hope...you know, if
anything, black people are full of hope [laughter]...that’s one thing
I know for sure that they, when they heard that. I think that’s
what really got them excited, when they heard that. We all hope
for a better place, but besides that, anything else is not effective.
The view that political actors are essentially beholden to the system once
elected was a strong theme in the conversations regarding trust for gov-
ernment. Even the most high profile campaign regarding the prospect of
dramatic change in the country garnered skepticism from what some might
have considered Obama’s most reliable supporters, inner city minority male
citizens. However, as Markus illustrates, these citizens are also keenly aware
of issues outside personality contests and single issue elections. The gen-
eral distrust of politics finds corroboration in the Manza and Uggen study.
Consider Mary*, a 40 year old female inmate, who saw politicians equally
unprincipled.
Well, when you first base an opinion about politics, I feel that the
majority of the politicians are out there just trying to get money,
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trying to sway, you know, the, um, people towards their beliefs
and or whatever, you know, they want to portray. And I feel that
the majority of them are just plain crooked.
Roger*, a 54 year old white male on probation for “swindling”, was more
considerate towards politicians. Roger saw the effects of power of paramount
interest, while politicians should not be held to a higher standard than the
average person. In addition, he voiced a central role for communication in
politics.
Uh, I think politics today, they don’t take into account, you know,
I think if you’d take a look at everybody in the House and the
Senate, how many people they all say – We’ve got the best age
of communications. I worked for a telephone company...And yet
communications is probably the biggest breakdown of everything.
Whether it be, you know, having to do with politics or whatever.
Communication is still...If our company loses a customer, nine
times out of ten it’s because we didn’t communicate with them.
Roger’s* view that communication was a central concern about the ef-
ficacy of politics is useful in considering the role of parties and political
participation. It also goes some way in describing the impact which am-
bivalence and even outright avoidance from political actors has on citizens.
This lack of a communicative relationship with constituents is reflected in
the views of Markus (below) on how he sees political participation affected
within communities.
7.2.3 Political Participation
Across both studies, interviewees were questioned on their views about the
effectiveness of voting to make government and politicians pay attention to
their needs. Many of the answers given across studies were extensions of inter-
viewees’ views regarding trust in government, as might be expected (i.e.,the
one informs the other, and vice versa). In fact, the lack of trust in gov-
ernment is often cited as the reason for disillusionment with the political
process, causing citizens to eschew participation. As seen previously, in the
view of interviewees, political actors are only interested in their own gains,
not of the community, and especially not of the communities which are hit
hardest by social and economic deprivation. When the citizen in these com-
munities does interact with the government, it is either through street level
bureaucrats (e.g., public welfare agencies or police officers) or intermittent
(at best) political actors during election cycles.
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Concerning the feeling of disadvantaged community members towards
voting, Markus complimented the opinions of Roger*, in his words:
The majority [sentiment] is “no point”. Because, and the reason
why the majority feels that way because, a lot of times councilmen
and legislators, they’re not actually there, you know, they feel
like, you know, don’t just come around one time, when it’s time
for you to be elected. All of a sudden you want someone to
campaign for you, you want us to be active as far as voting for
you, when we haven’t even seen you for the rest of the time. So
I mean, if they was active inside of those communities, where
they can actually see what they are doing, and allowing people
to know what laws they are trying to pass, how it will actually
effect them, making people aware. You know, they don’t see that.
This lack of visible attention from political actors in the daily lives of con-
stituents is additive with the deprivation which those constituents are occu-
pied with. Thus, as with the studies of Mani et. al (2013), not only does the
adversity of poverty reduce cognitive ability, the mental resources needed to
operate in these environments overwhelms their motivations to become in-
volved in seemingly extraneous relationships such as politics. Consider again
the words of Markus:
The only thing what people, a lot of times, in those communities
are concerned with is how they gonna survive, how they gonna
make it from paying bills. So what it boils down to them is not,
it really is not about being involved with the legislature, it’s more
about being involved with survival, that’s what it basically boils
down to. People that’s more concerned with their day to day
activities. “How I’m gonna survive, how I’m gonna pay these
bills, how I’mma eat. And that’s it. They’re not concerned with
politicians and politics.
Interviewees expressed a good deal of concern about their perceived value to
government and the necessity of negotiating more immediate concerns, as well
as seeing politics as mainly a contest among actors and not competing policy
agendas. Low participation rates, however, should also be seen in context
of the real-life practicalities which face offenders and the communities which
they originate from and return to. As William explained, “yeah, just eh,
just too much goin on to worry about politics. You’re just trying to live.
Everybody is just trying to get by”. In addition, a view of a rift between
those in power and those from more deprived areas is a recurrent theme
among interviewees. Michael* evinced this rift provocatively:
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Look at all the people in the United States, man, if everybody
could vote, I don’t know. . . If everybody could vote, man, that
would be something. . . I think there’d be two presidents. If ev-
erybody could vote, ‘cause it’s like half and half. The upper class,
the upper and middle class all gonna vote for the Republicans.
The rest is always voting for the Democrats, minority people, but
we really don’t get to vote, ‘cause most of us minority people got
felonies. You know, that’s why we really don’t count sometimes.
You know, I, I was always wondering that. . .Who the rich peo-
ple, who, who did ah, Farrakhan vote for? That’s what I want to
know. For real. They talk about helping us, but we don’t know
who they voted for. . .
When probed whether he thought there was a racial context for voter
preference, Michael* voiced his opinion that, while not having had exten-
sive contact with white citizens, they would most likely vote alongside their
African American counterparts.
I haven’t never really seen no poor white people, to tell you the
truth. Not really, where I come from, it’s all black people in
Chicago. On, on the south side, anyway....I don’t know, but I
thought poor white people might, ah, vote for Democrats, too,
they be in the same situation, too. . . be on welfare, like us, they
be needing help, you know. For real.
Such views are compelling evidence, especially in light of the results re-
ported in the previous chapter on partisan identification among felon re-
spondents. However, knowing that felons prefer the Democratic party to the
Republican, even when their explicit party identification is not that of the
Democratic party (i.e., when respondents are matched to parties based on
their answers to survey items), only goes part of the distance in understand-
ing why respondents are more keen on this affiliation.
7.2.4 Partisanship
The responses given to a series of questions asked from both this study and
the Manza and Uggen study shed valuable light on the issue of partisanship.
Interviewees, echoing Michael’s* own views, repeatedly reported a class di-
vide between Republican and Democratic parties. When asked what candi-
date or party he would have voted for in the preceding election (i.e., the 2008
presidential election - Obama v. McCain), David explained that his choice
was not based on race, but on vested interest. In his words:
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The Democrats. Cuz they was trying to help the poor people
and all that. I mean. Get the food stamps and stuff, that’s why
I would have went with them. Like I said, most of the issues
they was talking about, like helping out, I mean. Like, you know
what I’m sayin, I don’t want to say just the food stamps, but
like...school stuff and all that, they was hittin all those bases like
that.
Similarly, James* preferred the Democrats because of their perceived stance
on welfare policies and the clients thereof; while Daryll saw the primary
appeal between the two major parties as an overriding concern with money
and power on the part of the Republicans (respectively)
I would probably prefer to the Democrats more because I feel
they look out more for the poor. And Republicans, you know,
they gonna look out more for the rich, and less for the poor really.
That’s how I see it.
I would have to say Democrat... Because we here that you know,
democracy, Democrats are for the people. They want to listen
to the people and therefore carry it out. Versus the Republicans
which really don’t give two cents about no one, but about lining
their own pocket type thing.
Markus was more critical of the two major parties, identifying as an
independent. His view was that “on paper” the two parties stood for separate
policy agendas; however, in “real life”, the two were essentially the same.
Without openly aligning himself with a third party, Markus did explicitly
support what he described as socialist policies to help communities. When
asked which party he would identify with (i.e., as opposed to which party or
candidate he had or would vote for), David opted for neither, explaining:
So, if I see like, like I say, like a president I know seem like he
really gonna change things around here. I would vote for him.
I don’t, I can’t really say...I don’t know about the Republican,
Democrat stuff, but...if he good on both parts. He’s got my vote
everytime, cuz he got a lot of confusion and all that, I aint gonna
vote...Sometimes I believe I’m a Democrat, and then sometimes
I believe I’m a Republican too, so. It be half on half. depends on
like, what be, who be saying the best thing when that election
time comes.
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David’s views point to a pragmatic view of politics which transcends party
allegiances, despite his preference towards Democrats. While he would have
voted for the Democratic party, it was on the basis that they supported poli-
cies which were more attuned to his own preferences. However, he (like many
of the interviewees and the results from the survey responses) was not neces-
sarily a “party supporter”. There is thus a potentially tangible reason why
few political actors in the Democratic party, who are assumed to benefit from
an expanded electorate, do not more forcefully push for political universality.
Outside of the enormous political costs of being viewed as soft on crime, there
is no guarantee for either party that an increase in voters, especially from
citizens who make up the bulk of the disenfranchised offender, would trans-
late into party loyalty. For many, it is the attention which party members
extend to their communities, focused on bettering their own prospects rather
than temporarily exploiting their votes of resources, that motivate their sup-
port for the parties. For Thomas*, the Republican party represented a party
which exploited the lower classes for their own gain. According to Thomas*:
The Republicans gonna, in my eyes, is gonna be like a snake, a
serpent. You know, reach out for the weak. And they’re gonna
use you, twist you, spit you out whatever. They don’t need them,
throw them away.
When further probed into the how Democrats had reached out to him in his
community, Thomas* went further:
They, um, there was one guy, you know, he was a part of the
organization once before, and he became, you know, he kind of
turned his life around, you know? And he came and talked to us,
you know? And we wasn’t, we wasn’t feelin’ it at first. We was
like “No, we don’t understand that.” But he said “Well, listen
to me. They’re having an election downstairs-”Okay, they came
to Division 5, and it was like, it was like the school. It was like
seventeen, eighteen was over. And they said you have a chance to
make a, make a, to do some type justice because you’re probably
[not] gonna get this chance again.
Michael* was clear about his views on the differences between the two major
parties, consistent with the anti-welfare stereotype of the Republican party:
Well, I think the Republicans more based in the middle-class
area. . . They try to do for them. But the Democrats, you know,
try to help out with child care. . . They really don’t want people
on welfare, you know, they try to help you get off welfare and get
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a stable job. Whereas, the Republicans, they just, they just want
you to be based how you already is, you know. . .
These remarks reflect that of Markus and Roger*, reinforcing the idea that
a fair amount of potential positive reinforcement between participation and
attention from party operatives incentivizes political participation. It also
signals a clear distinction between Democrats as the party of the poor and
the Republicans as the party of the economic elite. These results point to an
intriguing facet, pointed out in Abramsky (2006), that voter demobilization
in the form of felon disenfranchisement helps to artificially constrain the
natural limits of the Democratic party - intentional or otherwise. However,
considering the quantitative and qualitative results thus far, it appears likely
that while there may be some truth to this assumption, it exists owing to
an overlap of preferences between the Democratic party’s reputation of pro-
welfare policies and the needs of the communities where the disenfranchised
originate from. In a manner, the adage of “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend” may be reflected in the support of the Democratic party as the party
which opposes the perceived party of the affluent. Democratic operatives are
equally strategic in their actions, avoiding those communities where they see
little return for their canvassing efforts. As Abramsky records of the views of
former Tennessee State Representative Larry Turner (D) regarding allocating
campaigning resources to distressed communities/districts:
In those precincts [i.e., projects]...200 people turn out. In other
precincts, 1500 might go to the polls. I always concentrate where
there’s going to be a higher turnout. (Abramsky 2006:162)2
The dearth of political attention which communities adversely affected by
political disenfranchisement experience is not limited to any party or actor.
Rather, such lack of communication on the part of political actors is driven
by short-term goals, further bolstering interviewees’ impressions about their
value as constituents. This neglect may further depress policy representation
and then feed back into the community by the absence of representative
policy. “Trapped in poverty”, in the words of Rep. Turner, “many turn to
crime, and convicted of crime, they then are barred from many walks of life
and remain mired in poverty” (Abramsky 2006: 164). This begs a further
question which was posed to interviewees in the primary study and extracted
from those of the Manza and Uggen study. That is, what do the interviewees,
those who have been on the other side of the issue, see as the leading causes
of criminal activity in their communities.
2What’s more, these were the words of an avowedly Democratic politician, with direct
ties to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in a
state where “race-based” poverty (157) forms a reality of daily life.
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7.3 Public Policy and Perceived Drivers
7.3.1 Drivers of Criminal Activity
In following from the aforementioned levels of distrust of government and
politicians, and the skepticism which interviewees hold towards party al-
legiance (though predominantly against the “wealthy” Republican party),
interviewees were asked to give their own accounts of the policies (or defi-
ciencies of) which they felt contribute to the propensity of criminal activity.
In Chapter 3, it was shown that under-investment in social policies leads to
criminogenic environments. This followed from Chapter 2 which illustrated
the importance of political participation in producing policies which decrease
incomed inequality, which in turn increases turnout. It has been illustrated
above that interviewees relate the cause of their own political apathy, and
that of their communities, to a lack of trust of and appreciation from gov-
ernment and politicians. Here I look specifically at the views of interviewees
regarding their own perceptions of what drives criminal activity, specifically
in terms addressable by public policy. From their own accounts, the prefer-
ences which they hold for desirable policy outcomes reflects their appraisals
of the underlying drivers of criminal activity, and thereby political disenfran-
chisement. In exploring policy drivers, it is possible to better interpret the
logic of policy preferences of both respondents and interviewees.3
3Over the course of interviewing respondents for the primary research, a hitherto un-
realized facet of the criminal justice system was overlooked. In hindsight, the area seems
an obvious area to inquire into. That is, while reviewing the research findings, the issue
of conviction and correctional system change became apparent as an understudied area
from the perspective of those who have witnessed it firsthand - specifically, the changing
perceptions of race and the criminal justice system in the eyes of offenders. As only two
interviewees were known to have an extensive history with supervision, it was not deemed
possible to pursue this issue in full. However, given the value of these first-hand accounts,
it seems an area which should be pursued more. William, with a long history of convictions
and recidivism dating back to the early 1980s, tells of his own perceptions about what he
sees as the waning importance of race in conviction and supervision rates.
It used to be a race thing, but now it’s just, it don’t matter... We’re all
having it bad. I mean, and it don’t matter. I mean, it’s just everybody
now. It’s not just, it used to be the blacks, just were picked on I guess...It’s,
it’s a legal extortion to lock you up and it don’t matter what color you are.
They’re gonna get money, the government, they’re, somebody is gonna get
paid from you being locked up. So they lock you up quick...But now, over
the years, it don’t matter. It don’t matter the race. And it seems like, they
lock you up for anything now because it’s just like a legal racket. It don’t
matter. ... Child support, you know if you can’t pay for it, they lock you up,
you’re doin time. DWIs, you know, I, they gettin hard on everything. And
they’re locking people up for everything. Prisons are just getting crowded,
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While a few interviewees directly related the environmental conditions
of communities as the driving factors for deviance, more noted the under-
lying factors of such community break-down, of which the burdens of weak
labor market positions and social protections garnered the lion’s share of
attention.4 As Daryll describes his own experiences:
You have some individuals. I have associates, that, you know,
their parents sold drugs or used drugs, and so from a very young
age they was exposed to it. ... when you see a community, we
call it “hood”, when you see a community struggling, you know.
You take Sandy Run [lower class neighborhood]. The majority
of everyone, if not everyone, in Sandy Run is connected with
some type of illegal activity. And you see a whole bunch of little
kids runnin around, that’s what they see, that’s what they do.
Because, we are creatures of habit. You know. Versus someone
who’s in NorthWoods [middle class neighborhood], you know,
where all they see is individuals going to school, going to college,
going to work. This is the natural order of things. So, they
conform to that.
David also saw an influence of drugs and gang culture, but went further to
explicate a more instrumental role of precarious life events. In his words:
Most of it because, kids growing up without the mother and father
in their life, and they be having little, they’re basically hanging
with the wrong crew. And then and then you got this little
Blood and Crips thing out here, so, everybody want to get in
with something for more protection. So. Stuff like that. Gettin
little kids wide open...Like, if they make like more programs and
stuff, maybe kids would not like get into a lot of that.
Going further into why these factors became prevalent, David revealed
that, ironically, policies intended to alleviate social disadvantage actually
contribute to further disadvantage.
Child support. You got guys out here that’s tryin to pay it, then
you got guys out here who don’t even try to pay nothing. The
crowded, and crowded, and people are going back. It’s just like a revolving
door.
4The term environment applies to the experiences which individuals have been exposed
to in their day-to-day lives, as opposed to specifically the life science definition.
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ones who try to pay, they get the worst end of the deal, so they
make them want to go steal, rob, sell drugs, do whatever they
gotta do to try to make it...the majority of it’s because there’s
no work.
David’s views of the burden of child support were quite salient issues for
himself. As a father of several children, he found it increasingly difficult to
find a job in a labor market which formally allows for the exclusion of of-
fenders from employment, while placing the burden of support on individual
fathers for children. While receiving unemployment insurance payments of
88 dollars per week, this is reduced by half to be forwarded to his depen-
dents of which he does not reside with. The remaining financial resources
available, per month, are insufficient to cover basic necessities. The design of
policies which place the burden on the individual in the name of attempting
to instill personal responsibility, coupled with extreme discrimination in the
labor market, therefore appear to foster one dilemma while attempting to
resolve another. For Lucas, the situation was also uniquely connected to the
financial instability caused by unemployment and compounded by barriers to
offender employment. For him, the initial disadvantage of financial resources
increases exponentially once criminal sanctions are imposed on an individual.
You get in trouble and your people got money and you can pay
for a lawyer, 9 out of 10 you can ease around that to get you a
misdemeanor. But if a person don’t have that type of money or to
have someone fight for them, you gonna get a felony conviction.
That felony conviction gonna hinder you down the road. And
here, being in North Carolina, I was told that they don’t have a
felony that can get sealed. As I was told. And if that’s the case,
you gonna have a hard time gettin a job, and I’m meeting guys
all the time, everyday. We talk, I talk to a lot of people, and that
felony conviction they saying, they can’t get a job. So when you
can’t get a job, what are you gonna do? That’s why.
Similar sentiments were repeated by Marcus, who saw the effect of not
just unemployment, but the status which it brought upon as determinant of
criminal activity.
We already have the idea, in the community, that ok, whatever it
takes to survive, that’s what a person...ok, I mean, that’s for
anyone, but a lot of times, the African American community
sayin that, we gonna do whatever it takes to survive. so I mean,
crack....rock...are a means to survive. and it makes up for the
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jobs not being there...you know because of a lack of jobs, so you
know. To actually do something that there’s no means there,
people gonna do any type of means, whatever it might be to sur-
vive. So, and a lot of times, some of the society, the community
I was raised up in, you know, this is why, what people turn to.
Because of a lack of, lack of jobs, lack of employment...so, uhm.
And the thing was guys wasn’t criminal in a sense of the term
how they use the word criminal. But you know, it was kind of
like, ok, this is something that they wanted. and whatever they
had to do, this is what they had to do to get it.
The emphasis on crime as a method of survival, and an accepted method,
resonates across interviewees. As William emphasized:
No work, no work you know. People can’t find jobs you gonna go
out and you gonna do what you do. Cuz you gonna support your
habit one way or another. And if you can work you gonna do it
that way, and if you don’t you gonna go out and break the law.
James*, in Minnesota, repeated this opinion - in his words:
Well, I mean, basically I mean - Some people, some people, I
mean, have to try out for so long to get a job ‘til they figure
like, “Alright, I’ve been trying to get a job.” And I mean they
push people toward crime, you know? They figure ain’t nobody
trying to give them a chance to work so I mean it’s hard, you
know what I’m saying? It’s- to stay, you gotta survive, you need
money. So a lot of people resort to crime. That’s how a lot of
crimes get started, you know? That’s how I got myself caught
up between trying to get a job. A lot of people would deny me,
you know? Basically it had to do with experience. They say, you
know, experience, a lot of jobs. You know, you don’t have the
qualifications or experience that they’re looking for, I mean they
won’t give you a chance? So I figure, you know, I’ve got a family,
you know, I need money myself, I’ve got bills. So, you know, do
what you gotta do.
Rita*, a 41 year old single white female still serving a prison sentence for
drug charges, was pensive about the prospect of succeeding after release
even without being back in the labor market.
I have a big concern. I don’t, uh, know what I’m gonna do for
work or where I’m gonna live when I get out. And the easiest
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thing for me to do would be to go back out to what I was doing
before. Yeah. It, it would be the easiest thing for me to do is to
go back out and go stay with my dope people. And I can make
money, you know? And I, I mean I know how I can make money
illegally and do it good, but that will bring me back here.
The lack of viable employment opportunities both before and after convic-
tions, which builds environments of insecurity as a result of commodification
(i.e., via residual welfare policies) is reflected in the preferences discovered in
the empirical results of the primary research. Thus, the preference for policies
which decommodify basic aspects of the life course form a discernible solu-
tion to what many of the respondents see as the central causal factor in their
criminal histories (and indeed their suspected future criminal activities). This
creates, in essence, a linkage of a poverty-crime-disenfranchisement trap. In
addition, at least part of the cause of re-admittance into correctional super-
vision (i.e., custody) for offenders stems not from their committing offenses,
but rather (and perversely) their inability to work within the existing social
protection system parameters. This is particularly the case with unemploy-
ment, where probationers are often required to gain employment of some sort
or be returned to custody, but also with other areas such as child support
payments.5 Take for instance the situation of David, the most outspoken of
interviewees on the issue which affected him.
If you got to pay child support, as long as you paying something
they will not mess with you. Like I say, they taking mine out
my unemployment. Here, they doing the same thing, but lately
I don’t be getting any money. And this for one child. I been
paying child support for 14 years now, been locked up for child
support, now I’m feeling I’m getting to a point that I feel like I
might get locked up for child support. For one child...It’s neither
[a misdemeanor or felony]. It’s just not complying with child
support. You got to do 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, 120 days. Like
that. But, like I say, I’m paying for 4 other kids...
David was one participant among many in a group of potential interviewees
with whom an informal discussion was witnessed over the course of this re-
search. During these conversations, many of the respondents expressed simi-
lar attitudes - openly referring to their situations with the administration of
5This does not include the myriad of public benefits which convicted offenders are
barred from during and after their sentences. Taken together, these extra-penal poli-
cies distort the functioning of social protection systems from accomplishing their goals of
wellbeing stabilization.
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unemployment and court ordered obligations (e.g, child support payments).
While substance abuse was brought up in both studies, the driving factor of
such behavior seemed also linked to a situation of hopelessness and disparate
challenges faced by interviewees in the labor market and compounded by
insufficient social protections - even protections against social protections.
The lessons from the Marienthal Case appear to continue to hold lessons for
researchers.
7.4 Public Welfare Policy and the Reach of
Government
These views on the reasons for low trust in politics and government, as well as
for the underlying drivers of criminal activities points to a critical role for the
social protection system as a whole, and specific program areas in particular.
Whereas the Manza and Uggen study focused on a deep understanding of
the effects of disenfranchisement and community cohesion and similar facets,
the study here sought to examine the policy areas which affected the disen-
franchised citizen - as well as which policies in particular interviewees saw as
the solution to the problems facing their communities. While it is impossible
to represent all the possible solutions, considerable insight can be gained by
registering the thoughts of interviewees on such programs.
7.4.1 Social Corrections
One of the key arguments presented in this work is a reconceptualization of
services provided under the auspices of correctional departments as formal
components of the larger welfare system. This tier, as pointed out before,
functions as a remedial tier for deficiencies in the larger welfare system, of
which clients are subjects of. Over the course of research, many of the persons
involved in this study related their experiences of services provided while
in custody. While they themselves, and indeed many others, did not see
these activities as related to the welfare system super-structure, their stories
clearly illustrated the often overlooked functionality from a welfare system
perspective. When asked to describe his personal views on losing the right to
vote and how this affected his and others’ perceptions of themselves, Jacob
incidentally illustrated some of the benefits which social corrections had for
his life.
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You’re dehumanized. I mean, you don’t have anymore. Even
though, you know, they give you a number, you don’t mat-
ter....you don’t matter, but you do. That’s, while I’m in there,
I’m building military trucks, while I’m in. So why you saying
I don’t matter? I put together MG920s. Did that for years ...
dropping engines in, putting transmissions in, I mean we start on
the rails from top to bottom. I mean, I learned a lot. Like I said,
it was a bad situation but was the best thing for me, cuz it gave
me a bunch of skills I didn’t think I could do. I got welding, I got
4g, went through truck driving course...I learned how to sew in
the lineup, inseams of military clothing, we make the clothing.
Despite the degrading effect of incarceration, Jacob was able to gain skills
which helped him after his release through work experience and programs
offered in prison. Similarly, David, recalling his own experiences of incarcer-
ation, reflected that he would have preferred that he had been moved to a
different facility based on their programs available - primarily to offset the
loss of his earnings.
I went... from [institution x] to [institution y], to [institution z].
That’s the work farm... But now, things is different. When, I
don’t want to go back, but they got work release down there and
everything. That’s what, they should of had that when I was
there, atleast I could have gone outta there with more money
than what I had.
Similar pragmatic concerns were found in the secondary data. Rita*
voiced her vexation that her sentence was too short, as longer sentences
would have enabled her to increase her chances of working within the social
corrections programs to obtain employment and stable living accommoda-
tions:
Well, I’ll have to come back here if I don’t get a job right away
‘cause they have, I wasn’t here long enough to get set up... to try
to find my one. If I would have been here for more than three
or four months, I would have been eligible for the work-release
program where I could have gone to a half-way house and got a
job and got in a program where I’d already have a job when I
was getting out. But since I was in here for such a short time,
they’re basically letting me out on the street. I’m one of them
that’s pretty much doomed to fail unless I get really lucky out
there and find a job right away.
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These views help to buttress the propositions laid out previously. They also
go some way to illustrate the functional use of social corrections as one which
essentially compensates for existing deficiencies outside the tier, one which is
a widely discussed topic across interviewees. Larry*, a 30 year old white male
serving a prison sentence for murder, described his experience with imported
services under social corrections:
Yeah, there’s this, uh, outside non-profit organization ...that hires
inmates and trains them in the computer programming field and
then actually puts you on projects, or puts the inmates on projects,
to work,
Such experiences were also referenced by Travis*, in his late twenties and
on parole for drug related charges. For Travis*, the training and exposure to
skills while incarcerated provided him with the direction he needed to find a
suitable career trajectory.
I did take a class, ... while I was incarcerated. And I liked that. I
found where I was interested in. So when I was doing this drafting
work, then I got involved in the structural design. Now I’m going
to school for engineering, engineering degree. That’s what I want
to do, and I, and I like it.
Professionals in the social corrections tier have long since recognized the
needs of their clients, though their remit is largely constrained by budget
cuts and the disconnect between their own work and the realities clients face
after leaving their supervision. Assuredly, these programs are often insti-
tuted with the explicit goal of reducing re-offending and recidivism. What
is compelling about the experiences illustrated here is the overwhelming de-
mand citizens have for pragmatic policies, especially as concerns their ability
to survive in the market economy. That is, while recognizing the knock-on
effect of reducing criminality, their personal concerns are of survival in the
market economy. In fact, interviewees sought more assistance in areas of
remedial services to help them integrate into society.
Mary*, in her 40s and incarcerated on drug related conspiracy charges,
lamented on the reduction of programs to help offenders survive when return-
ing to their communities, especially for women. For Mary*, these programs
provided not only a means of acquiring skills, but also as a means of com-
bating counterproductive self-images and encouraging personal confidence.
I mean here we have nothing.... They’ve taken away different
types of working programs where people were going on the outside
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and working jobs. And yes, they were paying room and board.
And yes, they were paying and things like that, okay, but they
were also still paying their way and had money of their own, and
they felt good about themselves. They’ve taken that away.
The extent of these services does not terminate at the level of skill acquisition
for employment. Rather, the benefits of social correction systems, when they
do benefit clients, extends also into other crucial areas of personal well-being
and motivation. The vocational training which many receive assists in help-
ing clients find and maintain themselves, which in turn (it is hoped) disuades
any further offending. However, other services are also provided which might
otherwise be foregone without entering this tier.
Karin*, almost in her 40s and incarcerated at the time of the interview,
compared the circumstances which educative programs in social corrections
mitigates.
I have taken college courses here at the institution because they
offer them, um, and where else can you get them at five dollars a
semester, you know?
Additionally, Lori* commended the opportunity to receive personal di-
rection from mentoring services which helped to motivate her to attend uni-
versity.
I’m gonna tell you something: I, I mean never thought I would
ever be in college, ever. You know? I just thought, “No. My
life is, you know, being a crook.” That’s what I always thought.
These women need to have somebody sit down with them and
say, “You know what? What you’ve told and what you believe
is right.” You know what I’m saying? “I see this and this and
this in you. You can do this stuff.” And have somebody mentor
them. A mentor is really important.
Such services are crucial in accomplishing the goal of reductions in offending,
but they are conjointly instrumental in correcting for those areas in social
policy which are unable or not designed to avert. For Nathan*, not only
should such programs be promoted, but these programs should be more in-
tegrated into the public discourse to provide more understanding of their
benefits for communities.
I believe they’ve got a bunch programs out here, but they’re
poorly ran. Because they don’t show interest to the public. The
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public doesn’t realize that that program could save that person
from re-offending, going out in the community. But, the com-
munity don’t care. The community shows ignorance towards the
system. They don’t want to care.
On a more thought-provoking note, Susan*, an incarcerated white female
in her 30s, went as far as to suggest that far from from detriments to society,
returning offenders were in some respects better situated to participate in
the community because of their experiences in social corrections.
A lot of people come to prison and they’re messed up. A lot of
people change in here. We have the benefit of these walls telling
us to change. There’s so many people out there, they haven’t
done a crime, or they haven’t been caught, or they haven’t done
a violation of law, but they’re probably icky people, or mean or
rude or whatever. But, you know, and they don’t have four walls
telling them “you need to change” We have that benefit, you
know. Actually, so a lot of people come in here and they change
and they go “I used to never read the paper,” you know. I’ve
done that, and I’ve become really interested in politics and stuff,
and a lot of people have changed.
Taken together, these views illustrate an instrumental role for the so-
cial corrections tier in welfare systems. The evidence shows that many cit-
izens rely on the services provided to conform to the prevailing standards
set out by the community. In particular, the evidence suggests that labor
market integration remains a strong component of social corrections among
respondents, enabling many to begin or change their trajectories. This is
further substantiated by the views given by respondents regarding policies
they would prefer to see promised and provided by politicians and the gov-
ernment. From this perspective, not only do social corrections replace “state
mental health hospitals as the institutions for confining most of [America’s]
mentally ill” (Rosenthal 2004:12), they also continue to play a crucial role in
the regulation of the country’s refractory labor force.
7.4.2 Preferred Policies:
Overall, interviewees held clear views about the role which government ought
to play and which policies they would prefer to see instituted, especially as
concerns their own communities. The general areas of assistance, besides
that of employment assistance, revolved around education, healthcare, and
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childcare. As might be expected, interviewees were most concerned with poli-
cies which would protect the individual from financial ruin and destitution.
Consider the views of William on what he considered the most important
issues he would like addressed:
Healthcare for the elderly and the homeless, I believe that that
would be a big issue. And schools man, people need education.
I think of schooling, will be. And just help for the homeless,
and the people that’s havin it rough. Especially for the elderly
and the people that can’t work. But the people that can work, I
believe that they should, I don’t know, it’s just the , they gotta
find a job, I mean, there’ve gotta be jobs. People can’t work,
they’re just gonna keep doin what they been doin.
The policies which many prefer to see are, above all else, overwhelmingly
modest and pragmatic in nature. Take for instance the views of Markus.
In his view, while education is a valuable asset, it should not be taken as a
panacea for social problems, especially that of liberal arts education. In his
view:
I know it’s a thing that’s loud about with bull horns and stuff,
“go back to school, go back to school” , telling everybody to go
back to school, but how the hell is all these people gonna go back
to school when there are still no jobs? And where they gonna find
work at? And not only that, like what I said, what’s happening,
cuz the government is a bunch of bullshit because, that’s what’s
keeping universities running. But not only that, but these people
are all in debt cuz now they gotta pay the tuition back! So now,
they don’t have a job, nor do they have the means to pay their
tuition back, so now they’re in debt. So, I mean. It’s kinda like,
what’s the point?
Markus followed these thoughts by voicing that he did not believe that gov-
ernment had necessarily a responsibility, or even the capacity, to create jobs
for all, but that it should promote the type of environment conducive to job
creation, especially as concerned industry moving overseas:
...you know, make it more pleasing to these corporations in terms
of actually just staying. You know, whatever happened to Amer-
ican owned, American built?
These views were echoed by Lucas who also believed that training, par-
ticularly vocational education, was underdeveloped. Consider his response
when presenting his views on education:
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Well, making more education affordable, and that people can at
least go to school and educate themselves after high school, or
everybody’s not for college. So therefore you need trade schools.
You need uh, classes for showing you better living. How to live
and how to get along with people. Cuz a lot of things work with
hand to hand, a lot of the things I see work with hand to hand
[manual labour].
This was followed almost in lock-step with Markus’ views on the industrial
situation which workers faced concerning overseas competition:
A lot of the factories, the manufacturing companies that’s leaving
overseas. Right now you can get on the phone and 911, I mean
information [411] and you might be talking to someone overseas
instead of somebody here. So the jobs leave here, but all the
jobs leaving here and these big corporations are together forming
something just for them. What about the little people? See,
nobody care about the little people. So, eventually what’s gonna
happen 10, 15, 20 years from now?
Concerning their views on overall welfare, that is, when asked their views
on welfare policy in general, many respondents from both studies expressed
moderate demands for institutional policy. Daryll, as with William, was
supportive of the need for affordable healthcare, and even connected this
view with the inequities of the economic system, in his words: “Millionaire,
billionaires, or you know, these corporations, they don’t, they say, you know,
500 dollars a [doctor’s] visit, that’s no chain off their backs, versus we need to
work 2 or 3 months just to, you know, try to save and pinching”. This view
was equally shared by Lucas and David (respectively), with the addition of
social care for children:
Definitely health insurance. Uhm, I feel everybody should have
health insurance. And definitely childcare. Cuz without anybody
taking your kid you can’t even work, so. And some of that, fall
back on us, but we can never say how long a person gonna be
with us, how long, and when, whoever , which ever party decides
they gonna leave [i.e., relationship breakup]. And uhm...last one,
I say education. Cuz we can all be taught to do something, we
have a skill. Once you obtain that skill it’s up to you and your
drive to make it work.
I mean, because, that’s for the people, they might need that
extra little help on something. Like the unemployment, like, the
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daycare. Cuz some people do still work, and might can’t afford
baby sitting, or something like that, I mean. They need all them
programs out there. But. And then it all depends. I know some
people try to take advantage and stuff...Uhm, the health care, the
day care, and unemployment. I’d say them three. Like I say, if
a person has been working, they gonna need a little something.
They gonna need gas to go and buy food, and pay bills.
However, Daryll, like others, did not advocate a far reaching benefit sys-
tem to be instituted. On the contrary, interviewees juxtaposed their desire to
see supportive welfare policies with practical limits. Consider Daryll’s views
again.
... Any services needed providing that the individual and or fam-
ily is doing everything in their power to go to the same goal. You
know. Welfare for instance. You find a lot of individuals on wel-
fare. And, a lot of them just don’t want to work. They know
that it’s there. And they utilize it and abuse it. That should be
cut out in my opinion. If you’re going to school, if you’re trying
to work, you trying to do this to the best of your ability. Then
Uncle Sam should be there by all means to give a helping hand.
Anything outside that, you know, you gotta get out there and
get it.
Markus and William both concur with Daryll’s assessment, in their opinions
respectively:
[It] should mostly depend on the person’s needs...and...not their
wants. I don’t think persons should be receiving certain amount
of money, they goin’ out and they spending, if you don’t need
any shoes or clothes then you are buying unnecessary things.
Things as far as food, and housing and shelter. Food, clothing
and shelter. So just making sure that there’s enough that they can
survive weekly. So it’s maybe. I mean, if a person is only making
minimum wage, and they was main person in the household. But
I think, let’s say they make 200 dollars, [there] should be a portion
set aside cuz they have a family.
Well, atleast...atleast should, be enough to live on. I mean, I
don’t know a price or nothing, but it should be at least enough
to live on. a week, I’d say three or four hundred dollars. At least.
I mean, cuz, you gotta have enough to live on. and have a certain
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class of living. I mean... I don’t know about that man. I just,
I feel like the government should take care of its people though,
you know. Cuz, if, if they don’t take care of their people. It’s
just, everything is going to go to hell out there. People’s gonna
be robbin’ and stealin’. It’s, it’s gonna be mad, it’s gonna be
crazy, chaos.
The opinions presented here help to explain the responses in the survey
data that show participants have increased demands for public services, how-
ever also have demands for decreased spending and assistance for businesses.
These views were shared by those in the Manza and Uggen study, without ex-
plicitly intending to probe into the themes of welfare policy. Take for instance
the views of Louis*, who lamented on the need for welfare reform on the one
hand, and the need to make sure working citizens received the supportive
assistance from the state to lessen the burden of full-time employment, in
particular, dependent care.
With the welfare benefits. I, I do agree that something should
be done to reform welfare, but one thing that we fail to realize is
that, uh – I was on welfare. A single parent with two kids. And it
took me, not that long, but Ohio offered me child care so I could
work. You know it wasn’t penaliz- you had to cut my money,
which I could have cared less, you know, they cut the money.
Okay, fine. ‘Cause I’m making more money working anyway, but
it gave me child care, which I couldn’t afford.
Indeed, even while interviewees, for example Sally* and Paul* (respec-
tively), expressed positive views on welfare provision, these needs were resti-
tutive in nature and pragmatic towards alleviating labor market pressures.
Speaking on welfare reform, Sally* felt that while she could empathize with
the need for welfare reform, she also felt that persons in her situation would
be particularly badly hit; while Paul* saw that the purposes of welfare (so-
cial insurance and assistance) and social corrections as important particularly
given particular contingencies in the life course.
But welfare’s going to go down even further than what it had
been in the first place. But it’s like it’s gonna affect us. It’s
really gonna affect us. You know we get out, we’re felons. It’s
hard to get a job for some of us. Um, we’re gonna need- Even
though we are willing to work, it’s hard to get a job. We can get
a job pay 7 dollars, 8 dollars an hour, but that doesn’t feed, feed
me, my child, and pay the rent and pay the bills. It doesn’t do
it.
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My feeling about being in prison, being a felon is my same feeling
about the welfare system. Some people need help at times. Or
correction at times. And they get back on their feet and they
resume their role as, as a productive member in the community.
Consider also the views of Mary*, a mother of four in her forties. For her,
the programs provided, and indeed mandated, by social corrections directly
impacts the wellbeing of clients, which in turn helps them return to their
communities better off than when they entered.
You know and they tell you, “ Okay, you need to be in education.
You need, uh, to be more self-help type of program”, you know
anger management, things like that, you know. They try and, you
know, focus you in a certain area based on your crime and, you
know, the things that you’ve talked to them about over the period
of time that you’ve been here. And they watch you grow, and they
watch you develop. And, yes, you get certificates of completion so
you can feel good about yourself, that you actually did something
and you have something to show for your achievements. But, you
know, now they’re taking those things away, and there’s going to
be a lot of women here that a) don’t have a job or b) are going
to be working fifteen hours, and that’s not very much money or
c) they’re gonna be broke, you know. There’s going to be more
fighting, there’s going to be more theft.
These views provide substantial evidence of the demand for more services
by respondents. They also help to understand the nature of responses in the
survey instrument by showing that while respondents do demand more social
assistance to help them negotiate a competitive labor market while main-
taining their own responsibilities, obviously cognizant of the effects which
macro-economic policy has on their life chances. While the demand for un-
employment assistance, whether in the form of cash payments or employment
services, was slightly expected, the demand for childcare across both male
and female participants was particularly striking. This is especially so as
interviewees saw the role for childcare as a labor market strategy first and
foremost.
7.5 Experience of Criminal Sanction
Returning to more political issues (and specifically experiences which are
particular to the massive felon population in the United States), interviewees
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were asked their views regarding the meaning of the loss of their voting
rights, how they perceived of the underlying reason for such policies, and if
they believed political actors would be receptive to their voice in the absence
of these policies. Beginning with the primary study participants, Daryll
expressed his feelings about losing his right to vote:
When you first hear that you lost your right to vote, even if you
never voted in your entire life, just the for the mere fact that it
was taken away from you. It really puts some distance between
you and society. It really makes you feel like you in that “other ”
category, whatever “other” may be. You know what I’m saying.
You no longer see yourself as being a part of any community,
any...it’s just you and your criminal activity. You and whatever
got you in there. You know, well damn, they already written me
off. They didn’t take, but you know, they done take my time,
they done took my money, they done took all this, and now they
took my right to vote. They pretty much just written me off.
Fuck them. So, you know. versus some that says, well, I can’t
wait to get it back, maybe I can do something different this time.
You know?
For Jacob, the loss of the right to vote was more circumspect, explicitly
connected to aspects of political power and control.
Well it’s kinda simple to me. They need me to pay taxes but
my vote don’t matter. I’m paying a guy who’s basically saying
“fuck you”. I’m paying his check. I hate to be explicit, but that’s
basically what it is. I mean they make mistakes, so do we. Ours
is more systematic, there’s is more [a] slap on the wrist.
Meanwhile, William again saw the overwhelming problems of daily life as
too overbearing to be concerned about the loss of his vote, for him there
was “just too much goin on to worry about politics. You’re just trying to
live. Everybody is just trying to get by”. David, speaking for himself and
others who had had their rights suspended, echoed these feelings towards the
ostracism from political life.
...they think, ok, you took my rights away, well, ... that, anything
I do, shouldn’t really matter. I mean, you make that person right
there the lowest scum of the earth. I mean, whatever I do now, I
mean, y’all don’t care. Y’all taking my rights away. Cuz I got a
charge, and like I say, everybody is not, everybody is not guilty.
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Some people might be innocent, just like I said, just got chopped
off, or just got caught up in the wrong place. So, that’s the way
I look at it.
Given the strong feelings of interviewees towards the loss of their voting
rights, especially in light of their general lack of trust in government and
political actors, their views on the reason for such policies provide a useful
insight into the mindsets of those directly affected concerning these policies.
As noted in Chapter 4, several competing theories have been forwarded con-
cerning felon disenfranchisement statutes. Four theories stand out. In no
particular order, these theories revolve around the use of felon disenfran-
chisement as a racist policy, as a means to suppress the Democratic vote
share, as a way to remove anti-law and order preferences, and (as argued
in this work) as a means of suppressing a labor vote. From the evidence of
the qualitative interviews, however, it is not readily discernible which theory
resonates more with the disenfranchised themselves.
From the perspective of some, the racial vote suppression theory is seen
as the probable cause of felon disenfranchisement policy. As Daryll viewed
the issue, felon disenfranchisement was a policy of control over African Amer-
icans. In his words:
The first thing that came to mind, was that, once again, 70-80
percent of the prison populations are African Americans. And so,
if you want to keep a foothold on any particular individual, then
you cut off the amount of say that they have in certain things.
You cut off the communication, and that is definitely an effective
way to do it.
This view was echoed by James* as well. In his view:
To be honest, I think that they, I think that they just want less
blacks to vote, you know what I’m saying? ‘Cause 90 percent of
people’s that’s in jail, they’s black anyway, or on probation or
whatever. I feel, I feel that’s what it is though. Less black people
to vote, you know?
Lucas, while seeing disenfranchisement policies as a way to “weed out cer-
tain types of people ... and to bring in certain types of people”, and further
more as a method of “putting [people] down” and eliminating their voice,
did not draw such racial divisions. David, recalling his time incarcerated,
recounted his surprise of many whom he considered capable and intelligent,
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regardless of their crimes. In his view, disenfranchisement served as a method
for suppressing voices which might upset the status quo. Regarding one ac-
quaintance in particular, “Tom”, Lucas felt: “it hurts some of them, like
him... yeah, he like, what I say, he might could throw some issues out there
that might be good. And just, if someone with a little more power than him
will listen”. Craig* also viewed the central reason for disenfranchisement
as a manner of suppressing the views of divergent preferences, though did
not indicate whether this was because of racist or other motivations. In his
words: “I guess the reason why they didn’t, why they don’t let offenders vote
is because they, maybe they wouldn’t agree with some of their theories and
they wouldn’t elect them”.
Others, such as Jacob (noted earlier), connected the loss of political voice
to political-economic power relations, a theme which was also evident in
the perspective of Susan*, who linked disenfranchisement directly with the
removal of rights from the poor.
So it’s like you take society and there’s this little criminal element,
and then some of them change and they get better, and then
they can’t vote? But they’ve seen the downtrodden, poor side
of society, and it’s like, I’m sure this isn’t intentional, but it’s
like the high-ups, the upper portion of society is saying “we don’t
really want more people to vote” and so all of the one’s involved
in crime, and you know, that’s like, most of the people involved in
crime are poor. So if they change and get better and get educated
we really don’t want them becoming community activists, you
know what I’m saying?
These sentiments were also reflected in the views of Paul*, who combined
the previous assertions of Lucas, Craig*, and Jacob with his own detailed
perspective. For Paul*, the use of felon disenfranchisement laws is primarily
a way for powerful interests to shore up their grip on those who are most
governed (i.e., those who come into most contact with the government).
Um, if people had the right to vote that were in prison, or felons
that don’t have the right to vote, if they were involved in the
process as much as I am – I understand that some people really
don’t give a damn - Um, but if the people that do, uh, and were
involved or had the right to vote, I’m sure they would not be
voting for people who are passing things like the Prison Litigation
Reform Act.6 You know? And I know a lot, a lot of prisoners
6The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 was a comprehensive overhaul of remedies
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are involved in government just because we are governed more
than any citizen and we have the least amount of say. And that’s
rather ironic. You know, we’re governed more than anyone and
yet we have no voice in that government body. Yeah. And that’s,
and so, you know, I think that’s one reason the government does
not want us to have the right to vote is because if they, if we did,
we would not be, we would not allow these people to be elected.
Or we wouldn’t vote for them.
While felony offenders certainly cannot be regarded as a homogeneous
racial or ethnic grouping of citizens, even despite the large proportion of
African American males sentenced to supervision, their class positions and
experiences as the “most governed” members of society does place them at
a unique crossroad in the political landscape. While some see the raison
d’eˆtre of criminal disenfranchisement through the lens of the racial theory,
many more see these policies as predominantly strategies to reduce the voice
that citizens and their communities have in self-government. Interviewees
suggested these policies existed because political actors feared their voices
would challenge their (re)election chances, as well as the policies which they
pursue. Poverty and inequality in the US is interminably clothed in racial
narratives and discrimination, and thus the potential impact which felon
disenfranchisement has on policy agendas, and specifically welfare policy, is
likely to be tinted with such overtones. That said, the voice of interviewees
couches the policy of felon disenfranchisement not only in terms of racial
animus, but in terms of suppression of lower and working class political
power. This is in-line with the results received from the quantitative research
involving corresponding items.
7.6 Discussion
Taken together, the views from interviewees deepens the interpretation of the
quantitative survey results. One of the more unexpected findings, which is
corroborated in the quantitative analysis, is the modesty of the preferences of
the disenfranchised felon. That is, the disenfranchised represent a practical
voice in the political discourse, not a radical overhaul of the legal or welfare
systems. Respondents viewed the political process as in need of rules and
regulation, but with a degree of acceptance that politicians do pay heed to
available to prisoners to reproach states. It limited the scope of rights available to prisoners
to address grievances.
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the constituents who they view as important.
Interviewees viewed welfare as an essential part of government action,
and especially favored policies which enhance the ability of workers to live
in relative security. As with the quantitative results, interviewees were not
particularly, or overly, generous across the board. Indeed, while the topics
directly covering the preferences of benefit amount and conditions were lim-
ited, those who did voice their views felt that benefit fraud was a problem
from their own perspective and that limits ought to be put in place to pre-
vent abuse or over-reliance. Thus, while respondents desired more protection
from the government in terms of social assistance and insurance programs,
they did so with the caveat that it ought to be provided on the basis of need
and work ethic. As such, it is not that a “felon vote” would expropriate the
resources of the many to encourage the idleness of the few. To the contrary.
It seems all the more obvious that given their first-hand experiences, when
faced with making actual policies, the disenfranchised might actually make
more frugal demands on the government in more working-class friendly man-
ners than some of the more active liberal members of the widely perceived
“welfare friendly” Democratic party. Put in simpler terms, an enfranchised
felon population, two-thirds of which reside in their communities, seem likely
to support policies which focus on practical solutions for the poor and work-
ing class.
In terms of a constituency, from the evidence thus far, the main areas of
concern for the disenfranchised felon voter appear to be those which revolve
around pragmatic programs in the social insurance, assistance, and correc-
tion tiers of the state. In areas such as education and childcare, interviewees
saw the benefit of such programs as ways to help citizens secure and progress
in their careers, and even deride higher education in the liberal arts as coun-
terproductive - instead voicing preference for vocational and trade oriented
training programs. It is quite likely, if many others also follow the views
of Markus for instance, that many of the disenfranchised would prefer more
affordable, hands-on, trade programs to a liberal arts education. Aside from
their preferences for welfare programs, however, one of the more interesting
findings from both the primary and secondary analysis came not from what
was mentioned, but rather what was not mentioned. None of the intervie-
wees analyzed promoted any sort of anti-law and order preferences.
Rather, many saw policing institutions as public bodies which should re-
spect citizens and be bound by the principles of non-discretionary power. As
such, it might of course lead to a case where law and order policies would be
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limited in their liberties to exert street level discretion in the execution of du-
ties; however, this need not be seen as a detriment to law and order, but more
so as a regulation of the policing powers of the state by those affected by it.
Indeed, of the opinions raised by those interviewed, only two major themes
came to the fore concerning law and order issues. One was the desire to see
personal liberties safe-guarded, and the other concerned primarily greater
resource allocation and management of programs to promote (re)integration.
Ironically, the enormous politically disenfranchised felon population might
be the biggest untapped resource in advocating for increased funding for cor-
rectional departments. Considering the concentration of constituents located
within the same facility (i.e., citizens are typically supervised in relative prox-
imity to their home communities), under the same conditions, and in direct
contact with so many government administrators, it is not surprising that
those who come into closest contact with these citizens are counted among
their supporters for re-enfranchisement. As Gwendolyn C. Chunn, President
of the American Correctional Association, has stated: “We’ve got record
numbers of people who’ll be coming home this year: 600,000 people - that’s
over half a million people. And when we’ve got those kinds of numbers,
we need to fully engage those people in being good citizens.” (ACLU 2008)
While legal and philosophical debates have gone far to ascertain the benefits
and pitfalls of any such policy movement, the fields of democratic governance
as concerns political economic policy making may still require further explo-
ration. From the results here, such an inclusion of previously disenfranchised
constituents may demand a change in political platforms from affected and
aspiring political actors. While those who advocate enfranchisement on legal
and/or moral grounds present firm arguments, it is the duty of those inter-
ested in political processes and social policy to keep a watchful eye on any
success in dismembering such policies.
Finally, the secondary qualitative analysis presented here compliments
the previous findings of Manza and Uggen (2006)in a variety of ways. First,
while limited, the evidence from the primary research shows that the results
based in Minnesota need not be limited to that state’s disenfranchised pop-
ulation. In fact, the results illustrate more that the findings of Manza and
Uggen may be more generalizable than they assume. Certainly more work
should be undertaken to validate such a supposition. Secondly, the SQA re-
vealed numerous themes in the Manza and Uggen data than were previously
reported. This is rather expected, as their study focused on highly related
topics. Indeed, many more issues existed in both datasets than could be
given space for in such a brief treatment. Larger qualitative projects might
make use of the wealth of knowledge and insights which can be gained es-
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pecially as pertains to hard to reach populations such as offenders and the
unemployed by this method.
In closing this chapter, the results presented here and previously should
not necessarily be taken as praise nor criticism for social correction services.
Such is not the intention of presenting the views of interviewees on their
experiences under supervision. Indeed, there are many instances where the
well-being of the individual and the community are most likely better served
in dedicated clinical, educative, and/or training environments. However,
in lieu of the ability to make use of such services - either because of lack
of access or dearth of provision, it appears that the services provided by
social corrections do supplement and even substitute the demand for such
services in their respective communities. In as much, the exclusion of the
voice of such current and potential clients clearly implies a demobilization of
such preferences in the political arena and particularly in areas most affected
by criminal disenfranchisement policies. It is to this subject, the spatial
exclusiveness of criminal disenfranchisement, which this thesis now turns.
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Chapter 8
Spatial Exclusiveness
1 percent of electoral districts accounted for nearly 24 percent of
prisoners; but less than 5 percent of the population (Behan 2012:
22)
This chapter presents exploratory work on the spatial dimensions of po-
litical demobilization in the context of felon disenfranchisement in the state
of North Carolina. Using GIS analysis methods and data at the sub-county
level, I present evidence which addresses two fundamental premises concern-
ing these policies. First, building on the assertions (again) of Uggen and
Manza (2006), I use data from the North Carolina Department of Correc-
tions to locate those areas at the census tract level which have the highest
rates of prison entries as a proxy for state sponsored political demobiliza-
tion. Second, combining these results with census and electoral data from
the North Carolina Board of Elections, I parse data on disenfranchisement
and rates of social welfare take up and political partisanship to show the
spatial exclusiveness which political disenfranchisement entails.
The chapter proceeds in two sections. Section 8.1 provides both an
overview of applicable works in the field of spatial analysis as concerns po-
litical processes, followed by concerns related to the subject matter at hand
(8.2). Particularly, 8.2 brings together the underlying concerns inherent in
geographic clustering of populations and the ramifications of a disenfran-
chised electorate for partisan politics. While the review of the literature is a
narrow assessment of existing work, and not intended to provide the entirety
of the literature in the field of spatial analysis or its use in the social sciences,
it provides a sufficient basis for the exploration of the importance of spatial
variation in this study. Following this, Section 8.3 lays out the findings of the
analysis on spatial exclusiveness in the study area. Section 8.4 concludes with
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discussion of the findings and consideration of future avenues of research.
8.1 Spatial Analysis and Political Processes
The probability that two randomly drawn individuals exhibit the
same partisanship is a function of the distance between their res-
idential locations. (Rodden 2010)
The social sciences are rooted in contextual settings distributed across
geographic space. The axiom of Tobler’s law reminds us that “everything
is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things” (Tobler 1970). This issue is particularly important for the political
sciences, where the dynamics of political processes are played out at the indi-
vidual level and aggregated to often arbitrary electoral units. The geographic
spread of political processes are an essential dynamic of understanding the
ways in which they are both input and output of democratic governance. The
use of spatial analysis in political science is by no means novel. Harvard’s
Fredrick Turner (1914) had earlier documented the contours of the Ameri-
can political landscape to explore the inter- and intra-regional sectionalism
which eluded views concentrated on differences between North and South
(Cho and Nicley 2008). Contemporary investigations, however, trace their
agendas to more familiar research topics - notably that of Valdimer Orlando
Key, Jr’s (1949) (hereafter Key) seminal work, Southern Politics in State
and Nation. Key’s work was critical in elucidating the deception caused by
assuming micro-level behaviors from macro-level results - not least of which
shapes the outcome of distributional policies.
A mainstay of the discipline, especially for Southern politics in the US,
one of the most significant aspects of Key’s work was the illustration of the
fractures existing in what was otherwise considered the “solid South” (i.e.,
the notion that the Southern region was homogeneously supportive of con-
servative Democratic party principles). Key illustrated, for instance, that
the distribution of support in the Alabama Gubernatorial race of 1946 was
clearly split along socio-economic boundaries.1 Figure 8.1 shows the distri-
bution of support for Jim Folson (a populist candidate advocating increased
spending on elderly care, education, and infrastructure) and Handy Ellis (ad-
vocating low taxes and support for business interests). Folsom, an outspoken
1Key’s results concerned the Democratic primaries. Because of the power of the Demo-
cratic party at the time, primaries formed the “real” power in determining which prefer-
ences inside the party would act as the future government.
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opponent of the upper class domination of the state, drew nearly all his sup-
port from low-income white areas in the northern and southern most parts
of the state. Correspondingly, Ellis garnered the lion’s share of support from
the traditional Black Belt, those areas populated by the elite of Alabama
society.2 Due to the de facto disenfranchisement of African Americans dur-
ing this time, the electoral power of the wealthier Whites predominated in
this region. Despised by the Ku Klux Klan and segregationist whites, Fol-
som (following his election victory) instituted a broad policy of infrastructure
development and bi-racial compromise.3
Figure 8.1: V.O.Key’s Map of Support for Pro-Liberal Governor Folsom
(Corbett, n.d.)
Such work has enabled the preservation of important political historical
matters for the study of politics. Without such work, and without the clear
illustration of clustering of preferences, the historical records often regresses
to inaccurate assumptions regarding political units (e.g., states or regions).
2The term “Black Belt” originally refers to the area of the state (and extended to the
region) where the soil for agriculture was particularly rich. Because of the plantation
system, this area was concomitantly populated by African Americans by which contortion
of the term has arrived.
3According to Stewart (1975), Folsom pledged to “‘scrub out’ the capitol by striking
first at the autocratic power of the Black Belt by reapportioning the legislature...repeal
the poll tax, ...provide free textbooks every Alabama school child, and ...pave farm to
market roads in every Alabama county” (193).
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While Key’s work is also noteworthy for identifying the “friends and neigh-
bors” processes at work in political campaigns, the methods of clearly re-
porting the demarcations of partisanship have continued to influence work
in contemporary political studies, as well as revisiting historical accounts of
the settling of the US and other countries (DeBats 2009).
This work has led to the advancement in understanding the problem of
ecological inference in social processes. That is, aggregation of behaviors at
varying levels provides the researcher with an overall feel for the dominant
process at work, however it masks the underlying processes which are of more
substantive interest. The attention to physical space is thus an important
element in developing both theory and the models which test them (Cho and
Gimpel 2012; Sui and Hugill 2002; Baybeck and Huckfeldt 2002; Cho 2003;
Gimpel et. al. 2008). Indeed, spatial modelling has become an integral part
of the quantitative researcher’s toolkit for accurately modelling many social,
economic, and political issues (Anselin and Bera 1998; Anselin 2002). Inad-
equately specifying spatial factors into common OLS estimates, for instance,
can lead to misspecification and unreliable estimates and error terms (Cho
and Gimpel 2010). Advances in spatial lag and error methods, as well as
utilization of Geographic Weighted Regressions (GWR), have increased our
capacity to make reliable estimates of social and political phenomena (Cho
and Gimpel 2012).4
Despite the history of spatial analysis and the advances in its application,
“geography”, argues Rodden (2010:332), has constituted “a blind spot for
political scientists”. The spatial clustering of similar traits are by no means
novel (a fact many human geographers and demographers have long been
aware of), and Galton’s problem persists in the social sciences. This is par-
ticularly true for the political sciences because, as Darmofal (2006:2) argues,
data used in the study of political processes are inextricably spatial data.5
Geography matters precisely because variables such as socio-economic status
are not randomly distributed across space. Likewise, political partisanship
is not distributed normally or evenly across space and this has implications
for electoral systems based on representative democracy, especially those em-
4For further reading on robust techniques of spatial modelling and specification, see
Bivand, Pebesma,and Go´mez-Rubio (2013), as well as Anseling and Rey (2010).
5Galton’s Problem states that aggregate data on social behaviors obscure the underly-
ing processes of the phenomenon. Phenomenon may be observed to co-exist or co-locate
because they are consistent with underlying variables shared by differentiated groups, or
via a diffusion process whereby one group is affected directly by another’s interaction (Ross
and Homer 1976 ).
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ploying plurality systems - such as the US.
Detection and Determination of Spatial Processes: Analysis of the
variation of spatial processes often takes on one of two, and often both,
courses of analysis. Establishing the contours of the phenomenon of inter-
ests remains a particularly common use of spatial analysis. Findings such as
those from Key’s analysis of partisanship and clusters of socio-economic and
demographic variables is one example of this technique. The use of describing
such patterns emerges across several disciplines, most notably in the fields of
epidemiology. Geographic mapping of outbreaks, for instance, are crucial in
estimating the origin and intensity of infectious or contagious diseases. How-
ever, such uses are transferable to the social sciences as well. Such techniques
have been employed to determine the prevalence and density of criminal ac-
tivity (Ackerman and Murray 2004), incidence of poverty (Bedi, Coudouel,
and Simler 2007), and the determination of resettlement areas of released
prisoners (LaVigne, Cowan and Brazzell 2006). Such studies offer valuable
insight into processes which can inform policy decisions more effectively. Af-
ter determining whether spatial variance is significant - typically with the use
of statistical methods such as Moran’s I or Getis Ord - researchers can move
to investigate whether such variation in spatial distribution is accounted for
by first-order or second-order processes. While the present study focuses pri-
marily on the determination of clustering of political processes, and not the
more rigorous analytic endeavor of determining how and why they do so, a
brief overview of these issues is presented for the reader’s information.
First order processes refer to the spread of phenomena or processes over
the entirety of ones data. To put this another way, first-order processes are
produced by characteristics of the spatial location at which processes are
observed. Lack of spatial stationarity is an indicator that one has a first
order process at work. Stationarity is determined by whether a phenomenon
is statistically independent of its absolute location.6 Second-order processes,
by contrast, are spatial processes in which the underlying mechanism is rela-
tive to each unit. Units influence other units, and this process results in the
formation of non-homogeneous distributions of phenomena over space. Units
cluster in space as with the first-order results, however such clustering is the
6Take for instance John Snow’s 19th century use of neighborhood mapping to determine
the source of a Cholera outbreak in the Soho district of London. Because the deaths caused
by the outbreak represented spatial non-stationarity, the event was an example of spatial
auto-correlation. The deaths were contingent on the environment near the contaminated
water source.
387
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Filings - Magnets (b) Magnetized Filings
Figure 8.2: 1st and 2nd Order Processes
result of an interaction effect.
These two processes can be illustrated using an example of iron filings
on a sheet of paper. In the first situation, the iron filings are placed ran-
domly onto the surface of the paper with magnets placed directly under the
paper (Figure 8.2a). The resulting pattern distributes the units respectively
across the surface. In the second situation, iron filings are magnetized and
again distributed randomly onto the surface of the paper, without underly-
ing magnets. The attraction between the units segregates them respectively
across the surface (Figure 8.2b). The processes are facially identical, however
the processes involved are inherently different. Beyond the task of identifying
whether phenomena are significantly clustered exists the further analytic pro-
cess of determining which process produces these conglomerations. These are
important apsects when seeking to understand how phenomenon congregate
(or do not) in particular locations over space - and thus which administrative
units agents fall in.
Sorting the Electorate: While some scholars have pursued the dynam-
ics of campaign strategies and results (e.g., Thielemann 1993; Lewis-Beck
and Rice 1983), others have pursued agendas studying the effects of prox-
imity on social policy, especially as these relate to partisan advantage. Such
issues arise given the history of racial segregation and under-representation
of minority interests globally, but strikingly so in the US. While spatial clus-
tering is not always negative for minority populations (Cho, Gimpel, and
Dyck 2006), the history of ethnic and racial segregation has corresponded
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and exacerbated high rates of social, economic, and political deprivation. It
is these areas which spatial research has generated insightful findings which
help to shed light on many of the current questions of political behavior and
geographic sorting.
Sorting, the process by which individuals cluster into homogeneous group-
ings of particular characteristics (e.g., race, religion, or political disposition),
has developed beneficial insights into human interaction and non-interaction.
This phenomenon, however, is one which remains a contentious issue. For the
political sciences, a major concern is whether individuals actively and inten-
tionally migrate or encourage migration to develop more homogeneous com-
munities. For the interests here, we are concerned (primarily) whether agents
select in or out of spatial locations based on political factors - e.g., partisan-
ship. There is some indication that internal migrations do exhibit political
sorting (i.e., relocation based on partisan considerations). Cho, Gimpel, and
Hui (2013), using individual level data of movers with partisan identifiers,
suggests that after controlling for “a host of neighborhood characterstics”,
Democrats and Republicans sort for political reasons. Furthermore, they
argue that this tendency is stronger amongst Republicans than Democrat
movers. Bolstering this argument, Nall and Mummolo (2013) find that once
“valence” issues (e.g., good schools, proximity to living conveniences, and
low-crime) are taken into consideration, decisions to relocate to particular
geographic settings among those who identify as partisan do play a signifi-
cant role in the sorting process. They find that Republicans and Democrats
prefer “Republican” and “Democratic” states and cities. While Republi-
can partisans gravitate towards sub-urban and rural placements, Democrats
tend towards more urban settings. The propensity for such environmental
settings, attached to political preferences, has serious repercussions for po-
litical representation, an issue I will explore in more detail.
Despite these findings, the majority of movers simply do not relocate
based on their partisan preferences. The valence issues (careers, housing,
etc.) of day-to-day concerns largely outweigh positional concerns such as
political co-location. While political actors may recognize the importance of
boundaries of partisan geographic units, citizens seem less concerned with
(and likely even less inclined to consider) the ramifications of migration into
and out of partisan strongholds. Individuals thus gravitate largely towards
material benefits which disperse their preferences accordingly. The resulting
contours of the political geographic landscape exhibit variable characteristics
consistent with gravitational models of spatial distribution. What occurs
is a spatial distribution where neighboring partisan preferences are closely
389
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
related, and this clustering of partisanship (with the exception of natural
boundaries such as riparian borders) traverses administrative boundaries,
such that units often share similar attributes as neighboring units (Cho and
Nicley 2008). Because electoral districts reflect population change and enu-
meration, such migrations can affect the dynamics of electoral contests and
their concomitant policy developments.
Boundaries of Political Geographic Units: The evolving research on
political geography provides a more holistic view of the dynamics of political
processes which impact electoral and therefore policy results. The control
over which preferences are represented by which representatives, and indeed
if they are represented at all (e.g., incarcerated citizens and/or foreign born
- non-naturalized residents), has been the source of numerous debates and
controversies. From the infamous 1812 Gerrymandering in Massachusetts
to augment Republican prospects in the Senate, to the current controveries
(Eggen 2005 ), the strategic importance of geography for partisan politics
has remained a salient issue. Figure 8.3 illustrates particularly egregious in-
stances in four state congressional districts (CD): CD 4 - Illinois, CD 11 -
Georgia (1992); CD 4 - Louisiana (1992), and CD 11 - North Carolina (1992).
While Illinois’ CD 4 remains intact, both Georgia and Louisiana amended
their boundaries to reflect more compact districts. North Carolina’s CD 12
has been only slightly modified and remains controversial. Such distortions
are a serious cause for concern regarding the manipulation of spatial bound-
aries of political units.
In particular, these issues raise important concerns about “cracking” and
“packing” districts to achieve particular ends. In the case of North Carolina,
following the Republican controlled 2011 redistricting of the state, partisan
interests dismantled the competitive district 11 by removing the urban center
of Asheville and substituting its constituents with Republican precincts in
the North. The legislature then migrated Asheville voters into CD 10, an
overwhelmingly Republican district (Ohlemacher 2014 ). This adds to the
already apparent packing (predominantly Democratic) of minorities into CD
12 to create a majority-minority district which, at 2012, maintained 50.4 per-
cent identified African American residents compared with 37.6 percent White
residents (Census 2014 ).7 Such moves emphasize the continuing dynamics of
7The facts surrounding the creation of District 12 in 1992 are themselves telling. Follow-
ing the 1990 census, NC legislators were tasked with the redrawing of district boundaries.
The creation of one racial majority district following the redistricting process was struck
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Figure 8.3: Controversial Contemporary Redistricting (Source: Ebersole
2012)
political maneuvering and spatial concerns. They also illustrate the complex-
ities of assuming micro-level political preferences from macro-level political
boundaries. North Carolina marks an exceptional case in which both partisan
interests have taken to manipulating political boundaries to solidify political
gain.
down by the US Justice Department under President Bush (Sr.), demanding the state
appropriate two districts under the Voting Rights Act (Rosen 1993 ). The Democrat
controlled legislature complied with the ruling by creating the 12th District along Inter-
state Highway 85, which protected the incumbent interests by avoiding a dissection of the
Democrat power-base. Several lawsuits immediately emerged on claims that the drawing
of borders based on racial concerns violated the Equal Protection Clause, ironically es-
tablished to protect the interests of minority citizens (Culp 1997 ). The Supreme Court,
however, maintained the legitimacy of the persistently serpentine district.
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Thus, because the boundaries of political units are in fact endogenous to
the political process (i.e., controlled by the party in power), sorting (and by
extension, clustering) of preferences becomes instrumental in the translation
of those interests into seats. These issues are at the heart of redistributional
politics. By distorting boundaries of representation, partisan preferences,
on either side, are able to distort the flow of public funds which accrue to
the electorate and their respective communities. Ansolabehere, Gerber, and
Snyder (2002) found that due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v
Carr (1962), sub-state entities (i.e., counties) received substantially altered
levels of economic resources from state legislatures.8 The “equalization of
voting strength of counties”, they argue, “produced equalization of transfers
of state funds to the counties” (40). However, this expenditure differential
was not captured in levels of spending, per se. Rather, what was modified
on account of the equalization of democratic strength was the distribution of
spending: “the post-Baker reapportionment redistributed billions of dollars
per year [to counties]” (41). This phenomenon, they find, is universal across
the US, resolving any contentions that malapportionment was an inherently
Southern problem. Malapportionment grossly over-weighted the preferences
of rural constituents in respect to their urban (largely Democrat and liberal)
counterparts. Geographic (re)districting and apportionment, then, are not
simply a reflection of underlying political power processes, but a part of the
power that operatives have at their disposal. The case of North Carolina
illustrates this point.
The structuring of the political-spatial landscape has repercussions for
resource allocation. Chen (2010) and Chen and Malhotra (2007) show that
increasing the ratio of lower house (House) representation within an upper
house (Senate) district reduces the expected returns from “pork barrelling”
to the respective constituency. That is, more centralized and parsimonious
political boundaries increase the probability that representatives will secure
special projects (and the concomitant economic benefits) for their constituen-
cies. This occurs as the ability of actors to claim credit for such rewards is
more readily ascribable. Where multiple actors compete for tribute, the in-
centive to return “particularistic benefits to their constituents” is abridged
(Chen 2010:317). The affect of boundary limits and representational account-
ability, especially in majoritarian political systems, also influences whether
and when constituents will punish incumbents. Where local policy is decen-
8After Baker, states were mandated to apportion representation based on population
– one person, one vote. Before Baker, it was common for rural populations to dominate
legislatures at the expense of urban residents.
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tralized, or where the causal relationship between social and economic policy
success is largely outside policy control, such a representative is less likely to
be held accountable.
Economic voting - the dynamic between the economic situation of a par-
ticular administrative unit and its lead representative(s) - is dependent on
where the constituency places the blame of “failure”. Ebeid and Rodden
(2006) find that in states which are more dependent on primary products
(e.g., agriculture and mining) as means of income are less likely to hold
incumbents accountable for the results of bad crop seasons or depleted re-
sources. States which are less reliant on primary products, and thus more
integrated with industrial and post-industrial economic systems, tend to hold
their incumbent governors accountable. Thus, states with higher autonomy
over their economic performance are more likely to critically evaluate sub-
national offices based on economic performance as opposed to the national
economic situation. This entails that across the board, governors and other
state level officials are increasingly held responsible for the economic perfor-
mance of their own states instead of shirking performance onto the national
economy or natural phenomenon. By extension, this would also entail that
the benefit of excluding disgruntled constituents may be more useful in urban
areas where job performance is more open for consideration in constituent
voting decisions.
Rodden (2010) elaborates more forcefully on the potential impact of polit-
ically delimited spatial areas. Because individuals are clustered at different
spatial locations, their median preferences are not the same as the inter-
district (or inter-electoral unit) median preferences. The clustering of the
left in urban districts and former centers of transportation hubs is in some
respects, according to Rodden, an artifact of previous periods of industri-
alization where the left established primacy in these locales. This artifact
has produced pockets of political preferences which persist into the present.
Conventional theoretical models, posits Rodden (2010:325), excessively as-
sume a symmetric distribution of preferences across units. In such models,
the units to the left of the median are taken up by the left party, the units to
the right by the right party. The strategies of both parties must be such that
they attain the median voter while ensuring the extremes do not splinter off
and form their own party and diminish their electoral power.
Electoral threat, then, may operate also at a more aggregate level than
simply punishing at the polls. Staving off entrant parties or splinter groups
may benefit from barriers to the franchise. This is where the strength of
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the two-party system in the US begins to impact such issues. Entrance of
alternative parties in proportional systems are more common, where issue
parties may emerge to fill unsatisfied gaps in preferences. In the US, how-
ever, the dominance of the two party system discourages alternative political
party formation and entails that it is the primaries which hold the effective
power over platform decisions. With broader bases of support, parties are
pressed to construct broader platforms which satisfy the greatest number of
relevant constituents. Narrower differences in the distribution of supporter
preferences entails that parties are able to consider and deliver more succinct
platforms. In a situation where the left party in a two party contest tries to
capture the support of the left-most district with an asymmetric skew (i.e.,
further to the left) to avoid the entry of a far-left party, it will jeopardize
its supporters near the median of the inter-unit distribution. In Rodden’s
argument, where the party in question attempts to retain this far-left fac-
tion, opportunity arises for the entrance of a center-left party, or (in a two
party contest) to right party defection. This goes someway to help explain
the “Southern Democrat”, and it certainly has support for the politics in the
ante-bellum US (i.e., the rise of populist parties). Where national leaders
are not able to enforce their will on a single coherent agenda, local represen-
tatives will “heed their constituents” and create localized policy platforms
without fear of reprisal. The termagant entrance of the Tea Party in recent
years, and the Libertarian party earlier, into mainstream politics comes to
mind. However, these offshoots have conspicuously concentrated on the right
side of the political spectrum.
This has considerable ramifications not just for partisan membership, but
for preference articulation in particular. In a plurality/ first past-the-post,
two party system, “the poor are distributed across [expansive Federal] House
districts such that they can be pivotal in less than a quarter of them” (Rod-
den 2010:336). Packing low-income preferences into homogeneous districts
may function as a way of diluting their strength even when the intention is
morally and/or legally defensible (e.g., to promote racial or ethnic represen-
tation). Due to the manner in which districts are regulated in the US, it is
much less likely for its poor to have a say in policy than in other countries
like France or the UK (Juskso 2011). The diffusion of income groups over
space acts in tandem with their numeric strength. “The geographic distri-
bution of income groups”, claims Jusko, “and especially low-income voters,
importantly distributes the structure of party competition” (Jusko 2014:12).
For redistributive policy making, and the welfare state, these aspects
have proved to be fundamental to the development of electoral rules coincid-
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ing with greater electoral distribution (i.e., franchise extension). As Rodden
(2010) argues, through franchise extension, the rules instituted came to re-
flect concerns of the established and emerging parties so as to protect their
electoral prospects. In areas where Socialists were strong (in urban and min-
ing areas), they preferred a proportional system because “their geographic
concentration in a small number of high-population districts led to dramatic
bias in the translation of votes to seats” (Rodden 2010:337). Moreover, this
builds on an understanding of why, in some circumstances, conservatives ad-
vocated for enlarging the pool of eligible voters. Given the strength of left
parties in areas under Liberal control, such a move could be expected to
split the vote in those areas and hand control to the Conservative minority.
To counteract this, Liberals advocated a proportional system. Thus, in this
view, in Denmark (for example) where urban areas were the strongholds of
Conservatives (and where Socialists would diminish their power) it was a
coalition of Conservatives and Socialists who argued for proportional repre-
sentation to shore up their electoral prospects.
The Surplus Vote: Taken together, the importance of spatial placement
of preferences becomes an integral part of the story of political power. To
recap, the equalization of representation has been shown to bring about a cor-
responding equalization of distribution of resources. While political strate-
gists continue to “crack” and “pack” districts into favorable playing fields
for their own interests, it is also the case that this is made less extreme by
the “natural” sorting of partisan preferences into homogeneous spatial clus-
ters which break across political and/or administrative borders (Cho and
Nicley 2008). Simply put, even without political interference, preferences
tend towards like preferences. Democrats congregate in dense urban areas
and former industrial and transportation hubs; while Republicans gravitate
to more sparsely populated areas surrounding these left leaning islands of
Democratic support. Paradoxically, efforts to increase racial representation
(i.e., minority-majority districts) leads to packing districts and reducing any
partisan advantage in the overall contest. Furthermore, by moving racial mi-
norities (especially lower income minorities) into majority-minority districts,
voter turnout may actually suffer (Keele and White 2011).
Because such safe districts offer little incentive in the way of preference or
partisan competition, the inclination to turnout may actually decline instead
of rise. While the creation of such districts had initially boosted participa-
tion following the VRA, such gains have been shown to have waned (ibid.).
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Where the low income vote is corralled into tight district spatial concentra-
tion, any additional vote for the dominant political group (by and large the
Democratic vote in urban cores) is in essence “wasted” in such a surplus
district. Thus, after redistricting in the state of North Carolina, the three
remaining Democratic stronghold districts (Congressional Districts 1, 4, and
12) returned their incumbents with seventy-five, seventy-four, and eighty per-
cent of the vote respectively in 2012 (Ohlemacher 2014). These cases are of
course extreme, and produced from explicit political processes designed for
such ends. The more “unintentional gerrymandering” (Chen and Rodden
2013) caused by sorting based on valence issues contribute to a more subtle
partitioning of the electoral landscape. For the case of the political disen-
franchisement of felony offenders, this has a particularly distressing impact.
As I will illustrate further, the spatial exclusiveness of political disenfran-
chisement of felons has a particularly exclusive impact for those areas where
partisanship is highest.
8.2 Co-location of Political Disenfranchisement
The issue of felon disenfranchisement, and indeed any systematic removal of
electoral power, is particularly intriguing for several reasons. The moral and
republican reasons laid out in Chapter 4 are often cited as paramount to the
issue of felon disenfranchisement. These arguments hold that such policies
are both against the rationale of republican government, and contrary to the
contractarian basis of government. The partisan issues surrounding the ex-
clusion of so many undeniably poorer and less educated, working class males
also begs attention, as noted in Chapters 6 and 7. Equally intriguing, how-
ever, is where the effect of such demobilization is concentrated. Standard
assumptions would depict lower income neighborhoods which, while they
may suffer from lower levels of political participation, would likely support
the Democratic party. While this is not inaccurate, it does obscure a poten-
tially subtle and detrimental aspect revealed in Rodden (2010) and Junsko
(2011, 2014). The removal of such constituents by and large favors Repub-
lican party interests, considering the evidence which puts support squarely
in the Democratic camp. However, because of the manner in which partisan
strengths are distributed (illustrated further in this chapter), the more in-
sidious aspect of felon disenfranchisement is not the removal of Democratic
supporters to the direct benefit of the Republican party, but also at the ben-
efit of more conservative (middle of the road) interests in the Democratic
party itself.
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Figure 8.4: Two Party Distribution
Here I revisit the proposition provided earlier by Rodden (2010). Given
symmetric distributions of two parties (e.g., Democrat and Republican), we
can assume that the main effect of the removal of offenders from the elec-
torate serves to diminish the numerical strength of the party which represents
the interests of the left. In this situation, illustrated in Figure 8.4, the losers
in the game of disenfranchisement are those associated with the party of the
left. The blue curve represents the party of the left, and the Red curve repre-
sents the party of the right. The dotted line represents the zone of exclusion
where political disenfranchised citizens are concentrated to the left.
This scenario, of course, supposes no internal distribution of preferences
within the party of the left. That is, of those who identify and support the
party of the left, there is no division of internal groups. All supporters are
members of the same faction. Felon disenfranchisement in such a scenario
implies a reduction in the overall group benefit in contests between the two
parties. However, if we differentiate groups within the party (e.g., by income
group), we can interpret a situation wherein not only does the removal of
voters benefit the opposition party, it also reduces the prospect of entry of
a more left party where the aggregate party membership fails to address its
concerns. Put simply, with exceedingly divergent interest from the center and
moderate factions within the party, the party may benefit by “trimming” its
surplus votes in areas where it has no clear and present need to be concerned
with the loss of their numerical strength. Figure 8.5 illustrates a situation
where parties are divided into 3 equal factions, growing in strength away
from the center of the x-axis. The y-axis represents levels of partisanship.
In this hypothetical scenario, we assume that the relative loss primar-
ily affects the left party (Democrats) in relation to the party of the right
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Figure 8.5: Two Party Distribution with Degrees of Partisanship
(Republicans). As the distributions represent political units, those where
exceedingly large portions of the voting age population are removed create
an artificial deficit in preference solicitation. That is, with reduced incentive
to appropriate attention to their demands, political actors (unencumbered
by viable third party entrants) cannot only tolerate loss of real or potential
supporters, they may also prefer to do so from a strategic standpoint. The
resulting scenario is one where left-party strongholds are also cradles of polit-
ical demobilization brought about by conservative/right party punitiveness
emanating from clustered partisan districts surrounding (and outnumbering)
these “islands of the left”. Such surrounding areas are themselves relatively
insulated from the criminogenic environments of commodified daily life, typi-
cally exacerbated in urban settings. According to the results presented below,
not only does the geographic mapping of communities of high-density crim-
inal disenfranchisement reveal co-location of economic and social variables
(e.g., increased poverty, larger relative minority populations, etc.), it also re-
veals co-location of partisanship clustering.9 In addition, analysis of turnout
from two election cycles (the 2006 mid-term and 2008 presidential elections)
indicates that the incidence of political disenfranchisement co-locates with
areas of low-turnout. As such, not only are these areas more partisan than
other tracts of the same party registration, their participation levels are also
lower and significantly clustered to those areas in proximity of high rates of
political disenfranchisement.
The resulting phenomenon is represented in figure 8.6, where high parti-
9Results from exploratory geo-processing further illustrate the apparent segregation of
partisanship by fixed environmental structures and zoning patterns; wherein (in the case
of the city of Raleigh in Wake county) communities are markedly corralled by industrial
and other non-residential zones, including highways and commercial estates.
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Figure 8.6: Contours of Partisan Landscape
san values for the Democratic (left) party are represented in blue, and high
values for the Republican (right) party are shaded in red. Values along the
vertical axis represent the degree of participation across space, with nega-
tive values indicating significantly lower levels of participation. The evidence
from the spatial analysis of turnout-out in the 2006 Mid-Term and 2008 Presi-
dential election cycles indicates good reason to be concerned. The clustering
of political disenfranchisement is concentrated not only in highly partisan
areas (figures 8.10 - 28), such co-location also manifests itself in areas of
significantly lower turnout (figures 8.11 - 38). Blanket political disenfran-
chisement, therefore, does not locate itself randomly across space and this is
a considerable concern for systems of representation which rely on geographic
aggregation of preferences within plurality structures.
8.3 Analysis of the Spatial Exclusiveness of
Felon Disenfranchisement
Section 8.1 has laid out an overview of how spatial processes and their re-
lated units of segregation are relevant for political representation of political
preferences. Such issues unavoidably affect, among other areas of policy,
redistributive spending. While felon disenfranchisement is, procedurally, an
outcome of criminal activity and conviction (i.e., not all crimes are prosecuted
and/or assigned felony status equally or consistently), such policies are first
and foremost political phenomenon. Such abrogations of rights, as discussed
in Chapter 4, are intrinsic to the American system. The consequences of
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such policies have only recently (i.e., within the last 40 years) developed to
such a critical mass that their intentional or unintentional repercussions can
be assessed. As such, the investigation into those policies must be reconciled
with the gamut of research on how and why political participation matters
in the system of policy making; as much as has been described previously
in this work. Adding to the findings on the development and justification of
such policies (Ch. 4), the quantitative results depicting the disenfranchised
citizen’s preferences (Ch. 6), and the elaborated views of this group on se-
lected issues (Ch. 7); the following results illustrate the political-geographic
relevance of disenfranchisement - visually mapping the co-incidence of af-
fected areas with their political features. This subsection provides a detailed
descriptive analysis of the the 6 key metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
which the main survey and interview activities were confined.
8.3.1 Confirming Respondent Spatial Origin
As the data used herein to map respondents to communities of origin, and
thereafter larger representations of those communities’ political make-up and
participation - the issue of Modified Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) must be
addressed. This is due to the variable level of aggregation used across the
datasets in the following analyses. MAUP, first addressed in Gehlke and Biehl
(1934), is approximate to the problem of Ecological Fallacy. In the most basic
terms, measuring phenomenon at different aggregations (e.g., census tracts
compared to voting districts) leads to differences in results. Such issues take
on the form of either a scale or aggregation affect; where the former applies
to the overall area of the units used, and the latter to the shape of the units
used (i.e., how an area of investigation is divided) (Taylor and Openshaw
1979; Openshaw and Rao 1995 ).
To account for this issue, electoral information has been manually aggre-
gated to the census tract level. This was decided as registration statistics
are reported at the district level, which does not allow for precise matching
of the rates given by the North Carolina Department of Corrections. As
such, the tract level registration rates based on those as of mid-year 2010
are given followed by the official district level registration rates provided by
the Wake County Board of Elections. A further analysis of all counties is
not pursued as the purposes herein entailed determining whether the general
method used to calculate registrations at the census tract level approximated
to those given at the district level. In simpler terms, the method used al-
lows the approximation of felon disenfranchisement (proxied by prison entry
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rates at 2008) and electoral statistics at the same (i.e., census tract) level
of aggregation. Precinct level data available from the Wake County Board
of Elections for the years 2008 and 2010, mapped to their respective poly-
gons, confirms the overall trend generated from the geo-processing methods
mentioned above (Figure 8.7). This mapping approximates well with the
distribution of actual electoral participation across space.
Data on respondent addresses reported by participants in the quantita-
tive study are compared with those tract centroids provided by the NCDOC
(confirmatory findings are presented in the Appendix). The results indicate
the locations of survey respondents closely approximate those areas where
increased prison entries occurred during the 2008 reporting period. That is,
using geo-statistical methods, it is possible to assess whether the sampling
process from the quantitative research stage has successfully drawn partic-
ipants from expected areas based on official records. Respondent locations
and census tract rates are presented in tandem, directly for the Raleigh-
Durham area (Figure 8.8), and in the appendix for the remaining MSAs
(Figures 14 to 18).
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Table 8.1 shows selected demographic, economic and political variables
for tracts which are found to have significant clusters of high rates of prison
entry (High-High) versus those exhibiting significant clusters of low prison
entry in 2008 (Low-Low).10 The variables, in descending order, measure
the percentage of households (per tract area) receiving nutritional assistance
for Over-60s (FSHH60), for persons 18 years and younger (FSHH18), the
unemployment rate (UNEMP), the percentage of female-headed households
(FHH), and the percentage of those 25 years and older without high-school
education (NOHS). This is followed by the percentage of those of voting age
(18 years and up) in poverty (PVAP), the percentage of each tract which
is white (WHITE) or black (BLACK) of one race. These are followed by
the median share of registered voters who are Democrat (DEM), Republican
(REP), Libertarian (LIB), or Independent/Non-Affiliated (IND). The final
three variables indicate the median value for the Republican-to-Democrat
share of the total two-party registered count (INDEX), and a measure of
turnout in the 2006 (MIDTERM) and 2008 (PRES.) elections. The first
column (DIFF.) reports the degree to which the median of High-High tracts
compared to the medians of their Low-Low counterparts. That is, it is the
difference between the median value of High-High and Low-Low tracts di-
vided by that of the Low-Low tracts.
The results are telling.11 High-High disenfranchisement tracts are nearly
150 and 25 percent more reliant on old-age (FSHH) and dependent (FSHH18)
nutritional assistance than their Low-Low counterparts. Unemployment rates
(UNEMPL), low-education (NOHS), poverty among the working population
(PVAP), and poverty among the elderly are all astonishingly higher for these
areas. In addition, the racial mix in these tracts is considerably different
than that of the Low-Low tracts. While Low-Low tracts have near four hun-
dred times fewer black residents, this does not entail that the High-High
tracts are exclusively non-white. To the contrary. The median percentage of
white residents in High-High tracts is just less than half the black population.
For Low-Low districts, this ratio is drastically different, with whites at
10The Standard error for High-High and Low-Low tracts is 0.264 and 0.845 respectively.
11These results must be taken with caution given the relevant dates used in the data,
as stated previously. While all demographic data comes from the American Community
Survey estimates for the year 2009, the data on registration and turnout are calculated
using data accurate as of mid-year 2010. More robust calculations using the exact number
of registered voters in a given tract for the precise year would doubtlessly return variable
results, however for the purposes here, the results provide a sufficient indication of a
general trend of partisanship and turnout for the related items.
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(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 8.8: Raleigh-Durham MSA Respondents and Tract Rates
404
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
Table 8.1: Selected Characteristics of Clustered Census Tracts
High-High Low-Low
DIFF. Median Skew Kurt. Median Skew Kurt.
FSHH60 1.47 23.100 1.454 2.262 9.350 1.824 3.241
FSHH18 0.25 57.500 -0.727 -0.649 45.900 -0.087 -2.018
UNEMP 1.98 11.900 1.171 1.657 4.000 0.063 -2.256
FHH 2.97 13.900 0.397 -0.634 3.500 1.602 1.950
NOHS 3.38 16.200 0.167 -0.211 3.700 0.495 -1.973
PVAP 3.30 24.100 0.884 0.355 5.600 0.600 -1.463
P+60 3.90 20.600 0.803 0.156 4.200 0.467 -1.632
WHITE -0.68 0.258 0.608 -0.965 0.809 -0.709 0.278
BLACK 3.90 0.595 -0.275 -1.177 0.121 0.739 -0.509
DEM 0.86 .737 -.500 -1.040 .397 .697 -1.848
REP -0.77 .077 1.459 2.025 .340 .045 -1.616
LIB -0.46 .001 2.421 8.935 .002 -.574 -1.693
IND -0.30 .179 .569 -.974 .254 -1.451 3.173
INDEX 10.36 -.817 1.201 .757 -.072 -.422 -2.028
MIDTERM -0.29 0.174 1.453 2.451 0.246 1.039 1.232
PRES. -0.10 0.611 -0.312 0.927 0.682 1.108 1.043
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four-fifths of the resident population. Disenfranchisement does affect areas
of higher non-white residency, however these areas are not exclusively non-
white; whereas areas of Low-Low clustering are vastly more homogeneous in
racial composition. Most interestingly, and a facet which is illustrated further
for each MSA under investigation, is the overwhelming partisanship of High-
High disenfranchisement areas. While Low-Low areas are split nearly evenly
between Republican (39.7 percent)and Democrat (34 percent), High-High
areas are nearly three-quarters Democrat (73.7 percent). This is borne out
in the median values for the partisanship index (INDEX), where High-High
areas are over ten times more partisan than their Low-Low counterparts.
These political facets are made even more concerning by the low values for
turnout in not only traditionally low-turnout elections (i.e., Mid-Terms), but
also for the extremely high profile 2008 presidential election.
8.3.2 Partisanship Distribution
I now turn to the distribution of partisanship over geographic space. Figure
8.9 shows the spread of partisanship over the Raleigh-Durham MSA study
area, paired with the Moran’s I analysis of clustering underneath. These
results reveal a decidedly divided landscape of North Carolina’s (registered)
political community. Figures 19 to 23 in the Appendix report near identical
distributions for the remaining MSA study areas.12
These figures, partially illustrated in figure 8.7a, reveal the divide be-
tween the Democratic strongholds located in the eastern urban communities
of the cities of Raleigh and Durham as compared to the Republican dominant
areas in the northern and southern segments of Wake county. The Raleigh-
Durham MSA study area is useful for pointing out a significant implication
of the previously mentioned issue of geographic sorting and the surplus vote
phenomenon advanced by Rodden (2010). We can see that, more or less, the
Raleigh-Durham MSA study area is (as measured by the index of partisan-
ship used herein) overwhelmingly in favor of the Democratic party. Durham
county reports no advantage for Republicans in a head-to-head competition
between registered voters. Wake county does see variation, particularly in
12The partisan registration index is calculated using the total number of Republican
registrants within a census tract area, subtracting the total Democrat registrants per
tract, and dividing by the sum of Republican and Democratic registrants per tract. The
resulting index indicates the relative strength of each party for the given tract. Negative
values indicate registered Democrat strength, where as positive values indicate registered
Republican strength.
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(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 8.9: Raleigh-Durham MSA Partisan Regisation
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the north and south.
These cases are illustrative because, when the incidence of disenfran-
chisement is superimposed (Figure 8.10), they show that political disenfran-
chisement is particularly clustered in the most partisan areas even within
an overwhelmingly Democratic environment such as Durham county. Us-
ing GIS methods to map these events provides useful evidence of just how
discriminant disenfranchisement policies are across variable locations. The
evidence for this can be seen even more apparently in figures 24 to 28 in
the Appendix. The results strongly indicate that the incidence of political
disenfranchisement is not only concentrated into particular communities, but
is concentrated into particularly (and statistically significant) partisan (i.e.,
Democrat) clustered areas.
8.3.3 Patterns of Turnout
We can see that the incidence of disenfranchisement does not fall evenly
across party dominant areas, and indeed that it clusters heavily in areas of
not only Democratic support, but highly Democratic partisan support. This
is one issue. Yet another issue which is able to be addressed with the use of
GIS methods is the mapping of political turnout. Typically, as with the is-
sue of mapping partisanship, these data are aggregated to election precincts
which break within and across census tract areas for which more detailed
information is available. However, using the wealth of data available from
public repositories, it is possible to construct unique measures to identify
approximate turnout rates for the level of area under study. Using this data,
we can see also the approximate participation levels across the MSA study
areas in relation to their partisan and disenfranchisement levels.
Figures 8.11 and 8.12 show the calculated rates of turnout among reg-
istered voters at the census tract level or the two election cycles reported
in Table 8.1. These maps do not show the partisan participation rates, but
rather the overall participation rates as a percentage of the total registered
voter population per census tract. Figure 8.10a illustrates the distribution of
turnout across the Raleigh-Durham MSA study area, while figure 8.10 shows
the clustering of participation rates using the Moran’s I analysis. While the
first map reveals the general distribution of the turnout of the electorate
across space, the second clearly draws out those areas which are significantly
higher and lower turnout areas across the study area.
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(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 8.10: Raleigh-Durham MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location
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(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 8.11: Raleigh-Durham MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering
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(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 8.12: Raleigh-Durham 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering
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Table 8.1 gives a sense of the differences between the median of these
units, these maps clearly reveal the gravity of the situation. The differences
in rates are replicated in the high turnout election of 2008 seen in figure
8.12.13 These results provide evidence that the situation of high-turnout right
(i.e., Republican) and low-turnout left (i.e., Democratic) areas (depicted ear-
lier in Figure 8.6) is a distinctively, and disturbingly, tenable phenomenon.
Figures 29 to 38 in the chapter Appendix corroborate these results with the
remaining study areas. As was reported earlier in Chapter 6 (Figure 6.37),
respondents, while self-identifying as independents, shifted heavily into the
Democratic camp. More so, comparing the inter-democratic group scores
(i.e., those between the ISSP control and Respondent predicted Democrats)
reveals a significantly leftward stance of respondents as compared to their
ISSP counterparts. This work builds on the work of Rodden (2010, 2011)
and others (e.g., Cho and Nicley 2008, Darmofal 2006, Ebeid and Rodden
2006) by further revealing the exclusiveness of spatial patterns of partisan-
ship, participation, and (significantly explorations of political demobilization
and/or criminality) exclusionary policies.
8.4 Discussion
This chapter has provided a ground-level look at the political disenfranchise-
ment of criminal offenders in the state of North Carolina not previously
supplied. With this evidence, it is possible to answer the question as to
what electoral geographies this policy has at the local level. The use of GIS
technology has greatly augmented the ability of researchers to investigate
phenomena at various levels of complexity. V.O. Key’s work has stood as a
testament to the usefulness of descriptive investigations into of political is-
sues combined with such geographic analysis of social and political processes.
Through the use of these techniques, incidents of electoral migration (e.g.,
Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013), sorting (Nall and Mummolo 2013; Cho, Gim-
pel, and Dyck 2006), and segmentation (Ansolabehere,Gerber, and Snyder
2002; Chen 2010; Chen and Malhotra 2007) are brought further into focus
for the investigation of political processes and outcomes. This chapter has
connected the seemingly unrelated field of criminology and incident mapping
13In 2008, the Obama campaign waged an extensive battle in the state which it won by
only 0.4 percent against Republican candidate John McCain (NYT 2008) The win marked
the first victory for a Democratic candidate since the success of President Carter in 1976
over the Republican incumbent President Ford. Obama narrowly lost the state in 2012 to
Republican candidate Mitt Romney.
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(as this field dominates -rather curiously - the literature concerning felon dis-
enfranchisement) with the evolving field of political-spatial research. In as
much as political geographies impact the creation and sustainability of pol-
icy regimes, the spatial exclusiveness of political disenfranchisement should
necessarily be extracted from the field of criminal justice studies and placed
firmly in the field of political studies. Political demobilization is, after all,
first and foremost an electoral policy, and only secondarily (if at all) a re-
tributive or rehabilitative policy for affected citizens.
Furthermore, as Rodden (2010, 2011) has pointed to, geographic distri-
butions of partisanship and participation are key issues for redistributive
politics, particularly in plurality systems.
By creating winner-take-all districts with a sufficiently skewed
distribution of district medians, a society can create policy bias,
such that plurality elections with a single national district, or
elections using proportional representation, would yield different
equilibrium policies. (Rodden 2010:136)
Recall the illustration in figures 8.4 and 8.5 regarding the distributions of
district preferences. In a two district scenario, the loss of members of ei-
ther party is detrimental to the party as a whole. That is, where one party
competes entirely against another or multiple parties, it is in the interest
of the party to mobilize the maximum number of supporters to gain seats.
However, where parties are internally cleaved, it is not necessarily the case
that all supporters need to be (or indeed are even desired to be) mobilized.
This is especially so where parties operate in “safe” political units where
competition is muted.
In such districts, increasing numbers of surplus voters are generated. In a
situation where the distribution of preferences are not normally distributed
across units (i.e., districts or precincts), those at the tails of the distribution
away from the inter-unit and inter-party medians create tangible threats as
concerns entrance of emergent new or splinter parties/groups. In propor-
tional representative systems - where the entrance of emergent left, right,
and/or center parties are the norm - the inter-unit difference is likely to find
a political party which best represents its interest. In plurality systems, by
contrast, barriers for entrant parties inhibit constituent defection to emer-
gent groups and thus constrain the choices available to dissident preferences.
That is, the preferences on the periphery of the inter-unit distribution are
unwilling or unable to contribute any meaningful support to an emergent
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party or internal faction.
Where demobilization occurs within districts which are known to tend to-
wards distinctively left preferences (for instance), demobilization effectively
mutes the interest of the dominant left party in soliciting the support of those
constituents. The preliminary results using predicted group memberships
between ISSP control respondents and survey respondents reveals precisely
such evidence - i.e., significant differences not only between Republican and
Democratic partisans, but differences within the Democratic party itself. Re-
spondents predicted to be Democratic supporters were significantly more left
leaning on the index of spending (p<.05) and government responsibility for
provision of public services (p<.001) - see Figure 6.37.
The results of this chapter show that (using prison entries as a proxy)
political demobilization is concentrated in areas which are highly partisan in
their party preference measured by registration parity between the Republi-
can and Democratic parties. These differences are measured in urban areas
(MSAs) which are typically more politically liberal than rural areas. Even
within (urban) areas that are expected to lean more Democratic than other
(rural) areas (Rodden 2010), distinct segregation of partisan and mobiliza-
tion are evident across study areas. Republican strongholds are distinct from
Democratic areas, and vice-versa.
This pattern is seen across the six MSA areas investigated. What is
particularly interesting about this phenomenon (i.e., congregating left pref-
erences within particular districts) is the potential ramifications it has had
for the development of political preference articulation. While conserva-
tive groups have seen particular success in forming independent and near-
autonomous factions (i.e., the Libertarian party and Tea Party), the left has
not managed to field a vibrant or even articulated faction within the Demo-
cratic party or outside the party. If the views of respondents in both the
primary and secondary qualitative analysis, and those of elected representa-
tives (Abramsky 2006), are any indication of the value which political actors
see in surplus votes, then the proposals of Rodden and those of this work
are telling. It would suggest that while the demobilization of supporters of
the Democratic party (i.e., the dominant left party) is of interest to national
contests, their value to the party at sub-national levels is of less interest or
desire - especially in cases where districts are created so as to decrease com-
petitiveness in both or either party.
The dissuasion of constituents through punitive social welfare and assis-
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tance policy, increased commodification of daily life, and the explicit removal
of political rights from the clients of the social corrections tier curtails the
consideration of preferences of the left by the custodial Democratic party
simply by culling their ability to demand attention. Removing surplus vot-
ers who have vested interests in the extension of governmental services which
decrease the impact of marketized living conditions does not hurt (and even
helps) conservative party members seeking re-election and/or compromise
with an increasingly rightward Republican party. To be tough on crime wins
votes by sacrificing the very preferences which help anchor the leading party
of the left from migrating to the center. This may help to build on our un-
derstanding of the stagnant and even rightward movement of the Democratic
party in recent decades compared to the strikingly right shift among the Re-
publican party (Steinglass 2012).
Taken together, these findings suggest that not only do disenfranchised
respondents differ in their preferences for policies and the extent of gov-
ernmental intervention, they are also significantly clustered in areas of high
surplus votes.14 To put this another way, political disenfranchisement of
large swathes of disaffected, unemployed, under-educated young men across
the United states (clustered overwhelmingly in Democratic strongholds) may
not necessarily warrant attention from incumbents or other political actors
who have no need of their votes. Districts simply are not competitive enough
to value such voters, while the limited resources to make convincing campaign
promises to assuage their likely demands would further demote their value as
electors. This leaves a precarious situation where the entirety of the blame
for declining relevance of electors in these areas is placed on their (real or
imagined) apathy towards political processes, itself a product of disengage-
ment by political actors.
What is particularly interesting, and perhaps somewhat ironic, is that it
may be the Republican party itself which loses out by inadvertently allowing
the Democratic party the ability to disregard significant numbers of con-
stituents which could potentially participate to the detriment of that party’s
established hierarchy. That is, by promoting punitive policies disproportion-
ately affecting/removing Democratic partisans on the tails of the inter-unit
distribution, Republicans may in fact enable the Democratic party to move
to the center without worry of ostracizing the most left of their party. The
correlate being that the most extreme factions of the Republican party are
14Without further investigation, it is not possible to know how these assumptions from
such a limited primary analysis completely match up with empirical reality.
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not silenced, on par, and thus are allowed to factionalize intra-party dynam-
ics. Such a proposition is certainly an interesting research topic for later
exploration. The question remains whether political actors would seek votes
from such voters considering the caustic environment of political campaigns.
However, evidence from Parkes (2003) would suggest there is some credence
to such prospects.15 Such a proposition would depend of course on the cre-
ation of more competitive districts as opposed to the tendency to establish
more secure partisan districts.
A further implication of the work presented herein concerns the non-
partisan motivated sorting of Democratic preferences into urban areas. In
light of the research on the effect of sorting into high-density partisan areas,
Democratic and left preference constituents may possibly be doing more harm
than good in choosing to reside in more urban areas, thus leaving large
swathes of the remaining districts devoid of competing interests. The desire
to live within homogeneous communities may decrease the ability of the left
to demand desirable policies simply by reducing the total seats they are
able to win. A more strategic scenario would consider promoting migration
of left and Democratic supporters away from urban districts and into right
and Republican dominated areas. This, of course, seems unrealistic as an
actionable strategy; however, advances in technology and infrastructure may
in fact enable urban left preferences to out-migrate to such areas and create
more competitive precincts and districts both within and outside of their
current urban islands.
15According to Parkes (2003):“During the 1998 provincial election campaign, Parti Que-
becois candidate Raoul Duguay visited Cowansville Penitentiary, a federal prison which
houses many long-term inmates. Under Quebec law which provides that inmates’ votes
are counted in their place of domicile, ninety-two inmates had designated the prison as
their place of domicile. For Duguay, who was running in that district, those ninety-two
votes were significant enough to warrant meeting with inmates to discuss their concerns”.
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Conclusion
This work has focused on the issue of democratic representation and the rela-
tionship which it shares with that of public policy. While the ramifications of
electoral participation have remained a contentious issue in public debates,
and especially within the fields of political and welfare state studies, this
study points to the intrinsic value which such aggregation of preferences has
for public policy. In addition, it has pointed to the reciprocal relationship
which public policy has with democratic agency.
The reasoning for this investigation has come about from the persistence
(notably in the United States) of the policy of political disenfranchisement
of citizens following a felony conviction. While the US is not alone in admin-
istering this policy, the extent to which it has come to pervade democratic
communities in that country makes its existence a particular concern. Thus,
while other nations continue to deny the right to participate in elections
based on felony statuses (and other qualifications), it is the extent of that
exclusion in the US which makes it a prime case for study.
Felon disenfranchisement viewed through the political-economic lens of
the welfare state is a useful approach with which to uncover the intimate
relationship presented herein. It is perhaps one of the few contemporary
examples of a natural experiment which demobilize so many of the popula-
tion systematically. Moreover, the investigation presented has sought and re-
ported alternative explanations of this form of political demobilization which
lie persistently below the surface of popular challenges to the policy. This is
so, I have argued, because so much of the debate in the US has centered on
the omnipresent issue of race in American political and social life - not to
mention economic life. Because debates on the nature of civil, political, and
social rights is so incessantly mired in framings of real or imagined racially
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prejudicial behaviors and intentions, much of the debate on the ramifications
of political demobilization has succumbed to their conclusions.
Thus, the main theses for this work have stemmed from a central concern
spawned by the existence of political disenfranchisement policies, specifically
in the United States. That is, if we are wiling to support or challenge clear
abrogations of democratic participation, it is essential to debate and dis-
cern not only the normative logics operating in the background, but also the
very real practical ramifications of such stances. To tout normative values
of democratic participation is, to some degree, to hold court for the sake of
holding court. Too often, both challengers and defenders of political demo-
bilization (not exclusive to felon disenfranchisement) have used moralistic
argumentations to pursue their ends. While this is true of many movements,
such strategies have proven particularly caustic for the struggle for demo-
cratic rights. The case for the de-establishment of political demobilization
policies runs head-first into this dilemma. While many value the ideal of
political equality, the acceptability of outcast citizens (presumably volun-
tary violators of the social compact) remains a distasteful pill to swallow for
many. That the war on crime was inflated by the success of the victim’s
rights movement and attachments thereof is telling of the strength which the
framing of issues has had on the political landscape in the United States and
elsewhere (Simon 2003, Gottschalk 2006, Fraser 1984, 1989).
Themerit concept of the right to vote, evidenced by the historical findings
in Chapter 4, has helped to enable a situation wherein the political demo-
bilization of the predominantly lower and laboring classes is possible. The
demise of social welfare, with the rise of neo-liberal ideology since the mid-
20th century, formed part and parcel of the vigorous redefinition of clients
of the welfare state (significantly in the lower tiers) as contemptible and un-
deserving recipients of communal relief. Race prejudice and its central role
in social and economic life played no small part in enabling much of the dis-
course and decisions which dissolved many of the gains made in the previous
eras of progressive government. While its existence has been and remains a
tenacious issue in social life, both within and outside of the US, the decisions
made possible by its exploitation overwhelming impact those who are at risk
in the environment of highly marketized living.
This fact is important to keep at the forefront of our thoughts on cor-
rectional populations in general, and the disenfranchised members of that
population in particular. In simpler terms, while many of the clients of social
corrections are (at least in terms of unweighted counts) disproportionately
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racial minorities (and particularly African Americans), the vast majority of
its clients are the poor and laboring classes of all racial groupings. Such
a distinction is central to understanding felon disenfranchisement’s place in
the realm of the political economic realm of the welfare state. This work has
attempted to bring together, to the extent possible, the multitude of con-
siderations needed to approach the political demobilization of felons (and by
extension their communities) from a more comprehensive viewpoint. Indi-
vidually, these issues are worth their own field of study, and as much is clear
by the range of academic debate reported in each of the topics presented.
Taken together, however, a more fluid picture emerges - one which greatly
enhances our understanding of issues of class relations in the democratic de-
mobilizaiton.
9.1 Discussion of Findings
The chapters and sections herein have presented a broad depiction of the
concerns inherent in dealing with the issue of felon disenfranchisement in
particular and the political demobilization of citizens in general. For the
reader’s convenience I review these here along with their relevant hypotheses
and findings.
In chapter 1, I began with an overview of key theoretical issues in welfare
state studies. Such an overview informed the context of the arguments and
findings which followed in the remainder of the work. This chapter laid out
a survey of a selection of the leading theoretical conceptions of the welfare
state’s development as according to comparative welfare state literature. The
chapter proceeded with a survey of the logic of industrialism, followed by the
logic of capitalism, and then rounded off with an overview of the Power Re-
source and the Varieties of Capitalism approaches to the study of welfare
systems comparatively.
Following this, a more in depth argument has been given as regards the
debate between the firm centered VoC approach and the resource based PRA
approach. By shifting the focus of concern from left party and working class
mobilization, VoC scholars have reinvigorated the debates concerning welfare
state formation and persistence. PRA, however, remains a formidable the-
oretical construct in the field of study. Having dealt with these theoretical
concerns, this chapter then moved onwards to consider the basis for welfare
state legitimacy and attendant justification. These areas concerned three
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main premises for state intervention into the market. While an insurance
approach focuses on the often debated efficiency and technical aspects of
welfare state legitimacy, moral and political approaches look at more socio-
political aspects of such intervention.
The moral argument concerning state intervention revolves, I argue, around
a single axis along a continuum of concepts about the place of state and in-
dividual in social, economic, and political life. On the one end of this contin-
uum lies a residualist conception of the state. This Malthusian approach, I
argue, takes the individual as the sole custodian of her own fortunes. In this
perspective, the individual ought only be guaranteed the negative freedoms
necessary to pursue her own interests. Survival is a function of individual
propensity and ability to succeed. The alternate view places the individual at
a more communitarian pole, one which elaborates on the enabling ability of
collective protection. This Kropotkin variety of social Darwinism places the
individual within the social environment as author and product. The state
has a responsibility, and interest, in creating policy by which the individual
benefits. This section illustrated how these two stances have been evidenced
in social and economic policy across time and space - notably in the cases
of the New Poor Law reforms in Victorian England and the creation of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 in
the US. Importantly, this section illustrates the consistent controversial na-
ture of state intervention in the social and economic lives of individuals and
the manner in which such intervention is couched.
Moving from this, the political variant of justification of the welfare state
was put forward - illustrating the current and emergent views by which the
welfare state is legitimized and even structured. In this approach, the Mar-
shallian concept of citizenship plays a central role for advocates of the welfare
state. The social rights which developed following the extension of civil and
political rights are (in contrast to a more static conception of Marshall’s
framework) symbiotic with the latter. This approach to understanding the
welfare state relies on the (de)formative capacity of policy established at the
bequest of social rights on citizen political agency. Utilizing the theoreti-
cal concept of Reflexive Democracy elaborated by Olson (2006), this section
merged these insights with the conceptual understanding of political pro-
cesses of Easton (1957) to illustrate the potential ramifications of political
(de)mobilization and welfare state structures.
In as much, the premise of this approach maintains that the welfare state
can be argued as legitimate (and the policies and processes within it as just)
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in as much as the system actualizes political agency amongst constituents
of the welfare system. In a political system built upon the ideal of full
democratic participation and universal suffrage, the ability of constituents
to realize their rights is dependent on and author to the design of welfare
policies. More simply, we get out what we put in. This section provides the
core concept of interest in the following chapter. That is, Chapter 2 tests
these assumptions more fully.
Chapter 2 empirically tests the assumptions of reflexive democracy by
utilizing an original dataset of cross-sectional and longitudinal data of the 50
United States across 16 years. Using a three-stage series of regression anal-
yses with this Time-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) data, this chapter finds
that the relationship of the welfare state and political participation remains a
viable avenue of research, even in light of emergent criticisms to the contrary.
As with Toikka et. al (2004), I find that allocations towards policies which
decommodify the individual are significantly reliant on political participation
(H1).
I find that those policies which are significantly associated with political
turnout are those which reduce the post-transfer inequality of citizens across
the US - i.e., cash benefits and generosity reduce post-transfer inequality
(H2). Furthermore, I find that it is likely that it is the experience of in-
equality itself which mediates the effect of welfare state policies on political
turnout. States with higher inequality measured after the effects of trans-
fers have been taken into account exhibit significantly lower rates of turnout
on election day. The findings from this chapter add a welcomed degree of
support for those who focus on the (de)formative effects of welfare state
structuring on the individual’s (and by extension their community’s) ability
to author policy. That is, it illustrates the effect which the welfare state has
on political agency, as well as the effect which political agency (materialized)
has on the welfare state. Further inquiry is merited and welcomed in explor-
ing this issue further. As such, these findings entail that the demobilization
of large swathes of the electorate, and particularly those of the lower and
laboring classes, has very real implications for their well-being in subsequent
rounds of the policy process.
Chapter 3 provided a developing view of correctional systems (e.g., pris-
ons, jails, youth detention facilities, community supervision) in respect to
the welfare state. In this view, correctional systems are separate only as
concerns their punitive purposes. All other services provided under their au-
thority (e.g., medical, dental, educative, psychological, employment training,
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etc.) are necessarily and rightly to be viewed as extended welfare state ser-
vices outside the field (particularly for the United States) of typically defined
welfare state components - i.e., they are for the most part isolated to par-
ticular beneficiary populations. To delimit the areas of the welfare state, by
which to facilitate a clearer understanding of the placement of such clients
in the overall system of welfare, an adapted version of the Titmuss (1965)
(and later Abromovitz (2001)) framework is given which firmly situates these
clients in terms of overall welfare state processes. Using this framework, it is
possible to more easily discern not simply where clients of correctional sys-
tems fit in with respect to the welfare state (a matter that must be further
explored in the general welfare state literature), but also why scholars and
practitioners ought to be concerned with their fate. This conceptual explo-
ration is supplemented by a practical example of this tier using the state
of North Carolina as a case in point. This analysis reveals temporal varia-
tion of program uptake and funding in one state. It also provides perhaps
one of the first welfare state examinations at this level of disaggregation.
Because this framing of correctional systems places their functional value at
the center of investigation, it reveals not what the social corrections tier (and
consequently the clients it serves) means for social and political discourse,
but rather what it does for the residents of the political economic landscape.
This chapter ended the first part of this work, that which dealt with (largely)
the theoretical concerns inherent in pursuing a study of the demobilization
of constituents via felon disenfranchisement policy.
The second part of this work explored almost exclusively matters directly
related to the disenfranchisement of felony offenders in the United States.It
began with an exploration of the modes and methods of general disenfran-
chisement, then turning specifically to the area of felon disenfranchisement.
As a definable population, it is argued that felons represent the single largest
and most systematically demobilized group left in the United States. No
other group receives so little support from so many peers as does the felony
offender. To investigate this, I look at the development of discourses regard-
ing the practice in the United States. I find that while racial prejudicial
arguments have formed the core of debates in recent years, their prominence
is not without detriment. Particularly, I find using an analysis of the histor-
ical literature regarding the subject that a more labor oriented framework of
the practice is useful for uncovering which types of persons are most at risk
of this policy. That is, I argue that the literature provides sufficient evidence
to provide for the argument that felon disenfranchisement (akin to many
other forms of political disenfranchisement (Keyssar 2009)) predominately
impacts the lower and laboring classes, specifically those disproportionately
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at detrimental risk from a commodified labor market system. The fact that
minorities are so “disproportionately” impacted by these policies has much
less to do with policies aimed specifically at their racial grouping and much
more to do with their precarious position in unprotected markets. This is not
incidental. A closer examination of the context in which such policies were
devised reveals the explicit merit based conception which the right to vote
was encoded. This chapter argues that challenges to the practice of felon
disenfranchisement, while raising real concerns on the impact of minority
communities, would do well not to steer away from the very real political-
economic concerns of those most impacted. The results from this chapter
inform the impetus behind chapters 6, 7, and 8.
Chapter 5 provided for the rationale and methods used in the bulk of
this research. The three main findings chapters reveal the results of quanti-
tative, qualitative, and geographic data taken from primary and secondary
sources (in the case of some interviews and the spatial analysis). In order,
chapter 6 takes the results from the survey of felons conducted in the state of
North Carolina and produces a coherent set of depictions of the preferences
of those respondents in terms of issues which are more closely discernible in
terms of policy choices. As mentioned in the work, these preferences have
been measured at a much more detailed level to provide insight into the ac-
tual preference profiles of the disenfranchised - as opposed to simply asking
respondents their support of a particular candidate or party.
Such detailed item selection is not without its drawbacks, which I will
discuss in turn below. However, the information retrieved from respondents
indicates, at least for those surveyed, that the disenfranchised are not as
liberal as some might speculate, nor as anti-governmental as others might
also conjecture. In fact, the results find that respondents are particularly in
support of state responsibility and action on a variety of issues, and notice-
ably variant when it comes to issues of protection from the labor market.
Indeed, their exposure to the labor market is perhaps the single most defin-
ing feature of the politically disenfranchised. While respondents do indicate
a lesser desire to see increased spending on policing services, this is only so
as it pertains to a lack of desire to increases in spending.
Respondents do not call for drastic reduction in policing and law en-
forcement spending by the state. On the contrary, their divergence from the
control population is only apparent due to the desire for increased spending
by the control population. More so, respondents do not try to soak the rich,
and surprisingly so. From the evidence so far, the disenfranchised felon is
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much more likely to support policies which enable a protected labor market
at the benefit of those who pursue gainful employment. They do not indicate
a desire to see generous benefits extended to all working aged adults regard-
less of activity. This finding is reflected in the results of the qualitative data.
Using responses from the ISSP06 item group, I have constructed a profile
of respondents based on their answers to these items in order to produce
an answer to a more basic question for many researchers - are respondents
Democrats or Republicans. While the bulk of respondents reported them-
selves as Independent with their placement on a political self-identification
scale, the analysis of their placement given their responses on the items of
interest suggest a heavily Democratic party bias.
While respondents may not be avowedly Democratic, their replies indi-
cate that their preferences would likely be inline with those of the control
group who are openly Democratic party supporters. Adding to this, an anal-
ysis between predicted Democrats who are disenfranchised and of the control
group indicate that respondents are also significantly more liberal politically
in terms of government’s responsibility and effort towards decommodifica-
tion of the individual via welfare state effort. Put simply, not only are the
disenfranchised (according to this analysis) Democratic supporters, they are
the left of the Democratic party in terms of their preferences for state in-
tervention in areas of welfare spending and responsibility for action. This
facet is corroborated in the qualitative interviews with both a selection of re-
spondents and secondary analysis using respondents from Manza and Uggen
(2006).
The results from the qualitative data in chapter 7 reveal a much richer
source of data than was possible in a self-complete survey design. The re-
sults from this chapter indicate the degree to which respondents see not
only the state’s place in their lives, but also the place of political actors and
agency. Taken together with the quantitative survey results, a far richer
picture emerges of respondents. While the finding of the quantitative re-
sults reveal a non-electorate more prone to support greater spending on is-
sues related to employment related topics and to view officials as largely
untrustworthy; the results from the qualitative research reveal voices which
elaborate on these preferences. In terms of voice, respondents in both the
primary and secondary groups saw a need for greater state intervention, but
also a need for such help to be properly administered. In terms of their
political agency, respondents exhibited opinions which saw the ambivalence
of political actors as dissolute and largely lacking in concern for themselves
and their communities. Particularly interesting was both the lack of racial
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reasoning behind views and the support for social correction services as mean
of remedying current and past institutional failures in the social safety sys-
tem. More so, the mixed methods approach used in this work has greatly
enhanced the reliability of the survey instrument, especially given the special
circumstances for this and other hard to reach populations of interest. Most
importantly, this segment of the work closes the gaps identified by Manza
and Uggen (2006) regarding the more detailed profiles of the disenfranchised.
Following the evidence from both the quantitative and qualitative results,
a further piece of the political disenfranchisement puzzle was brought to bear
in the form of a detailed spatial analysis of those areas especially impacted
by the removal of the vote via criminal disenfranchisement (Chapter 8). This
final piece closes another gap in the study of political disenfranchisement -
the spatial exclusiveness of the affected communities and its importance in
political systems. Advances in GIS methods and technology enable social
scientists to revisit proven techniques of research to deliver further insights
in the field of political and economic research. These results holds as well
for the welfare state. First, using respondent approximate points of previ-
ous residence (i.e., points nearest to their previous location of residence and
therefore likely voting district), this work overlaid official records of prison
entries for the year 2008 to estimate the approximate areas where the dis-
enfranchised are located. Going beyond the simple descriptive analysis of
spatial location, this chapter utilized a rich set of data containing the reg-
istration and behavior of millions of North Carolina voters in order to gain
insight into the types of political and economic environments from where the
disenfranchised originate.
The findings from this chapter are particularly useful in understanding
the complex nature of political rights in the context of vote aggregation us-
ing geographic boundaries. Interestingly, the removal of more left leaning
voters from Democratic (noncompetitive) party strongholds is not detrimen-
tal to the party equally. Rather, because of the structure of the political
institutional framework in the United States (in particular), removing such
voters from the pool of Democratic electors may in fact work in favor of those
within the party itself to maintain party unity. That is, by reducing the need
(real or potential) to court the votes of constituents with preferences farther
to the left of the median inter-district preference, felon disenfranchisement
may in fact enable party elites to remain unmoved and even move to the
center and right over time. Republicans, while sharing some of the effect of
political disenfranchisement, have less to fear from criminal disenfranchise-
ment. However, their vulnerability to entrant groups and factionalization
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may entail that they are increasingly moved to the right as a party, and face
threats by separatist groups as well. This has particularly interesting ram-
ifications as it may be that it is indeed the Republican party centrists and
those to the left which lose out, as their party must move to the right to
avoid splinter groups from forming; while Democrats are (theoretically) able
to capture those disaffected voters in the center. This area of study is only
suggestive herein; however, the implications are worth dedicated study. The
primary results from this chapter remain the identification of the communi-
ties of high disenfranchisement as co-located with areas of high partisanship
(Democratic support) and low turnout regardless of election cycle. While the
present study does not enable direct comparisons to be made with the non-
disenfranchised from the same communities as the respondents, the evidence
provides new insight into the importance of political agency in a spatial con-
text.
9.2 Limitations
The work presented herein is not without its limitations. For one, the re-
sults here cannot be readily assumed to apply to all the millions of politically
disenfranchised across the United States. Indeed, it is difficult to say with
confidence whether these results hold for the entire population of disenfran-
chised across the state and or even urban areas. Given the low return rates
of the quantitative surveys, it is difficult to apply these findings without
due hesitation. The results of the qualitative analysis does go some dis-
tance in providing a check against this low turnout rate. This is especially
so in consideration of the QSA analysis. That is, taking the responses from
those outside this analysis and under different conditions (i.e., under sepa-
rate sampling and incentive structures) does provide a degree of comfort in
interpreting the results from both the quantitative and qualitative findings.
That said, future research designs should work with the considerations out-
lined in the aforementioned section pertaining to research with hard-to-reach
populations.
In addition, we might be concerned with the comparability with the con-
trol group used in this analysis. As has been previously noted, respondents
in the control groups are not specifically drawn from the same population as
that of the primary research. Contributor control groups (ANES, ISSP06,
ISSP09) were limited to those states considered South according to the US
Census Bureau; however, it stands to reason that the opinions of those across
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states may also be a source of contention for the results provided herein.
While this study implemented, to the greatest extent possible, strategies
to ensure respondent participation and comprehension, the nature of self-
complete surveys with supervised populations simply hampers any research
design of this scale. Future research must incorporate not only greater num-
bers of respondents (e.g., all crime categories), but also more in depth means
of data gathering. In-person, computer assisted survey methods, as well as
greater numbers of research staff would deliver immensely more adequate
results than those achieved herein.
9.3 Final Reflections
This work leaves open still more issues which must be addressed by fu-
ture scholars. While it builds on the available information about political
(de)mobilization and the welfare state, and adds significant information re-
garding those affected by felony disenfranchisement statutes, it opens the
discussion regarding how much we have left out of the debate on both wel-
fare state studies and political agency. This work shows that the verdict on
felon disenfranchisement policies (and indeed any type of disenfranchisement)
is not set in stone. Whereas much of the literature regarding the practice
of felon disenfranchisement, correctional growth, and even welfare state de-
velopments has operated under the heading of race relations in the US, this
work shows that it need not limit itself to such considerations. While not
a central tenant of the work I have endeavoured to provide here, the issues
surrounding racism in the United States continues to form a serious obstacle
in discerning many political economic phenomenon.
More so, it ought to be noted that the ideas put forward here are in no way
intended to “paper over” race and racism in the United States or elsewhere.
The poverty and inequality which has so attached itself to those considered
African Americans in the United States has been and remains a potent re-
minder of the myriad of policies and movements to institutionalize racism
in the country. Certainly, programmatic choices which disproportionately
and intentionally affected African Americans and other minorities across the
US cannot be defended on any grounds. What I attempt to provide here
is an alternate manner of viewing many of these issues which stem from a
more political economic understanding of such developments. Thus, in a
manner similar to many scholars of the Marx and Engels school of thought,
this work has indeed looked at social corrections as a largely labor regula-
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tory institution. However, it has not done so as to benefit those strands of
scholarly work. Instead, social corrections act as such institutions because
of their inescapable functional purpose as components of the social welfare
mix - across time and space. As concerns the issue of race cleavages in the
US, the exclusion of large swathes of domestic and agricultural workers at
the advent of the New Deal era (in an effort to bring on board Southern in-
terests), for example, was undoubtedly aimed at the predominantly African
American workforce. Equally so, the redlining of many residential areas to
prevent investment in those communities where African Americans were or
could be dominant residents continues to impart a vicious reality on the so-
cial, economic, and political prospects of the African American community
- long after the realization of the Fair Housing Act. However, I argue, these
events must also be understood for what they mean in a broader sense for
welfare systems and the clientele thereof.
Since the realization of the power of poverty as a unifying force among
labor in the early years of the United States (e.g., Bacon’s Rebellion - see
Breen (1973)), economic and political interests have found the instigation
and intensification of racial prejudices to be an effective mechanism in divid-
ing lower classes against common communitarian solutions. This work takes
as the focal point of race relations the perverse effect of disproportionately
over-commodifying the lives of minorities as a key factor in many past and
present disparities.1 African Americans and other minorities suffered racism,
less cannot be said; however,such active and passive prejudicial treatment
was compounded by their exclusion from any form of protection from the
market - be it labor, financial, housing, or otherwise. “Effectively”, notes
Coates (2014), “the black family in America [has been] working without a
safety net. When financial calamity strikes — a medical emergency, divorce,
job loss — the fall is precipitous.”
The fact that such market exposures occurred simultaneously with politi-
cal demobilization was not coincidental. Indeed, the two (as evidenced in this
work and others) are co-dependent. The policies enacted in the Jim Crow
1That is, by denying loans to lower and middle incomed minorities, the Federal Hous-
ing Authority unduly subjected citizens based on racial profiling to the deleterious effects
of under-protected housing environments. Likewise, reducing the eligibility of African
American workers in the ineligible areas of agriculture and domestic work to obtain ad-
equate employment security funds exposed these workers to the savages of unregulated
labor market policies, leading many to migrate to areas where labor market opportunities
were already limited - note the use of Southern labor to overcome labor union gains and
thereby leaving newly arrived laborers to underlying racial and ethnic acrimony.
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South share many of the same similarities with those of criminal disenfran-
chisement and work towards the same end. It is thus not surprising to see the
conclusion that skyrocketing prison (and conviction) populations are thus a
new form of Jim Crow policy, aimed at African Americans. Such reactions,
however, tend to downplay the effect which these events have across race -
subsuming market position to racial divisions. The views expressed share
many similarities with the Marxian view of false consciousness. However,
the view here does not argue for an overhaul of class awareness as a cure for
income or political inequality. This work argues merely that we must mind
the innate place of class and those policies which mitigate inequality. The
work on integrating correctional systems pursues the same ends by differing
means. By integrating the correctional system back into mainstream welfare
state and political studies, it is possible for the scholar to maintain the place
of these issues in coherent study.
The issue of felon disenfranchisement, likewise, is not intended to repre-
sent any concrete degree of cure for the many ills which face those commu-
nities adversely affected. Remedying this practice is more akin to staving off
an ecological cascade effect in political-economic policies which under-gird
the welfare state. The blanket removal of political rights from criminal of-
fenders is but one part of a larger puzzle for those interests concerned with
the relationship of political agency and human welfare. We may also extend
this study to the growing populations of first and second generation migrant
populations across Europe, who remain without meaningful political repre-
sentation. Such consideration is a very real concern at a time when current
and future immigrants to the continent are slowly and purposely classified
into desirable expats and only minorly desirable immigrants and refugees. I
consider also the many aboriginal citizens of Australia, for instance, who be-
cause of these same policies are also demobilized and locked out of the polling
booth; we may even extend to those traveler populations (e.g., Roma and
Sinti) who face analogous barriers to inclusion. The matter is at the heart
of the modern welfare state, it is somewhat disturbing to note the dearth of
studies dealing with the functional meaning of barriers to democratic gov-
ernance in terms of those areas most affected by its actualization. With no
small number of actors of the opinion that government intervention is akin
to promotion of negative values and phenomenon among society, it is impor-
tant that bridges be built between various fields whose interests overlap with
welfare state issues. Thus, commentators in and out of academia support the
views of less state intervention without fully considering the ramifications of
their calls to action (or rather, inaction). To quote the indulgences of Dr.
Krauthammer regarding state intervention:
429
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
I mean, what we’re going to end up with is a European level of un-
employment, chronic unemployment subsidized. And the fact is,
if you subsidize apples, you get more apples; if you subsidize un-
employment, you get more of it. And that’s what the economics
study shows. It’s not that people are lazy. It shows that if you
have unemployment insurance, then you can make choices which
would allow you to turn down a job that perhaps isn’t exactly
what you want. (Miller 2014 )
Such rhetoric on the part of state minimalists fail to take into account
the realization that what is being subsidized is the security to make proper
and responsible decisions in the midst of economic hardship. As such, they
repeat the Malthusian calls to state dissolution on the backs of an ever in-
creasingly commodified and penalized labor force. Because of the political
demobilization which occurs throughout the various tiers of the welfare state,
and obviously so in the US, in conjunction with the political institutional dy-
namics also at play - those most adversely affected by policies based on such
discourse are ushered out of the policy making process overtly and by their
own dissent.
This research has brought many questions in answering others. Does
market inequality itself allow access to the poorer electorate by right wing
policies that attribute simplistic solutions to complex socio-economic prob-
lems? Does chronic poverty or living in a situation of prolonged welfare
minimalism build a path dependency of poor decisions? Do more progres-
sive communities reinforce themselves by reducing the stress on the whole
of their population, minimizing the personal cognitive barriers to partici-
pation by directly decommodifying citizens? Do minimal systems subvert
their own purposes by creating incentives, especially for the participants of
the research presented herein, to circumvent institutional assistance or seek
out the stabilizing environments of correctional environments? Furthermore,
does the type of political economic system which promotes political exclu-
sion of vested interests require particular policies to exist in order to endure?
Many of these questions are under investigation, and it stands to be seen
which conclusions will shed light to those presented herein. The results here
find that democratic participation remains important for policy, and partic-
ularly for welfare state policy. Also, the inclusion of social corrections into a
tier of the welfare state is both functionally justified and (outside the burden
of time) particularly unburdensome to undertake. Finally, the resolution of
felon disenfranchisement will likely not result in any dramatic changes to
the current or near future social safety net; however, this does not make
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the matter any the less important for policy makers or academic interests.
Indeed, a more pro-active approach to policy making, especially as pertains
to re-including disassociated constituents, which actively seeks out the pol-
icy preferences of those left out of the decision making process may make
changes to policies less reactionary.
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(a) 1992 (b) 1993
(c) 1994 (d) 1995
(e) 1996 (f) 1997
Figure 1: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 1992 - 1997
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(a) 1998 (b) 1999
(c) 2000 (d) 2001
(e) 2002 (f) 2003
Figure 2: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 1998 - 2003
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(a) 2004 (b) 2005
(c) 2006 (d) 2007
(e) 2008
Figure 3: AFDC/TANF Recipient Rates and Prison Rates 2004 - 2008
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The questionnaire in this packet asks you about your opinions 
on subjects important in your community.  This first of its kind 
survey is voluntary and anonymous. Your help is greatly 
appreciated. 
To participate: 
 
 
 Read through the description of 
the project. 
 
 
Complete the questions as best 
you can. 
 
 
Put the completed questionnaire 
into the drop box at the location 
you picked this up from 
OR 
 
Mail the questionnaire back with 
the provided return envelopes 
 
Figure 4: Community Supervised Insert
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You have been selected to participate in a survey being conducted by the Bremen International 
Graduate School of Social Science in conjunction with the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. 
The questionnaire in this packet asks you about your opinions on subjects important in your 
community.  This first of its kind survey is voluntary and anonymous. You have been chosen at 
random to participate. 
To participate: 
 
 
Read through the description of 
the project. 
 
 
 
Complete the questions as best 
you can. (About 30-45 mins max) 
 
 
Put the completed questionnaire 
into the drop box at your facility 
With additional support from: 
Figure 5: Institutional Supervised Insert
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Political and Economic Choices of Felons: North Carolina 
A study by the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This project is not connected with any political, governmental, or interest group in any way. Answers to these 
questions will not be shared with anyone outside those involved with the project without your express consent. 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
  
Figure 6: Example: Institutional text - 1
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Dear Sir/Madam, 
You are being asked to voluntarily participate in a social science research project which looks at the views and opinions of 
North Carolina felons. This survey is being distributed as part of further research into the opinions of North Carolina 
felons as part of the research of Daniel Horn [PhD Fellow – Bremen International Graduate School of Social Science] 
under the supervision of Dr. Olaf Groh-Samberg [University of Bremen], Dr. Klaus Boehnke [ Jacobs University], Dr. 
Bernhard Kittel [University of Oldenburg], and Dr. Christopher Uggen [University of Minnesota]. This survey 
investigates the social, economic, and political attitudes of North Carolina citizens who have lost their right to vote 
through conviction of a felony offence. This project is the first of its kind in the United States and will be part of the 
development for further research into national attitudes regarding the issues covered. You participation is very important 
to this research.  
You are being asked to complete a short questionnaire on a variety of social, political and economic issues which will take 
approximately 30 – 60 minutes to complete. You will be asked to complete the survey on your own and return the booklet 
to a drop-box which will be available for your completed booklets. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
By some estimates, more than 5.3 million U.S. citizens, such as yourself, have lost the right to vote in elections because of 
a conviction of a felony offence. In 2006, the number of North Carolinians who had lost their right to vote for a felony 
conviction was roughly 73,330 persons. The United States is alone in the world for the number of persons who lose their 
right to vote in elections because of a felony conviction. While many Senators, Representatives and other officials 
continue to work on this issue, we still do not have much information regarding the impact of this policy. 
The research you are being asked to participate in looks at, specifically, U.S. citizens who have had their right to vote 
removed due to a felony conviction (disenfranchisement). As such, this research is interested in your views on a variety 
of nationally and internationally used surveys that typically under-represent the views of felon populations. Your 
participation will increase the general knowledge of offender populations for future generations. 
What are some general things you should know about the research study? 
You are being asked to take part in a research study for which you have been randomly selected.  Your participation in 
this study is voluntary. You have the right to be a part of this study, to choose not to participate or to stop participating at 
any time without penalty.  The purpose is to gather your views on political issues and economic policies. You are not 
guaranteed any personal benefits from being in this study. If you do not understand something it is your right to ask the 
researcher for clarification or more information – an opportunity will be available at the time of collection of materials. 
Neither your sentence nor your treatment by prison staff will change in any way.  
If at any time you have questions about your participation, do not hesitate to contact the researcher named above.  
What will happen if you take part in the study? 
Figure 7: Example: Institutional text - 2
447
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
3 
 
By completing this survey you are consenting to participate in this research. You will be asked to answer a variety of 
questions which have all been used in other surveys of the general populations both in the United States and across the 
world. The questions are exactly the same as those given to others who have taken part in past surveys. Some questions 
are much longer than others and will require a little time to read through and answer. Take your time, it is much more 
important that you feel comfortable with your answers than to rush through.  
Finished Surveys: 
Once you have completed this booklet, place the completed booklet into the supplied “drop-box” at your institution. Your 
forms will be collected by the researcher. No Department of Correction Staff will be involved in the collection of 
materials. 
Risks 
For the survey you will be asked to fill in, there have been no foreseeable risks found.  
Benefits 
Your participation in this research will greatly increase the information that future researchers and academics will have 
regarding persons convicted of felony offences. To the knowledge of this researcher, this is the first in depth survey of 
persons who have lost their right to vote because of a felony in the United States or elsewhere. You will be part of the first 
respondents ever in what is hoped to be a much larger project to pay attention to disenfranchised persons’ op inions on 
policies that may affect their communities.  
Confidentiality 
The information in the study records will be kept confidential to the full extent allowed by law.  The staff of the 
Department of Correction are not conducting this research project. They will not get a copy of your name or of your 
answers. The Department will receive a copy of the overall results at the end of the study but will not be able to identify 
you personally from the copy they receive. 
No subjects (i.e. you) will be identified in any report or publication about this study. Although every effort will be made 
to keep research records private, there may be times when federal or state law requires the disclosure of such records, 
including personal information. This is very unlikely, but if disclosure is ever required, the Department will take all steps 
allowable by law to protect the privacy of personal information. All answers that you give will be kept confidential. There 
are several exceptions to this secrecy: if you tell the researcher that you are thinking about hurting yourself, hurting 
someone else, or planning an escape, these matters are not a secret. You know that the researcher must pass this 
information on to the prison staff. 
Compensation  
For participating in this study you will not receive any compensation in accordance to the rules and regulations set forth 
by the North Carolina Department of Corrections.  
Figure 8: Example: Institutional text - 3
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What if you have questions about this study? 
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact the researcher, Daniel Horn at 
dmhorn@email.unc.edu  or by mail. Additionally, the Principal Researcher will be onsite to collect survey materials, at 
which time you may meet with the PI to clarify any questions and complete/correct any questions you may have had 
problems with. 
 
D. Horn 
c/o C.E.S. 
FedEx Global Education Center 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Campus Box 3449 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3449 
 
 
  
With additional support from: 
Figure 9: Example: Institutional text - 4
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Please fill out the information on the following pages as best you can. 
 
Why do we ask for this information?  
 
The questions you are answering are taken from 3 nationally representative surveys carried out in the United States 
and across the world. Because we wish to be able to compare your responses with others, we need to make sure we 
paint an accurate picture of “who you are” - though obviously no survey can really tell us your entire history. 
1. First, I would like to ask if you could tell me where you are from. Please fill in as much information as you 
remember. 
"Why do you need to know where I am from?" 
? This information is used to determine your community of origin. This helps to match up your replies to those in 
your home community.  As with all information, this information will not be given to anyone outside this survey 
project.  
2. Have you ever registered to vote in North Carolina? [Check One] 
City & Zip code: 
Your last street address: 
OR: Voting Precinct : 
YES NO 
3. Please choose one option which best describes your race: [Check one] 
Native American 
African American Asian 
  
White Hispanic 
Other 
  
  
 
 
4. Please select your gender: [Check one] 
Male 
Female 
 
 
Figure 10: Example: Institutional text - 5
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10th Grade 
5. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed? [Check One] 
Elementary [Grades 1-5]  
6th Grade  
9th Grade  12th Grade  
 8th Grade 
 7th Grade 
 
5th Grade  
11th Grade 
 
College/University  
None of these  
GED  
10th Grade 
6. What is the highest level of formal education your mother has completed? [Check One] 
Elementary [Grades 1-5]  
6th Grade  
9th Grade  12th Grade  
 8th Grade 
 7th Grade 
 
5th Grade  
11th Grade 
 
College/University  
Don’t Know  
GED  
10th Grade 
7. What is the highest level of formal education you father has completed? [Check One] 
Elementary [Grades 1-5]  
6th Grade  
9th Grade  12th Grade  
 8th Grade 
 7th Grade 
 
5th Grade  
11th Grade 
 
College/University  
Don’t know  
GED  
10. Regardless of whether you attend any religious services do you ever think of yourself as part of a particular church or 
denomination? [Check one] 
NO  YES  
10. A. Which denomination below best fits you? [Check one] 
Jewish  
Catholic  Muslim  
Baptist  
Methodist  Mormon  
E. Orthodox  Other  
9. Do you attend religious services? [Check one] 
Almost every week  
Every week  Once a month  
A few times a year  I don’t attend  
Only on holidays  
Figure 11: Example: Institutional text - 6
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To begin with, let’s talk about government... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's responsibility to... 
Definitely 
Should Be 
Probably 
Should Be 
Probably 
Should Not Be 
Definitely 
Should Not Be 
Can’t 
Choose 
Provide a job for 
everyone who wants one 
Keep prices under control 
Provide health care for 
the sick 
Provide a decent 
standard of living for the 
old 
Provide industry with the 
help it needs to grow 
Provide a decent 
standard of living for the 
unemployed 
Reduce income 
inequalities between the 
rich and poor 
Give financial help to 
university students from 
low-income families 
Provide decent housing 
for those who can't afford 
it 
Impose strict laws to 
make industry do less 
damage to the 
environment 
Figure 12: Example: Institutional text - 7
452
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
4 
 
  
14. Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show whether you would like to see more or less 
government spending in each area. Remember that if you say "much more", it might require a tax increase to pay for it. 
The Environment 
Health 
Law Enforcement 
Culture/Arts 
Education 
Military/Defense 
Retirement 
Unemployment 
Spend Much 
More 
Spend 
More 
Can’t 
Choose 
Spend the 
Same 
Spend 
Less 
Spend 
Much Less 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. Generally, how would you describe taxes in America today? 
( Taxes include all taxes together, including wage deductions, income tax, taxes on goods and services and all the rest. ) 
Much 
Too High 
Too 
High 
About 
Right 
Too Low 
 
Much 
Too Low 
Can’t 
Choose 
First for those with high incomes, are 
taxes… 
Next, for those with middle incomes, 
are taxes… 
Lastly, for those with low incomes, 
are taxes… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the 
individual person. Others feel that the government in Washington is not getting too strong. What is your feeling, do you 
think the government is getting too powerful or do you think the government is not getting too strong? [Check one] 
Don’t know, 
no interest 
Government is 
Too Strong 
  
Government is 
Not Too Strong 
 
Figure 13: Example: Institutional text - 8
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Appendix: Chapter 7
North Carolina Topic Guide
Background Information
1. To start with, I’d like to get some basic information down: Could you
tell me a little bit about yourself – your hometown, marital status, age,
etc?
2. Since I am looking into issues which directly effect persons who have
had run ins with the law, I will ask you a couple of questions about
criminal convictions.
(a) Have you ever been convicted of a felony?
(b) Was this in North Carolina or in another state?
(c) What year was the first and last conviction?
3. What is your current legal status? When do you expect to have com-
pleted your supervision requirements?
Situations of Felons
I want to start with some of your views about what you think is going
on in America, and more so, the situation of people in America who are
convicted every year.
1. Why do you think so many people are being arrested in America?
(a) Why do you think so many people are being convicted?
(b) Why do you think so many people are in prisons now?
(c) Is there much of a difference between people in prison and people
out of prison?
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(d) Do you think there is much of a difference between the Americans
who are serving time and the communities where they come from,
or is there not much difference socially and culturally?
2. Can you describe some common traits of people you know who end up
in prison or convicted of felonies? (race, income, age, education) Why?
3. If you could think of one common trait among all felons, what would
it be, besides being convicted of a felony.
4. Have you had much interaction with other persons convicted of felony
offenses?
(a) How would you describe their backgrounds? (family background,
education, income)
Political participation
1. Have you ever voted in an election? When was that? Could you name
some of the candidates you voted for?
2. Did you ever lose the right to vote because of a felony conviction? How
did you find out about this? Have you voted since then? Why or why
not? What do you understand your voting rights to be?
3. Were you able to vote in the last presidential elections?
(a) Do you think you would have voted if you had had the legal right
to vote?
i. Why or why not?
ii. Who would you have voted for?
(b) What about the future, do you think you will vote in an election?
4. Was it important to you who won the presidential election?
5. Can you tell me, which issues are important to you in deciding between
candidates?
6. If you had to chose, would you generally consider yourself a liberal, a
moderate, or a conservative?
(a) What do these words mean to you?
7. Do you think of yourself as closer to the republicans or democrats?
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8. Do you think elections are a good way to make government pay atten-
tion to what people think?
(a) Do you think people like you have a say about what government
does?
9. Do you think the government can be trusted to do what is best for the
country? Or, do you think most people in the government cannot be
trusted?
10. The word “politics” means different things to different people, what do
you think of when you hear the word politics?
11. Some states have laws that let people vote while they are in prison, on
parole or probation and others take away voting rights for life. Do you
think people should lose the right to vote when they are in prison?
12. How does losing the right to vote affect a person’s ideas about being a
part of their communities?
(a) About their government?
13. Have you lost other rights because of a criminal conviction? Which
ones are most important to you?
14. Do you feel like you are less of a citizen because you have lost these
rights?
15. Do you think of voting as a right or a privilege?
Social Policy
I’d like to ask you some questions regarding what the government
should have a responsibility to take care of and what people should be re-
quired to take care of for themselves.
1. Some people believe that the government has a responsibility to take
care of the general welfare of the population. What do you think gov-
ernment has a responsibility towards?
(a) Which sorts of programs can you think of?
(b) Which ones do you think are most important?
Political Disenfranchisement
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Returning to the issue of Felon Disenfranchisement, I wonder if you
could give me your views on a few questions:
1. How much do you know about this issue?
2. Have you been involved in politics in the past?
3. Do you think politicians would care if felons voted?
4. What do you think the purpose of taking away the right to vote is?
5. Do you think politicians would pay attention if felons were required to
vote?
6. What do you think would change if felons had the right to vote?
(a) Do you think politicians would pay attention to them?
Manza and Uggen Topic Guide
The following has been taken with permission from the authors to be used
as a guide to those interviews carried out in Minnesota by Manza and Uggen
(2006). All analysis is secondary and any errors are my own.
Current Status
1. To state with, I’d like to get some basic information down. Could you
tell me a little about yourself - your hometown, age, marital status,
etc?
2. Because these laws only apply to people who have been in trouble with
the law, I will ask a couple questions about criminal convictions. Have
you ever been convicted of a felony? Was this in Minnesota or another
state? What year was the first and last conviction?
3. What is your current legal status? When do you expect to be released?
Political Involvement and Engagement
1. Have you ever voted in an election? When was that? Could you name
some of the candidates you voter for?*
2. Did you ever lose your right to vote because of a felony conviction?
How did you find out about this? Have you voted since then? Why or
why not? What do you understand your voting rights to be?
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3. Where you able to vote in the last presidential election? Do you think
you would have voted if you had the legal right to vote? Why or why
not? What about in the future? Do you think you will ever vote in an
election?
4. Who would you have voted for? Which issues are important to you in
deciding between candidates?
5. Did you care who won the presidential election? Did you watch stories
about the election on TV or read about it in newspapers or magazines?
Partisanship, Efficacy, and Trust
1. If you had to choose would you generally consider yourself a liberal, a
moderate, or a conservative? What do these words mean to you? Do
you think of yourself as closer to the Republicans or to the Democrats?
2. Do you think elections are a good way to make the government pay
attention to what people think? Do you think most people like you
have a say about what the government does?
3. Do you think the government can be trusted to do what is best for the
country? Or, do you think most of the people running the government
cannot be trusted?
4. The word politics means different thins to different people. What do
you think of when you hear the word politics?
Community Involvement Generally
1. Just like ”politic,” the word community has a lot of different meanings.
A lot of people that I’ve talked to in prison mention the word ”com-
munity” - saying things like ”I want to give back to my community.”
What do you think of when you hear the word ”community”?
2. How can people who have been in trouble with the law help out their
communities? Is there anything that you have done to help out your
community? [PROBE: volunteering, community center, etc.]?
3. Do you think that former prisoners who out (or get involved) in their
communities are less likely to go back to jail or prison? Can you think of
any people or examples of how this might work? [PROBE: restorative
justice involvement]
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Voting and Registration
1. Some states have laws that let people in prison, or on parole, and
probation vote and others have laws that take away voting rights for
life. Do you think that people should lose the right to vote when they
are in prison? What about when they are on parole? On probation?
2. How does losing the right to vote affect a person’s ideas about being a
part of their community? About their government?
3. Have you lost other rights because of a criminal conviction? Which
ones are most important to you? Do you feel like you are less of a
citizens because you have lost these rights?
4. Do you think of voting as a right or privilege?
5. Aside from voting in politics, I’m interested in how people who’ve been
in the criminal justice system eventually move away from crime. Could
you describe things in your life that have moved you away from crime
- or pulled you into crime? Can you name any turning points in your
life?
(a) Work: Have any jobs or work experiences influenced you? How?
(b) Family: Have any family members been especially helpful or harm-
ful? Friends?
(c) Community: Is there anything about your community or neigh-
borhood that has made it tougher or easier to move away from
crime?
(d) Time: How long would you say it has been since you’ve done any
crime? Serious crimes or smaller crimes?
6. To tie this back to politics, do you think that losing the right to vote
makes it tougher to stay clean or out of trouble with the law? Or is it
really a small factor compared to other issues? How?
Wrap-up
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Table 5: Demographics of Interviewees
Characteristic Frequency Percentage
Race Manza / Uggen Horn Manza &/Uggen Horn
White 22 1 67% 17%
Black 6 5 18% 83%
Native 5 0 15% 0%
Sex
Male 23 6 70% 100%
Female 10 0 30% 0%
Age
Age 20-29 15 2 45% 33%
Age 30-39 11 1 33% 17%
Age 40 and over 7 3 21% 50%
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Appendix: Chapter 8
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 14: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Respondents and
Tract Rates
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 15: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Respondents and Tract Rates
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 16: Asheville MSA Respondents and Tract Rates
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 17: Fayetteville Respondents and Tract Rates
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Respondents
(b) Rates
Figure 18: Wilmington MSA Respondents and Tract Rates
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 19: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Partisan Regisation
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 20: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Partisan Regisation
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 21: Asheville MSA Partisan Regisation
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 22: Fayetteville MSA Partisan Regisation
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisan Registration
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 23: Wilmington MSA Partisan Regisation
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 24: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA Disenfranchisement
Co-Location
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 25: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 26: Asheville MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 27: Fayetteville MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Partisanship and Rates
(b) Clusters and Rates
Figure 28: Wilmington MSA Disenfranchisement Co-Location
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 29: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA 2006 Mid-Term
Turnout and Clustering
487
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 30: Greensboro-High Point-Winston Salem MSA 2008 Presidential
Turnout and Clustering
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 31: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 32: Charlotte-Gastonia MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Cluster-
ing
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 33: Asheville MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering
491
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 34: Asheville MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 35: Fayetteville MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 36: Fayetteville MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering
494
Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 37: Wilmington MSA 2006 Mid-Term Turnout and Clustering
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Political Demobilization and the Welfare State
(a) Participation Rates
(b) Significant Clusters
Figure 38: Wilmington MSA 2008 Presidential Turnout and Clustering
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